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Recent years have seen an influx of medical technologies capable of remotely monitoring the 
health and behaviours of individuals to detect, manage and prevent health problems.  Known 
collectively as personal health monitoring (PHM), these systems are intended to supplement 
medical care with health monitoring outside traditional care environments such as hospitals, 
ranging in complexity from mobile devices to complex networks of sensors measuring 
physiological parameters and behaviours.  This research project assesses the potential ethical 
implications of PHM as an emerging medical technology, amenable to anticipatory action 
intended to prevent or mitigate problematic ethical issues in the future. 
PHM fundamentally changes how medical care can be delivered: patients can be monitored 
and consulted at a distance, eliminating opportunities for face-to-face actions and potentially 
undermining the importance of social, emotional and psychological aspects of medical care.  
The norms evident in this movement may clash with existing standards of ‘good’ medical 
practice from the perspective of patients, clinicians and institutions.    By relating 
utilitarianism, virtue ethics and theories of surveillance to Habermas’ concept of colonisation 
of the lifeworld, a conceptual framework is created which can explain how PHM may be 
allowed to change medicine as a practice in an ethically problematic way.  The framework 
relates the inhibition of virtuous behaviour among practitioners of medicine, understood as a 
moral practice, to the movement in medicine towards remote monitoring.   
To assess the explanatory power of the conceptual framework and expand its borders, a 
qualitative interview empirical study with potential users of PHM in England is carried out.  
Recognising that the inherent uncertainty of the future undermines the validity of empirical 
research, a novel epistemological framework based in Habermas’ discourse ethics is created to 
justify the empirical study.  By developing Habermas’ concept of translation into a procedure 
for assessing the credibility of uncertain normative claims about the future, a novel 
methodology for empirical ethical assessment of emerging technologies is created and tested.  
Various methods of analysis are employed, including review of academic discourses, empirical 
and theoretical analyses of the moral potential of PHM.  Recommendations are made 
concerning ethical issues in the deployment and design of PHM systems, analysis and 
application of PHM data, and the shortcomings of existing research and protection 
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1 Chapter 1: Introducing the Project and Associated Research 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen an influx of medical technologies capable of remotely monitoring the 
health and behaviours of individuals to detect, manage and prevent health problems (Schmidt 
& Verweij 2013).  Known collectively as ‘Personal Health Monitoring’, these systems are 
intended to supplement medical care with health monitoring outside traditional care 
environments such as hospitals, and range in complexity from single-sensor mobile devices to 
complex networks of sensors measuring physiological parameters and behaviours.  
Development has been primarily driven by the perceived medical, social and economic 
benefits for patients associated with health monitoring at home (Neild et al. 2004; Gaul & 
Ziefle 2009; Bowes et al. 2011; Palm 2011; Ure et al. 2012), and the perceived need to 
supplement existing medical resources to address demographic trends  towards aging 
populations in developed countries (United Nations 2007; United Nations 2008; Population 
Reference Bureau 2012) via technological means (Rigby 2007, p.352; British Medical 
Association 2008; OECD 2010; Remmers 2010; Sadri 2011).1  Systems are being developed for a 
range of demographics (see: Chapter 2), with many targeting the elderly and chronically ill. 
PHM has the potential to facilitate ethically problematic medical interactions as the lives of 
patients outside GP offices and hospitals are subject to medical scrutiny for the sake of 
identifying, categorising and managing health conditions (cf. Lyon 2003).  A sense of privacy 
and self-determination in daily life may be lost (Remmers 2010), as PHM reminds the user of a 
medical condition (Courtney et al. 2007; Light 2010).  Face-to-face interactions between 
patients and providers may be reduced as care is increasingly provided remotely, while vast 
amounts of sensitive health data are captured and processed, future implications of which 
cannot be predicted with certainty. 
Existing protection mechanisms may be insufficient to respond to ethical issues raised by PHM, 
as policies and legislation are often not updated frequently enough to respond to problems 
emerging from technological innovation, creating a ‘policy vacuum’ (Moor 1985).  In the field 
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resources, which fuels the perception that healthcare systems must adapt to demographic trends, 
requires a correlation between age and demand to be viable.  Such a correlation is not self-evident 
(Arrison 2011).  Whether or not it can be proven, the influence of this questionable belief on medical ICT 
development is broadly evident (e.g. Rigby 2007, p.352; British Medical Association 2008; OECD 2010; 
Remmers 2010; Sadri 2011). 
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of medical information and communication technologies (ICT) this is particularly worrying due 
to the strong protections typically granted to data about bodies or health.  Personal health 
data is treated as a particularly ‘sensitive’ category of data in data protection (DP) measures in 
the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) (European Parliament 1995; UK 
Department of Health 1998), deserving of greater protection and limitations of use to protect 
the privacy rights of individuals.  PHM presents unprecedented opportunities for the 
collection, analysis, mining and sharing of personal health data (Mittelstadt, Fairweather, et al. 
2013), so questions must inevitably be asked about the implications for the privacy of patients. 
PHM is designed to operate within the private sphere, being worn on the body or installed in 
‘personal spaces’ such as the home.  The private lives of users can be digitised, recorded, 
stored and analysed, creating novel opportunities for data sharing, mining and social 
categorisation (cf. Lyon 2003).  New connections can be created between areas of private life 
traditionally outside the scope of health and health care (Bowes et al. 2011).  By design, PHM 
broadens the scope of health and medicine by allowing for various parameters of private life 
to be monitored in the pursuit of better health.  The quantity and quality of information 
available to clinicians and medical institutions in delivering care increases, and alternative 
means for care delivery are established; however, these advances are not necessarily 
beneficial for patients.   
These observations merely hint at what is known of the ethical implications of PHM, which can 
be seen to raise questions about the appropriate relationships between humans, technology 
and the natural world in pursuit of better health and longer life.  With the potential to change 
how humans relate to each other under the auspices of health and medical care, PHM can be 
said to have ‘moral potential’, or the potential to contribute to situations in which divergent 
conceptions of the ‘good’ life or ‘right’ actions come into conflict (see: Section 3.1.1). 
Interest in PHM can be seen throughout the EU in a growing body of academic research (see: 
Chapter 2), systems in development (Empirica & WRC 2010), and interdisciplinary research 
projects (Gök et al. 2013, p.68).  As an emerging technology with the potential to 
fundamentally change the delivery of medical care through the creation, analysis and 
transmission of data about the lives, environments, bodies and behaviours of patients, the 
opportunity remains to proactively respond to the potential issues of a PHM-enabled future.  
However, anticipatory action requires first understanding the potential ethical issues raised by 
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PHM.  Two recent EU research projects looking at the ethical implications of PHM and similar 
emerging technologies can help to begin to explain the technology’s vast moral potential.  
These projects helped direct the scope of research in this thesis, and further justify why it is 
necessary to research the ethical implications of PHM. 
1.2 Associated Research: PHM-Ethics and ETICA2 
As novel technologies are developed and implemented in various contexts of use, normative 
issues accrue which must be addressed at local, national and international levels.  Within the 
EU, this need for ‘ethics governance’ is met through a variety of approaches including 
research, policy, and ethics review committees.  The 7th Framework Programme (FP7), 
sponsored by the European Commission, placed calls research projects which would develop 
approaches for ethical, social and legal assessment of emerging technologies to address the 
limitations of governance. 
PHM-Ethics (GA 230602) and ETICA (Ethical Issues of Emerging ICT Applications, GA 230318) 
were among the projects that responded to these calls.  PHM-Ethics directly addressed ethical 
implications of Personal Health Monitoring through multidisciplinary research.  ETICA was a 
sister research project to PHM-Ethics, which focused on the ethical implications of a broad set 
of emerging ICTs, which included technologies similar to PHM.  Through a shared orientation 
towards policy and development, the two projects provided concrete recommendations and 
practical tools for ethics governance based upon interdisciplinary methodologies incorporating 
theoretical and empirical approaches.  In the process, PHM was categorised by technological 
features to assist in ethical, social and legal assessment of different applications.  
Methodological challenges faced in the ethical assessment of emerging technologies were also 
addressed. 
In contrast to prior procedural governance approaches (Goujon & Flick 2011), neither project 
sought to provide a comprehensive list of ethical issues and solutions for emerging ICTs or 
PHM.  Rather, each sought to identify potential ethical issues, with recommendations for 
further discourse between stakeholders for future context-specific governance.  The projects 
developed methodologies for the incorporation of ethical, social and legal methodologies into 
innovation and governance.  In both projects EU legislation and approaches to ethics 
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governance (e.g. ethics review committees, FP7 programmes, Technology Assessment) were 
critically reviewed to identify procedural gaps and limitations to overcome through 
development and implementation of the assessment methodologies (PHM Ethics Consortium 
2011a; Szekely et al. 2011).  The reviews revealed both short and long-term problems related 
to context-sensitivity, reliance upon expert opinions in governance, ethical “blind spots” (PHM 
Ethics Consortium 2012) which preclude consideration of emerging ethical issues, and various 
legal challenges to be overcome in implementing PHM and emerging ICT, such as liability law 
reform (Stahl 2011a, p.5; PHM Ethics Consortium 2012). 
ETICA (Stahl 2011a, p.4) and PHM-Ethics both focused on ‘high-level’ technologies, and based 
ethical analysis on general defining features of each technology as opposed to specific 
applications.  A distinction was defined between technologies, artefacts and applications in 
ETICA, seen as a spectrum proceeding from general to specific (Stahl 2011a).  At the most 
specific, applications are systems bound by a fixed characteristic of their context of use, 
including specific uses, methods of interaction, characteristics of users and aspects of the 
location of use (Brey 2011, p.21).  To use ‘smart homes’ as an example: PHM is a technology, 
sensors installed in the home are artefacts, and fall detection combining data from various 
sensors is an application.  The technology level focus of both projects was appropriate 
considering the early stage of development and implementation at which PHM currently 
exists: proactive governance, such as broad EU regulatory frameworks, is still feasible.  
Furthermore, conceptual frameworks are still required within which the potential ethical 
implications of PHM may be identified and understood.  
1.2.1 PHM-Ethics3 
The main aim of PHM-Ethics was to “conduct scientific interdisciplinary research to analyse the 
dependencies between ethics, law and psychosocial sciences in personalised health monitoring 
in relation to the major types and steps of this very dynamic part of IT-development from a 
European perspective” (PHM Ethics Consortium 2012, p.8).  PHM was defined as “all technical 
systems collecting, processing, and storing data linked to a person. It allows monitoring 
parameters of that person and can lead to health-related information of that person” (PHM 
Ethics Consortium 2011b, p.6).  An integrated European approach to the combined regulation 
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of ethical, philosophical, legal and psychosocial constraints was developed (PHM Ethics 
Consortium 2012) between several European partners.4 
Emphasis was placed on the creation of a reflexive, open-ended PHM-Ethics ‘toolbox’ for 
ethical, legal and psycho-social assessment of emerging PHM applications in future contexts.  
An assessment methodology was developed to meet this goal consisting of five components: 
1. Dependencies Map: A multi-layered, complex network of relationships illustrating 
dependencies and relationships between stakeholders involved with PHM (e.g. 
government, clinicians, policy makers, patients). 
2. Taxonomy: A classification system which categorises PHM technologies and 
applications representing the state of the art in PHM. Categories with similar 
characteristics were created to make distinctions between similar technologies. 
3. Psychosocial Assessment Module: An integrated module for psycho-social health 
technology assessment. It consists of a map highlighting selective psychosocial issues 
of relevance when applied to a PHM application. It covers various domains of 
technology perception and psychosocial outcome criteria. 
4. Ethical Assessment Module: A module for ethical evaluation of existing and upcoming 
PHM applications. Ethical values and principles are put into perspective within PHM, 
raising questions in the fields such as privacy, autonomy, freedom of choice and 
justice. 
5. Legal Framework: A legal report that describes EU legislation relevant to telemedicine 
and health monitoring. It takes into account the consequences of recent decisions by 
the European Court of Justice important for PHM, regarding privacy and 
reimbursement of monitoring systems.  Limitations and gaps in regulation and 
governance schemes are identified, along with differences in ethical constraints 
established in EU directives and national legislation (PHM Ethics Consortium 2012, 
pp.8–9). 
 
Each component can be viewed as an assessment tool to be applied to specific PHM 
applications in future contexts.  The tools are complementary in the sense that results from 
one can be used to inform application of the others.  For example, the modules allow for 
assessment at multiple levels of the taxonomy, guided by the interrelationships identified in 
the dependencies map.  The taxonomy and dependencies map will be updated in light of 
future PHM developments (PHM Ethics Consortium 2012). 
PHM-Ethics consisted of three phases, the first of which identified ethical, psychosocial and 
legal implications of emerging PHM applications through a descriptive literature review and 
empirical research (PHM Ethics Consortium 2012, p.12).  The Dependencies Map and 
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Linköping University (Sweden), Law Firm Callens (Belgium), University Medicine Göttingen (Germany), 
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Taxonomy were developed from the findings.  The second phase was dedicated to the 
assessment of PHM from ethical, legal and psycho-social perspectives.  Assessment tools from 
these perspectives were developed and validated (PHM Ethics Consortium 2012, p.12).  The 
third phase involved disseminating the developed methodology through validation workshops 
and a dissemination conference (PHM Ethics Consortium 2012, p.13). 
A reduction in the time between development, ethical assessment and implementation is 
expected if the PHM-Ethics methodology is adopted by EU policy-makers and industry.  
Facilitation of a proactive approach to ethics governance, in which context-sensitive 
participatory assessment occurs simultaneously with development, is therefore the overall 
goal of PHM-Ethics.  The developed tools assist in both identifying and responding to emerging 
ethical issues of PHM through engagement of stakeholders in these processes.  Furthermore, a 
foundation is created for evidence-based policy-making through assessment with the PHM-
Ethics toolbox. 
1.2.2 ETICA5 
The main objective of ETICA (Ethical Issues of Emerging ICT Applications) was to identify and 
evaluate emerging ICTs, potential applications, and their ethical implications.  These activities, 
supported by critical evaluation of existing ethics governance in the EU, led to policy 
recommendations intended to facilitate proactive evaluation of the ethics of emerging ICTs 
(Stahl 2011a).  The project included partners from universities in eight EU countries to ensure a 
broad European perspective.6 
Review of ICT ethics literature led to the identification of eleven emerging technologies with 
predicted ethical relevance: Affective Computing, Ambient Intelligence (AMI), Artificial 
Intelligence, Bioelectronics, Cloud Computing, Future Internet, Human/Machine Symbiosis, 
Neuroelectronics, Quantum Computing, Robotics and Virtual/Augmented Reality.  Of the 
identified technologies, AMI was closely related to PHM, with many potential applications in 
health monitoring (see: Section 2.3.2.4).  Technologies were defined as “high-level socio-
technical systems that have the potential to change the way humans interact with the world” 
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website at:  http://www.etica-project.eu/. 
6
 Project partners:  De Montfort University (UK), VTT Technical Research Centre (Finland), Delft 
University of Technology (Netherlands), ForschungsZentrum Karlsruhe (Germany), University of Namur 
(Belgium), Steinbeis University Berlin (Germany), Eötvös Károly Public Policy Institute (Hungary), 
University of Lodz (Poland). 
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(Stahl 2011a, p.4).  Emergence hinged upon current research and development, which 
indicates technologies that will be socially and economically relevant in the next 10-15 years. 
The emerging technologies are expected to overlap in future ICT developments, and are 
believed to exist in a hierarchical relationship (Stahl 2011a, p.15), in which ethical implications 
are shared across multiple technologies due to shared aims, audiences or technical 
characteristics.  A methodology was described and validated within the project for 
identification and evaluation of the technologies as well as ethical, legal and social issues.  
Once identified, ethical issues of the eleven technologies were ranked by severity according to 
an interdisciplinary perspective. 
Recommendations from ETICA were aimed towards policy-makers and industry which sought 
to improve ethics governance approaches (e.g. Goujon & Flick 2011; Stahl 2011a).  While 
policy-makers were recommended to establish an environment in which participatory ethics 
governance is required and supported, industry, researchers and civil society organisations 
(CSOs) were encouraged to use the tools provided by policy-makers to undertake ethical 
assessment before implementation of emerging ICTs. 
1.2.3 Ethical Assessment Methodologies 
In PHM-Ethics a questionnaire based on interactive Technology Assessment (iTA) was created 
for ethical assessment of specific applications in future contexts of use.  Technology 
Assessment (TA) comprises a family of approaches that aim to combine empirical research on 
likely consequences of technologies with normative insights (see: Section 7.3.1.6).  Many 
‘flavours’ of TA, including participative TA (van Eijndhoven & van Est 2002; Joss & Bellucci 
2002) and iTA (Reuzel et al. 2001), involve laypeople in development and governance to 
improve the acceptability of emerging applications within specific contexts of use.  In line with 
the aims of FP7 and PHM-Ethics, iTA is intended to improve the ethical acceptability of 
emerging PHM applications by providing a way for users to influence innovations at an early 
stage (PHM Ethics Consortium 2011c), perhaps reducing the time and appearance of ethical 
issues between deployment and governance.  The involvement of non-experts is also intended 
to reduce expert bias in ethical assessment (Reuzel et al. 2001) by giving laypeople an equal 
role. 
The PHM-Ethics questionnaire asks stakeholders to identify and rank moral values and 
principles with regards to the specific use of PHM in which they are involved (PHM Ethics 
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Consortium 2011c).  In contrast with iTA (Reuzel et al. 2001), stakeholders are not asked to 
engage in theoretical ethical analysis, meaning the concerns, values and principles raised by lay 
persons are left to be interpreted (within theoretical frameworks) by ethical experts (PHM 
Ethics Consortium 2011c, p.53).  The ethical assessment methodology is therefore 
participatory in a limited sense by deferring theoretical analysis exclusively to ethical experts 
(PHM Ethics Consortium 2011c, p.53). 
Restricting the participation of laypeople in ethical assessment hints at a broader limitation of 
the project’s ethical assessment methodology.  The PHM-Ethics approach is designed to 
improve governance and development, not to facilitate discourse between stakeholders 
beyond governance schemes once a technological application is actually deployed, although 
the taxonomy and initial list of ethical issues may be helpful in this regard.  Ethical issues are 
experienced and given meaning by stakeholders in specific contexts (cf. Nissenbaum 2004; 
Musschenga 2005), yet the PHM-Ethics methodology does not contribute to discourse 
between all stakeholders beyond a single stage of governance.  In practice this means 
discourse between stakeholders outside of governance schemes, such as those occurring 
between a patient and his general practitioner (GP), do not benefit directly from the project.  
This is not necessarily a weakness of the approach, but rather a gap in the contribution of the 
project, suggesting a need for further ‘patient-oriented’ research. 
In ETICA, ethical assessment consisted of two phases.  In the first, ethical issues were identified 
through analysis of the matrix of emerging applications.  Technology-level analysis identified 
broad ethical issues not yet on the agenda of EU policy-makers and developers.  A separate 
analysis was conducted for each technology guided by the technology descriptions (Stahl 
2011a), consisting of defining features and application areas (Heersmink et al. 2011).  The 
bibliometric analysis was then cross-referenced to ensure all related concepts and issues were 
considered.7  Ranking occurred in a second round of analysis focusing on ethical standards, 
principles and values identified in EU and national level ethical reviews, advisory reports and 
policies (Nagenborg & Capurro 2011; Olesky et al. 2011; Szekely et al. 2011), and was 
performed by all project partners.  The second round used legal, gender, ethical and 
Technology Assessment perspectives in evaluating the technology descriptions as well as the 
results of the initial ethical analysis, which was based on the literature review, bibliometric and 
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 Defining features and applications were constructed in Work Package 1, and are available for review 
on the ETICA web-site (http://www.etica-project.eu/). 
9 
 
technology description analyses (Heersmink et al. 2011).  Ranking was necessary to ensure 
issues of immediate or severe importance to policy-makers were highlighted.  Common issues, 
principles and concepts were identified across the range of technologies.  The second round of 
analysis was also supplemented by focus groups including members of the public who were 
asked to express their concerns relating to AMI (Heersmink et al. 2011). 
A weakness of the methodology employed in ETICA as related to the research described in this 
thesis is its broad scope, focusing on emerging ICT as opposed to PHM, or even medical ICT.  
Issues were primarily identified through bibliometric analysis of academic discourse 
concerning ICT ethics.  Potential uses of AMI were not limited to healthcare, raising questions 
over the likelihood and potential importance of the identified issues for PHM, despite the 
general themes (e.g. autonomy, privacy, surveillance) being mirrored in the PHM-Ethics 
analysis (see: Section 1.2.4).  The analysis does not claim to be exhaustive, instead providing an 
overview of potential issues at a technology-level.  The meaning given to concepts such as 
privacy and surveillance by stakeholders in specific contexts is not explored, suggesting a need 
for ‘patient-oriented’ analyses in which the meaning of such broad ethical concepts to 
particular stakeholders in particular contexts can be understood.  For emerging technologies 
this type of analysis can help explain the expectations and needs of potential users, and 
perhaps influence development and governance.  Without such analysis, responding to ethical 
problems at ‘ground-level’, or creating solutions around the needs and expectations of specific 
stakeholders, cannot be accomplished.   
1.2.4 Results: Initial Ethical Issues of PHM 
The analyses conducted by the projects concluded that the potential ethical implications of 
PHM and emerging ICTs are mostly extensions of pre-existing ethical issues, principles and 
concepts, as opposed to genuinely new contributions (Goujon & Flick 2011; Heersmink et al. 
2011; PHM Ethics Consortium 2011a); however, the need for extensions or other revisions to 
pre-existing concepts and principles was noted (Heersmink et al. 2011; Stahl 2011a).  Although 
ETICA studied eleven technologies in total, overlap was found between its analysis of AMI and 
PHM-Ethics’ analysis of PHM.  In ETICA, privacy, surveillance, data protection, autonomy, 
freedom, equity and liability were seen as important ethical concepts in understanding the 
implications of AMI (Heersmink et al. 2011), and by extension PHM.  Each of these topics was 
reflected in PHM-Ethics (PHM Ethics Consortium 2011a). The constrained focus of PHM-Ethics 
reinforces the validity of the conclusions of ETICA about AMI. 
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Collection, storage, transfer and fair use of data took central importance in both projects.  
Contextual monitoring of health and daily behaviours made possible through both 
technologies is a major problem for the privacy of users (Heersmink et al. 2011).  PHM was 
compared to a modern ‘panopticon’ (Albrechtslund 2005; Light 2010) due to its ‘long memory’ 
and influence on the behaviour of users (PHM Ethics Consortium 2011a).  Unforeseen 
combinations of PHM applications can create opportunities for monitoring parameters beyond 
health, in which the combination of monitoring data about multiple parameters monitored 
individually provides insight into daily behaviours and the user’s private life (PHM Ethics 
Consortium 2010a).  This extension of PHM systems to new users and unintended uses is 
referred to as ‘usage creep’ (Lymberis 2003; PHM Ethics Consortium 2010a, p.20).  At its most 
extreme, usage creep could lead to biometric profiling through the linkage of biometric data 
with PHM and AMI systems, enabling tracking of individuals (Haggerty & Ericson 2000; 
Heersmink et al. 2011).  These imagined scenarios involve infringement of expectations of 
privacy, and further erode the utility of protection mechanisms such as informed consent, 
which rest upon the adequacy of knowledge about risks and benefits.   
PHM and AMI may also have implications for user autonomy, defined here as “the ability to 
construct one's goals and values, and to have the freedom to make one's decisions and 
perform actions based on these decisions” (Brey 2005, p.94).  Trust in ‘systems’ is considered a 
crucial element in avoiding perceptions of surveillance in PHM, justified or not (Yuan et al. 
2007; PHM Ethics Consortium 2010a; Heersmink et al. 2011; Ziefle et al. 2011).  The possibility 
of infringing autonomy increases as emerging technologies are used to replace or assist 
humans in activities, a problem recognised in ETICA’s analyses of Robotics and AMI (Heersmink 
et al. 2011).  Diffusion of applications which supplement human workers is enabled by 
perceived socioeconomic benefits (Heersmink et al. 2011; PHM Ethics Consortium 2011c), such 
as cost-savings in healthcare. 
1.2.5 Recommendations and Outcomes 
Critical review of governance revealed two significant limitations of governance of emerging 
technologies.  First, the inherent uncertainty of the future precludes confident identification of 
the ethical, social and legal implications of emerging technologies (Ahmed & Skogh 2006; 
Tannert et al. 2007; Stahl 2011b).  Proactive ethical assessment of emerging ICT is required to 
prevent foreseeable ethical problems.  While the predictions made in the projects may never 
come to pass, the position of uncertain proactivity is preferable to merely reacting to ethical 
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problems as they occur (Stahl 2011a).  Researchers, policy-makers and civil society tend to 
undertake actions meant to shape the future in desirable directions without absolute certainty 
over its course (Brey 2011; Stahl 2011b); proactive ethical assessment should be seen in this 
light.  In designing this research project, the need to continue this future-oriented, proactive 
discourse is recognised, as well as the difficulties faced in such approaches to ethics (see: 
Chapter 7). 
Second, in so far as people live in specific contexts and not the abstract, ethical issues occur in 
specific contexts and are experienced by specific stakeholders.  Ethical analysis is intended to 
influence real contexts and affect the lives of real stakeholders, suggesting that ethics is not a 
single-event preceding development or deployment of an ICT.  This is not to suggest that 
abstract theories and principles have no place in ethics, but rather when the aim of ethical 
analysis is ‘applied’ in the sense that it seeks to influence the actions and outcomes of 
individuals in real contexts, characteristics of the context and stakeholders involved must be 
considered.  Both projects share a concern with the lack of context-sensitivity in governance 
approaches.  Much of the literature reviewed in PHM-Ethics focused solely on implications for 
social systems rather than users (PHM Ethics Consortium 2011b).  This situation is problematic 
because stakeholders in different contexts experience issues differently according to varied 
expectations, moral values, principles and beliefs. 
Norms are prescriptive statements given content and relative importance within specific 
contexts by stakeholders.  Many governance schemes treat norms as statements separable 
from context, amenable to logical deduction (Musschenga 2005; Stahl 2011a), leading to the 
exclusion of relevant perspectives and emphasis on sectoral and specialist interests in ethics 
discourses (Stahl 2011a).  Approaches which seek to provide general specifications of norms 
applicable across multiple contexts therefore fail to capture the importance of context in 
articulating and comprehending norms.  In light of this concern, the projects recommend the 
future assessment of emerging technologies at the application-level, by which implications are 
unique to specific contexts and fully understood only through the inclusion of stakeholders in 
development and governance (e.g. Joss & Bellucci 2002).  Through civil participation, ethical, 
social and legal issues of practical importance can be identified and headed off. 
In response to the limitations identified in governance, the projects focused on improving 
governance schemes through the creation of ethical assessment methodologies.  In 
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comparison to PHM-Ethics, ETICA provided broad policy and development oriented 
recommendations to create an environment in which proactive ethical assessment is possible.  
ETICA’s recommendations are aimed at policy-makers as well as industry, researchers and 
CSOs, recognising their diverse roles in ICT governance: policy-makers formulate regulatory 
frameworks which govern ICTs as they emerge, while industry, researchers and CSOs are 
“innovators and users of ICT…who ought to be proactive in their consideration of ethics” (Stahl 
2011a, p.3).  In contrast, the recommendations made by PHM-Ethics are, although policy-
oriented, focused primarily on the specifics of stakeholder participation in governance and 
context-sensitive assessment.  PHM-Ethics recognised the need for a regulatory framework 
which encourages “interactive ethical assessment,” in which contextual understanding of 
norms and stakeholder participation are enacted in assessment and development going 
forward.  
1.2.6 Comparison of Aims, Methodologies and Outcomes 
The research described in this thesis builds upon PHM-Ethics and ETICA.  PHM is conceived of 
as an emerging technology, meaning the opportunity remains to influence its design, 
governance and usage, with proactive assessment being preferable to reactive governance.  
The need to include non-expert stakeholders in assessment, and the associated call for 
context-specific assessment of PHM, is recognised as necessary to improve understanding of 
the technology’s potential ethical implications.  This type of assessment was not carried out in 
either project, meaning that future assessment of ethical issues outside of governance do not 
benefit directly from either project (see: Section 1.2.3). 
The research described in this thesis differs from PHM-Ethics and ETICA in terms of aims, 
methodologies and outcomes.  PHM-Ethics and ETICA had primarily procedural aims, the 
outcome of which was the improvement of governance of PHM and emerging ICT through the 
development of new assessment methodologies.  Both projects addressed procedural 
weaknesses of governance, and sought practical solutions.  The research described here is 
altogether different with conceptual rather than procedural aims, focusing on the theoretical 
moral potential of PHM as a technology, comprehended through a conceptual framework 
which can help identify and specify ethical implications of emerging PHM applications specific 
to future contexts and uses.  Such a framework can contain theoretical analysis of the 
technology through which implications are identified; relevant theories help ‘make sense’ of 
the moral potential of PHM by identifying or otherwise explaining potential ethical issues from 
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a theoretical perspective.  This type of theoretical analysis, intended to contribute to future 
context-specific assessment of individual PHM applications, was not carried out in PHM-Ethics 
or ETICA.  The research described here can thus be seen as filling a gap in PHM ethics discourse 
not addressed by either of the framing projects.   
As an example of how this research builds upon PHM-Ethics and ETICA, the initial list of ethical 
issues offered by both projects will be expanded by taking a conceptual rather than descriptive 
approach, or by interpreting extant literature concerning ethical aspects of PHM through 
different theoretical ‘lenses’.  This responds to a limitation of the analyses carried out in both 
projects, which were primarily descriptive and lacking a theoretical framework through which 
themes in the literature could be identified.  Instead, broad themes were identified based on 
existing ethical concepts and principles, such as privacy, autonomy, and informed consent 
(Heersmink et al. 2011; PHM Ethics Consortium 2011c), with PHM merely giving rise to new 
issues described in these terms.  This limitation is perhaps unsurprising, as both PHM-Ethics 
and ETICA sought to create methodologies for the ethical assessment of emerging 
applications, not to conduct a conceptual analysis of the technology itself.   
The outcome of the conceptual approach undertaken here is a conceptual framework which 
facilitates understanding and resolution of ethical issues arising in practice (for example, in 
clinical encounters or home-based care), which cannot be solved proactively through 
governance or participatory design.  The process of coming to understand the ethical 
implications of emerging ICT is as much about revealing the unique moral potential of the 
technology, as it is about placing the technology into the pre-defined conceptual categories 
with which existing ‘technosocial’ interactions are understood.  Where existing normative 
frameworks prove inadequate to clarify the implications of emerging ICT, conceptual 
innovation is required (cf. Borry et al. 2008; Kon 2009).  It is hoped that future discourses 
between stakeholders, most importantly those occurring outside of governance schemes, will 
be enhanced by the conceptual framework which clarifies the moral potential of PHM to 
‘cause’ ethical issues in future contexts.  Such a framework is necessary because ethical 
assessment of emerging technologies is limited to tools, concepts and theories from prior 
discourses of other technologies, which cannot address the transformational or 
unprecedented effects of the new technology.  The framework may help stakeholders 
understand the ethical implications of using PHM, or to locate their particular moral values in 
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relation to the technology, or simply to increase awareness of the potential for PHM to have 
undesirable implications beyond claimed benefits (e.g. Nordgren 2012).   
1.3 Research Questions 
Before any theoretical analysis of the literature and non-expert stakeholders can be 
undertaken, a clear definition of PHM is necessary to demarcate the technological applications 
under study.  This need leads to the project’s first research question: 
 How can PHM be defined? 
The first step of the research then must be a review of PHM applications to define the 
technology.  The construction of the conceptual framework would benefit from linking 
technological features of these applications to specific ethical implications, so as to clarify 
which implications are initially relevant to which types of applications and users (e.g. patient 
and demographic groups).  This need leads to the project’s second research question: 
How can PHM be categorised to link potential ethical implications to specific 
emerging applications? 
Addressing these questions, the next chapter builds a definition and categorisation of PHM 
based upon a review of the PHM-Ethics Taxonomy as well as academic literature discussing 
ethical aspects of PHM. 
These questions do not exhaust the research scope of the project.  In Chapter 3 an additional 
research question is defined in response to perceived gaps in PHM ethics discourse reflected in 
extant literature, which further narrows the scope of the ethical implications considered in this 
project.  Later, in Chapter 5, a fourth research question is identified in response to the need for 
an empirical methodology capable of ethically assessing the views of potential users of PHM, 
understood as an emerging technology. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Before moving on to definitions of PHM, it is worth reviewing the structure of the thesis.  The 
thesis can be divided into two halves.  Chapters 1 through 5 address substantive issues with 
PHM, describing the current state of PHM ethics discourse and suggesting ways to move it 
forward through conceptual innovation and empirical research.  The first two research 
questions are addressed in Chapter 2, which defines PHM and categorises it according to 
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ethically relevant features as identified in academic discourse. Chapter 3 then critically reviews 
the same literature, focusing on the ethical implications of PHM, identifying weaknesses and 
linkages between the various themes seen in the discourse.  On the basis of these chapters a 
gap in the discourse is identified relating to the implications of PHM as a mediator in medical 
relationships, which can be ‘made sense of’ through Habermas’ notion of ‘colonisation of the 
lifeworld’.  This gap helps define the project’s third research question concerning the ethical 
implications of PHM for medical relationships. 
To begin to address this question, Chapter 4 describes a novel conceptual framework built 
from multiple sociological and ethical theories for analysis of the ethical implications of PHM 
for medical relationships and practice.  To assess its limitations and explanatory power, a need 
is identified to apply the conceptual framework to a particular context into which PHM is 
predicted to be deployed in the near future.  As the final chapter of the first half of the thesis, 
Chapter 5 describes England as a context for empirically studying the implications of 
introducing PHM into the world’s largest national healthcare system.   
The second half of the thesis describes methodological and epistemic issues with studying 
PHM and emerging ICT in general, before presenting results of the empirical study called for in 
Chapter 5.  Studying PHM through the views of potential users necessitates an empirical 
methodology which accounts for the epistemic restrictions of research under conditions of 
uncertainty.  Chapter 6 begins to describe such a methodology, including an overview of 
philosophical paradigms to ground the study and criteria for assessing its quality.  Chapter 7 
expands the methodological foundation laid in Chapter 6 with an explanation of the epistemic 
difficulties of research under uncertainty.  An approach is described which is capable of joining 
empirical data with ethical analysis under conditions of uncertainty, relying upon an extension 
of Habermasian thought to explain the epistemic difficulties of studying the future.   
Turning to the conduct and content of the empirical study, Chapter 8 provides practical details 
about how the empirical study was carried out.  Chapter 9 then describes a method of data 
analysis consistent with the methodological and epistemic decisions taken in Chapters 6 and 7, 
before presenting the results of the empirical study with attention given to links with the 
themes identified in Chapter 3.  Results are linked to the conceptual framework described in 
Chapter 4, demonstrating its explanatory power and limitations.  Chapter 10 then concludes 
the thesis, reviewing how each research question was addressed and summarising 
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recommendations made throughout the thesis.  Finally, limitations of the project and areas 
necessitating further research on the basis of the preceding analysis are identified. 
1.5 Conclusion 
The primary contribution of the thesis is a conceptual framework built upon empirical and 
theoretical analysis of PHM as an emerging technological mediator in human and professional 
interactions.  The framework is intended as a tool to improve the dialogue between 
stakeholders in medical relationships by identifying potential effects of PHM within specific 
contexts of use, so as to create a fairer discourse in which the implications of the technology 
are clearer to all stakeholders.  Before the framework can be constructed, the state of PHM 
ethics discourse reflecting current knowledge of the technological scope of PHM and its ethical 




2 Chapter 2: Defining PHM 
2.1 Introduction 
To start building the conceptual framework called for in the previous chapter, it would be 
helpful to categorise PHM to link potential ethical implications to specific applications, so that 
it can be said applications of type A potentially (or are more likely to) cause issues X, Y and Z.  
In this chapter categories are created based on a review of current academic discourse 
regarding the ethical implications of PHM.  By definition an ethical implication of a technology 
is based upon some characteristic of the technology or application. Categorisation is an 
attempt to identify and group applications according to these underlying characteristics 
implicit in predicted ethical implications of PHM; for example, systems which collect vocational 
data have the potential to cause privacy concerns over tracking behaviours unrelated to 
health. 
Before categorisation is possible, a clear definition of PHM is required to identify relevant 
systems.  Initial exploration of PHM ethics literature and analysis of the results of PHM-Ethics 
(PHM Ethics Consortium 2012; Schmidt & Rienhoff 2013) revealed that  a common definition 
of PHM does not exist.  The term itself is rarely used, with synonymous and related phrases 
preferred including “telehealth and telecare” (Kaplan & Litewka 2008), “assistive technologies” 
(Demiris & Hensel 2009; Tiwari et al. 2010), “ambient intelligence and ubiquitous computing” 
(Bohn et al. 2005; Kosta et al. 2010), “somatic surveillance” (Monahan & Wall 2007),“wearable 
health sensors” (Lymberis 2005; Arnrich et al. 2010) and “surveillance technologies” (Niemeijer 
et al. 2010).  The terminology reflects the breadth of emerging applications which may be 
considered PHM. 
In response to the research questions posed in Chapter 1, a systematic review of PHM ethics 
literature is undertaken in this chapter for three reasons:  (1) to provide an overview of 
applications fitting the definition of PHM; (2) to identify any further restrictions on this 
definition necessary to distinguish PHM from other medical technologies; and (3) to categorise 
PHM technologies linking potential ethical implications to specific applications.  Any answer to 
these questions must be preliminary; as new systems are developed, the categorisation 






2.2 Defining PHM 
A definition of PHM based upon an extensive literature review was created in the PHM-Ethics 
project, where PHM is defined as “all technical systems collecting, processing, and storing data 
linked to a person.  It allows monitoring parameters of that person and can lead to health-
related information of that person" (PHM Ethics Consortium 2011b, p.6).  PHM has a diverse 
range of application areas within healthcare, including prevention, treatment, assistance and 
rehabilitation, as well as occupational and recreational health monitoring.  Within these areas 
PHM applications are used for a variety of purposes including longitudinal data monitoring, 
early diagnosis, detection of anomalies and emergencies and lifestyle feedback (PHM Ethics 
Consortium 2012). 
The PHM-Ethics definition is purposefully broad to allow for the inclusion of future 
technological developments (Gök et al. 2013, p.68).  Although a large variety of systems may 
be considered PHM, the PHM-Ethics definition is excessively broad.  Many established as well 
as emerging medical systems fit the definition, from in-hospital heart and ECG monitors which 
automatically alert staff to emergencies to smart home systems which monitor the health and 
related behaviour (e.g. sleep patterns) of dementia patients.  A narrower definition is required 
to distinguish PHM as an emerging medical ICT, distinct from existing medical ICTs.   
On this basis a narrower working definition was created for a systematic review of the 
literature, intended to ensure that all sources discuss systems with sufficient similarity.  For the 
review, PHM was defined as any electronic device or system that monitors and records data 
about a health-related aspect of a person’s life outside a hospital setting.  To qualify as PHM 
a system must be capable of transferring data to a third party, and be usable by a layperson 
outside a traditional medical environment such as a hospital.  These additional restrictions to 
the definition are necessary to bring it in line with the types of systems identified in PHM-
Ethics (PHM Ethics Consortium 2011c; Gök et al. 2013).  The limitations demarcate PHM from 
existing monitoring systems by emphasising that PHM (1) occurs in spaces traditionally not 
subject to medical monitoring and (2) can share data about the patient’s health with others. 
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These restrictions may not sufficiently distinguish PHM from other technologies in such a way 
that one can coherently speak of ethical implications unique to PHM as a group of similar 
medical ICT applications.  Recognising this, the definition may require further refinement on 
the basis of the literature review. 
2.3 Systematic Literature Review:  Definition and Categorisation 
A systematic review of academic literature discussing ethical implications of PHM was carried 
out.  In this chapter the literature is analysed with a view towards defining and categorising 
PHM, while the next chapter critically analyses the discussion of ethical issues of PHM.  While 
each chapter highlights different aspects of the literature, they address the same sources. 
The literature search was designed to systematically identify academic literature discussing 
ethical implications of PHM, with a search query constructed to move beyond the 
technological and demographic scope of prior reviews of related technologies (e.g. Niemeijer 
et al. 2010; Zwijsen et al. 2011).  PHM applications often share technical capabilities with AMI 
and ubiquitous computing (Bohn et al. 2005).  The search query was designed to include only 
health applications, although it is recognised that ethical issues of non-medical applications of 
these technologies may be relevant to PHM.8 
2.3.1 Method 
Academic literature available in four databases (Scopus, IEEE, MEDLINE, and ISI Web of 
Knowledge) addressing the ethical implications of PHM was reviewed between May 2010 and 
September 2012.  Attention was given to the discussion of normative issues in each article, 
with the goal of identifying themes in the literature.  The databases were searched to identify 
literature discussing issues of ethics, privacy or risk relating to the development and 
deployment of PHM.  The search was of all English language sources in the indexed literature.  
Although most of the reviewed literature consists of peer-reviewed journal articles, other 
types of publications including commentaries, reviews, books and conference proceedings 
were included where indexed by the chosen databases.  Sources were also identified through 
citations in literature returned in the database searches. 
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Sources were located through systematic searching of databases as well as through the 
references of reviewed literature.  Multiple search techniques were used to ensure 
comprehensiveness.  Recognising that “Personal Health Monitoring” is an emerging term not 
yet widely used in the literature, synonyms were used such as “somatic surveillance,”  
“wearable body sensors, ” “personalised health,” “pervasive health,” “assistive technologies,” 
“ambient intelligence,” “health surveillance,” “ambient assisted living,” “telecare,” 
“telehealth,” and “smart homes.”  All articles matching the synonymous terminology were 
checked to ensure the technology under discussion matched the working definition of PHM. 
The search query consisted of three categories of terms connected via Boolean operators (see: 
Table 2.1).  Recognising that ethical issues are not always identified as such, additional terms 
(privacy and risk) describing ethical aspects of PHM were included.9  The desired outcome of 
the search query was to identify articles mentioning PHM or related terms that also directly 
discussed ethics or ethical issues. 











tech*’, ‘assistive tech*’ 





‘ethic*’ OR ‘privacy*’ OR 
‘risk*’ 
Table 2.1 - Search Query 
Articles were reviewed to identify discussion of ethical aspects of PHM, and were excluded if 
they only discussed development, implementation or technical specifications.  Requirements 
were not set for type of article, length or thoroughness of the discussion of ethical issues. 
A potential weakness of the search procedure is its focus on ethical discourses.  As the search 
query was designed to identify sources discussing ethical issues of PHM, and not merely PHM 
itself, the sources returned may provide an unrepresentative sample of PHM systems biased 
toward those with which authors are particularly concerned with ethical issues.  In turn, any 
                                                          
9
 This decision was made on the basis of feedback from an early version of the literature review 
presented at ETHICOMP 2011 (see: Mittelstadt et al. 2011)).  The review was criticised for limiting the 
search terminology in category three to the term “ethic*,” thus ignoring issues described purely in terms 
of privacy or risk.  On this basis, ‘privacy’ and ‘risk’ were added to the search string.  Privacy was chosen 
because of its frequency of appearance in the early literature review.  Risk was chosen on the belief that 
normative dimensions of PHM may be termed ‘risks’, and analysed in ‘risk assessments’. 
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definition or categorisation created based on this range of systems may be similarly 
unrepresentative of PHM. 
To address this potential flaw, examples of PHM were also located through hand searching of 
developer and commissioning web sites as well as news articles.  These additional sources 
were only considered for the categorisation and definition of PHM, and are not included in the 
results of Chapter 3 which concern ethical implications of PHM.  Systems identified in ETICA 
and PHM-Ethics, which did not limit their reviews to ethics discourses (see: Section 1.2), were 
also included.  These secondary search techniques provided a more representative sample of 
PHM systems for categorisation and definition. 
2.3.1.2 Data Analysis 
All sources underwent content analysis to identify treatment of ethical implications of PHM.  
Key terms were identified, interpreted and combined into themes present across multiple 
articles in a process analogous to grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin 1994).  Words and 
passages were highlighted that appeared to refer to ethical issues or concepts.  Highlighted 
segments were then coded.  Similar codes were assigned to themes as discussed below (see: 
Section 3.2).    
2.3.2 Results 
A total of 569 articles were identified for review through the systematic and secondary 
searches, 118 of which met the inclusion criteria of explicitly discussing ethical, privacy or risk 
implications of PHM.  Categories were defined according to the location of sensors, which was 
interpreted as contributing to distinct ethical implications.  On this basis three general 
categories of PHM were identified in the reviewed literature (n=118):  Mobile Monitors (n=38), 
Environmental Monitors (n=79), and In Vivo Monitors (n=4).10  A brief discussion of each 
category follows, with numerous examples intended to provide an overview of the types of 
PHM applications currently available or in development. 
The categories aim to group underlying characteristics of PHM which give rise to ethical 
concerns.  Through the categories, implications are connected to the design of the system 
                                                          
10
 The ‘n value’ identifies the number of sources discussing PHM systems fitting into each category.  
Sources could occupy multiple categories, such as when a smart home system employs environmental 
and wearable sensors.  Of the 118 reviewed sources, nine failed to provide enough detail for 
categorisation.  See Appendix 1 Table 1.3 for categorised results. 
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based on the location of sensors.  They are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather the first 
step in constructing the conceptual framework. 
2.3.2.1 Mobile Monitors 
Mobile monitors are devices which are worn on the body or carried by the user for the 
purpose of monitoring health parameters, for instance vital signs, stress, and blood quality 
(e.g. Stuart et al. 2008; Ojasalo et al. 2010).  Such devices may be used both to track the 
progress of a specific health condition as well as for preventative and lifestyle purposes, such 
as detecting deviance in health parameters at an early stage (Palm 2011), which may indicate 
the onset of a medical condition requiring treatment.  Contextual information can also be 
gathered by identifying user location and behaviours, which can be linked to changes in health 
parameters.   
The range of mobile monitors is broad and 
includes wrist and arm bands (see: Figure 2.1), 
‘smart’ clothes (see: Figure 2.2), body area 
networks (Lim et al. 2010; Mana et al. 2011), 
global positioning system (GPS) trackers 
(Landau and Werner, 2010) and smart phone 
devices (Ganti et al. 2010; Boulos et al. 2011).  
GPS trackers designed for use with dementia 
patients and other persons prone to dangerous 
wandering are already in use (Abbas et al. 
2011).  Wireless medical sensor networks 
consist of wearable devices with multiple 
interlinked wireless sensors (Milenkovic et al. 
2006) capable of physiological monitoring, on-
site analysis and automatic alerts when factors 
fall outside normal parameters (Gao et al. 2008; 
Giannetsos et al. 2011, p.1298).  Monitored 
parameters include blood oxygen, heart rate 
and ECG (Gao et al. 2008), plethysmographic 
signal (organ volume changes) (Giannetsos et al. 
2011, p.1298) and blood pressure (Laurance 2011).  New software can turn existing devices 
Figure 2.1 - Blood Pressure Wrist Watch 
A patient with hypertension can use a wrist 
watch style device which monitors their 
blood pressure (BP) continuously (Laurance 
2011).  The monitor creates a log of blood 
pressure fluctuations throughout the day, 
and can alert the user to an out of range 
BP.  The data can be analysed alongside a 
log of the user's behaviour throughout the 
day, which may reveal the effects of the 
wearer’s daily activities.  This information 
may be used by medical professionals to 
create a personalised treatment or lifestyle 
plan for the user. 
Figure 2.2 - Smart Clothes 
Clothes with sensors woven into fabric can 
measure heart rate, respiration, body 
temperature and other physiological 
parameters.  Such devices could aid athletes 
in training and physical competition, or 
provide early detection of heart conditions 
for COPD patients (Ure et al. 
2012).  Emergencies and physical limits 
could be detected with precision. 
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into PHM, as shown with health monitoring smart phone ‘apps’ which can track exercise or 
movement and share data with health professionals and third parties (Pentland 2009; Boulos 
et al. 2011).  ‘Body area networks’, or sensors worn by the user woven into or textiles worn 
beneath clothing, can be combined with smart phone applications to provide longitudinal 
health tracking (Lim et al. 2010; Boulos et al. 2011) on devices already familiar to users.   
One type of PHM rarely discussed in the reviewed literature with potential implications 
beyond elderly and chronically ill users are lifestyle monitors, sometimes called “persuasive 
technology” (Ijsselsteijn et al. 2006, p.1), which are designed to influence decisions in real-time 
by providing the user with information about lifestyle behaviours and choices (Berdichevsky & 
Neuenschwander 1999), suggesting unique implications for user autonomy.  Examples include 
‘virtual fitness coaches’ and social network visualisations which provide qualitative feedback 
about the effect of social interactions on mental health and emotions (Jea et al. 2008; 
Pentland 2009); while these devices do not monitor physiological parameters, they can 
provide contextual information which may be helpful in interpreting such measurements.  
Furthermore, lifestyle monitors can provide persuasive feedback to users intended to alter 
behaviour or promote values and goals seen as desirable by system developers.  Ethical 
principles may be required to ensure such technological persuasion is ethically acceptable (e.g. 
Berdichevsky & Neuenschwander 1999). 
The capacity to monitor location and behaviours beyond established ‘monitored spaces’ 
suggests mobile PHM may have unique implications in relation to privacy, such as an inability 
to retreat to non-monitored ‘private’ spaces.  Contextual information about non-health 
aspects of the user’s life may be inferred by tracking location over time, suggesting 
implications for the user’s ability to control what monitoring data reveals about his life and 
behaviours.  Wearable monitors may also pose a risk of stigma or embarrassment as a visible 
reminder of the user’s need for monitoring, with potential implications for how the user views 





2.3.2.2 Environmental Monitors 
Environmental monitors provide information about a patient’s private space, such as the 
home, car or workplace.  They do not require 
the patient to wear, carry or implant sensing 
devices, but instead use sensors embedded 
into an environment, although combinations of 
wearable and environmental sensors are 
foreseeable.  Applications of environmental 
monitors include smart homes11 (see: Figure 
2.3) and related ‘gerontechnologies’ (Chan et 
al. 2009), which seek to provide a “cost 
effective remote healthcare solution in the 
wake of a growing elderly population and 
rising healthcare costs” (Stuart et al. 2008).  
Devices in this category may also be referred 
to as AMI and ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) health applications, which typically involve 
embedding sensors into public as well as private spaces (Brey 2005). Examples include fall 
detectors , ‘smart’ beds with weight and movement sensors, ‘smart’ pillboxes which track and 
transmit medication dispensing (PHM Ethics Consortium 2011b), motion trackers and pressure 
sensors which can detect gait (Caine et al. 2006). 
In terms of ethical implications, environmental monitors provide spatial information, or how a 
user moves through and interacts with a space.  Spatial awareness enables behaviour tracking, 
and can provide contextual information related to the user’s health condition (Liampotis et al. 
2009).  Environmental monitors may prove harder to ‘escape’ in terms of psychological and 
physical obtrusiveness (see: Section 3.2.4) than mobile monitors which are easily hidden or 
taken off, assuming sensors must be installed into the user’s environment prior to use.  
Relationships with other members of a household or friends and family may also be affected, 
based on changes to the ‘character’ of the monitored space (Roush & Cox 2000) or a 
perception of being watched (Welsh et al. 2003; Percival & Hanson 2006; Bentwich 2012). 
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 An extensive review of smart home systems in development is available in Chan et al. 2008. 
Figure 2.3  - Smart Homes 
Chronically ill and elderly persons, confined 
to their homes, can make use of smart 
home technologies, which can detect 
behaviour and health parameters through 
sensors installed in the home (Frisardi and 
Imbimbo 2011).  Sensors could detect sleep 
patterns, activity levels, falls, and 
emergencies and automatically alert family 
members or medical professionals when an 
emergency occurs, or a problematic health 
or behaviour pattern emerges.  The effect 
of medications could also be tracked 
through behavioural data.  Information 
gathered by smart home sensors could be 
used to evaluate the care needs of 'at-risk' 
patients, and keep a 'watchful eye' on them 




2.3.2.3 In Vivo Monitors 
In vivo monitors require implantation in the user to provide real-time monitoring of 
physiological parameters, such as blood 
chemistry and pressure.  Examples include in 
vivo glucose monitoring chips built on radio-
frequency identification (RFID) technology 
(PositiveID 2011) which may eventually be 
coupled with in vivo insulin dispenser systems, 
or an implantable stent monitoring the 
constitution of blood (Gaul & Ziefle 2009; 
Pousaz 2013) for chemotherapy or early 
detection of heart attacks (see: Figure 2.4).  
Development of such systems appears 
relatively limited compared to other types of PHM (n=4), perhaps because of the ethical issues 
posed with implanting a technological system into the human body or the ramifications of 
false positives and negatives.  This situation may be a result of the recognition of ethical issues 
related to implanting ICT into the human body, which introduces issues of human 
enhancement into PHM discourse (e.g. McGee & Maguire, Gerald Q. 2007; Monahan & Fisher 
2010; Coeckelbergh 2011), raising questions related to bodily integrity, justice, and the ethical 
difference between technologies of ‘enhancement’ and ‘restoration’.12 
2.3.2.4 Related Technologies 
Overlap exists between PHM and similar technologies including health applications of AMI, 
ubiquitous computing, assistive technologies (AT), telehealth and telecare (see: Figure 2.5).  It 
is worth reviewing this overlap in terminology to demarcate the applicability of related 
discourses to PHM. 
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 Although relevant to the discourse, the ethical implications of PHM as a form of human enhancement 
are not discussed further here due to the relatively limited development of in vivo monitors.  In vivo 
monitors are not ignored from this point forward; however, the unique issues resulting from their 
implantation within the human body, conceived of as a form of human enhancement, are ignored.  The 
implications of PHM as human enhancement may require further attention if feasibility of in vivo 
monitors progresses, at which point existing discourses around human computer interfaces may be 
relevant.  For example, see: Hochheiser & Lazar 2007. 
Figure 2.4 - In Vivo Blood Monitoring 
Patients with a wide variety of disorders 
detectable through blood tests could 
make use of an in-vivo system which 
monitors the constitution of blood in real 
time.  Possible uses include real-time 
blood glucose monitoring for diabetics, 
or early warning of heart attacks from 
the presence of indicator enzymes which 
appear in the blood immediately before 
an incident (Pousaz 2013).  The effect of 
medications could also be tracked in 






Figure 2.5 - Overlap of Terminology with Technologies Related to PHM 
PHM is related to ambient intelligence and ubiquitous computing in the sense that all three 
aim to monitor the activities of individuals, sometimes including health parameters.  However, 
ubicomp and AMI are terms used to describe a broader range of technologies than PHM, with 
potential uses in public spaces and for monitoring beyond health parameters (Bohn et al. 
2005; Friedewald et al. 2007; Giannetsos et al. 2011).  As described here PHM is used to 
monitor the health of a specific individual or group, rather than the activity of the general 
public in a particular space.   This distinction means that ‘user identity’ is an important concept 
to distinguish PHM from related technologies; only monitoring technologies in which the 
identity of the user is known, either to the system or its operators, can count as PHM.  Without 
knowing the identity of the user longitudinal tracking of health and behaviour, as well as 
feedback based on such data, are not possible.  While PHM can be distinguished from AMI and 
ubicomp in this way, some AMI and ubicomp applications may also qualify as PHM by the 
definition of PHM offered below (see: Section 2.4)—the technological groupings overlap. 
The same is true of assistive technologies, which are designed to assist elderly or disabled 
persons with impaired daily tasks such as walking, bathing and communication.  AT may also 
support carers by monitoring the user and alerting the carer in an emergency (Chan et al. 












former are designed primarily to replace or supplement impaired characteristics of the user, 
whereas the latter only monitor, collect and analyse data, and perhaps alert third parties to 
relevant events.  AT is often lacks networking capacities, whereas PHM relies on the 
transmission of data off-site (cf. van Hoof et al. 2007, p.156).  A crossover exists between the 
two: a device may be both PHM and AT, but not necessarily so.   
Telehealth delivers healthcare services to chronically ill patients via ICT allowing for remote 
consultations (Department of Health 2011a, p.4).  Users may be taught to use health 
equipment and take health readings at home (Ure et al. 2012) which can be exchanged with 
their clinician during consultation.  Telecare is a subset of telehealth aimed at supporting and 
monitoring elderly and chronically ill individuals at home (Department of Health 2011a), 
especially those  at greater risk of emergencies or requiring in-home care or support (Stowe & 
Harding 2010).  Telecare typically monitors for emergencies automatically outside of remote 
consultations (Department of Health 2011a, p.4), and may support informal carers as well 
(Palm 2011).  Telehealth and telecare rely upon networked ICT to interact with patients, and 
often utilise video cameras, microphones, touch screen displays and ‘traditional’ healthcare 
devices such as blood pressure cuffs.   
PHM is distinct in the sense that users are typically required to input data, answer questions or 
take measurements with telehealth and telecare (e.g. Ure et al. 2012), whereas PHM can 
‘passively’ monitor the user without active measurements such that remote consultations are 
unnecessary—the patient is instead continuously remotely monitored as opposed to individual 
instances of data collection.  The distinction is, however, controversial—telehealth and 
telecare systems can utilise PHM type sensors which passively monitor the user (e.g. Stowe & 
Harding 2010), suggesting that as ‘always-on’ or passive sensing is increasingly built into 
telehealth devices, the distinction between the three terms will blur further.  However, the 
distinctions should be maintained as PHM has applications outside of the care environments 
for which telecare is designed, such as preventative health and lifestyle monitoring (see: 
Section 2.3.2.1). 
2.3.3 Discussion 
PHM may be categorised and differentiated from related technologies according to sensor 
location, field of application and technological characteristics.  Different ethical implications 
come with different types of PHM.  The categories provide a basis for the discussion of the 
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ethical themes which emerged from the reviewed literature, by identifying systems for which 
certain implications are more or less relevant. 
Mobile and in vivo monitors enable longitudinal tracking and linking of health and behaviour 
parameters, which allows for increased interactions between third parties and data 
representations of the user.  Environmental monitors potentially reveal information about 
private spaces and behaviours, creating a ‘public window’ into the private lives of users.  
Spatial information, or how a user moves through and interacts with a space, enables tracking 
of health-related behaviours in private spaces, such as sleeping patterns and falls.  
Environmental monitors may prove harder to ‘escape’ in terms of psychological and physical 
obtrusiveness than mobile monitors which are easily hidden or taken off, assuming sensors 
must be installed into the user’s environment prior to use.  Despite these differences, all types 
of PHM share certain moral potential on the basis of common technological capacities, such as 
monitoring and transmitting information about the user’s health to third parties. 
The categorisation of PHM by location of sensors does not exhaust possible categories linking 
characteristics of specific applications to potential ethical implications.  Additional categories 
are suggested by the PHM-Ethics taxonomy (Gök et al. 2013), based upon technical features 
and field of application.  Different technical features, such as visual versus non-visual sensing, 
give rise to different issues (e.g. Caine et al. 2006).  Collecting ‘simpler’ types of data may 
reduce ethical concerns, for example in comparing monitoring vital signs to daily activity 
(Gammon et al. 2009).  Similarly, different uses of identical systems can give rise to different 
issues, for example in tracking the location of criminals versus patients with dementia (e.g. 
Landau and Werner, 2010).   
The PHM-Ethics taxonomy (see: Section 1.2.1) contributes to ethical categorisation by 
constructing different views of the technology based on location, field of application and 
technical features.  By location, systems are categorised according to the location of sensors 
which can be worn or implanted in the body, or installed in personal or public spaces (Gök et 
al. 2013, p.71).  By field of application, systems are grouped as applications in health care 
(preventive, treatment related, assistive and rehabilitative), public health, or other health 
services such as occupational health (Gök et al. 2013, p.72).  By technical features, PHM is 
grouped in a hierarchical tree by a variety of technical features or non-technical features which 
describe the participants or target groups of monitoring (see: Figure 2.6).  The technical view 
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of PHM consists of a hierarchy in which ethical, psycho-social and legal implications are 
inherited along branches of the hierarchy based on shared characteristics (Gök et al. 2013, 
p.73). 
The technical hierarchy provides an overview of the range of applications and uses of PHM.  
The hierarchy incorporates the field of application and sensor location views as well, providing 
a practical tool for ‘mapping’ implications of emerging PHM applications against similar 
existing applications for which implications have already been identified.  Each branch of the 
technical hierarchy need not be reviewed in detail to understand the contribution of the 
taxonomy to the conceptual framework. The hierarchy shows how emerging applications can 
be grouped according to technical and non-technical features, with implications inherited 
along branches of the hierarchy.  Increasingly complex systems can be mapped on the 
hierarchy, and implications traced along the various branches (e.g. PHM Ethics Consortium 
2010b, pp.20–1).  As a result, the conceptual framework can refer to groups in the hierarchy 
when identifying implications, rather than individual PHM applications.  The taxonomy 
therefore facilitates applying the framework to emerging applications by establishing a 
hierarchy of characteristics against which new applications can be mapped.   
The conceptual framework bolsters the hierarchy by allowing for implications to be linked 
across the hierarchy to technological capacities, such as behaviour tracking or lifestyle 
feedback, or to patient cohorts requiring certain types of monitoring.  Importantly, the 
implications identified in the framework are qualitatively different than those identified in 
PHM-Ethics; the former will be defined with the help of a theoretical framework and describe 
implications from the perspective of patients and other non-expert stakeholders, whereas the 
implications mapped onto the hierarchy in PHM-Ethics concerned governance.  The hierarchy 
and conceptual framework may therefore prove complementary in analysing emerging PHM 
applications within specific contexts of use beyond governance schemes. 
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Figure 2.6 - PHM-Ethics Taxonomy: Technical Hierarchy of PHM (PHM Ethics Consortium 2010b, p.18) 
31 
 
2.4 Re-Defining PHM 
The review revealed shortcomings in the working definition of PHM based upon comparisons 
with existing and related technologies.  PHM is therefore re-defined in this project as: 
Any electronic device or system with the capability to collect, store and transmit data about 
a health-related aspect of an identified user’s life outside a hospital or similar medical 
environment.  
The concept of user identity has been added to show that PHM is distinct from AMI and 
ubiquitous computing in the sense that the identity of the monitored individual is known in 
PHM, but not necessarily so for AMI which may monitor public spaces.  The capability to 
transmit data has been added to distinguish PHM from existing consumer health monitors, 
such as blood glucose or blood pressure monitors which record data but cannot transmit it to a 
third party.  The transmission of sensitive data to third parties gives rise to a range of ethical 
issues and enhances the importance of user protections, for example privacy and system 
security.  Including it in the definition is necessary to ensure these types of issues are given 
sufficient attention in PHM ethics discourse, and to emphasise the opportunities opened by 
PHM to deliver medical care remotely.   
2.5 Conclusion 
Through reviewing current academic discourse PHM has been re-defined to better distinguish 
emerging PHM applications from existing and emerging related technologies.  The purpose of 
defining PHM through review of academic discourse was to clearly demarcate a set of 
technological applications for which common potential ethical implications can be identified.  
On this basis PHM was categorised according to the location of sensors, field of application and 
technical features.  Categorisation is intended to facilitate matching ethical implications with 
emerging PHM applications in future contexts of use. 
With a definition and categorisation of PHM established, it remains to be seen what types of 
ethical implications can be matched with different PHM applications.  As a first step in this 
direction, a review of academic discourses concerning the ethics of PHM can help identify an 
initial set of ethical implications.  In the following chapter the literature discussed here is 
revisited to identify themes in the treatment of ethical implications of PHM, as well as gaps in 
the discourse related to the implications for stakeholders, beyond problems with governance 
schemes identified by prior research (see: Section 1.2). 
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3 Chapter 3: Review of Ethical Implications 
3.1 Systematic Literature Review: Ethical Implications 
A systematic literature review of academic literature discussing ethics and PHM was carried 
out to critically assess academic discourse of ethical implications of PHM.  The method of the 
review was described above (see: Section 2.3.1).  This chapter presents the results of the 
review relating to the treatment of ethical implications of PHM.  Gaps in the discourse are 
identified, focusing on implications for stakeholders, beyond governance, which require 
further research.  This focus acknowledges the results of PHM-Ethics and ETICA, which have 
already reviewed problems with governance schemes (see: Chapter 1). 
3.1.1 Defining Ethical Implications 
Ethical implications are defined here as the effects or outcomes of PHM which give rise to 
ethical issues.  In turn, ethical issues are situations in which different ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
actions have occurred or can be taken.  Value systems inform conceptions of right and wrong, 
meaning ethical issues are often problematic situations characterised by conflict over the 
correct course of action.  The justification for defining a situation as problematic varies by 
different ethical theories, but typically involves benefiting or harming something regarding as 
‘morally valuable’, such as human goods, rights, needs, preferences, and experiences of 
pleasure or pain (cf. Singer 1993; Kant 1998; Mill 2002; Darwall 2003).  The realisation or 
protection of these goods provides motivation to take action—hence they are valuable.  The 
value of such goods varies by source and intensity according to different ethical theories, but 
the understanding of goods as something worth protecting or realising grounds ethics as a 
discipline. 
Ethical issues are addressed through the evaluation of actions as more or less right according 
to different value systems.  Ethics consists of the formalised principles or conceptions of the 
good life that justify differing systems of morality (Leget et al. 2009).  These principles can be 
used to compare and rank the moral values, or criteria for preferring certain actions and 
outcomes, of diverse groups, as well as to solve disputes, describe the good life or justify 
actions as right or wrong.  It is the dispute between differing value systems or the correct 
values from which to derive acceptable actions, and the justification for each system’s 
prescriptions, which define something as an ethical issue. 
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Morality, or moral decision-making, is defined here as the process for resolving ethical issues 
through deciding on a course of action justified by a particular value system, ethical theory or 
the relative value of a human good.  Moral decision-making is expressed through normative 
claims, where normativity refers to a variety of norms or reasons supporting an action, 
including legal norms, moral norms, practical norms, etiquette (Molewijk et al. 2003, p.70), or 
any other norm meant to justify actions. 
The values or norms by which ethical issues are evaluated and addressed come from different 
theoretical approaches to ethics.  According to teleological theories, ethics is the a discipline 
which helps us understand how to realise our essential nature as humans, or how to achieve 
the rational happiness unique to humans as a species (MacIntyre 2007, p.52).  Another way of 
conceiving of the discipline is that it aims to provide a philosophical answer to the question 
“How should one live?” (Habermas 1993, pp.116–7).  To answer this question a concept of the 
‘good life’, or the “true nature” which humans seek to achieve (e.g. telos) is necessary 
(MacIntyre 2007, p.52).  From this approach ethics does not prescribe ‘right’ actions or reasons 
for acting, but rather defines conditions or traits (e.g. virtues) necessary to lead a good life, the 
possession of which disposes one to good actions and to realising the human telos (MacIntyre 
2007, p.53).  Without a telos humans would lack an initial reason to want to be moral 
(MacIntyre 2007, p.56), or motivation to choose moral actions.  This is not to suggest that an 
individual is born with certain traits and leads a good life as a result; rather, the individual must 
reason between possible actions, choosing the one through which the good life is realised.  
The reasoning in this choice is guided by virtues, and as such the individual is pre-disposed, but 
not pre-determined, to act ‘good’. 
Teleological approaches have been criticised for being morally relativistic by defining virtues 
against culturally-relative social roles or practices, meaning ‘good’ or morally correct character 
is defined relative to a particular culture, not universal ideals.  Emancipation through appeal to 
rational moral ideals may be impossible in a teleological view (Habermas 1993, p.125), 
although this criticism only applies to static or pre-determined conceptions of the good life 
which does not necessarily apply to modern teleological theories in which telos is defined over 
a life time (e.g. MacIntyre 2007).  Alternative conceptions of the distinction between ethics 
and morality not vulnerable to these criticisms are possible beyond the separation into 
conceptions of the good life for the former, and rules or principles which guide action to 
achieve that good life for the latter (cf. Stahl 2008, p.157).  Instead, moral practices can be 
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seen as requiring formal ethical justification which can be provided by a number of ethical 
theories, such as appeal to Kant’s categorical imperatives or Habermas’ theory of discourse in 
which the quality of discourses and validity claims justify moral practices (Stahl 2008, p.151).  
Justification of actions in this case is not linked to a conception of the good life and prima facie 
principles accepted as leading to it, but rather comes from adherence to imperatives of 
rationality (Kant 1998) or the validity claims of an ideal discourse (Habermas 1984; Habermas 
1985). 
A teleological approach is at odds with a Kantian deontological approach (e.g. Kant 1993; Kant 
1998; Kant 2003), which requires the individual to take the “moral point of view” in deciding 
between actions, from which his decision is guided solely by reason.  From this view the 
individual is required to act impartially, choosing ‘right’ actions over ‘good’ actions, or those 
actions “which all could will,” evaluated only in terms of autonomy and justice (Habermas 
1993, p.118).  The Kantian approach considers ‘goods’, or things which lead to the ‘good life’, 
as equivalent to other subjective needs and wants, lacking any status in moral decision-
making.  The individual therefore makes decisions purely through reason, ignoring the 
contextual, communal and interpersonal bonds  in which the decision occurs, in an attempt to 
lead an ideal life defined by autonomy and justice (Habermas 1993, pp.119–20).  This account 
of ethical decision-making, or deciding how to act in a particular situation, relies upon 
‘universal’ reasons which by definition ignore the unique characteristics of particular contexts, 
such as the consequences of the chosen action, in evaluating ‘right’ actions. 
Regardless of the theoretical position taken with regard to an ethical issue, moral relativism, or 
the state in which all possible actions are seen as equally acceptable in addressing an ethical 
issue, should be avoided if ethics as a prescriptive discipline is to have a purpose.  Relativism is 
related to emotivism, or the position that moral beliefs are mere expressions of subjective 
opinion and thus cannot be proven or criticised from a rational basis or proven through 
argumentation (Edgar 2002, p.46; MacIntyre 2007, pp.23–4). While the theories described 
here have different approaches to justify actions with ethical conceptions such as the good life, 
universal principles or validity claims, each implicitly endorses the possibility of distinguishing 
between right and wrong actions by some criteria, through argumentation.  If moral relativism 
is accepted, we surrender the emancipatory possibility of appeal to ‘rational’ moral ideals or 
conceptions of the good, defined for example through virtuous behaviour, as a means to 
criticise ‘wrong’ actions.  Procedural approaches to ethics, such as Habermas’ discourse ethics 
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(Habermas 1984; Habermas 1985) (see: Section 7.3.2), provide a way out of the relativist trap; 
while particular positions are possibly subjective, a structured approach to ethical decision-
making guarantees that, in establishing norms for cooperative social life, all stakeholders can 
advance and question claims by identical rational criteria.  Even without a procedural approach 
to ethical decision-making, ethical assessment must be seen as a quest to avoid purely 
relativistic guides to action through rational argumentation if it is meant to improve the quality 
of social life against some ideal.  The fact that the entities affected by this process have 
interests (cf. Singer 1993), or can benefit from or be harmed by decisions, further suggests that 
all claims and outcomes should not be equally valid. 
3.2 Results13 
Academic discourse discussing ethical implications of PHM was reviewed to assess the types of 
ethical issues, theories and concepts linked to PHM.  A total of 118 sources were reviewed.  
Nine ethical themes were identified across the literature.  In addition to the categories of PHM 
discussed above, five demographic groups of target users were identified during review of the 
literature.  The literature is organised into tables by category in Appendix I. 
The following is a thematic overview of the findings.  Although the ethical themes emerged 
according to frequency14, the overview does not merely highlight this frequency.  Rather, the 
discussed results were chosen for one of four reasons:  (1) to draw attention to common 
interpretations of ethical themes and concepts, (2) to emphasise individual cases and issues 
that demonstrate ethical implications, (3) to highlight studies with an in-depth analysis of 
ethical concepts and issues, and (4) to identify gaps in the discussion in need of further 
research.  The discussion focuses on the author’s analysis and interpretation of the literature. 
Before proceeding with the overview, definitions are required for terms used in discussing the 
results.  The creators or subjects of data (e.g. who the data is ‘about)’ are denoted as ‘users’.  
This title highlights the interaction between persons and PHM systems, which creates the data 
affecting privacy.  The identity of the user is known to the system or its operator, whether real 
or pseudonymous.  Persons or organisations that handle the data once created are referred to 
as ‘data custodians’.  Other stakeholders, including carers, clinicians, healthcare professionals 
                                                          
13
 The results of the literature review concerning themes in PHM ethics discourse have led to the 
publication of articles in conference proceedings (see: Appendix 17) and one manuscript currently under 
peer-review for publication in the International Journal of Technoethics (see: Appendix A18.1). 
14
 N-values for each ethical theme can be found in Appendix 1 Table 3. 
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and management may also have a claim to the data.  A ‘misuse’ of data is any use (e.g. 
searching, analysis, comparison) to which the user has not consented.  Data refers to 
measurements of quantities and qualities which can be interpreted, compared and analysed. 
3.2.1 Privacy 
Privacy emerged as the dominant theme in the reviewed literature, often being connected to 
or defined by issues of autonomy, stigma, security and risk.  Of the 118 sources reviewed, 68 
sources mentioned privacy.  Of these, 33 sources addressed designing PHM or underlying 
security/privacy architectures, 20 were empirical studies into user, family or professional 
attitudes, 12 reviewed literature about privacy, risk or security aspects, nine were theoretical 
analyses or conceptual discussions, five analysed normative dimensions of future scenarios of 
PHM usage and two were risk assessments.  Two general types of privacy emerged:  data 
privacy and personal privacy. 
3.2.1.1 Data Privacy 
A majority of the reviewed literature focused on aspects of controlling and disseminating data 
about oneself.  Data privacy was interpreted as the right to control data about oneself and 
limit third-party access (e.g. van De Garde-Perik et al. 2006; Tentori et al. 2006; van Hoof et al. 
2007; Jea et al. 2008; Mitseva et al. 2008; Chan et al. 2009; Demiris 2009; Tiwari et al. 2010; 
Mittelstadt et al. 2011).  At its narrowest, data privacy was equated with hiding personally 
identifiable data from unauthorised parties (Ahamed, Talukder & Kameas 2007; Garcia-
Morchon et al. 2011), and was seen as quantifiable (Srinivasan et al. 2008).  Concerns over 
data control were common among participants in empirical studies (Melenhorst et al. 2004; 
Coughlin et al. 2007; Courtney 2008; Little & Briggs 2009; Wilkowska et al. 2010) although 
qualitative dialogue to understand their motivations was found less often (e.g. Beaudin et al. 
2006a; Percival & Hanson 2006; Coughlin et al. 2007; Coughlin et al. 2009; Dorsten et al. 2009; 
Little & Briggs 2009).  Unauthorised access or identification of the user may be prevented 
through anonymisation at data collection (Agrafioti et al. 2011), with access policies allowing 
chosen actors access to identifiable data (Bagüés et al. 2007a; Subramaniam et al. 2010; 
Garcia-Morchon et al. 2011) for acceptable purposes (Beaudin et al. 2006a; Massacci et al. 
2009; Chakraborty et al. 2011).  Transparency of relationships between data collected and 
purposes of collection is central to protecting privacy of users (Giannotti & Saygin 2010), who 
make decisions regarding acceptable uses. 
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Data privacy empowers users to control the information revealed to others, limiting 
opportunities for unwanted disturbances and exploitation.  Information enables regulation, 
behavioural control and social categorisation by those with greater access (Kosta et al. 2010), 
so controlling information flow enhances dignity, autonomy and privacy by acting as a check 
on the power of data custodians (Friedewald et al. 2007; Moncrieff et al. 2009).  Risks 
associated with uses of personal data beyond those found acceptable by users require “strict 
guidelines of confidentiality” to prevent unwanted personalised marketing and insurance 
premiums (Percival & Hanson 2006; Kosta et al. 2010), or discrimination against (non)users 
wishing to limit access to their personal data (Brey 2005).  It would appear that information 
about temporal limitations and purposes for data use need to be available to users before data 
gathering to limit data misuses and come closer to an ideal of informed consent, by which the 
user is able to understand the potential for misuse. 
Despite the empowerment derived from data privacy, it appears absolute control over 
personal data may not be necessary for PHM to be accepted by users.  Empirical studies into 
attitudes towards PHM revealed a preference to forego data privacy in emergency situations 
(Rashid et al. 2007, p.191; Steele et al. 2009), suggesting a need to find a balance between the 
desire to control data and enjoy the benefits of services which require that data.  A similar 
balance is expressed in preferences towards PHM for data gathering over human intrusion into 
the home (Essén 2008).  User-end policies have been proposed as a solution which allows 
users to pre-define a customised level of privacy meeting their expectations (Friedewald et al. 
2007; Massacci et al. 2009; Garcia-Morchon et al. 2011).15  Privacy tools such as these are said 
to enable users to interact with a range of PHM systems without negotiating individual privacy 
agreements, while respecting the necessity of informed consent (Bagüés et al. 2007a).  
Reliance upon ‘enterprise’ level policies, in which data custodians (rather than users) define 
appropriate uses of stored data, are seen as inappropriate in scenarios in which users are 
constantly in contact with multiple monitoring systems (Friedewald et al. 2007, p.27; Bagüés et 
al. 2010, p.342). 
Many of the challenges to data privacy stem from the capacity to collect large amounts of data 
about the personal lives and health of users, which can be organised and searched, enabling 
                                                          
15
 User ownership of personal data has also been suggested as a solution to data mining risks presented 
by PHM (Pentland 2009); this solution would, however, present a significant barrier to the realisation of 
legitimate commercial and research interests, and would require sophisticated legislation detailing 
appropriate third party uses of personal data without the explicit consent of the data owners. 
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various forms of data mining and profiling (Bohn et al. 2005; Friedewald et al. 2007, p.15).  
Contextual information is required to understand the meaning and importance of such data, 
which justifies increasingly pervasive data collection in the name of better service or improved 
health outcomes.  It is this ‘feedback loop’, in which increasingly pervasive health monitoring 
justifies further surveillance and classification of users as ‘at risk’, in which health surveillance 
concerns seem most plausible. 
3.2.1.1.1 Security 
Although not included in the search query, security emerged as a theme in data privacy 
literature.  Privacy and security were frequently conceptually interchangeable (e.g. Ahamed, 
Talukder & Haque 2007; Chan et al. 2008; Stuart et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2008; Armac et al. 
2009; Garcia-Morchon et al. 2009; Busnel & Giroux 2010; Dhukaram et al. 2011; Elkhodr et al. 
2011; Mana et al. 2011); ensuring system security through appropriate frameworks and 
encryption algorithms was taken to guarantee user privacy.  The concepts can be 
differentiated by their ends: security is concerned with guaranteeing the quality of the data 
collected by and passing through a system in terms of “confidentiality, integrity and 
availability” (Giannotti & Saygin 2010, p.75), enabling users to protect privacy by controlling 
dissemination of personal data.  Under this distinction, security mechanisms may alert a user 
to flows of information between systems and stakeholders (Moncrieff et al. 2009), which could 
be limited to respect data privacy.   
Security risks were defined in terms of interception, modification and falsification of sensor 
data (Acharya & Kumar 2010; Lim et al. 2010), and authentication schemes (Massacci et al. 
2009; Subramaniam et al. 2010; Giannetsos et al. 2011).16  Security frameworks including key 
management schemes, encryption algorithms and authentication mechanisms were seen as 
protecting the confidentiality, integrity and flow of data passing through PHM systems (Chan 
et al. 2009; Acharya 2010; Fragopoulos et al. 2010; Giannotti & Saygin 2010).  Confidentiality 
refers to limiting access to data to stakeholders with authorisation (Giannotti & Saygin 2010, 
p.77; Giannetsos et al. 2011, p.1299).  In these terms, security features enhance a user’s ability 
to control and trust his data—the conceptual confusion seen in the reviewed literature is 
therefore unsurprising. 
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Trust emerged in the reviewed literature as a necessary component for PHM systems to be 
seen as ‘privacy enhancing’ (e.g. Rashid et al. 2007; Yuan et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2008; 
Coughlin et al. 2009; Bagüés et al. 2010; Chakraborty et al. 2011; Dhukaram et al. 2011), when 
privacy is interpreted as control over personal data.  In the context of data privacy, trust is 
interpreted as an interaction between a system that collects and processes data, the users that 
provide the data, and stakeholders who access it.   
A lack of trust in a system has been linked to reluctance among potential users to use systems 
(Brey 2005; McLean 2011).  Users ‘place trust’ in systems and stakeholders to handle their data 
responsibly, which facilitates and secures data sharing (Little & Briggs 2009; Bagüés et al. 2010, 
p.352; Kosta et al. 2010).  Trust can be interpreted as a sum of the credibility, motivation, 
transparency and responsibility of a system.  Credibility is linked to ‘loyalty’ or ‘reputation’ (cf. 
Rashid et al. 2007, p.190; Little & Briggs 2009); a stakeholder must be seen as responsible or 
credible enough to handle sensitive personal data.  Motivation refers to the intentions of 
stakeholders, or how they intend to use the data of users.  To achieve trust these motivations, 
as well as the extent of data held, must be transparent to users so that the system (and its 
custodians) are seen as responsible. 
Trust is something that develops over time, based upon development of the system and 
stakeholders involved (Giannotti & Saygin 2010).  Trust exists in stakeholders relationship into 
which PHM is introduced, for example when replacing ‘face-to-face’ clinical encounters with 
‘virtual consultations’ (e.g. Chan et al. 2008; Department of Health 2011b).   
When trust is breached, for example if an unauthorised third party accesses data, it must be 
clear who can be held responsible, and to what extent (Little & Briggs 2009).  Systems and 
stakeholders that clearly establish responsibility before a system is implemented are, 
according to this conception of trust, more trustworthy. 
3.2.1.2 Personal Privacy 
Personal privacy describes aspects of privacy not related to control of data, although the 
distinction between data and personal privacy is not always rigid in the literature.  By 
controlling the dissemination of personal data, a person may be spared future physical, social 
and decisional disturbance from third parties, such as friends, family and service providers (e.g. 
Friedewald et al. 2007, p.16).  Personal privacy was interpreted to mean the right to be left 
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alone or not monitored by a third party (e.g. Pallapa et al. 2007; Demiris & Hensel 2009; 
Dorsten et al. 2009; Wilkowska et al. 2010; Mittelstadt et al. 2011), which affects intimacy and 
control over private spaces (Gaul & Ziefle 2009; Ziefle et al. 2011).17  Personal privacy can also 
be a freedom, to “escape being observed or accessed when desired” (Essén 2008, p.130), 
implying a duty to respect the desire for isolation.  The introduction of PHM may cause a 
gradual loss of personal privacy (Steele et al. 2009), particularly among smart home systems 
(Coughlin et al. 2007; Demiris 2009; Dorsten et al. 2009).  Monitoring technologies can create a 
psychological disturbance, sometimes called obtrusiveness (Hensel et al. 2006; Nefti et al. 
2010), expressed as a feeling of ‘being watched’; certain technologies, particularly cameras, 
commonly inspire this concern (Demiris et al. 2004; Caine et al. 2006; Stowe & Harding 2010; 
Tiwari et al. 2010; Leone et al. 2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011). 
Personal privacy is a multifaceted concept, defined by interactions between individuals, ICT 
and the natural world, which includes: 
 Physical Privacy – Physical accessibility of a person to others, defined by physical 
borders, such as doors and walls (Brey 2005; Essén 2008; Little & Briggs 2009; Bowes 
et al. 2011).  Can include a right to personal space (Kosta et al. 2010), such as the 
home. 
 Social Privacy – Control over social interaction through geographical distance, group 
membership and location.  Connected to physical privacy (Coughlin et al. 2007; Bagüés 
et al. 2007b; Little & Briggs 2009) and social isolation. 
 Decisional Privacy – Absence of undesired interference from others in making 
decisions (Essén 2008; Bowes et al. 2011).  Decisional privacy enables the expression of 
autonomy. 
 
Physical and social privacy are placed at risk by the capacity of PHM to transmit data to third 
parties (Brey 2005; Friedewald et al. 2007), or move personal data past privacy protecting 
natural, social, spatial, temporal, ephemeral and transitory borders (cf. Marx 2001).  PHM 
increases the interconnectness of users and stakeholders through data sharing which blurs the 
boundaries between ‘public’ and ‘private’ spaces and data. 
Decisional privacy is placed at risk when monitoring is seen as electronic surveillance.  
Awareness of monitoring can affect behaviour (Essén 2008), especially risk taking among 
seniors (Percival & Hanson 2006; Remmers 2010) which may express a desire to retain 
                                                          
17
 The distinction between personal and data privacy was not always upheld in the reviewed literature, 
with control over dissemination of personal information occasionally understood as a form of personal 
privacy (cf. Bagüés et al. 2010). 
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independence at home, despite safety risks.  Monitoring may also lead to ‘labelling’ of users as 
‘health impaired’ or ‘at-risk’ (Percival & Hanson 2006; Rigby 2007; McLean 2011), further 
limiting behavioural freedom (Kosta et al. 2010).  Alternatively, the user’s home may be 
increasingly freed from external interference by reducing the need for carer visits; whether 
this is desirable, particularly among the mentally impaired and physically frail, remains a 
question of appropriate balances between safety, autonomy and self-determination 
(Remmers, 2010).  The need for ‘self-care’ can be reduced if PHM sends emergency 
notifications autonomously (Bowes et al. 2011), which violates decisional privacy through 
automatic sharing of data in the interests of satfety, causing an intrusion of a third party into 
the user’s private space. 
3.2.1.2.1 Surveillance 
These aspects of personal privacy are placed ‘at risk’ by technologies which enable the 
digitisation of the body, private life and spheres (cf. Nissenbaum 2004), including behaviours, 
decisions and physiological parameters.  Warnings of a “Big Brother” future in which electronic 
surveillance pervades private life have become common (Welsh et al. 2003; Brey 2005; 
Percival & Hanson 2006; Bowes et al. 2011), but perhaps overly pessimistic and too eager to 
assign responsibility for ‘surveillance’ to a vaguely sinister ‘other’  (Essén 2008; Sorell & Draper 
2012), be it a medical institution, service provider or government.  These predictions may be 
overblown, as PHM monitors identified users rather than public spaces (see: Section 2.3.2.4).  
Despite this, the capacity to transmit sensitive personal data to third parties, and the 
opportunities for building ‘health profiles’ of users afforded by this capacity (cf. Brey 2005), 
suggests that pervasive surveillance may be possible through PHM. 
3.2.1.2.2 Rights 
Personal privacy implies that humans possess a right to freedom of action, expressed in terms 
of autonomy, self-determination or independence.  This right can be (justifiably) violated 
through third party inference.  For instance, actions which undermine a person’s 
independence, such as the installation of PHM at the request of family members (Rigby 2007), 
are taken to violate decisional privacy because the user is no longer able to act free of external 
judgment within a private space.  To conceive of this as a ‘violation’ implies freedom of action 
is worth protecting.  Personal privacy is therefore intrinsically linked with political conceptions 
of humans as rights possessing entities (Remmers 2010; Zwijsen et al. 2011), and with ethical 




Although autonomy was frequently identified as an important ethical consideration, it was 
rarely defined or supported by reference to background theories of autonomy, personhood or 
human dignity.  Autonomy was interpreted to mean the right to make personal decisions 
(Fellbaum 2008, p.161; Demiris 2009; Islam et al. 2009, p.2), a right to freedom (Brey 2005) or 
a right to independence (Remmers 2010; Wilkowska et al. 2010; Ziefle et al. 2011).  Autonomy 
was discussed in terms of freedom and independence in the context of assistive technologies 
(Robinson et al. 2007; Busnel & Giroux 2010; Remmers 2010; Wilkowska et al. 2010; Zwijsen et 
al. 2011), smart homes (Brey 2005; Remmers 2010; Townsend et al. 2011) and residential care 
facilities (Dorsten et al. 2009; Zwijsen et al. 2011).  Retaining independence in decision-making 
was seen as an issue of autonomy in residential care where opt-in/out systems may be 
necessary to maintain respect for the autonomy of individual residents (Percival & Hanson 
2006; Remmers 2010). 
User autonomy can also be affected by the belief that developers, administrators or 
monitoring systems harbour behavioural expectations.  Smart homes, telehealth and telecare 
have been shown to exhibit passive control over users, including the alteration of daily 
routines based on the presence of monitoring (Tiwari et al. 2010; Sanders et al. 2012) for 
example by sleeping at certain times or not leaving the house for fear of being viewed as 
wandering (Tiwari et al. 2010).  Such alterations have been traced to the perception of a 
“watcher” on the “other side” of the monitor (Essén 2008), or the perception that the 
monitoring system is expecting behaviours within a “normal range.”   The ‘expectations’ built 
into a system, or the patterns which define ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour, become very 
important in this context; developers exhibit passive control over the behaviours of users by 
defining physiological and behavioural norms (see: Section 3.4.1.4). 
Inhibition of autonomy extends beyond behavioural control, with PHM influencing self-
identification, particularly among dependent users who develop a reliance on PHM (Brey 2005; 
Friedewald et al. 2007).  PHM can help care for individuals by reducing the need for the 
presence of a human carer, replaced instead by ‘always-on’ monitoring and emergency alerts.  
By providing a ‘safety net’ PHM can impede self-determination by reducing self-reliance 
(Percival & Hanson 2006; Remmers 2010).  In other words, the perception that a carer will be 
alerted if something goes wrong may reduce feelings of personal responsibility for maintaining 
health (Fugger et al. 2007; Demiris 2009; Bowes et al. 2011).  Dependent users may also 
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experience changes to their role in user-carer relationships—Kenner (2008) suggests carers 
can intervene in the life of the user based on PHM data, violating the user’s right to privacy 
and autonomy.  Infringements are possible regardless of the intent of intervention.  Medically 
beneficial interventions are not necessarily respectful of privacy or autonomy, as suggested by 
the tension characterising adoption of PHM (See: Section 3.3.2). 
Autonomy, conceived of as a right to independence, may also be enhanced by PHM aimed to 
support the elderly and chronically ill with living independently at home.  In a study of 
potential users, elderly and chronically ill individuals expressed a willingness to self-monitor 
critical bodily functions if it reduces the need for carer visits (Wilkowska et al. 2010, p.88).  
PHM enables patients in need of assistance to escape the “indignity” of being cared for by 
others (Gaul & Ziefle 2009, p.329).  Conceptually, indignity can be connected to stigma derived 
from requiring care (Gaul & Ziefle 2009, p.330); to require support is to be perceived as ‘old’, 
‘ill’ or ‘infirm’, and thus more dependent (Ziefle et al. 2011, p.410).  PHM can promote 
independence by reducing the burden placed on carers, while enabling patients to choose a 
method of care which matches their values or desire for independent living, although an 
overriding ‘need’ for the technology to feel safe may dominate the decision to adopt PHM. 
3.2.3 Safety 
PHM was seen to enhance safety when it contributes to detection and treatment of ill health.  
One study identified a lack of contextual information in PHM data presented to physicians and 
nurses as a possible safety risk, potentially causing misdiagnosis (Kaplan & Litewka 2008).  
Systems are often promoted as protecting or enhancing the safety of users (Nordgren 2012), 
particularly among individuals with dementia and their carers (Lauriks et al. 2007).  Safety 
appeared as a ‘goal’ that trumps ethical concerns, particularly in studies of dementia carer 
attitudes (Topo 2009; Landau, Werner, et al. 2010), which is troubling when monitoring 
individuals lacking the capacity to consent or choose preferred methods of care.18     
3.2.3.1 Ethical Tradeoffs based on Technological Need 
Safety was connected to a ‘need’ for PHM, particularly among elderly and chronically ill 
individuals (Melenhorst et al. 2004; Courtney 2008).  Need is a multi-factored concept built 
                                                          
18
 As an example of the bias towards safety in the literature, consider the contentious claims of Lauriks 
et al. (2007).  It is not clear if the study included individuals with dementia in reaching the conclusion 
that “GPS systems are proven to result in feelings of enhanced safety and less fear and anxiety.”  This 
conclusion appears to be based on the results of a single study, and cannot be generalised to all 
individuals with dementia. 
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upon internal and external perceptions of health and well-being, as well as the compatibility of 
PHM to the user’s environment and current care regime (Courtney et al. 2008).  Ethical issues 
caused by monitoring, such as a loss of privacy, can be justified by a ‘need’ for the technology 
derived from safety concerns related to health (Steele et al. 2009; Zwijsen et al. 2011).  This 
type of justification is described as a ‘tradeoff’, meaning that the benefit of safety is worth the 
cost of privacy or other undesirable implications.  The correlation between need and ethical 
concepts is, however, not always a negative tradeoff; an elderly user who ‘needs’ PHM to 
monitor his safety at home may also experience enhanced autonomy by delaying a move to 
residential care through monitoring (Essén 2008; Remmers 2010; McLean 2011; Townsend et 
al. 2011) or reducing the need for carer visits (Essén 2008; Ojasalo et al. 2010).   
Tradeoffs were often seen between personal privacy and safety, particularly among the 
mentally impaired (Landau, Werner, et al. 2010; Ojasalo et al. 2010; Stowe & Harding 2010), as 
well as frail elderly (Melenhorst et al. 2004; Courtney 2008; Courtney et al. 2008; Steele et al. 
2009) and chronically ill persons (Neild et al. 2004; Salih et al. 2011).  These tradeoffs may be 
seen as a necessary part of aging, with increasing susceptability to health problems (Steele et 
al. 2009), though this view should not be applied generally to associate ‘aging’ with reduced 
expectations of privacy, or to justify increasing violations of privacy in healthcare. 
3.2.4 Obtrusiveness and Visibility 
Obtrusiveness was identified as relevant to long-term acceptability of PHM (Demiris 2009; 
Demiris & Hensel 2009; Nefti et al. 2010; De Bleser et al. 2011; Townsend et al. 2011; Ziefle et 
al. 2011).  Several studies employed a common framework of obtrusiveness in interviews and 
focus groups with users of smart home “assistive technologies” (Hensel et al. 2006; Demiris & 
Hensel 2009; Tiwari et al. 2010).  The framework defines obtrusiveness, according to 22 
subcategories, as “a summary evaluation by a person based on characteristics or effects 
associated with the technology that are perceived as undesirable and physically and/or 
psychologically prominent,” meaning it is judged by the individual within a specific context 
(Hensel et al. 2006).  Although obtrusiveness appeared frequently as a term in the reviewed 
literature, the studies using this framework were alone in having a clear definition.  The 
framework alludes to the distinction between physical and mental obtrusiveness as seen in 
non-medical ambient intelligence applications (cf. Brey 2005).  According to these studies, a 
sense of obtrusiveness may lead participants to subvert PHM, for example by not stepping on 
pressure sensors (Courtney et al. 2007). 
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The related concept of visibility is interpreted as the degree to which a PHM device is 
noticeable by the user and other individuals, at home and in public (Robinson et al. 2007; 
Essén 2008; Landau, Werner, et al. 2010; Wilkowska et al. 2010; van Hoof et al. 2011).  
Visibility differs from obtrusiveness in its emphasis on the public sphere.  Characteristics 
affecting visibility include ease of use, size and weight (Landau, Werner, et al. 2010), 
suggesting a link to psychological and physical obtrusiveness.  Reducing the visibility of PHM 
may be a desirable outcome according to developers (Fellbaum 2008) and users (Essén 2008; 
van Hoof et al. 2011), but it is not without problems. 
The psychological disappearance of PHM can be problematic in two ways.  While 
disappearance may initially promote acceptance of the technology and preserve the meaning 
or character of the home (Courtney 2008), users with cognitive impairment may eventually 
forget entirely about the monitoring equipment.  This type of ‘covert’ monitoring raises 
questions of consent (Kenner 2008; Bowes et al. 2011), which was not recognised in all studies 
mentioning the phenomenon (e.g. van Hoof et al. 2011).  The issue of consent extends to 
individuals entering the home of a monitored individual, which suggests the possibility of 
inadvertent monitoring (Neild et al. 2004).  Whether users have a responsibility to inform 
guests of the presence of PHM remains an open question.   
3.2.5 Stigma and Identity 
PHM creates possibilities for a user to experience stigma, which can influence self-identity, for 
example by identifying as a ‘patient’ when wearing monitoring in public (e.g. Courtney 2008).  
Stigma is linked to the visibility of a system, and has implications for the identity of the user.  
The relationship must be approached from both public and private perspectives to reveal the 
source of stigma and effects on user identity. 
From a public perspective, PHM that is visible to others can cause stigma, influencing self-
esteem and self-identification as a patient.  PHM was seen to cause feelings of frailty and 
perceptions of external judgment from others in residential care based on the public visibility 
of the device (Courtney 2008), although the problem could potentially be mitigated through 
aesthetic choices (cf. Wu et al. 2012) or community wide implementation (Courtney 2008).  
Attractive as the latter solution may be, it violates the principle that PHM applications should 
be customised to the user’s individualised needs to avoid “monitoring for monitoring’s sake” 
(Bowes et al. 2011), or pursuing monitoring as an end in itself (Coughlin et al. 2007; McLean 
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2011).  Forcing monitoring upon residents without a need or desire for it would be 
disrespectful of their right to autonomy, making community wide implementations ethically 
problematic. 
From a private perspective, the relationship between autonomy and identity is important.  
PHM can affect how user’s self-identify if seen to represent frailty, dependence, illness or 
characteristics associated with ageing (Sanders et al. 2012).  Changes to identity may be 
limited to PHM used to monitor chronic illnesses or health conditions associated with ageing, 
while being less likely with PHM used for preventative purposes (e.g. lifestyle monitors) or for 
monitoring acute conditions.  By eliminating the opportunity to overcome obstacles associated 
with ageing, PHM eliminates experiences that contribute to “a new sense [of] the meaning of 
life” for the elderly (Remmers 2010).  Even without technological reliance, systems can 
influence how a user’s identity develops over time by automatically reporting risky or harmful 
behaviours indicative of frailty (Sanders et al. 2012).  These activities are often hidden by 
elders wishing to control the image presented to outsiders (Percival & Hanson 2006), meaning 
PHM can erode the ability to manage public identity. 
3.2.6 Social Isolation 
Concern was seen regarding socially isolating users if the need for face-to-face interaction with 
GPs, professional and informal carers, friends and family is reduced where PHM is used for 
preventative monitoring or home care of the chronically ill and infirm (Demiris et al. 2004; 
Friedewald et al. 2007, p.26; Little & Briggs 2009; Stowe & Harding 2010; Tiwari et al. 2010; 
Sorell & Draper 2012; Wu et al. 2012).  Isolation may occur if PHM is used to ‘care’ for patients 
in place of human carers as can be expected in efforts to reduce care costs and demand 
(Collste & Verweij 2012), jeopardising the health benefits of regular social interaction and 
physical touch (Chan et al. 2008).  Isolation may be a necessary tradeoff if PHM is intended to 
enhance autonomy or independent living, as the latter cannot improve without a reduction in 
interference in behaviour (Sorell & Draper 2012, p.42), for example through carer visits. 
Studies of the elderly have shown a concern that PHM will replace personal and social 
interactions (Chan et al. 2008; McLean 2011; Palm 2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011; Wu et al. 2012) 
rather than supplementing them.  Contextual information may also be less available when 
assessing a patient’s condition (Percival & Hanson 2006), suggesting that the quality of 
diagnosis and care is diminished by the loss of face-to-face encounters.  Sufficiently complex 
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emerging applications may be able to monitor enough contextual characteristics to provide an 
accurate picture of the person's physical and mental state (Pentland 2009; Sadri 2011), but the 
ability of extant monitoring systems to correctly assess complex emotional and social 
conditions indicating distress is questionable. 
Assistive homecare robots (Wu et al. 2012) and social networking features (Percival & Hanson 
2006) have been proposed as solutions to the problem of social isolation.  Classifying these 
interventions as solutions rests on the questionable assumption that human interaction can be 
adequately replaced by technological interventions.  According to Palm (2011), if PHM is 
viewed by professional care providers as a replacement for social interaction among 
dependent patients, morally unjustifiable burdens may be placed on “informal carers” (family 
members, relatives, spouses) that are increasingly responsible for providing care and face-to-
face interaction, while also suffering the social and physiological burdens of these roles (cf. 
Williams 2002, p.143).  Furthermore, although social networking can reduce feelings of 
isolation (cf. Feenberg et al. 1996), in doing so it forces users to give up personal information 
to regain the social interaction lost to PHM. 
Social isolation may be mitigated by a feeling of increased connectivity to care services 
mediated by PHM, for example through quicker access to GPs or data custodians (Dhukaram et 
al. 2011; Ure et al. 2012).  Although helpful, connectivity is not equivalent to face-to-face 
encounters in terms of physical touch and awareness of context, and should not be seen as a 
like-for-like replacement when assessing PHM. 
3.2.7 Delivery of Care 
Relatively few sources discussed the impact of PHM on medical personnel.  Two studies 
examining carers and power relationships concluded that “surveillance” in a social care setting 
can lead to new power relationships among professional carers and recipients, affecting 
interactions during visits (Kenner 2008; Vuokko 2008).  If granted access to monitoring data 
carers can ensure patients are following recommended medical interventions or detect risky 
behaviours, potentially disrespecting the patient’s right to privacy and self-determination 
(Remmers 2010).  Concerns were also expressed over the impact on professional carers, 
including the collection of data without the knowledge of patients/workers in public locations, 
such as hospitals (Tentori et al. 2006), or activity and location tracking of medical personnel 
(Ahamed, Talukder & Kameas 2007, p.208).  A connection with social isolation was seen in the 
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worry that PHM used to replace human interaction to prioritise care and reduce costs will limit 
carers to interventions recommended by PHM, and lessen opportunities for social contact with 
patients (Collste & Verweij 2012).  PHM is also perceived to threaten job security among home 
care workers if used as surveillance to expose human error (Tiwari et al. 2010; Collste & 
Verweij 2012), or to add to workloads or complicate work routines (Tiwari et al. 2010).  
Questions over the ethical acceptability of workplace surveillance within healthcare are raised; 
workers are deserving of some level of privacy (cf. Lankshear & Mason 2001), yet this right 
should be balanced against the need for oversight and patient safety.   
The influx of PHM data could also cause “information overload” for medical professionals, who 
may be obligated to review all available information about a patient (Kaplan & Litewka 2008).  
Alternatively, monitoring data may be useful to practitioners but lack practical value to users, 
which may jeopardise long-term use (Beaudin et al. 2006a), adding tension to the provider-
patient relationship and perhaps wasting valuable healthcare resources.  The implications for 
healthcare professionals expose the complex network of professional and personal 
relationships in which PHM will operate. 
3.2.8 Risk 
‘Risk’ was treated as an independent concept in the search terminology, with the hope that it 
would produce sources discussing normative aspects of PHM outside of the discussion of 
ethics, (e.g. Morris 2000; Hilty et al. 2004; Busnel & Giroux 2010; Kastenhofer 2011).  In 
contrast to expectations, the treatment of risk in the reviewed literature is mostly limited to 
privacy and security implications of PHM (Pentland 2009; Lim et al. 2010; Nefti et al. 2010; 
Sadri 2011) or risk taking behaviours of seniors (Percival & Hanson 2006; Remmers 2010).  Risk 
was rarely conceptualised as a future-oriented concept, as seen in risk assessments of future 
scenarios (e.g. Friedewald et al. 2007; Kastenhofer 2011).  The inclusion of ‘risk’ as an 
independent concept in the search terminology did not contribute content beyond the themes 
addressed.  The exception was a risk assessment identifying normative aspects of pervasive 
computing including environmental and human effects of non-ionizing radiation, stress 
imposed on users, restriction of consumers' and patients' freedom of choice, threats to 
ecological sustainability, and dissipation of responsibility in computer-controlled environments 




Medicalisation rarely appeared as a concept in the reviewed literature, although several 
studies described issues that can be interpreted as medicalisation of the home environment.  
Borrowing a definition from outside the reviewed literature, medicalisation is defined as 
transformation of “aspects of life previously outside the jurisdiction of medicine” into medical 
problems (Clarke et al. 2003, p.161).  In the context of the home, medicalisation occurs when a 
user is reminded of a health condition due to the presence of a monitoring system.  In this 
sense, PHM introduces a medical aspect into the “experiences and meaning of home” 
(Courtney 2008), which is otherwise seen as a place where privacy and identity are protected 
(Courtney et al. 2008).  Multiple studies remind PHM developers of their responsibility to 
address medicalisation of the home (Chan et al. 2008; Demiris & Hensel 2009; Gentry 2009; 
Bowes et al. 2011).  A risk for developers is to view the home environment as a blank canvas 
for medical monitoring technologies, or “just a machine” (Gentry 2009).  In this case the home 
could be turned into a medical environment or “de facto intensive care unit,” eliminating the 
public-private divide between home and “brick and mortar” medical environments (Chan et al. 
2008; Demiris & Hensel 2009; Bowes et al. 2011), turning the home into a ‘virtual hospital’ for 
all its inhabitants, not only users. 
The potential for medicalisation goes beyond the home.  Proliferation of PHM data could lead 
to the medicalisation of the lives of users, in which previously unnoticed fluctuations in 
physiological parameters and behaviours throughout the day enter the attention of users, 
reminding them of their condition (Dhukaram et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 2012).  Clinicians in 
one study suggested they would be reluctant to recommend PHM due to “fear their patients 
will overreact” to the collected data, whereas patients fear being diagnosed with a medical 
condition that would have otherwise gone unnoticed (Beaudin et al. 2006b).  With that said, 
an increase in the availability of personalised medical information could also lead to a better 
working relationship between patient and physician, for example through the reinforcement of 
healthy habits when a “weight loss plateau” is encountered (Beaudin et al. 2006b).  Effects 
such as these stemming from placing greater attention on user health conditions can be 




3.3 Critical Analysis of the Discourse19 
The discourse is filled with descriptions and analysis of ethical implications for specific 
applications, contexts of use and users of PHM.  While themes were identified in the discourse, 
technology-level analysis adopting a holistic view of PHM as an array of related applications 
and artefacts (cf. Brey 2011) was uncommon (cf. Brey 2005; Palm 2011; Sadri 2011).  The 
application-led approach is a commendable pragmatic approach to ethical analysis, useful for 
assessing implications of specific uses; indeed, much of applied ethics follows this course (e.g. 
Jonsen 2007).  However, the specificity of the cases considered meant that gaps are inevitable 
in the discourse, based on a lack of in-depth theoretical analysis and consideration of 
technology-level implications.  In some cases, the discourse as a whole fails in terms of its 
scope, for example with inadequate attention paid to ethical implications for particular 
applications or demographics of potential users.  Many sources also lack a critical edge, for 
example in not questioning the inevitability of ethical implications evident in user attitudes 
towards adopting PHM.  Similarly, existing mechanisms of preventing ethical harm, such as 
data protection laws and informed consent, are uncritically accepted as adequate without 
questioning the need for refinement or updating to protect against implications of PHM.  
Finally, the usage of ethical concepts such as privacy and autonomy was often without clear 
theoretically informed definitions, undermining the validity and scope of findings.   
3.3.1 Technical and Demographic Limitations of Scope 
In the discourse environmental monitors for the elderly have received a majority of attention, 
with Mobile and In-Vivo Monitors given comparatively little (see: Appendix 1 Table 1.1).  Even 
with a large share of the discourse, the discussion of ethical issues of Environmental Monitors 
was often superficial (cf. Niemeijer et al. 2010; Zwijsen et al. 2011), lacking reference to 
underlying concepts or theories.  It could be argued that despite the variety of PHM 
applications and technical features, the ethical implications are more or less common across 
the field, so the technical gaps are not problematic.  However, as suggested by the problems 
faced by technologically deterministic accounts of medical technologies (e.g. Timmermans & 
Berg 2003) as well as the conclusions reached in PHM-Ethics and ETICA, it cannot be assumed 
that technologies with similar technological characteristics will give rise to identical ethical 
implications across varying contexts, in which the technology and its implications are given 
meaning by stakeholders with varying backgrounds and moral values.  Features of specific 
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 The term ‘critical analysis’ is not an appeal to critical theory (e.g. (Stahl 2008); it refers only to an 
analysis with criticism. 
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contexts, such as user values and expectations of care, change how ethical implications are 
experienced.   
It follows that for a discourse dominated by application-specific analysis to provide sufficient 
understanding of the technology, as many categories of applications (see: Chapter 2), contexts 
of use (e.g. residential care, cohabited homes) and users (e.g. patient groups) need to be 
assessed as possible.  The discourse fails to give adequate attention to the range of 
demographic groups being targeted by PHM, particularly the non-elderly, healthy and acute 
patients, which is problematic if ethical implications are unique to specific contexts, especially 
when considering that applications aimed at different demographics possess different 
technical features and ends.  Elderly and chronically ill users received the majority of attention 
in the discourse (see: Appendix 1 Table 1.2).  In many cases PHM applications are designed 
with a specific age-group in mind, so the focus on the elderly is unsurprising considering the 
wealth of emerging smart home systems which respond to the growing burden placed on 
healthcare resources by individuals in the later stages of life (Remmers 2010; Palm 2011).  
Although it may be easiest to identify potential ethical issues in applications operating in the 
private sphere for the benefit of a ‘vulnerable’ population (e.g. Kenner 2008; McLean 2011), 
non-elderly users deserve more attention because the goals of PHM (e.g. preventative 
monitoring, chronic illness management) which PHM responds to are not age-specific.   
Many studies of the elderly treat advanced age as a chronic illness (cf. Agree et al. 2005; 
Percival & Hanson 2006; Courtney 2008; Courtney et al. 2008; Dorsten et al. 2009; Tiwari et al. 
2010) rather than as a normal process of life (Remmers 2010).20  In the discourse users are 
treated as patients adopting PHM in response to a health condition, which ignores the 
potential of PHM for preventative and lifestyle monitoring among healthy users.  Only five 
sources address implications of these uses among non-elderly and healthy users (Beaudin et al. 
2006b; Monahan & Wall 2007; Gaul & Ziefle 2009; Pentland 2009; Ziefle et al. 2011), despite 
these groups potentially being the largest (Dittmar et al. 1997; De Rossi et al. 2000; Lymberis 
2003; Ganti et al. 2010).  The potential implications of secondary uses of PHM data alone 
justifies further research into healthy users (cf. Cios & William Moore 2002; Monahan & Wall 
2007). 
                                                          
20
 The treatment of ageing as a medical condition, by which elderly people are described in “ageist” 
terms as frail or vulnerable, is not unique to the discussion of PHM (e.g. McLean 2011). 
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Secondary stakeholders (non-users) including medical personnel (Percival & Hanson 2006; 
Beaudin et al. 2006b; Melander-Wikman et al. 2007; Vuokko 2008; Landau, Auslander, et al. 
2010; Niemeijer et al. 2010; Tiwari et al. 2010; Agrafioti et al. 2011; Mittelstadt et al. 2011), 
family carers (Percival & Hanson 2006; Mahoney et al. 2007; Robinson et al. 2007; Landau, 
Auslander, et al. 2010; Palm 2011; Rigaud et al. 2011), and non-adopters were also given 
insufficient treatment in the literature (Palm 2011), despite serious potential effects on the 
relationships between users and non-users.  Non-adopters were entirely ignored as 
stakeholders in the literature, despite the potential for PHM to affect them indirectly, for 
example if healthcare commissioning is based on monitoring data.   
Clearly, the scope of stakeholders and interests considered in the literature needs expansion.  
Generalising findings from studies involving only elderly and chronically ill individuals to non-
elderly, healthy and acute users is problematic given variance in acceptance motives within 
age and health demographics (cf. Gaul & Ziefle 2009; Ziefle et al. 2011), as well as context and 
application specific implications.  As a result, demographic groups must be treated in future 
discourse as increasingly heterogeneous in terms of their responses to PHM, with non-elderly, 
healthy and acute users requiring more attention. 
3.3.2 The Inevitability of Ethical Tradeoffs  
Beyond the nine ethical themes identified, a common trait was found in the moral reasoning 
among participants in several studies.  A form of moral bargaining was seen which revealed an 
‘inherent duality’ in participants responding to the ethical challenges presented by PHM 
(Melenhorst et al. 2004; Mahoney et al. 2007; Courtney 2008; Demiris et al. 2008; Ding et al. 
2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011).  The inherent duality of participant’s moral views reveals the 
complexity of the ethical tradeoffs faced by individuals choosing to adopt PHM for themselves 
or others.  The belief that the technology would fulfil an important need that outweighs its 
downsides was common, for example with privacy concerns overridden by technological need 
based on safety concerns.  In this context deliberation was described as a “pragmatic 
approach” to adopting PHM, by which privacy implications are recognised by adopters but 
seen as less important than the safety need filled by the technology (Courtney et al. 2008, 
p.198).   
The inherent duality seen in moral deliberation (cf. Niemeijer et al. 2011) reveals a tension in 
the decision to adopt PHM by which users and third parties find appropriate tradeoffs 
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between moral values, technological benefits and burdens.  Many such conflicts were seen, 
including: 
 Freedom and Safety (e.g. Gammon et al. 2009; Landau, Werner, et al. 2010; Landau, 
Auslander, et al. 2010; Palm 2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011) 
 Privacy and Autonomy (e.g. Melenhorst et al. 2004; Essén 2008; Steele et al. 2009; 
Remmers 2010; Townsend et al. 2011) 
 Stigma and Safety (e.g. Melenhorst et al. 2004; Courtney 2008; Wu et al. 2012) 
 Autonomy and Safety (e.g. Percival & Hanson 2006; Kenner 2008; Gaul & Ziefle 2009; 
Wilkowska et al. 2010; Bowes et al. 2011; Ziefle et al. 2011) 
 Privacy and Safety (e.g. Melenhorst et al. 2004; Neild et al. 2004; Courtney 2008; 
Courtney et al. 2008; Ojasalo et al. 2010; Zwijsen et al. 2011) 
 Medicalisation and Safety (e.g. Chan et al. 2008; Courtney 2008; Demiris & Hensel 
2009; Bowes et al. 2011) 
These examples characterise the moral reasoning of users in adopting PHM as an ethical 
tradeoff between conflicting goods by stakeholders, in which benefits are enjoyed through the 
acceptance of undesirable outcomes.   
 Accepting this form of moral reasoning in which the acceptability of PHM is seen as a balance 
between privacy, autonomy and safety (cf. Mittelstadt et al. 2011) is problematic.  Deliberation 
is not dichotomous by necessity, with two values coming into direct conflict; deliberation will 
likely involve a range of ethical concepts and moral values, informed by the stakeholder’s 
individual background.  The implications of PHM are far more complex than allowed by these 
three familiar concepts which dominated the discourse (see: Appendix 1 Table 1.3).  This type 
of reasoning may be encouraged by the tendency among developers, evident in the morally 
loaded language used to advertise their products (e.g. Nordgren 2012), to embrace a 
technologically deterministic attitude by which PHM is believed to cause pre-determined, 
typically desirable outcomes (Fugger et al. 2007; van Hoof et al. 2011; Nordgren 2012), 
regardless of the context of use.  A similar attitude is taken by researchers who see PHM as 
‘morally neutral’ because users have the opportunity to rank different goods in an ethical 
tradeoff prior to adoption (e.g. Welsh et al. 2003; Martin et al. 2007). 
The acceptance of a dichotomous view of adoption, by which ethical tradeoffs are a necessity, 
implies that nothing can be done by developers or service providers to lessen the burdens for 
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users.  The fact that this view is so common in the discourse suggests that users fail to see 
possibilities for impacting on the design and deployment of PHM to better meet their values 
(e.g. Joss & Bellucci 2002; Friedman et al. 2008), for example regarding expectations of privacy. 
3.3.2.1 Context-Sensitivity and Ethical Tradeoffs 
The dominance of ethical tradeoffs in adoption thinking is also problematic in the sense that it 
presents a dichotomous positive/negative view of PHM, by which an application is generically 
‘privacy enhancing’ or ‘autonomy inhibiting’ for users across all contexts of use.  The tradeoff 
can be formulated as ‘adopting application X causes desirable effect Y and undesirable effect 
Z’.  Approaching tradeoffs in this deterministic fashion is problematic if ethical concepts and 
implications are given meaning by stakeholders in specific contexts (cf. Nissenbaum 2004) 
(see: Section 1.2.6), shaped by the user’s values, medical needs and expectations of care, as 
well as the effect of the technology on user expectations (cf. Latour & Venn 2002); this is why 
the same application can be privacy enhancing in one context, and inhibiting in another (see: 
Figure 3.1).  It is therefore problematic to rely solely on preconceived definitions, specifications 
and hierarchies of ethical concepts in empirical research (Clouser & Gert 1990; Martin et al. 
2007), or to assume the existence of a ‘common morality’ between researcher and 
participants.  Instead, a context-sensitive approach is required in which ethical concepts are 
given meaning by the stakeholders of a specific context. 
Figure 3.1 - Smart Homes and User-Specific Implications 
As an example of context-specificity, consider a smart home system designed to constantly 
monitor an elderly user to detect falls and other emergencies requiring carer intervention 
(cf. Chan et al., 2008).  User A welcomes the system in his home because it means that his 
daughter, who acts as his primary carer, does not need to visit as frequently to ‘check up’ on 
him, making sure (for example) that he has not had a fall or taken ill.  The system frees up 
the time of the daughter to pursue personal interests and projects, while helping User A 
regain his sense of independence which was lost when he started to require care on a 
regular basis from his daughter.  Although having similar care needs, User B hates the idea of 
having PHM in his home, because he values his privacy above all else.  While he understands 
the need to be ‘looked after’ by someone, he much prefers visits from his family members 
and friends because it gives him time to socialise and enjoy the company of others.  With 
that said, he knows that when he shuts the door behind them, his house becomes his private 
space once again.  The idea of an ‘always-on’ monitoring system bothers him greatly because 
he loses the opportunity to ‘close the door’ on the outside world.  As a result, User B feels 
that PHM would make him feel ‘watched’ in his own home (cf. Percival and Hanson, 2006), 




Context-sensitivity was missing from much of the discourse, with the meaning of ethical 
concepts derived from the researcher’s preconceptions rather than stakeholders in the context 
under study.  Typical of these studies was a superficial discussion of ethical theory and 
concepts (e.g. Welsh et al. 2003; Coughlin et al. 2007; Fugger et al. 2007; Lauriks et al. 2007; 
Gammon et al. 2009; Stowe & Harding 2010; Tiwari et al. 2010; Ziefle & Röcker 2010; Frisardi 
& Imbimbo 2011; van Hoof et al. 2011; Kovach et al. 2011; Rigaud et al. 2011), ignoring the 
need to explore the context-specific meaning of principles and concepts (e.g. Fellbaum 2008, 
p.161).  Without engaging participants in a process of interpretation in which norms are 
“specified” (cf. Richardson 1990), conclusions reached in such ‘common morality’ studies 
remain presumptive, based not on the beliefs of the participants but the preconceptions of the 
researchers.  The failure of these studies raises doubts over the legitimacy of pragmatic 
conclusions derived from such top-down research. 
This is not to suggest that ethical theory and principles have no place in ethical analysis, or that 
examination of specific uses alone can provide sufficient understanding of moral potential of 
an emerging technology. Rather, the point is that a common morality between researcher and 
user, or developer and user, by which concepts and implications carry the same meaning 
across contexts, cannot be assumed.  The studies mentioned here were characterised by a lack 
of sensitivity to the values and meaning given to ethical concepts by users, meaning they could 
benefit from further reflection on how ethical concepts were defined. 
3.3.3 Difficulties of Adapting Protection Mechanisms 
As with all emerging ICTs, it is difficult to predict the future ethical implications of PHM prior to 
widespread use.  Known as the Collingridge dilemma (1980), this problem is the result of the 
complexity of producing “accurate and meaningful technological forecasts” (Palm 2011) 
representing complex contexts of use.  This problem is especially applicable to PHM, as it 
involves unprecedented socio-technological interactions with uncertain consequences.  These 
uncertainties suggest a proactive social response is necessary to avoid foreseeable ethical 
harm.  In this context existing mechanisms which protect users from ethical harm achieve new 




3.3.3.1 Informed Consent 
Of the existing protection mechanisms, informed consent received the most attention in the 
reviewed literature (see: Appendix 1 Table 1.3), although there was a failure to recognise the 
difficulties of granting informed consent due to the uncertainty of emerging PHM implications.  
The primary difficulty is that a reliable account of the ethical implications or risks of using PHM 
cannot be given prior to use (Demiris & Hensel 2009; Stowe & Harding 2010), particularly 
concerning secondary uses revealed through data mining (Cios & William Moore 2002).  It is 
therefore difficult if not impossible to meet practical standards of informed consent in medical 
practice, such as those set out by the UK’s General Medical Council (GMC) which require that 
the user be given all relevant information about an intervention including their diagnosis, how 
the diagnosis was reached including unknown factors and assumptions, the design and 
purpose of the intervention, known risks and benefits, the likelihood of success, alternative 
treatment options, who will be involved in the intervention and any conflicts of interest.  The 
information must be tailored to the needs of the patient, taking account for the patient’s level 
of understanding, the type of information necessary to make an informed decision, as well as 
clinical or other factors the patient may find significant.  However, it is ultimately the 
responsibility of the patient to determine the required information, ask questions and to make 
a decision he considers reasonable (General Medical Council 2008).   
For PHM, it is doubtful that the risks and benefits of future uses could be predicted with 
sufficient reliability to provide a confident account to the user, due to the complex relationship 
between context of use and outcomes.  An intertwined relationship between societies and 
technologies with a two-way process of cause and effect has been explored in recent years by 
researchers in social informatics (Kling 2007).  Under this model, the effects of a technology 
will be determined by the user and social context in which it is deployed, meaning the effects 
will change as the context changes.  If this approach is correct, it is impossible to accurately 
predict the future risks and benefits to a potential user of PHM because contexts and uses of 
the device will change over time.21  This is not to say technological forecasting or proactive 
ethics is impossible, but rather that the ideal of informed consent requires revision in response 
to the inherent uncertainty of emerging technologies.   
                                                          
21
 Even if this limitation is overcome and the ideals of informed consent are otherwise met, there is no 
‘right’ way to present implicitly normative information about risks and benefits to patients in every 
situation (Molewijk et al. 2003) unless the normative background of every piece of information and 
judgment involved can be made explicit, which would place a significant burden on physicians. 
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This uncertainty need not cause a practical problem for practical versions of informed consent 
used in medical practice, such as the GMC’s (2008), so long as the user is free to determine the 
volume and quality of risk/benefit information required to make a reasonable decision.  With 
that said, the importance of identifying the shortcomings of the risk/benefit information 
during the consent process is to ensure the unpredictable effects of a technology and its social 
context are communicated to potential users of PHM.  Considering the normatively loaded 
language used by developers in advertising PHM (Nordgren 2012), it is imperative that 
potential users receive information on the limitations of predicting effects of adopting PHM to 
avoid creating unjustified and unrealistic expectations among users. 
3.3.3.1.1 Problems of Proxy Consent 
The decision among carers to adopt PHM for dependent users and children is often 
characterised by ethical tradeoffs in the discourse (Gammon et al. 2009; Landau, Auslander, et 
al. 2010; Palm 2011), hinting at a potential problem with proxy consent.  Previous studies 
(Mozley et al. 1999; Nygard 2006; Hellström et al. 2007; Cubit 2010) have demonstrated 
incongruity between carer and dependent values, suggesting that the exclusion of individuals 
with impaired intellects from the design and governance of PHM may inadvertently produce 
applications ill-suited to the values of dependent patients.  Questions about the integrity of 
proxy consent for adoption of PHM are also raised.  For instance, GPS tracking devices may be 
chosen by carers to protect the safety of mentally impaired individuals.  However, early 
Alzheimer’s patients have been shown to fear the loss of autonomy more than death (Cohen-
Almagor 1996), so it seems counterintuitive to use autonomy-inhibiting devices such as 
tracking technologies to ensure their safety.  This example hints at the unique problems that 
will be faced with proxy consent for PHM, which exceed previously identified issues with proxy 
consent (cf. Cubit 2010). 
3.3.3.2 Data Protection Legislation 
The provisions offered in forthcoming legislation which govern the collection, processing and 
storage of personal health data deserve anticipatory analysis because data protection 
legislation contribute significantly to the legal and ethical frameworks in which future 
development and deployment occur (Kosta et al. 2010).  Systems, developers and data 
handlers abiding by relevant legislation are seen as ‘responsible’, ‘ethical’ or respectful of the 
rights of users.  A ‘policy vacuum’ (Moor 1985) may exist in which DP legislation is insufficient 
to protect users against the privacy implications of PHM.  In the EU the Data Protection 
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Directive of 1995 personal data related to health is protected as ‘sensitive personal data’, 
although it is unclear whether all of the data collected by PHM would qualify.  Similarly under 
the UK’s Data Protection Act of 1998 PHM data regarding user behaviours may not be 
classified as “sensitive personal data” because of its indirect connection to the health of the 
user, in which case it would be afforded less protection than given to other types of medical 
data (see: Appendix A2.1).   
These problems will be moot in the near future when the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation comes into full effect in 2016, replacing national data protection legislation 
throughout the EU.  Personal data is defined as any data which can identify the user through 
name, address, location, identification number, pseudonym including online identifiers, as well 
as physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural and social identifiers (European 
Commission 2012, Article 4).  The Regulation clarifies the ambiguities of prior legislation in that 
behavioural data is considered a ‘special category of personal data’ which can only be used in 
the ‘legitimate interests’ of the user (European Commission 2012, Article 9), assuming a link 
between behaviour and health can be found.  With this said, misuses may be justifiable 
through a broad interpretation of the ‘legitimate interests’ of the user, and are more likely to 
occur when users are unable to exercise their privacy rights22 due to ignorance of the extent of 
data held.23 
3.3.4 Privacy and the Lack of Context-Sensitivity 
Throughout the discourse, usage of ethical concepts without explanation of their meaning or 
reference to underlying theoretical frameworks was common (see: Section 3.2).  Nowhere was 
this more obvious than in the discussion of privacy.  Privacy can be seen as intrinsically morally 
valuable, or deriving its value from related rights or ethical concepts, especially autonomy or 
freedom (e.g. Schoeman 1984; van den Hoven 2008, p.302).  Although the precise content of 
                                                          
22
 In the literature reference was often made to the privacy rights of individuals (see: Section 3.2.1.2.2).  
The independent existence of such rights, which has long been questioned by moral philosophers (cf. 
MacIntyre 2007, p.69), is immaterial to importance of weaknesses identified with data protection 
mechanisms; so long as such rights are treated as real in international agreements and national law, 
they form a pragmatic  ‘first line of defence’ against privacy violations and should be taken seriously in 
proactive ethical analysis. 
23
 The legal implications of PHM and legal uses of PHM data are outside of the scope of this research 
project.  It is however recognised that data protection legislation is particularly relevant as a tool for 
protecting the privacy rights of users, and limiting how PHM data can be used by third parties, including 
for social surveillance (cf. Lyon, 2003).  On this basis a more detailed analysis of the implications of 
specific provisions of the forthcoming EU General Data Protection Regulation for the privacy rights of 
PHM users is offered in Appendix A2.2.  
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the concept, which can be construed as “a right, a condition, or an aspect of human dignity” 
(van den Hoven 2008, 302), remains fiercely debated, many actions which affect privacy can be 
identified without a definitive or clearly explained understanding of the concept.  In the 
discourse this approach was common, which created uncertainty over the nature of privacy 
violations apparently mitigated by advances in security architecture and design of PHM 
systems.  To understand why privacy analysis without a theoretical framework is problematic, 
it is necessary to first define how the concept can be understood in relation to PHM systems 
capable of monitoring myriad ‘private’ spaces and bodies. 
Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity explores the meaning of context-specificity 
in connection with norms of privacy (Nissenbaum 2004).  According to her theory, which is 
limited to data privacy for individuals but can be reasonably extended to cover aspects of 
personal privacy, expectations of privacy are determined by norms which are created in the 
multitude of contexts and relationships entered into in social life.  Contexts are part of nearly 
all aspects of life, including “things that we do, events that occur, transactions that take place,” 
which implies that contexts in which “anything goes” in terms of privacy or dissemination of 
information, as seen (for example) in dichotomies such as ‘public’ and ‘private’ spaces, do not 
exist.  Contexts vary in size, from broad contexts of education, medicine or politics, to single 
events or locations such as dentist visits, shopping online or walking in a park (Nissenbaum 
2004, 119).  No matter the size, “each of these...contexts involves, indeed may even be 
defined by, a distinct set of norms, which governs its various aspects such as roles, 
expectations, actions and practices.”  Furthermore, norms need not be rigidly defined to exist: 
“implicit, variable and incomplete” norms are as important as highly regimented codes of 
conduct (Nissenbaum 2004, p.119), although the likelihood of violating such transient norms 
may increase when they are not obvious, meaning a shared understanding of the content of 
the norm does not exist between stakeholders.   
Norms are relative to specific contexts, but may draw upon (universal) ethical theories, 
principles or concepts for justification (Nissenbaum 2004, pp.128–9).  Norms can be defined 
with reference to various ‘privacy-enhancing borders’, which suggest specific barriers between 
people and spaces which PHM may violate: natural borders, such as physical objects (e.g. 
walls, clothes, closed doors) which prevent intrusions; social borders, or social relationships 
which dictate different expectations of privacy to be respected by people in different roles; 
and spatial and temporal borders, which are violated when information is isolated from the 
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space, time or context in which it was created (Marx 2001, p.158).  Each of these borders can 
be violated by PHM, which can enable ‘always-on’ monitoring of physical spaces or bodily 
functions considered private by the user, and creates data which may be shared and 
reinterpreted in social and professional relationships not consented to by the user. 
Nissenbaum suggests that two types of information privacy-related norms exist: those related 
to the appropriateness, or types, of information revealed to specific persons, and those 
restricting the dissemination of information (Nissenbaum 2004, p.120).  Norms governing 
aspects of personal privacy and appropriate uses of information need to be added to extend 
Nissenbaum’s theory to aspects of personal privacy (see: Section 3.2.1.2), such as norms which 
restrict physical access to a person (Marx 2001), define physical and social borders affecting 
access to data and permissibility of monitoring, or limit access to the user and his data in terms 
of social/professional relationships and roles.  The latter is necessary when information 
revealed in a particular sphere or for a particular purpose is transferred or used for another (cf. 
Walzer 1983; Schoeman 1984).  If privacy norms are context-relative, it follows that treating 
information according to norms influential in other contexts constitutes a violation of privacy 
(Nissenbaum 2004, p.127).  Respecting privacy, then, requires understanding the content of 
privacy norms within the specific context in which a technology is used which collects and 
shares personal data.24   
The meaning of context-specific privacy norms vary “across cultures, contexts, kinds of persons 
and social categories” (Marx 2001, p.160), suggesting the conception of privacy concepts, such 
as public and private spaces, as acontextual is incorrect (e.g. the idea that the bathroom is 
always a private place across all cultures).  To correct this tendency towards acontextual 
understanding, norms of privacy should be conceived as attached to individuals, not spaces, 
meaning norms are always in effect even in ‘public’ spaces.  Telehealth, and PHM by extension, 
has been recognised to blur such boundaries between public and private spaces (e.g. Kaplan & 
Litewka 2008, p.409).  However, conceptualising spaces in terms of privacy-enhancing borders, 
as opposed to distinctly public or private spaces, provides a better framework for 
understanding how monitoring can violate norms of privacy bound to barriers which limit 
acceptable activities in physical spaces, social, spatial and temporal relationships.  It is 
therefore not self-evident that the privacy norms influential in existing patient-provider, 
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 Violations of context-specific norms may however be justifiable, for example when information is not 




family-patient and developer-user relationships are appropriate in the context of PHM which 
bridges the gap between all three. 
3.3.4.1 Privacy Myopia in Development 
Privacy was rarely treated as a concept defined by context-specific norms in the discourse.  
Instead, the discourse overwhelmingly addresses protection of data privacy through security 
measures, where norms embedded in security architecture are taken to assure privacy 
protection.  This is especially true of sources discussing the development of PHM systems and 
underlying security architecture (e.g. Stuart et al. 2008; Garcia-Morchon et al. 2009; Acharya 
2010; Fragopoulos et al. 2010; Lim et al. 2010; Elkhodr et al. 2011; Garcia-Morchon et al. 2011; 
Salih et al. 2011), of which only four mention aspects of personal privacy (Neild et al. 2004; 
Pallapa et al. 2007; Bagüés et al. 2007b).  While other types of sources addressed personal 
privacy, few references were found to background normative theory or theories of privacy.  In 
many sources discussion of privacy, risk and related concepts was very brief, limited to few 
sentences or paragraphs, although some longer discussions were found outside development 
discourses (e.g. Brey 2005; Friedewald et al. 2007; Gaul & Ziefle 2009; Little & Briggs 2009; 
Remmers 2010; Ziefle et al. 2011).  Privacy was often seen as a hurdle to be overcome to make 
systems acceptable to users by protecting their right to control their data (cf. Zwijsen et al. 
2011), ignoring theoretical discourse around the concept.   
Explicit definitions and discussions acknowledging the conceptual complexity of privacy were 
scarce in security or development-oriented literature25, suggesting that systems are being 
designed and secured under the impression that privacy exists conceptually apart from specific 
contexts of use.  This approach risks presenting systems as ‘privacy-enhancing’ (cf. 
Subramaniam et al. 2010) which are merely technically secure: “the idea is tempting: once we 
solve security, that is, once we are able to achieve authenticity and trusted communications, 
privacy will be a by-product that follows inevitably from a secure environment” (Langheinrich 
2001).  This security-oriented approach, reflected in the security and development literature, is 
deterministic in the sense that privacy is ‘built-in’ to systems, regardless of the context of use.  
This ‘top-down’ approach to privacy eliminates the experience of the user from the equation; 
privacy flows from the system to the user.  Conceived as such, privacy is something that can be 
designed for without context-sensitive understanding of the expectations and norms valued by 
stakeholders.   
                                                          
25
 Of the 81 sources mentioning privacy, only 27 explicitly defined privacy or risk. 
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Another example of a myopic view adopted in the literature was the limited attention given to 
risk, for which a single perspective was present in the literature.  In the few sources discussing 
risk factors of PHM, ‘risk’ was limited to the external—environmental factors pose a ‘risk’ for 
humans.  Risk conceptualised as an internal factor, by which aspects of the body, genetics, 
behaviours or demographics place a person ‘at risk’ (cf. Lupton 1995, pp.77–8), was not 
addressed in the reviewed literature.  This limitation will prove important in assessing the 
potential for PHM to socially categorise users by degrees of medical risk (see: Section 4.4.3) 
The myopic character of the discourse reveals two significant gaps in the literature: (1) system 
and security developers fail to consider the role of the user and the effects of context-specific 
norms in privacy and related concepts (e.g. security, trust, confidentiality); and (2) aspects of 
(personal) privacy which cannot be addressed through system and security development 
receive comparatively little attention. These gaps suggest a disconnect between theoretical 
and applied (e.g. development) privacy discourses, in which theoretical development of 
privacy as a normative concept fails to inform development of PHM systems and underlying 
security architecture. 
The myopic conception of privacy, by which privacy is reduced merely to control of data, risks 
simplifying future discourse, design and governance of PHM by ignoring personal, context-
sensitive aspects of privacy.  The discourse risks devaluing experiences of users falling outside 
of the narrow scope of privacy (defined in terms of data).  Furthermore, it is problematic to 
claim that a PHM system or security mechanism is ‘privacy-enhancing’ (e.g. Pallapa et al. 2007; 
Garcia-Morchon et al. 2009) without demonstrating awareness of the conceptual complexity 
of privacy, and underlying theories of privacy.  The need to expand the scope of the discourse 
has been recognised (Caine 2009), but remains largely unrealised as evidenced by the 
relatively few sources which provide in-depth discussions of aspects of privacy beyond security 
or data control. 
This feature of the discourse may be a result of application developers lacking expertise in 
security (Busnel & Giroux 2010), privacy and ethical theory, while simultaneously failing to 
acknowledge research in these areas.26  This is not to suggest that developers need to engage 
                                                          
26
 The limitation of privacy to data control, dissemination and security aspects by developers matches 
Westin’s influential conception of privacy as the right of individuals “to control, edit, manage, and delete 
information about them[selves] and decide when, how, and to what extent information is 
communicated to others” (Westin 1970).  The social dimension of Westin’s definition, by which privacy 
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in theorising, especially in reporting on new systems, security measures and frameworks in 
conference proceedings and academic journals.  Rather, what was lacking from ‘applied’ 
discussions in the reviewed literature was awareness of the complexity of privacy, security and 
risk, and the ethical and social scientific works which demonstrate the difficulties associated 
with ‘universal’, acontextual conceptions of privacy (cf. Nissenbaum 2004).  The literature 
suggests developers understand privacy one-dimensionally: privacy is control over data about 
oneself, and is guaranteed through security mechanisms.  If this simplified conception 
becomes embedded in system design, users face a future of ‘privacy enhancing’ health 
monitoring systems which may fail to meet their privacy expectations in practice.  To mitigate 
this risk27, developers and regulators need to better explain their conception(s) of privacy and 
its theoretical foundations, and identify how it is translated into system design.  Furthermore, 
achieving a context-sensitive understanding of privacy requires understanding attitudes and 
expectations of stakeholders (McLean 2011), as well as practice-internal norms (cf. 
Nissenbaum 2004; MacIntyre 2007) of information dissemination and fair usage unique to the 
context(s) in which a particular PHM application will be used.  Empirical research (cf. Gaul & 
Ziefle 2009; Little & Briggs 2009; Ziefle et al. 2011) and participatory design methods (cf. Joss & 
Bellucci 2002; Genus & Coles 2005) which address these needs are readily available. 
3.3.4.1.1 The Capacity to Breach Privacy Borders 
Concerns relating to context-specific norms of privacy also extend to the quantity and quality 
of data collected.  PHM extends the temporal and spatial limitations of personal health data 
collection and storage.  Users can be monitored and data recorded longitudinally, revealing 
information about behaviours, physiological parameters, mental states and consumption 
(Bohn et al. 2005, p.11; Brey 2005).  PHM extends the types and extent of information 
available about users for subsequent searching, categorisation and mining, which has not 
occurred in the past because technologies to create similar longitudinal health data have not 
been available.  It is unclear, then, how the extensive digitisation and storage of seemingly 
                                                                                                                                                                          
“functions to provide and protect personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation and limited 
and personal communication,” has been lost in the emphasis on data control in security development 
discourse (Lyon 2007, p.174) 
27 A risk of a narrow definition of privacy is overreliance on encryption standards to ensure future 
privacy.  State-of-the-art encryption standards may be trivial to break with future advances in 
computing, particularly in the field of quantum cryptography (Wood 2011).  If privacy continues to be 
narrowly equated with security, we risk viewing potentially breakable technologies as sufficiently 
guaranteeing the privacy of users, while simultaneously ignoring context-specific privacy expectations 
(cf. Nissenbaum 2004). 
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benign personal health data will affect future data privacy, particularly regarding the types of 
relationships identified between seemingly unrelated pieces of data by custodians. 
The implications of long-term storage of PHM data can be conceived of as a problem of 
context-specific norms of privacy.  Revealing the same piece of information has different 
implications when transferred from its original context of collection/use (cf. Walzer 1983), 
affected by the identity of the person asking for it, the amount of time it will be held for, and 
the amount that the person will learn about the user from using the data for a specific purpose 
(Nissenbaum 2004; Giannetsos et al. 2011).  Relationships are central to defining norms of 
privacy; privacy enables individuals to maintain different relationships with different people 
(Schoeman 1984) by controlling the information shared, or personal, physical and 
informational access given to others.  With this said, relationships do not identify a piece of 
information or subject as ‘private’ as such, but rather define the private areas for which 
information can be requested (Schoeman 1984, p.411).  Areas deemed private are determined 
by context-specific norms defined by the user; relationships may then be built around such 
norms.  Relationships exist between patients, health professionals and medical paying 
organisations, with norms of privacy defined in part by the social role played by each actor.  
These context-specific norms dictate appropriate uses of data which may require revision as 
the type, quality and quantity of data made available to health professionals changes as a 
result of PHM.  The influx of PHM data thus creates opportunities for violating context-specific 
expectations of privacy. 
User-end privacy policies, embedded in PHM security architecture, could allow users to pre-
define expectations of the temporal limitations of data storage, defining for example that 
personal health data must be deleted after a certain period of time or the completion of a 
specific project or piece of research.28  The importance of empowering users in this way 
increases in the face of increasingly sophisticated data mining capable of identifying 
relationships between seemingly unrelated pieces of data, creating lucrative opportunities for 
data custodians (Friedewald et al. 2007; Pentland 2009).  The potential of data mining 
increases with the size and granularity of the available data set (Cios & William Moore 2002), 
providing motivation to retain data for a longer period of time, and use it for purposes 
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unforeseen at the time of consent.  Existing and future protection mechanisms may fail to 
protect users from undesirable or harmful secondary uses of PHM data (see: Section 3.3.3.2).  
3.3.4.1.2 Implications of Myopia on User Awareness 
The limitations in development discourse ignores intrusions by third parties into the ‘private’ 
lives of users unrelated to data dissemination, comprehensible only in terms of personal 
privacy.  Data sharing is at the heart of such disturbances, yet describing the normative 
character of these violations in purely informational terms misses the disturbing aspect of the 
intrusion—it is the fact that data is being collected or shared, rather than the content of the 
data, which is seen as problematic.  In other words, PHM systems disturb users through the 
introduction of third parties into their private spaces and decisions.  This aspect of PHM, which 
can be described in terms of psychological obtrusiveness (cf. Hensel et al. 2006), has not yet 
received the attention it deserves in the literature, perhaps because its solution does not lie 
(only) in ‘designing for security’. 
The importance of correcting this deficiency in the discourse also lies in the great potential for 
PHM to violate privacy expectations of users in collecting and handling extremely sensitive 
personal data.  PHM gathers data about health, often within the confines of the home (Rashid 
et al. 2007).  Systems are being implemented to monitor these sensitive domains, yet it is 
doubtful that users understand the systems’ potential, in terms of violations of privacy and 
data mining (Beaudin et al. 2006a).  Data can be collected and presented in potentially 
distressing or revealing formats, connections can be identified between seemingly unrelated 
pieces of information, and a range of unforeseeable secondary uses of increasingly rich 
longitudinal data sets are possible.  Users may assume that developers and data custodians 
have ‘protected them’ from unanticipated consequences through appropriate privacy policies 
(Rashid et al. 2007), creating a space in which privacy violations can occur beyond the 
awareness of the user. 
This situation raises a philosophical question regarding whether a user must ‘care about’ their 
privacy for violations of privacy to occur.  ‘Passively’ violating the privacy of an unaware or 
uncaring user may be just as problematic as ‘active’ violations.  A risk exists that a lack of 
concern for privacy among users could justify further violations of privacy, when the lack of 
concern may be a product of ignorance of the potential value and (mis)uses of seemingly 
benign data (Beaudin et al. 2006a; Percival & Hanson 2006; Steele et al. 2009; Remmers 2010; 
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McLean 2011).  Privacy protecting mechanisms, such as user-end privacy policies, are 
insufficient to protect the privacy of users who are unaware of the potential uses of PHM data 
(cf. Beaudin et al. 2006a; van Hoof et al. 2007, p.160).  Without such knowledge, users lack a 
rational basis on which their expectations of privacy can be balanced with the technical 
potential of a system and the potential uses of the data it collects.  It should therefore not be 
concluded that a lack of concern for privacy lessens the value of privacy protecting design and 
mechanisms, especially while the pervasive potential of PHM data mining remains unclear.29 
3.3.5 Medicalisation and Institutional Empowerment 
Treatment of medicalisation in the discourse was limited to changes to experiences of the 
home, and the potential for ‘health obsession’ due to physiological data being fed back to 
patients in real time.  The visibility of the device may also change the user’s experience of 
identity (see: Section 3.2.5), for example by implying the existence of behaviour expectations 
stemming from clinicians, family members or members of the public.  These expectations can 
be compared to behavioural expectations for ‘disabled’ individuals, for example the 
expectation that a person in a wheel chair will not stand up and walk, or at least lack the ability 
to do so as implied by usage of the chair.  This effect with regard to PHM can be described as 
the ‘medicalisation’ of the user’s identity. 
Medicalisation also changes the meaning of the home, which was acknowledged in the 
discourse, although the underlying character of the home which is changed, or how the home 
comes to have meaning attached to it by inhabitants, was rarely explained (e.g. Courtney et al. 
2008).  This shortcoming confounds understanding how the introduction of monitoring 
changes experiences with the home in which meaning is developed.  According to a western 
definition, the home is not merely a living space but somewhere with personal meaning, 
centred on identity, safety and privacy (Williams 2002, p.142), in which the individual is free to 
act autonomously or control his life “sheltered from the intrusions of public life” (Tamm 1999, 
p.50), albeit subject to legal intrusions by public officials such as the police in defined and 
limited circumstances.  One way to describe the home is as the “place of greatest personal 
significance in one’s life” where a “sense of belonging and purpose” is developed.  The sense 
of belonging, comfort and familiarity help give meaning to life, and contribute to personal 
projects and the formation of identity (Williams 2002, p.145).  Privacy and identity are 
                                                          
29
 For an explanation of how this conclusion suggests a certain theoretical conception of privacy as ‘user 
expectations’, and the implications of this approach to privacy for the moral obligations of developers 
and service providers, see Appendix 3. 
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simultaneously formed and protected within the home as a safe and comfortable place 
(Courtney et al. 2008, pp.196–7), where the inhabitant can ‘be himself’ away from outside 
attention. 
The meaning of the home can be changed by the introduction of professional health and care 
provisions (Courtney et al. 2008, pp.196–7).  The effects of PHM on the meaning of the home 
can be compared with the effects of professional carers entering the home, which can limit the 
privacy and behavioural freedom of inhabitants due to the intrusion of strangers throughout 
the day (Tamm 1999, p.49).  In comparison, PHM changes the home into a place open to 
medical institutional scrutiny when continuous monitoring is present—effects are not limited 
only to the times of day when carers are present.  When professional care enters the home, 
“the home ceases to be an existential centre for the individual and is turned into something 
between a home and an institution” (Tamm 1999, p.54).  PHM can be compared in this sense 
with hospital monitoring technologies, meaning it creates the possibility for happenings in the 
home to be shared remotely with health professionals.  The home can be conceived as a 
‘virtual hospital’, meaning monitoring allows for health professionals and medical institutions 
to influence the patient through feedback mechanisms (cf. Bohn et al. 2005; Bowes et al. 
2011).  To this end PHM extends the influence of institutions to spaces previously limited to 
home visits from clinicians, nurses and professional carers.   
This shift in relationships between patients, clinicians and institutions in which the power to 
monitor and influence patients is extended beyond the walls of hospitals and face-to-face 
interactions, was not seen in the discourse (see: Section 3.2.9).  This situation is problematic, 
but not because the extension of institutional influence is fundamentally undesirable; for 
example, it may reduce the need for strangers to enter the home for care, which could be 
desirable for patients and families seeking to protect the personal space of the home from 
physical intrusions (e.g. Tamm 1999, p.52).  Rather, in providing a new channel for medical 
influence to enter or ‘medicalise’ the lives and homes of patients, PHM necessitates a new 
understanding of medical encounters (cf. Emanuel & Emanuel 1992; Heritage et al. 2006); the 
introduction of remote monitoring necessitates re-visiting how moral obligations or duties 
which ground medical encounters (e.g. (General Medical Council 2013) can be met when 
monitoring is used, and the accompanying ‘ethical burdens’ shouldered by patients in allowing 




As with any literature review, it cannot be claimed that every example of relevant research 
was found in this review.  With that said, the review occurred over a period of three years, was 
updated on multiple occasions, and included extensive hand searching of citations found in 
sources during the database searches.  Furthermore, the search query incorporated as many 
synonymous terms for PHM as found in the literature, meaning that even though the term is 
not commonly used in the discourse, this feature would not undermine the results of the 
search.  Even if further sources are found, additional analysis would not undermine the critical 
analysis of moral deliberation, protection mechanisms and the need to address all types of 
user and systems in the discourse.  Beyond the empirical identification of gaps, the criticisms in 
the discussion are not empirically falsifiable, meaning the mere existence of sources with 
similar or conflicting claims would not undermine the reasons used to support the conclusions 
reached in the discussion.  Further review may, however, reveal additional gaps in knowledge, 
or demonstrate that the identified gaps have already been addressed elsewhere.   
The quantity of reviewed literature (118) would suggest a large and vibrant discourse of 
implications of PHM exists in terms of ethics and privacy.  However, a relatively small segment 
of the reviewed literature featured an in-depth30 discussion with reference to relevant 
background ethical and social theories and concepts (cf. Courtney et al. 2007; Courtney 2008; 
Kenner 2008; Demiris 2009; Demiris & Hensel 2009; Remmers 2010; van Hoof et al. 2011; 
McLean 2011; Palm 2011; Rhode 2011; Nordgren 2012; Sorell & Draper 2012).  Of this 
segment, even fewer sources consider PHM as an emerging technology31 with unique ethical 
implications for the future (cf. Brey 2005; Dorsten et al. 2009; Palm 2011; Sorell & Draper 
2012).  Although several themes were identified in the literature, many studies gave ethical 
                                                          
30
 For a discussion to be ‘in-depth’, it must (at a minimum) mention the theoretical underpinnings of its 
arguments and explore the (context-specific) meaning of the ethical concepts employed, such as privacy 
and autonomy.  Ideally, studies would also include empirically grounded analysis of the moral beliefs of 
(potential) users of PHM, and specification of ethical concepts through dialogue, although limitations on 
the number of individuals currently using PHM (Courtney, Demiris, and Hensel 2007) as well as 
methodological difficulties associated with the ethical analysis of future states serve as barriers (Brey 
2011). 
31
 This finding could possibly be explained by the necessary usage of synonymous terms in the search 
query, which would refer to existing types of technologies.  Given the lack of common terminology in 
the field (as revealed in the reviewed literature), the legitimacy of this explanation must remain in 
doubt.  However, terms such as “personal health monitoring,” “ambient intelligence,” “ubiquitous 
computing,” and “somatic surveillance” are typically used to refer to technologies either in 
developmental stages or predicted to emerge in the near future, so there is reason to believe that the 
alleged lack of future-oriented discussion of PHM is legitimate. 
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theory and concepts little more than cursory treatment because the explicit goal was often not 
ethical analysis (cf. Welsh et al. 2003; Coughlin et al. 2007; Fugger et al. 2007; Lauriks et al. 
2007; Gammon et al. 2009; Stowe & Harding 2010; Tiwari et al. 2010; Ziefle & Röcker 2010; 
Frisardi & Imbimbo 2011; van Hoof et al. 2011; Kovach et al. 2011; Rigaud et al. 2011).  In 
particular, privacy is discussed frequently, but superficially.  This gap in knowledge is important 
because the development, deployment and discussion of the ethical aspects of PHM are still in 
early stages.  To ensure PHM is deployed in an equitable and beneficial manner, further 
research into some of the gaps identified here is required prior to widespread deployment. 
The lack of in-depth analysis and the use of vague or undefined ethical concepts reflect that 
theoretical understanding of the moral potential of PHM as a technology is still in early stages.  
Similar to the ‘policy vacuums’ created by innovations in ICT (Moor 1985), a ‘conceptual 
vacuum’ appears to exist by which the functions of PHM and its implications for social life are 
not yet understood within a rational theoretical framework.  To begin to address this gap, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at how the various themes of seen in the discourse can begin to 
fit together to explain the moral potential of PHM as an emerging technology. 
3.4 Conceptual Framework to Link Discourse Themes32 
Although the discourse contains many weaknesses and gaps as identified in the previous 
section, it provides valuable insight into the moral potential of PHM.  To fill the conceptual 
vacuum created by PHM and make sense of the literature, a conceptual framework is required 
which can reveal common ground or connections between the disparate themes.  
Medicalisation hints at a broader conceptual framework, which could be based on Habermas’ 
notion of the system/lifeworld divide (Habermas 1984; Habermas 1985), to connect the 
various ethical implications seen in the discourse. 
3.4.1 The System Lifeworld Perspective 
The use of PHM, in which data about a patient’s condition is transmitted to a central point, 
provides benefits for both the hospital and the patient.  The patient may gain peace of mind by 
knowing his safety is increased through constant monitoring, enabling advice on when an 
intervention is necessary and continuity in contact with clinical staff.  As a result hospitals may 
be able to release beds, to work more efficiently and to reduce unnecessary admissions (cf. 
                                                          
32
 The discussion of the system/lifeworld perspective and colonisation of the lifeworld is taken in part 
from a paper co-authored with Neil McBride, Ben Fairweather and Mark Shaw, which is currently under 
review for publication by the International Journal of Technoethics.  See: Appendix A18.1. 
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Henderson et al. 2013).  A delicate balance must be struck between two domains of 
communication distinguished by the concerns of the patient and the concerns of medicine or 
medical institutions, which can be characterised in Habermas terms as the lifeworld and the 
system, respectively (cf. Habermas 1984; Habermas 1985).  The ethical themes found in the 
discourse—privacy, autonomy, visibility, stigma and identity, social isolation, care delivery, 
safety and medicalisation—are all influenced by the nature of the system/lifeworld 
relationship. 
The lifeworld of the patient concerns the personal domain of the user, or the values, 
traditions, culture, accepted ways of behaving and being which are developed within families 
and cultures and expressed within the home and through cultural and social norms (Habermas 
1984; Habermas 1985; Edgar 2002, p.89).  A person’s lifeworld is lived-out within personal 
environments such as the home and connected communities, in which a sense of belonging 
and safety is sought.  The lifeworld is concerned with quality of life and qualitative 
communication, and is formed and maintained through social communication in which 
relationships with communities are established (Edgar 2002, p.89), often with an emphasis on 
the private and the hidden.  The lifeworld may be expressed in the home in terms of layout, 
the arrangement of objects, and the meanings given to the space relating to identity, safety 
and privacy (cf. Williams 2002, p.142).  However, the lifeworld should not be confused or 
equated with the home or traditionally private spaces—it exists in these places as well as the 
relationships between members of a community, and is lived out by the individual in daily life.   
Rather than a physical space, the lifeworld exists in domains in which consensual 
communicative action is possible based upon mutual understanding, established through 
shared cultural understanding or norms, institutional and familial structures.  It encompasses a 
certain set of competencies, practices and attitudes establishing mutual understanding 
necessary for communicative action (Habermas 1984, chap.6).  At the heart of the lifeworld is 
a concern about who the user is, and who they are as part of a community.  In this sense PHM 
can exist within and change the user’s lifeworld wherever PHM is used—in the home, on the 
body, in work spaces or vehicles, or any other potential context of use.   
In contrast, the system is not concerned with the personal, social, private or informal aspects 
of life, but rather with the domain of institutions, power and economic goals, the public sphere 
and the control of resources (Habermas 1975).  The system can be said to exist wherever it is 
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understood that some actors in communication will pursue strategic action, often for shared 
purposes or mutual benefit (Habermas 1984, chap.6): medical practice, in which 
communication is structured in a certain way to facilitate clinicians receiving required 
information from patients in an efficient manner (Barry et al. 2001), is one such example of 
how the system can influence communication.  System discourses concern concepts such as 
cost-benefit analyses and quantitative communication.  The system requires predictability and 
control hence there may be an emphasis on rules, structure and organisation.  Simplification is 
necessary not only for actors in the system to pursue external goods (e.g. efficiency) and 
maintain the social practice, but also to allow for stakeholders to understand and participate in 
these practices (Edgar 2002, p.19).  Acting on the basis of predicted actions allows for 
increasingly complex social interactions to be controlled by the system (Edgar 2002, p.17), 
when the system is understood as situations or contexts in which communicative action is not 
necessary or possible.   
3.4.1.1 Colonisation of the Lifeworld 
The need for simplification, prediction and control to achieve external aims through strategic 
action is not itself a problematic feature of the system’s relationship to the lifeworld; however, 
treating actors as deterministic entities rather than socially embodied individuals capable of 
meaningful communicative action means values and actions of the lifeworld are increasingly 
restricted and limited to system concerns (Habermas 1985).  The ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ 
occurs when the system seeks to exert influence on the lifeworld by controlling or monitoring 
it, limiting opportunities for rational discourse and eroding meaningful communication 
through strategic action (Habermas 1984; Habermas 1985).  Examples of colonisation can be 
seen in the advent of personalised advertisements which aim to influence user behaviour, 
crafted according to ‘cookies’ storing information about internet usage on home computers 
(Truong et al. 2010), or when behaviour in the home concerning child discipline becomes a 
subject of legislation (Barnett 2008).  The colonisation of the lifeworld by the system may pit 
social and personal life against institutional and legislative life.   
Through colonisation social interactions become increasingly instrumental or guided by 
anticipated reactions (Edgar 2002, p.9), reducing the need for communication or shared 
meaning.  Complex social processes involve too many stakeholders and resources to allow for 
meaningful communication between actors at all times, meaning stakeholders must be treated 
as ‘means to an end’ (cf. Kant 1998) at times (Edgar 2002, p.18).  Meaningful actions are 
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treated as “mere behaviour,” meaning the system acts strategically rather than 
communicatively towards the lifeworld (Edgar 2002, p.18), seeking to manipulate actors 
towards desired ends rather than establishing shared meaning (Jones 2001, p.70; Scambler & 
Britten 2001, p.52; Edgar 2002, p.23).  The freedom to engage in meaningful communicative 
action, central to the maintenance and meaning of the lifeworld (Habermas 1985), is eroded as 
the system’s attempts at complex social projects necessitates “impoverished forms of 
interaction” based on predicted patterns of action (Edgar 2002, pp.90–1).  The possibility of 
communicative action (see: Section 7.3.2), understood as a deliberative process entered into 
when communication breaks down and validity claims are questioned (Habermas 1985; Edgar 
2002, p.42), is eroded through systemic strategic action seen in colonisation.   
Colonisation in this sense can change the ‘background’ components through which mutual 
understanding is achieved in the lifeworld (Habermas 1984, chap.6).  Colonisation can be said 
to occur when the distinction between domains or situations in which the system and lifeworld 
exist begin to blur; or as it becomes less clear when and by whom the rules of communication 
are relaxed to facilitate action (Habermas 1985).  When the system is defined by such 
situations (e.g. Habermas 1984, chap.6), the lifeworld is colonised by the system whenever an 
actor undertakes strategic action that is not obvious to other participants in communication.  
In this way the lifeworld can come to be characterised by ‘background’ elements, such as value 
systems, derived from the concerns of the system which enter the lifeworld when standards of 
communication are relaxed.  Colonisation is the process by which the system’s concerns 
related to external goods achievable through strategic action come to replace lifeworld 
concerns for communicative action and mutual understanding (Habermas 1985).   Colonisation 
can thus be enacted by actors acting strategically, or expressing themselves in terms of the 
system’s values or concerns (Habermas 1985; Scambler & Britten 2001).  For example, when 
patients come to view themselves or express concerns through medical terminology intended 
to facilitate medical care in the pursuit of external goods (e.g. health, efficiency), colonisation 
of the patient’s lifeworld has occurred (e.g. Scambler & Britten 2001); the concerns of the 
system have changed how patients express themselves in communication outside of system 
domains, such as the clinical encounters.   
The alteration of goods/values internal to specific lifeworlds is accomplished through the 
erosion of “communicative skills that are grounded in, and that serve to maintain, the 
lifeworld” through “the instrumentalism inherent in systematic activity” (Edgar 2002, p.21) 
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undertaken in coordination and sustenance of complex social processes.  In adopting the 
language and concerns of medicine, understood as a system domain concerned with the 
complex social project of maintaining the health of individuals in a society, the lifeworld of the 
patient is colonised (Scambler & Britten 2001); beliefs about health are understood in terms of 
the system’s values (e.g. external goods), and expressed through the language used by the 
system beyond its current boundaries.  
However, it is not just a case of the system invading the lifeworld like colonial masters entering 
a tribal society.  Many systems concerned with quantities within the medical environment—
processes, bookings, money and boards of directors—understood as components of the 
system, exist to serve and are legitimised by the lifeworld as they help control social processes 
too complex for communicative action (cf. Habermas 1975; Edgar 2002, p.90).  In exploring the 
system/lifeworld relationship, influence in both directions should be considered, although the 
power balance may be in favour of the system’s invasion of the lifeworld. 
3.4.1.2 Colonisation and Relationships 
Colonisation cannot occur without a relationship between the system and the lifeworld 
(Habermas 1975).  At a practical level the relationship is seen between actors expressing 
concerns of the system and the lifeworld respectively, e.g. professionals and laypersons, 
politicians and citizens, doctors and patients.  These relationships are the channel through 
which colonisation occurs.  In medicine this relationship does not exist between the patient 
and a lone institution, but is instead an amalgamation of the various (in)direct relationships 
the patient has with medical institutions and their representatives.  PHM will act as a mediator 
in these relationships, potentially opening the patient’s lifeworld to colonisation.  It is 
therefore necessary to give attention to how PHM will change interactions between patients, 
medical personnel and institutions, and whether these changes are ethically problematic. 
3.4.1.3 PHM as Mediator 
Within this perspective the role of PHM can be described as another communicative mediator 
of discourse between the system, the concerns of which are expressed by medical institutions 
(e.g. hospitals, paying organisations) and practitioners bound by system norms (for example, 
through professional associations or codes of conduct), and the lifeworld of the patient.  PHM 
bridges the communicative space between the lifeworld and the wider concerns of society 
enshrined in the system.  PHM has the potential to enable the colonisation of the lifeworld, as 
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the patient’s daily life becomes an extension of the hospital or GP office and the concerns of 
the institution shape the background components of the lifeworld which enable 
communicative action, or attitudes, values and behaviours of the patient.  PHM enables the 
quantisation of health parameters and behaviours outside of system domains, such as clinical 
encounters and hospital stays, such that the needs of the system become the concerns of the 
lifeworld, blurring the distinction between system and lifeworld domains.  If this view of PHM 
is accurate, the technology enables systemic strategic action through which the patient’s 
lifeworld is increasingly assessed against system values, for example by emphasising 
quantifiable monitoring data in clinical decision-making or care commissioning, or encouraging 
monitoring as a replacement/supplement to face-to-face care for efficiency’s sake. 
An example of how PHM introduces system concerns may help clarify the technology’s role in 
colonisation.  Feedback can be provided to the patient on the basis of PHM data concerning 
changes in physiological parameters.  A connection may be established between behaviour 
and health.  In both cases system values or concerns are introduced into the patient’s 
lifeworld, lived out in the home and connected communities outside of the system’s domain, 
influencing how the patient understands his behaviour and health in the lifeworld.  When a 
connection is established between activities in the lifeworld and medical concerns, a link has 
been made between system and lifeworld through which colonisation can occur.  To be clear, 
patients undeniably have an interest in their health and well-being which is part of their 
lifeworld; system concerns are only introduced when health is understood as an aspect of 
medicine, expressed through clinical language or parameters, as would be the case with PHM 
which enables monitoring of physiological parameters and behaviours that can be linked back 
to physiology.  Medical concerns and language belong to the system so long as medicine is 
conceived of as a complex social project seeking to address the health of individuals in a 
society, necessitating institutions and social systems to achieve its goals (see: Section 4.3.2). 
While this example does not exhaust potential modes of colonisation via future uses of PHM, it 
does show that the technological capacities of PHM can blur the boundary between system 
and lifeworld, as communicative action in the lifeworld comes to be replaced by strategic 
action and the concerns of the system.  PHM can increase personal communication, and 
develop safety, peace of mind and security such that the lifeworld is preserved and developed.  
However, PHM can also restrict the lifeworld, impinging the system’s concerns on the lifeworld 
such that restrictions are placed or information demanded in order to maintain institutional 
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structures or clinical expectations.  The capacity for PHM to impede communicative action in 
the lifeworld extends to relationships with clinicians if PHM contributes to a greater focus in 
clinical encounters on ‘objective’ PHM data representing the patient’s physiological health and 
behaviours in medical terms, precluding opportunities for discussing health in the “voice of the 
lifeworld” (Barry et al. 2001).  The possibility for communicative action between clinicians and 
patients is reduced in this way because external goods, such as the availability of treatments, 
influence clinical encounters and may change how the patient self-identifies (e.g. “I am a 
hypertension patient”) or understands his health (e.g. increasingly in medical terms).  
The concerns with simplifying and restricting discourse through colonisation of the lifeworld 
are also relevant to the influence of medical institutions on clinicians and clinical practice.  
Communication between clinicians and institutions may also be distorted by PHM, for instance 
if institutions commission or encourage reliance on PHM and its data, which are seen to 
provide an ‘objective’ account of the patient’s health or ‘efficient’ method of clinical care.  The 
‘lifeworld’ of clinicians (if such a thing exists), or at least the relationships between clinicians 
and institutions, may therefore increasingly focus on the concerns of medicine as a system 
domain or complex social project.  
By sending data about a patient to a central location, PHM opens the patient’s lifeworld to 
broader system scrutiny.  The placement of a monitoring system in a patient’s lifeworld means 
the patient’s physiology and behaviours are increasingly amenable to remote analysis, 
feedback and decision-making, each of which has implications for the user’s subsequent care 
and identity.  Colonisation may be understood as PHM exerting influence over the behaviours 
and values of the user, changing the values against which the user judges his actions to those 
represented by the PHM application, seen for example in analysis algorithms (e.g. equating a 
physiological reading with a problem) or feedback (cf. Molewijk et al. 2003).   
PHM allows the patient’s lifeworld to be evaluated at a distance, and his future medical 
choices to be limited by remote decision-making outside clinical encounters (cf. Lyon 2003).  
The ability of the patient to give meaning to his life, to define and pursue personal projects, to 
self-identify in a way matching the values of his lifeworld, are thus eroded by the systemic 
colonisation of the lifeworld through which behaviours and values subtly adapt to the rules 
and expectations of the system conducive to its continued maintenance (Habermas 1984, 
pp.346–8).  Colonisation need not be forced, or actively pursued by an institution with an 
76 
 
agenda for controlling the behaviours of patients, or governing private behaviours according to 
institutional values.  Rather, colonisation can be a subtle by-product of using PHM, introduced 
as much through the institution’s intervention recommendations as by the patient’s 
independently formed perceptions of PHM as surveillance, or a ‘portal’ through which their 
behaviours and health parameters can be seen by the outside world.  Indeed, the perception 
of an institutional agenda can affect how PHM is perceived by the user (cf. Sorell & Draper 
2012, p.40), with implications for the degree of self-discipline and behaviour modification 
exercised.    
PHM has the potential to act both as the repressive father, dictating behaviour and routine 
and demanding information for his own purposes, or the supportive mother offering both 
reassuring feedback and a sense of safety stemming from constant medical ‘attention’ (cf. 
Essén 2008).  As such ethical implications are both produced by and flow through PHM as a 
mediator.  PHM is a conduit for the flow of ethical concerns between the system and the 
lifeworld which inevitably alters the potency of such concerns and the ability of the user to 
manage them.  Each of the ethical themes identified in the literature review may be 
interpreted in terms of effects of PHM on the relationship between system and lifeworld. 
3.4.1.4 Ethical Themes as Colonisation 
The themes identified in the discourse (see: Section 3.2) can be connected within the 
colonisation framework.  PHM may compromise privacy because it provides the system with 
access to information about activities and behaviour outside of the GPs office or hospital, for 
example through monitoring via sensors in the home or a device worn by the user, or through 
data entered by the patient into an Internet-connected interface, as has been seen in patients 
with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) (e.g. De Toledo et al. 2006; Ure et al. 
2012).  Similar data may be provided by PHM to the user’s lifeworld, for example when data is 
shared with family members or acquaintances that the user would prefer not have access to 
the data, such as homebound elderly individuals not wanting to share information about risk 
taking with family members (e.g. Percival & Hanson 2006; Remmers 2010).  Data may 
potentially be misused and access to the data represents an invasion of privacy by the system.  
Pervasive categorisation and evaluation of patients as data sets, rather than as socially 
embodied persons (cf. Lyon 2003; Monahan & Wall 2007; Light 2010), becomes possible, 
which may lead to a greater reliance on ‘objective’ PHM data in clinical encounters (Monahan 
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& Wall 2007, p.168).  However, the mere use of the PHM may enable a patient to be based at 
home rather than in a hospital where privacy will be much more restricted. 
While autonomy may be promoted by the release of the patient from the confines of 
hospitalisation, PHM also allows the system to invade the lifeworld and exert control through 
the quantisation and regulation of behaviour in personal environments.  Rituals and routines in 
the home become the concern of the system, as they become visible, and the patient is 
encouraged to concern himself with system priorities in the pursuit of better health or medical 
care.  Behaviours may become more controllable as they are measured alongside physiological 
characteristics and interpreted within medical paradigms, or as parameters of health.  These 
measures, when provided to the system may result in intervention which regulates the 
behaviour of the user according to strategies and protocols legitimised by the system.  It is in 
this sense that PHM is a surveillance technology—it allows for the evaluation of the user at a 
distance as a quantified set of measurements, removed from the socially embodied person 
they represent.  In this sense contextual awareness, or information about the factors in the 
patient’s life affecting measurements such as the death of a loved one, can be lost from 
medical relationships and clinical encounters mediated by PHM data (e.g. Kenner 2008, p.264). 
PHM may also affect the user’s identity and behavioural patterns derived from the lifeworld.  
Behavioural patterns must be adapted to meet the requirement of the PHM application, 
whether that is in routines of monitoring by recording and transmitting physiological and 
behaviour data, or by routine of intervention, where therapies are conducted in response to 
the output of the PHM application.  Interpretation of the meaning of numbers generated by 
PHM is most likely to be a system interpretation based on accepted protocol, research and 
clinical practice (cf. Molewijk et al. 2003).  The underlying values of interpretation affect the 
lifeworld in making judgements about physiological state and behaviour as to whether it is 
‘good’ or ‘bad’, thus restricting the future opportunities of the user (cf. Lyon 2003).  The 
‘expectations’ built into a system, or the patterns which define ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ 
behaviour, become very important in this context; developers and medical institutions 
administering PHM passively control the behaviours of users by defining physiological and 
behavioural norms.  Such norms may effectively be ethical judgements, such that the system is 
imposing moral boundaries on the lifeworld.   
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While reducing the obtrusiveness of PHM might help minimise the effects on a user’s identity 
and autonomy, expressed through behaviours, the system still affects the lifeworld through 
remote evaluation, feedback and interventions.  Those interventions are determined by the 
system, based on clinical information and accepted treatment protocols and on the needs of 
the system which may concern economic justification of service provision or funding (Froggatt 
et al. 2011). 
The way in which PHM acts as a conduit between the lifeworld and the system may support 
medicalisation in which the power imbalance between system and lifeworld, particularly 
amplified by the patient’s dependency on the system, results in an invasion of the lifeworld in 
terms which may be described as medicalisation.  The system’s concerns are channelled 
through PHM as a mediator in medical relationships, affecting the character of the lifeworld 
lived out in the home with relationships between patients, family and members of the 
community.  Positively, connecting the system and the lifeworld through PHM may reduce 
isolation by legitimising contact with healthcare personnel and care workers (Gale & Sultan 
2013).  However, social isolation may also prevail if PHM gives the impression of ‘caring for’ 
the user in place of a human carer. 
Interpreting delivery of care through the lens of system/lifeworld raises further issues.  System 
concerns for control, regulation and economic management may not only be exerted on the 
patient as the user of PHM, but also on carers and clinicians.  It might be speculated that 
economic demands to optimise the use of paid-for care may result not only in the reduction of 
contact hours but also in the management and control of care giver activities through the 
proxy of PHM showing how metrics change when the carer is present.  Clinicians may be 
encouraged to move increasingly towards remote monitoring and self-care of chronic illnesses 
to better prioritise their time.  The system’s agenda for safety can also colonise the user’s 
lifeworld with PHM acting as a conduit, by introducing regulations and standards appropriate 
for institutions but restrictive in the context of the home environment, with the knock-on 
effect of changing the private behaviours of patients to meet institutional expectations.  
Rhetoric concerning technological need may increasingly be used by patients and institutions 
alike to justify further monitoring, even though the need is created more by the system’s 
requirement for efficiency or revenue than the patient’s clinical or personal needs. 
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3.4.2 Linkage between Ethical Themes 
The themes identified in this review do not constitute a catalogue of stand-alone concerns but 
are linked together in a network of interactions.  Using the technique of cognitive mapping of 
the issues discovered around the themes (Eden 1988; Eden 1992), a cognitive map (Figure 3.2) 
has been constructed. 
The map illustrates the web of influences between the ethical themes identified in the 
discourse from the perspective of the patient as user of PHM.  The links between issues 
identify positive (+) and negative (-) relationships between themes and concepts seen in the 
literature (see: Section 3.2), wherein positive relationships indicate a concept ‘increases’ or 
‘contributes to’ the connected concept, and negative relationships indicate a concept ‘reduces’ 
or ‘detracts from’ the connected concept.  Two particular phenomena can be identified.  First, 
cascades of links such that an ethical issue may have an effect further down the line, the link 
for which may not be obvious.  For example, PHM reliance, which is influenced by perceived 
need, may increase surveillance, which may increase the power exercised by carers, clinicians 
or institutions and reduces patient autonomy and privacy.  This type of map may enable 
researchers and practitioners to identify initial concerns, which through a cascade of ethical 
themes may exert unexpected influence on key ethical concerns.  This is not to say the links 
identify causal connections, according to which positive and negative relationships exist 
acontextually between the identified concepts; for example, the link between obtrusiveness 
and PHM subversion does not mean a user will always subvert or disable monitoring systems 
perceived as obtrusive.  Rather, links identify possible connections between ethical concepts 
linked to PHM in the reviewed literature, indicating potential implications of using or designing 
PHM to act in particular ways in particular contexts.  In other words, these are examples of 
issues that may arise, rather than predictions about what will actually happen once the 
technology is in the hands of doctors and patients. 
In some cases the links resemble the ethical tradeoffs previously described (see: Section 3.3.2); 
for example, perceived need, acting as a sort of reliance on PHM, reduces autonomy and 
increases medicalisation.  In practice, a proper evaluation of safety needs which makes a 
realistic assessment of actual risks, and considers the patient’s medical and social needs above 
those of institution and carers, may reduce the perceived need for PHM and hence protect 




Figure 3.2 - Cognitive Map of Linkages between Ethical Themes from the Perspective of the 
User 
Second, certain ethical issues are dominant and the target of other ethical influences.  
Autonomy, privacy, medicalisation and identity are highly interconnected issues, suggesting 
future research may need to focus on implications of PHM in these terms.33  At a theoretical 
level, each of these concepts can be viewed through the colonisation framework, which puts 
ethical implications in terms of the effects of PHM as a mediator in medical relationships 
                                                          
33
 With that said, the dominance of privacy in the discourse suggests that the other themes take 
precedence in future research, besides the need to address the weaknesses identified in privacy 
discourse (see: Section 3.3.4). 
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through which the system and lifeworld meet.  However, this account of colonisation lacks 
insight into how colonisation is actually experienced by stakeholders.  It would seem, then, 
that the theoretical account of PHM as a tool of colonisation can be further developed through 
research into specific contexts of use, in which PHM enables colonisation.  This type of 
research benefits from the cognitive map which explains how concepts and characteristics of 
PHM are linked or cascade within the colonisation framework. 
3.5 Colonisation of the Lifeworld as a Framework for Further 
Research 
The need for further consideration of the colonising effects of PHM suggests that 
understanding the relationships between patients, medical practitioners and institutions can 
help clarify the ‘moral potential’ of the technology.  Ideally, critical discourse between the 
patient and the professional concerning implementation of PHM, the interpretation of data 
and the behavioural and clinical interventions resulting from the PHM should result in greater 
understanding of how the patient’s lifeworld can be supported, and colonisation of that 
lifeworld by the system controlled.  Hence PHM is a subject for dialogue which will raise issues 
about care, independence, progression and treatment of a disease which extend beyond the 
technical confines of PHM.  A conceptual framework built around medical relationships can 
facilitate dialogue between these parties aimed at preventing undesirable colonisation of the 
patient’s lifeworld.  Studies are needed which examine the influence of PHM as a mediator in 
the various medical relationships through which colonisation occurs, so as to provide a 
referential framework for future dialogue through which potential problems may be identified 
and mitigated. 
Limiting study to patient-clinician relationships is, however, not sufficient to understand the 
broader colonising potential of PHM.  In moving care away from the face-to-face model and 
more towards remote and self-care, the introduction of PHM will undoubtedly have 
implications for the practice of medicine.  Habermas spoke of the colonisation of lifeworlds, or 
private domains and communities inhabited by individuals (see: Section 3.4.1).  Medicine does 
not have a ‘lifeworld’ as such; however, if conceived of as a practice unified by a set of 
accepted norms, principles or duties, PHM can be said to contribute to the colonisation of the 
practice of medicine with institutional values.  It is appropriate to conceptualise medicine as 
such a practice, with internal norms against which ‘good’ medical activity, or good medical 
relationships, can be defined (cf. Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993; Pellegrino 2002; MacIntyre 
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2007).  For individuals, autonomy can be inhibited by the introduction of institutional values 
into the home; similarly, the internal norms of medicine may become increasingly difficult to 
realise in caring relationships mediated by PHM.  Doctors may be restricted by institutional 
norms of care, or increasingly view patients as amalgamations of parameterised health data. 
3.5.1 Research Question   
Further research is necessary into the implications of colonisation brought about by PHM 
mediated medicine from the perspective of not only patients, but medical personnel and 
institutions as well.  Accessing the unique experiences of these stakeholders will hopefully 
identify and specify examples of colonisation and medicalisation not seen in the discourse.  
This need for further research into PHM and medical relationships is the source of the main 
research question addressed by this thesis: 
What ethical considerations will arise when PHM is introduced into relationships 
between patients, clinicians and medical paying organisations? 
The proposed outcome of answering this research question is a conceptual framework for 
analysis of emerging PHM applications (see: Section 1.2.6).  A framework should assist in 
understanding the normative dimensions of a technology, linking together the various uses, 
technological characteristics and normative implications into a coherent whole (Moor 1985).  
Such a framework should be useful to individuals and organisations for proactively identifying 
and addressing ethical issues.  As an emerging technology, PHM does not yet have such a 
framework. 
3.6 Conclusions 
While implications for patients, medical personnel and (to a limited degree) medical paying 
organisations were seen in the literature, they were not linked by an underlying framework 
characterised by PHM enabling colonisation of the patient’s lifeworld by concerns of the 
system.  As has been argued above, such a framework can help explain ethical issues created 
when introducing PHM precludes the possibility for communicative action in the patient’s 
lifeworld, and in communication with clinicians (e.g. Habermas 1984, chap.6).  PHM can be 
conceived of as a mediator in the various relationships between patients, clinicians and 
institutions that constitute medicine as a practice (see: Section 3.4.1.3).  In this role PHM 
enables the colonisation of the lifeworld of patients and clinicians with institutional values.   
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A lack of research is evident in PHM ethics discourse into the implications of PHM as a 
mediator in medical relationships.  For patients, a cognitive map of connections between the 
various issues raised in the literature suggests that further research needs to focus on the 
effects of medicalisation on autonomy, privacy and identity as monitoring increasingly opens 
the patient’s lifeworld to external scrutiny.  For clinicians, the internal goods of medicine (see: 
Section 4.3.1.1) may be modified or inhibited by working towards a model of care meeting the 
needs of the system, or more simply away from face-to-face encounters and towards remote 
monitoring, self-care and informal care of the elderly and dependent (cf. Williams 2002, 
p.142).  The ethical implications of inserting monitors into caring relationships, and the 
resulting shift in power in relationships between medical institutions, clinicians and patients, is 
not yet well understood. 
This gap in the discourse led to the identification of a third research question focusing on the 
ethical implications of PHM for medical relationships.  To begin to answer this question, a 
better understanding of the values by which medical practice may be evaluated is needed.  
The next chapter continues to construct a conceptual framework for PHM, first examining the 
ends of medicine, connecting them to virtues which provide evaluative standards for ethical 
analysis.  On this conceptual basis ethical analysis of the influence of PHM as a mediator in 





4 Chapter 4 – A Conceptual Framework for PHM 
4.1 Introduction 
To move PHM ethics discourse forward and answer the third research question (see: Section 
3.5.1), further research is necessary into PHM as a mediator in medical relationships.  This 
chapter addresses this gap by exploring ethical and social theories relevant to understanding 
the ethical impact of PHM across different contexts as a form of colonisation, teasing out their 
implications for a conceptual framework of PHM based on the ends of medicine as a practice, 
and identifying how they are inadequately applied or absent from current discourse.  As a 
general criticism, much of the discourse fails to follow through the implications of a particular 
ethical theory, concept or protection mechanism in-depth, working out its logical limitations 
and nuances when applied to PHM.  This type of theoretical analysis, missing from the 
discourse, is undertaken here concerning theories missing or inadequately applied in current 
discourse.  By relating virtue ethics, theories of surveillance and medicine to colonisation of 
the lifeworld, a conceptual framework begins to take shape which can explain how PHM may 
be allowed to change medicine as a practice in an ethically problematic way from the 
perspective of patients and practitioners alike.  This analysis builds upon and adds to the 
theory of colonisation of the lifeworld as a framework (see: Section 3.4) for understanding the 
many implications of PHM seen in the discourse. 
The conceptual framework is intended to help identify linkages between some of the themes 
and gaps found in the literature review.  Initial linkages have already been identified on the 
basis of colonisation, as seen in the cognitive map in Chapter 3 (see: Figure 3.2).  The 
framework itself consists of the unique way in which theories of virtue ethics, surveillance, 
medicine and colonisation of the lifeworld are interconnected and applied to PHM in this 
chapter.  The cognitive map is not part of the framework, but rather a tool which shows how 
the framework applies to particular ethical themes and concepts when considering the 
implications of PHM for medical relationships.  In practical terms, the links identified in the 
map are intended to be identified and unpacked within the framework described in this 
chapter.  Following the description of the conceptual framework and consideration of the 
results of an empirical study involving potential users of PHM, the map will be updated with 
additional links that can be explained through the framework (see: Section 9.4.1). 
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4.2 Utilitarian Support for PHM 
When PHM is seen as a desirable technology because it is thought to reduce the costs or need 
for human interaction in healthcare (see: Section 1.1), a certain conception of ‘good’ 
healthcare is advanced at least implicitly based on utilitarianism.  The core concept of 
utilitarianism in its various forms is that an action is right or good in so far as it maximises 
utility by producing the greatest benefits for the greatest number (of people, sentient beings, 
animals), with benefits often understood in terms of happiness and suffering (Mill 2002), or 
pleasure and pain (Bentham 1948).  Assuming that healthcare resources are finite, from a 
utilitarian perspective PHM tends to be a good technology if it increases the number of people 
that can be treated without reducing the quality of care.  These types of gains are predicted to 
be necessary in EU countries currently facing a demographic crisis, with resource shortfalls 
predicted in healthcare (see: Section 1.1).  Another way to understand the concern over the 
effects of shifting demographics on healthcare is that available resources will not be able to 
meet the assumed (see: Section 1.1 note 1) or predicted  growth in demand,  meaning either 
fewer people will be cared for or the quality of care will be reduced.  Both outcomes are 
undesirable from a utilitarian perspective, and can be understood as harming the patients with 
a legal right to services from such a healthcare system. 
In terms of ethical analysis, PHM would be more or less ethically acceptable according to its 
implications for resource expenditures in healthcare.  For any specific patient, if PHM is able to 
deliver healthcare of the same or better quality compared to current care at lower costs, it is 
an ethically preferable alternative because the ‘saved’ resources can be directed towards 
extending or improving care of other patients.  This sort of simple utilitarian calculus is a 
driving factor in strategic support for PHM to lower the costs of healthcare (see: Chapter 1).  In 
current discourse the dominance of utilitarian thought on strategic support for PHM was not 
questioned, with utilitarian or consequentialist theory rarely mentioned (cf. Berdichevsky & 
Neuenschwander 1999; McLean 2011).  However, limiting ethical analysis to financial 
considerations is unacceptable, given potential ethical implications which cannot be measured 
quantitatively in terms of distributing limited resources fairly among patients (see e.g. Sections 
3.2.1, 3.2.5, 3.2.9).  To prevent ethical harm justified by basic utilitarian calculations, PHM 
must be proactively assessed with alternative ethical theories which define ‘good’ actions 
beyond financial considerations.  
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This is not to suggest utilitarianism is useless in ethical assessment of emerging medical ICT, 
but rather that its application is too often limited to a basic calculation in which ethical 
acceptability is linked directly, and only, to financial concerns calculated quantitatively as a 
measure of happiness.  Simplistic calculation does a disservice to complex theories of utility, 
such as Mill’s hierarchy of intellectual, moral and physical pleasures (Mill 2002), or Singer’s 
utilitarianism based on preference satisfaction (Singer 1993).  Utilitarianism allows for 
consideration of non-financial goods grounded in the preferences or capabilities of humans 
(and animals); implications of data sharing can be assessed in terms of satisfying the 
preferences of affected stakeholders for privacy or autonomy, for example. 
As the practice of medicine changes in the face of emerging technologies, “something of the 
past is inevitably lost, not always for the worse” (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.32).  This 
sentiment suggests that the sort of changes faced in adopting PHM in medical care may not be 
undesirable—after all, if PHM allows for more patients to be cared for adequately compared to 
existing treatments, its adoption should be recommended on utilitarian terms.  However, the 
thesis explored here is that utilitarianism is an incomplete framework for assessing the 
potential ethical harms and benefits of PHM because the various implications for stakeholders 
(see: Chapter 3) cannot and should not be simplified for comparison and weighting in terms of 
utility, or benefits/harms, pleasure/pain or preference satisfaction.  Even if a sophisticated 
approach to utility such as preference satisfaction could treat various ethical implications as 
different components of utility, it remains unclear how relative importance of goods should be 
assessed; for example, does monitoring an additional cohort of patients justify a reduction in 
face-to-face care?  Limiting evaluation of the ethical implications of PHM to the utilitarian 
terms favoured in strategy (see: Section 5.2), where ethical acceptability is implicitly assessed 
in terms of patients seen, mortality, length of hospital visits and other temporal or financial 
measures, is unsatisfactory because it cannot account for implications of PHM beyond utility. 
With these problems in mind, what is needed is a theoretical framework which provides a 
basis for comparing the ethical acceptability of monitoring to existing medical care beyond the 
limitations of utility—one which helps explain the ends towards which medicine as a practice 
works.  If it can be shown that the model of care created by PHM is somehow deficient in 
achieving the ends of medicine as a practice beyond quantitative measurements of quality (or 
utility), then a utilitarian account must be deemed incomplete.   
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4.3 Virtue Ethics and Medicine as a Moral Practice 
Virtue ethics is seen as a way to demonstrate the shortcomings of utility for ethical assessment 
of PHM.  Virtue ethics is capable of explaining how PHM will either inhibit realisation of some 
of the ends of medicine, according to which patients are cared for as complete socially 
embodied persons (Haggerty & Ericson 2000; Lyon 2007, p.55), or persons with unique 
histories, values, needs and expectations of care, and not merely bodies presenting a disorder.   
Traditionally, virtue ethics was based on the telos of humanity, meaning that virtues are 
“habitual dispositions” to act in accordance with the ends of human life which define a ‘good’ 
life (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.8).  An Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics has been the 
most influential, with a ‘means’ based approach to defining virtues as the mean between two 
vices (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.6; Darwall 2003).  Modern virtue ethicists (e.g. Darwall 
2003; MacIntyre 2007) move beyond Aristotle’s ‘mean’ based account of the virtues, 
acknowledging that certain virtues such as justice or fidelity to trust cannot have a mean 
(Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.6).  Virtues act as a hermeneutic tool (Edgar 2005, p.166) 
helping individuals interpret, define and pursue the ‘good’ life. 
Virtue ethics is not merely an alternative ethical theory to established positions.  
Consequentialist and deontological theories make prescriptions between right and wrong 
actions, prescribing how to live a good life through moral conduct.  In contrast, virtue ethics is 
concerned with character, not conduct—it prescribes “how we should be rather than what we 
should do” (Darwall 2003, p.1).  It is an account of “ethically deep aspects of human life” that 
stands in contrast to morality as practiced as an irreconcilable dichotomy between competing 
conceptions of ‘good conduct’ (MacIntyre 2007), focusing instead on the character traits 
necessary to lead a ‘good life’ (Darwall 2003, p.1).  These are not traits which individuals are 
morally obligated to obtain, but rather those towards which we may aspire and value as 
‘good’. 
With this said, virtue ethics can provide guidance for moral action by connecting the 
acceptability of actions to the character of the actor (Oakley 2007, p.87).  Right actions are 
those which the virtuous person would perform.  Virtue ethics moves beyond the limitations of 
moral theories focusing on right actions (Darwall 2003, p.3), focusing instead on how the 
meaning of a ‘good life’ is derived from traits of the person living it, and how these traits 
contribute to ‘good’ actions.  Justification by reference to virtuous character creates a very 
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broad guide for actions which must be refined by defining specific virtues (Oakley 2007, p.87), 
which can be further specified for individual practices (MacIntyre 2007). 
4.3.1 Virtues and Moral Practices 
Of the modern virtue ethicists, Alisdair MacIntyre’s account has much to offer in terms of 
understanding how virtues help define the ends of specific social activities as medicine.  For 
MacIntyre, virtues are defined against the ends of a practice, which requires practitioners to 
fulfil a certain role conducive to those ends.  A practitioner filling the role well, or exercising 
‘good’ practice, is said to be virtuous.  The virtues are therefore traits which dispose the 
practitioner to fulfilling the ends of the practice.  They are not solely this, however; the ends of 
the practice can only be conceived within a broader conception of good human nature, or 
telos, which defines a good life (MacIntyre 2007, p.273).  A good life is one spent attempting to 
define and pursue the good life; the telos of humans can therefore only be conceived of within 
a narrative account of life as a quest for the good life.  Such a conception of life only makes 
sense within a particular moral tradition, understanding of which defines the third piece of an 
adequate definition of virtues according to MacIntyre (MacIntyre 2007, p.187). 
Of the three pieces of the account, practices are the most important in that they are the 
context in which virtues are realised and defined, albeit incompletely (MacIntyre 2007, p.191), 
according to a unique history and norms.  MacIntyre defines a practice as “any coherent and 
complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal 
to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the 
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended” (MacIntyre 2007, p.187).  This complex definition 
reveals that for an activity to be called a practice (1) it must have ‘internal norms’, or standards 
of evaluation defined by the ends and history of the practice, revisable over time by 
practitioners (MacIntyre 2007, p.190), through which good activity can be identified, and (2) 
engaging in the activity must develop in practitioners a sense of how the goods of the practice 
are defined, and the abilities or character traits necessary to achieve those goods. 
The character traits which pre-dispose practitioners to good actions are referred to as virtues.  
Limited to practices, MacIntyre defines a virtue as “an acquired human quality the possession 
and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices 
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and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods” (MacIntyre 2007, 
p.191).  Virtuous behaviour shows how the ‘good’ is realised through actions, but the ‘good’ is 
defined prior to the virtues.  The definition of a trait as a virtue therefore depends upon some 
conception of the ‘good’ internal to a practice.  Ethical assessment from the perspective of 
virtue means that actions are assessed in terms of whether they demonstrate the possession 
of virtues by the actor; actions are a reflection of character, which provides a basis for 
criticising the actor and act for in terms of how far they realise the ends of the practice or the 
good life. 
The central virtue in determining whether an actor is virtuous is phronesis (MacIntyre 2007, 
p.158).  Without it, other virtues cannot be exercised, as phronesis is the ability to make good 
judgments in particular cases, or in choosing between different courses of action conducive to 
realising the ends of the practice (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.84; MacIntyre 2007, p.154).  
Judgments are good because the person possesses other virtues; phronesis allows him to make 
good judgments by recognising “those ends that which are genuine goods for man” in different 
courses of action (MacIntyre 2007, p.154).  The reasoning process behind actions, informed by 
virtues possessed by the actor, is therefore crucial in understanding whether a particular 
action is ‘good’—those possessing phronesis are more likely to act virtuously. 
4.3.1.1 Internal and External Goods 
When speaking of the goods of a practice a distinction is drawn between internal and external 
goods.  The former are those goods which are fully comprehensible only by members of the 
practice, and can be expressed only in terms of the vocabulary, history or standards of 
evaluation of the practice (MacIntyre 2007, p.188).  By becoming a member of a practice the 
individual learns and is judged by the standards of excellence unique to it (MacIntyre 2007, 
p.190).  The latter are any goods comprehensible outside this framework and often refer to 
physical or social goods such as “prestige, status and money” (MacIntyre 2007, p.188), as well 
as utility (MacIntyre 2007, p.198), power and efficiency.  The crucial difference between the 
two is that the only way to achieve an internal good is by engaging in that particular practice, 
whereas external goods can be achieved by some other means (MacIntyre 2007, p.188).  This 
means that external goods are finite—one person gaining an external good means there is less 
of it to go around.  In contrast, internal goods are “good for the whole community” of the 
practice (MacIntyre 2007, pp.190–1), where a practitioner achieving an internal good is 
beneficial for the practice itself. 
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The internal goods of a practice are a reflection of the virtues of the practice; they are the 
effects of virtuous behaviour which help realise the ends of the practice.  Internal goods are 
defined and understood in terms of the unique history of the practice apart from which the 
ends and virtues of the practice cannot be defined.  In joining a practice one is judged by the 
standards of the practice established and updated throughout its history by practitioners, 
based on self-reflective evaluation of their experiences with the practice.  Internal goods have 
a history outside of which they do not make sense, or cannot be fully understood.  MacIntyre 
uses the example of playing chess—through repeated training and playing against a difficult 
opponent, “analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity” are developed, 
contributing to a fuller appreciation of the nuances and goods of playing the game (MacIntyre 
2007, p.188).  This type of appreciation—the appreciation of a practice performed well, which 
can only be understood in this example by the master chess player—is the type of ‘good 
referred to with internal goods. 
Practices are linked to institutions through the pursuit of external goods necessary to sustain 
the practice and its realisation of internal goods.  Practices and institutions form a “single 
causal order” in which the goods internal and external to the practice are tied together, with 
practitioners ideally concerned solely about the former and the institution, the latter.  A 
tension exists because the realisation of internal goods may prevent the achievement of 
external goods (MacIntyre 2007, p.196); for example, when providing a patient sufficient care 
conflicts with the efficiency goals of a hospital.  In this relationship the “cooperative care for 
common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution,” 
meaning that the primary role of virtues is to protect a practice, through exercise of virtues 
such as justice, courage and truthfulness, from the “corrupting power of institutions” 
(MacIntyre 2007, p.194).  The relationship is not merely one of corrupting power, however; 
practices must remain virtuous to justify the continued existence of the institution.  If practices 
fail to act as ‘ethical’ brakes on the institution, both will eventually fail.  The tension and co-
dependence seen in the practice/institution relationship mirrors that of the lifeworld/system 
(see: Section 3.4.1). 
In this relationship the ethical importance of virtues comes into view: without virtues both the 
internal and external goods of the practice cannot be realised, failing the individuals provided 
for by the practice (e.g. patients in medicine) while also failing to sustain the practice, its 
internal goods and history apart from which it cannot be understood.  It is therefore necessary 
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when assessing PHM from the perspective of virtue ethics to consider the ‘corrupting’ 
influence of PHM as an extension of institution values, or concerns with external goods, which 
may ‘colonise’ medical decision-making or the lifeworld of the patient via PHM (see: Section 
3.4.1.1). 
4.3.1.2 A Narrative Life and Telos 
Virtue ethics can be criticised for a broad definition of virtue, by which virtues are cultural- or 
practice-relative and open to maleficent traits, leading to moral relativism.  Another way to 
understand this criticism is that modern virtue ethics lacks a rational conception of the good 
because classical metaphysical conceptions of human good or telos, such as those of Aristotle 
or Aquinas (cf. Darwall 2003; MacIntyre 2007), are not empirically defensible (Pellegrino & 
Thomasma 1993, p.13).  Without an alternative rational conception of the good, virtue ethics 
cannot defend any definition of the virtues or virtuous behaviour as conducive to the good life 
or the ends of a particular practice. 
To answer this criticism, MacIntyre emphasises the need for a complementary “moral law” for 
any account of morality based on virtues (MacIntyre 2007, p.200).  For Aristotle, the 
complementary moral law appears to be a telos based on metaphysical biology (MacIntyre 
2007, p.184).  In contrast, MacIntyre claims that virtues must be defined with both the ends of 
the practice and a conception of the good life in mind.  These components explain what 
practitioners are working towards when engaged in the practice, and how the goods of the 
practice contribute to the good life.34  MacIntyre argues that a conception of the good life, or 
the telos of humanity, is necessary to fully understand any virtues, including those relative to a 
particular practice: 
“If a human life is understood as a progress through harms and dangers, moral and 
physical, which someone may encounter and overcome in better and worse ways and 
                                                          
34 It may also be possible to address this criticism from a Habermasian discourse ethics perspective (e.g. 
(Habermas 1984; Habermas 1985), from which the ends of moral practices are socially constructed 
through discourses in which participants bring different conceptions of how to define the good life and 
the ends of the practice (which serve the good life) to the discourse, in which a compromise is reached 
to define the ends of the practice for cooperative social life by questioning the validity claims made in 
the discourse.  Although a fundamentally different approach to ethics, a discourse approach may be 
helpful in explaining how the ends of a practice are refined over time.  If the ends of the practice are 
defined by discourse which is itself a model for ethical decision-making, the discourse provides a 
rational conception of the good for the practice in question. This idea is not explored further in the 
thesis, although it may provide an alternative way to justify a practice-based approach to virtue ethics as 
containing a rational conception of the good life apart from telos-based accounts.  The discourse itself 
may be seen in discourses between professional bodies, for example over accreditation requirements. 
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with a greater or lesser measure of success, the virtues will find their place as those 
qualities the possession and exercise of which generally tend to success in this 
enterprise and the vices likewise as qualities which likewise tend to failure” (MacIntyre 
2007, p.144). 
 
For MacIntyre, the telos of human life can only be understood when conceiving of human life 
as a unified narrative quest along which the individual pursues and learns about the virtues 
necessary for the good life, the relative weighting of goods (MacIntyre 2007, p.219), and the 
“meaning of one’s life” by “living and reflecting upon it” (Edgar 2005, p.168).  So defined, the 
telos of humans is to engage in a lifelong quest to understand the good life and the virtues 
necessary to understand and achieve it (MacIntyre 2007, p.219), with the virtues only 
comprehensible within the broader social tradition of that life (MacIntyre 2007, pp.273, 275).  
The internal goods of practices cannot be understood apart from the narrative of life, and the 
social tradition in which that life occurs. 
On this basis MacIntyre expands the definition of virtue beyond the confines of practice: 
“The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only 
sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will 
also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome 
the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will 
furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good” 
(MacIntyre 2007, p.219). 
 
This definition emphasises that virtues pre-dispose practitioners to achieve practice internal 
goods, while sustaining “communal identities” through which individuals pursue the good life 
as part of a broader social tradition.  As such, virtues provide “necessary historical context” for 
the comprehension of the goods of practices and human life (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, 
p.11). 
While the three-part definition of virtues as occurring within practices, the narrative life and a 
social tradition is seen by MacIntyre as fulfilling the need for a rational conception of ‘good’ 
against which virtues can be defined, it remains an incomplete answer to the criticism until an 
account is provided of the social tradition in which the good life is sought.  MacIntyre has 
acknowledged this much in his existing work (MacIntyre 2007).  The difficulty with the 
narrative life approach to human telos is that it appears to allow for a plurality of virtues across 
different social traditions—different people attempting to define and achieve the good life, 
while all coming to understand and practice virtues, are not guaranteed to arrive at the same 
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set of virtues.  This in itself is not a problem—the quest is understood as the important 
component of the good life for humans—but it does little to allay concerns of vices being 
mistaken for virtues until it is understood how a social tradition confines the traits which can 
legitimately be called virtues. 
The outcome of this argument may not be important for the task at hand, as it can be argued 
that when applying virtue ethics to specific ethical problems, defining virtues against the ends 
of the relevant practice(s) alone is sufficient.  Traits which contribute to good practice can be 
seen as sufficiently desirable in terms of the ends of the practice towards which they 
contribute.  This position assumes the ends of the practice in question are good, or part of the 
good life, however it is defined.  The purpose of fitting practices into a broader conception of 
human telos is to protect against recognising maleficent character traits as virtues (Pellegrino 
& Thomasma 1993, p.190), thus justifying the virtues as a rational basis for ‘good’ action.  For 
the purposes of this project it does not seem necessary to debate the truth of MacIntyre’s 
account of the telos in detail.  Rather, the ends of medicine can be seen to fit into many 
possible conceptions of the good life (see: Section 4.3.2), including MacIntyre’s (Pellegrino & 
Thomasma 1993).  The assumption made here is not radical; a defence of MacIntyre’s telos 
would only be necessary if doubt exists that medicine, as a social practice, does not serve a 
desirable social good, meaning that virtues defined in reference to the ends of medicine may 
be morally deficient.  Whether or not MacIntyre’s account of human telos is successful, 
conceiving virtues as traits conducive to good practice helps in applying the concept to specific 
problems, such as those faced with PHM.   
4.3.2 Ends of Medicine 
The implications of PHM can only be assessed in terms of virtue once the ends of medicine are 
understood.  Medicine is a practice by MacIntyre’s definition (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993), 
as shown by internal standards of good medical care (cf. General Medical Council 2008; 
General Medical Council 2013) and accreditation processes which uphold these standards.  The 
telos of a practice can be understood through critical examination of its internal goods or 
norms of evaluation; for medicine, these norms can be found in the doctor-patient relationship 
(Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.52).  As seen in this relationship, “the ends of medicine 
are...the restoration or improvement of health and, more proximately, to heal, that is, to cure 
illness and disease or, when this is not possible, to care for and help the patient to live with 
residual pain, discomfort or disability” (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, pp.52–3).  Broadly 
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speaking, the end of medicine is to guarantee the health of a society and individuals within it 
(cf. World Health Organization 1948; Fulford 1989), achieved through ‘good’ medical 
encounters with individual patients (cf. General Medical Council 2013).  In pursuing these ends 
in the doctor-patient relationship moral and technical capacities must work together in the 
interests of the patient because medical activity affects individuals with moral worth and 
interests.35 
Health is a fundamental good valued across many contexts, including personal, social and 
economic life, related to the maintenance and well-being of the whole person.  Without health 
personal plans cannot be made, projects pursued, or identities created without restrictions 
imposed by a physical, mental or social ailment (cf. Edgar 2005).  Health is therefore a 
prerequisite for the realisation of other human goods.  Despite the difficulties of defining 
health and illness, medicine is broadly recognised as a practice to promote health (Fulford 
1989; Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993; Schotsmans et al. 1998), thereby working towards a 
fundamental good.  A lack of agreement on a ‘correct’ definition of health, reflected in debates 
on the topic (cf. Fulford 1989; Petersen 1997; Clarke et al. 2003), does not undermine the 
fundamental value of health to human life. 
4.3.2.1 Medicine as a Moral Community and the Healing Relationship 
Medical relationships can be understood as a manifestation of medicine as a practice, in which 
expectations are attached to social and professional roles, judged in terms of practice-relative 
virtues.  Medicine can be considered a moral practice because its members form a community 
which shares a common goals and moral obligations (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.3; Morris 
1996; Schotsmans et al. 1998), meaning they are “guided by some shared source of morality—
some fundamental rules, principles, or character traits that will define a moral life consistent 
with the ends, goals, and purposes of medicine” (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.3).  The 
virtues of a practice help ensure its ends are met over time (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, 
p.32) by combating the corrupting influence of institutions and external goods (see: Section 
4.3.1.1).   
                                                          
35 These ends can be realised through different types of doctor-patient relationships; an influential 
account posits four models of the relationship in terms of the balance between physician and patient 
power in decision-making and the influence of values: paternalistic, informative, interpretive and 
deliberative, with the latter being preferred (Emanuel & Emanuel 1992) and very similar to shared 
decision-making models preferred elsewhere (e.g. (Pellegrino 2002; Karnieli-Miller & Eisikovits 2009). 
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Medicine is a moral practice out of necessity because of the moral obligations inherent to the 
healing relationship (Schneiderman et al. 1990; Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.3; Morris 
1996; Schotsmans et al. 1998).  Membership in the medical profession means committing 
oneself to the moral obligations of providing care, resulting from the patient trusting the 
clinician to use medical expertise in his best interest.  In clinical encounters the physician, as a 
practitioner of medicine, “voluntarily promises that he can be trusted and incurs the moral 
obligations of that promise” (Pellegrino 2002, p.379).  Importantly, the term ‘physician’ as used 
here can indicate a lone practitioner (as is implied in Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993), a care 
team consisting of multiple GPs, nurses, nurse practitioners, consulting specialists, and other 
members of the medical profession.  Where care is increasingly provided through care teams, 
the boundaries of the healing relationship should be expanded to include other members of 
the profession bound by the same moral obligations as the physician created by participation 
in the healing relationship. 
The virtues of medicine can be built upon five characteristics of the healing (Pellegrino & 
Thomasma 1993) or caring relationship (Schotsmans et al. 1998) between physicians and 
patients that create moral obligations (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, pp.35–6, 42–4): 
1. Vulnerability and Inequality – Patients experience a loss of control to define and 
pursue personal goals, and may experience emotional stress, fear, worry, and 
anxiousness (Morris 1996).  The immediate goal of life becomes the restoration of 
health and well-being by relieving or curing symptoms.  When symptoms are 
sufficiently severe, an unequal relationship is created in which the patient is forced 
to seek the help of an individual with privileged medical expertise in the pursuit of 
a return to health.  The physician has an obligation to not use his expertise to 
exploit the vulnerable patient, for example by recommending a treatment without 
justifying the decision and explaining its consequences to the patient (Pellegrino & 
Thomasma 1993, pp.35–6). 
2. Fiduciary Nature – The patient must place trust in a chosen physician and reveal 
aspects of himself and his life to allow diagnosis and healing.  The physician 
encourages the patient’s trust by taking an oath upon entering the profession to 
act in the best interests and welfare of the patient.  Physicians have a moral 
obligation to make use of the information and access provided by the patient in a 
trusting relationship in the patient’s best interests, and not for self-interest 
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(Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, pp.35–6, 42–4; Heritage et al. 2006, p.355; Karnieli-
Miller & Eisikovits 2009, p.2). 
3. Nature of Medical Decisions – Medical decisions are a combination of technical 
and moral features.  The physician’s diagnosis and treatment of the patient must 
be technically accurate to promote physical health (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, 
pp.35–6, 42–4).  However, decisions should also support the patient’s moral well-
being or autonomy as a being with moral value, in the sense that the decision 
should match with the patient’s moral values (e.g. Beauchamp & Childress 2009), 
assessed through dialogue with the patient.  This feature of the relationship 
creates a moral obligation to learn about the patient’s values, and structure 
treatment accordingly (Karnieli-Miller & Eisikovits 2009, p.2) to produce the best 
outcomes for both physical and psychological well-being (Heritage et al. 2006, 
p.354), and to not exploit the vulnerable patient with technically sound but 
morally incongruent treatments (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, pp.35–6, 42–4).  
To do the latter would be to act strategically toward the patient, for example by 
using confusing or technical language to convince the patient of a treatment 
poorly matched to his values (Edgar 1997, p.32; Scambler & Britten 2001, p.54), 
ignoring the psycho-social aspects of well-being by decontextualising the clinical 
encounter (see: Section 4.3.4).  The doctor therefore has an obligation not to 
engage in this sort of strategic action, knowingly or concealed (Scambler & Britten 
2001, p.54), meaning communicative action must ground the healing relationship 
(see: Section 6.1.3.3.1). 
4. Characteristics of Medical Knowledge – Medical knowledge is non-proprietary.  To 
ensure a sufficient quantity of health professionals, societies provide physicians 
with privileged knowledge and access to human bodies necessary to gain medical 
expertise, and may limit recognition of practitioners of medicine to individuals 
thus trained.  Physicians have a moral obligation to act as stewards to this 
knowledge, ensuring it is readily available to others, used ethically in the 
treatment of patients, and not used purely for self-interest, because of the implicit 
social agreement through which they originally obtained the knowledge 
(Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, pp.35–6, 42–4). 
5. Moral Complicity – The physician is the channel through which medical 
interventions flow to the patient, in the sense that the physician must agree to 
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each intervention carried out.  In this position the physician has a moral obligation 
to act as a gatekeeper, safeguarding the patient’s well-being and acknowledging 
his complicity in any interventions carried out (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, 
pp.35–6, 42–4). 
The characteristics of the healing relationship described here are not beyond question.  The 
experience of illness as vulnerability and inequality can be criticised in that it only seems to 
apply to acute problems with potential cures.  While chronic illness may start out similarly, 
patients must form different identities based around amelioration of symptoms rather than 
cures to make sense of the effects of the illness on their life (Edgar 2005).  Chronic illness need 
not be experienced in such an emotionally negative or disempowering way, as suggested by 
disability theory (cf. Page-Hanify 1980; Nussbaum 2007).  Despite this shortcoming in the 
understanding of illness, the fundamental nature of the medical relationship as one in which a 
patient in need seeks the expertise of the physician is beyond question.  In seeking out medical 
help, the patient is agreeing to reveal himself and private aspects of his life to the physician 
with medical expertise in the pursuit of health.  The relationship is an exchange of sensitive 
goods for improvements in quality of life, one which the patient is ‘forced’ to engage in if 
medical expertise is desired in pursuit of a return to health.   
Regarding the fiduciary relationship, if modern medicine is characterised by ‘empowered’ 
patients eroding the privileged position of physicians as ‘experts’, trust cannot be assumed to 
exist whenever healing occurs.  Despite this, a certain level of trust is implicit in the patient’s 
decision to allow himself to be examined by the physician, and to follow his recommendations.  
Furthermore, although medical information is increasingly available through other mediums, 
the role of expertise as an indication of fidelity to trust does not change.  Physicians are 
consulted not merely as ‘encyclopaedias of knowledge’, but rather as trained experts capable 
of subjective evaluation and understanding the patient as a socially embodied person with a 
history and values (Emanuel & Emanuel 1992, p.2225), suggesting that designing a healing 
relationship primarily around patient autonomy risks reducing the physician to a mere service-
provider, incapable of exercising the full range of medical virtue (see below). 
For the purposes of assessing PHM in terms of virtue, a more robust defence of the healing 
relationship and the ends of medicine is not necessary.  So long as medicine is seen as 
occurring primarily through the relationship between physicians and patients, and it is 
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recognised that medicine as a practice has internal goods (and therefore, virtues) that are 
pursued in this relationship, PHM can be assessed without the need to defend specific moral 
obligations or virtues as true across all medical relationships.  If PHM reduces opportunities to 
realise the virtues of medicine in encounters with patients, it can be criticised for undermining 
virtuous practice in medicine. 
4.3.3 Medical Virtues 
Virtues are defined against the ends of the practice which they are meant to serve.  For 
medicine, these ends are providing adequate care for a society, consisting of individual 
patients, in terms of physical and mental health and well-being.  These ends are realised 
through the healing relationship, the nature of which suggests certain moral obligations in 
meeting the ends of the practice. 
As with all practices, phronesis (MacIntyre 2007, p.154; Widdershoven & van der Scheer 2008) 
or prudence (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993) is a central virtue in medicine, without which 
other virtues cannot be incorporated into behaviour through virtuous acts.  Justice, 
truthfulness and courage are also necessary to protect medicine from the corrupting power of 
medical institutions (e.g. MacIntyre 2007, p.192), including hospitals, paying organisations and 
government departments.  These three core virtues are necessary for continuous revision of 
standards of excellence and internal goods by practitioners, which requires critical self-
reflection on the relationship between one’s actions and the norms of the practice (MacIntyre 
2007, p.191), or the institutional influence on the definition and realisation of norms. 
Justice is defined broadly as “the strict habit of rendering what is due to others” (Pellegrino & 
Thomasma 1993, p.92), or “the virtue of rewarding desert and of repairing failures in 
rewarding desert within an already constituted community” (MacIntyre 2007, p.156).  To be 
just, standards for treating people in a community must be “uniform and impersonal,” 
meaning it is unjust to favour personal acquaintances.  In social or national healthcare systems, 
justice can be applied to the distribution of medical resources (e.g. pharmaceuticals, 
treatments, clinical encounters) in a manner fair to all stakeholders.  Justice is not merely a 
quantitative notion, by which all stakeholders receive an equal share, but instead requires 
matching resources to the needs of the patient, and making judgments between the relative 
importance of different needs.   
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Fidelity to trust and beneficence can also be understood as core virtues unique to medicine 
(Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, pp.71, 156) because of the need for trust in healing 
relationships (see: Section 4.3.2.1).  A trusting relationship needs to develop over time 
between the virtuous physician and patient, in which the values, expectations and thoughts on 
illness and appropriate medical care are shared.  The patient must at a minimum believe the 
physician is acting beneficently, or in his interests and well-being (Pellegrino & Thomasma 
1993, p.156), to some degree for trust to exist. 
Other less central virtues include compassion, fortitude, integrity and temperance.  
Compassion is the trait of a physician which allows him to ‘enter the perspective’ of the 
patient, to understand how the patient’s values, expectations of care, social, emotional and 
physical well-being affect his experience of illness, and to customise his care and 
recommendations to the needs of each patient as a unique individual (Pellegrino & Thomasma 
1993, pp.79, 81).  Compassion may also necessitate the promotion of health-related values 
and deliberation with the patient to convince him of the best intervention in terms of fit 
between health outcomes as perceived by the physician and the patient’s values (Emanuel & 
Emanuel 1992, p.2226) Fortitude is a form of moral courage, by which an individual is willing to 
“suffer personal harm for the sake of a moral good” (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.109) 
such as a physician refusing to act in accordance with institutional rules which would be 
detrimental to his patient’s well-being, risking harm to his career and professional 
membership.  Fortitude can create an obligation for physicians to speak out against the 
potential harms of new institutional policies, technologies or treatments for their patients.  
Temperance is the restriction of behaviour in a practice to meet the moral obligations of that 
practice.  It can be used synonymously with virtue itself, but is distinct as a character trait of 
the virtuous physician (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.117) who suppresses self-interest in 
treating patients.  Without such restraint other virtues cannot be practiced. 
Integrity is the possession of all virtues combined with the ability to discern between moral 
principles in choosing appropriate actions conducive to the good of medicine in different 
situations (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993, p.127; Edgar & Pattison 2011, p.102).  It is the core 
virtue of the narrative quest for the good life, and can be seen in a life of virtuous behaviour 
(MacIntyre 2007).  Integrity can be exercised when a physician promotes the patient’s 
interests and welfare in the face of institutional pressure (Edgar & Pattison 2011, p.94), for 
example by not sending a patient home early from hospital.  Edgar and Pattison define 
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integrity as “the capacity to deliberate and reflect usefully in the light of context, knowledge, 
experience and information (that of self and other) on complex and conflicting factors bearing 
on action or potential action” (2011, p.102).  Integrity is therefore perhaps indistinguishable 
from phronesis, temperance and fortitude. 
PHM may change the nature of the healing relationship by affecting how and when care is 
provided, and thus how and when virtues may be realised in care.  It is thus the implications 
for the healing relationship, recognised as the arbiter through which virtues are realised, that 
are important for developing a conceptual understanding of PHM as a technology which may 
inhibit the realisation of medical virtues.  The content of the virtues themselves is less 
important for a conceptual framework, although their meaning must be fleshed out for future 
instances of application and context-specific analysis, in which PHM is seen to inhibit particular 
virtues in a particular relationship.    
4.3.4 Implications for PHM 
The healing relationship changes for patients cared for by PHM.  Groups responsible for PHM 
outside of the physician or care team, including service providers, data custodians and 
institutions, enter the relationship as new stakeholders for whom the moral obligations 
derived from the healing relationship may not be recognised, meaning PHM is not necessarily 
seen as an extension of the healing relationship.  The patient’s ‘vulnerable’ position in the 
relationship may also not be evident to these new stakeholders.  Face-to-face encounters may 
be reduced if care can be provided more efficiently (in the eyes of care commissioners or 
paying organisations) via monitoring and remote services.  Even if the frequency of clinical or 
care encounters remains the same, new interactions are created between patients and non-
physician stakeholders which are not necessarily bound by the moral obligations of the healing 
relationship.   
PHM data also affects encounters with physicians as a new tool to assess and diagnose the 
patient.  The healing relationship moves out of the physician’s office and hospital as PHM is 
installed in homes or worn by users, co-existing whenever monitoring is switched on.  Rather 
than a discrete series of events, the healing relationship may be a constant process, with face-
to-face or remote encounters with professionals linked together by monitoring.   
It is unclear whether this model of the healing relationship is conducive to the realisation of 
virtues in the same way as face-to-face encounters, even when face-to-face encounters are 
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not reduced through the use of PHM.  As a mediator placed between the physician and 
patient, PHM changes the dependencies between physician and patient by turning some 
degree of the patient’s care over to monitoring, meaning the patient’s health and well-being 
are to some degree reliant upon the quality of monitoring provided by a technological 
application rather than the physician.  Patients will have to trust PHM or service providers to 
some degree to acquiesce to use; whether this trust is similar in nature to trust in the healing 
relationship is unclear.  As discussed in reference to security (see: Section 3.2.1.1.2) trust can 
exist between a user and a system or the system’s operator.  The healing relationship model is 
applicable when trusting the individual or organisation providing PHM.  However, such trust 
may be misplaced if service providers do not experience the same moral obligations as 
physicians as members of medicine as a profession. 
This aspect of PHM inhibiting virtuous practice hinges on the model of service provided by 
PHM; if delivery is handled entirely by existing care teams bound by the moral obligations of 
the healing relationship, the problems created by ‘non-virtuous’ stakeholders entering the 
relationship are reduced.  However, if care is increasingly delivered by non-physicians, for 
example if PHM is provided through private channels or on a commercial basis outside of 
medicine, the moral obligations of the physician are temporarily displaced without clearly 
changing the patient’s experience of illness (e.g. fear, helplessness, dependency) or 
expectations of the healing relationship.  The features of the healing relationship which initially 
create moral obligations for medical professionals are not eliminated by the move to 
monitoring, meaning the same moral obligations exist pre- and post-monitoring.  As a result, 
the patient will still expect moral obligations to be fulfilled by the stakeholder(s) replacing or 
joining the physician in the healing relationship, without any guarantee that the new 
stakeholders (e.g. monitoring systems, service providers, data custodians) will be capable or 
willing to act virtuously towards the patient.  Therefore, the opportunities for virtuous medical 
practice are reduced by the move to care via monitoring. 
In such a relationship in which medical virtues are increasingly absent there exists a risk that 
patients will engage in healing relationships with physician-proxies, placing trust in monitoring 
systems or service providers assumed to be bound by the same moral obligations as 
physicians.  This risk can be seen as a continuation of the ‘deprofessionalisation’ seen in 
medicine in the past, during which time “character traits requisite for the protection of the 
welfare and interests of patients” have been increasingly lost among physicians (Pellegrino 
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2002, p.384).  The concept of a healing relationship between physician and patient may not 
accurately describe PHM-mediated care, necessitating a revised account of the moral 
obligations, and thus virtues, of medicine in which care via monitoring is the norm (e.g. chronic 
illness management).  It may be that a healing relationship between physicians and socially 
embodied patients, in which the values and expectations of the patient influence the course of 
care, occurs less frequently or not at all in PHM-mediated care.  PHM can be said to undermine 
the virtues of compassion and fidelity to trust in this instance, whenever physicians are denied 
opportunities to speak with the patient, empathise with and understand their point of view 
and values. 
Virtue ethics can help make sense of colonisation from the view of the patient’s lifeworld in 
terms of identity and pursuit of the good life.  If we accept MacIntyre’s narrative account of 
the good life (see: Section 4.3.1.2) PHM colonises the patient’s identity through medicalisation 
of his narrative.  Users must make sense of their lives as a ‘chronic patient’ or ‘at-risk patient’ 
due to monitoring (cf. Edgar 2005, p.169).  Through this process the patient becomes involved 
in the practice of chronic illness, by which his narrative and identity must be constructed 
within the “unavoidable framework” of chronic illness (Edgar 2005, p.169).  Acts which 
contribute to the adoption and sustenance of chronic identities, such as the “exclusive reliance 
upon measurable outcomes in assessing the management of chronic illness” (Edgar 2005, 
p.171) made possible by PHM data, can therefore be criticised for interfering with the pursuit 
of a virtuous life by colonising the patient’s understanding of the good life.  PHM contributes 
to ‘identity colonisation’ through the translation of physiological parameters and behaviours 
into data amenable to remote analysis and categorisation, contributing to remote and self-
management of the illness. 
The latter point hints at a second opportunity for the inhibition of virtuous practice created by 
PHM.  Monitoring physiological parameters reproduces a certain kind of health, by which the 
patient’s medical status is increasingly evaluated in terms of parameters amenable to 
monitoring.  The availability of PHM data creates a risk that monitoring data will increasingly 
colonise the healing relationship, reducing the importance of contextual factors to health or 
the view of the patient as a socially embodied person.  If PHM can deliver physiological 
readings necessary to diagnose the patient’s physical ailment, the temptation exists to engage 
less and less in face-to-face encounters during which trust is traditionally developed, or to 
trust the patient’s account in those encounters.  PHM can create a ‘veneer of certainty’, in 
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which ‘objective’ monitoring data is taken to represent a true representation of the patient’s 
situation, losing sight of the data collection context.  The outcome of this may be ignorance of 
the patient’s social, mental and emotional state, or ‘decontextualisation’ of the patient 
through which the psychological aspects of well-being describable only by the patient are lost 
from the clinical encounter (cf. Edgar 1997, p.35), which fails to recognise the necessity of such 
knowledge in shared-decision making models of clinical care (Karnieli-Miller & Eisikovits 2009, 
p.2).  In pursuit of external goods, institutions and physicians may be tempted to ‘close down’ 
discourses with patients through appeal to ‘objective’ physiological data, thus ignoring the 
(meaning of the) lifeworld of the patient.   
Decontextualisation can be conceived of as the inhibition of virtuous practice in medicine 
caused by monitoring as a model of care, rather than through a reduction in face-to-face 
encounters or the introduction of new stakeholders into the healing relationship.  The relative 
importance of this risk can only be determined in the context of specific relationships: for 
example, PHM data may instead provide a starting point for discourses in which the patient 
has greater knowledge of his condition and monitoring data.  The potential benefits of PHM in 
this regard, by which monitoring can empower patients in the healing relationship or promote 
patient autonomy by moving care out of hospitals and into homes in which patients are less 
restricted in terms of activity and identity (see: Section 3.4.1.3), for example, need also be 
considered in future discourses informed by the conceptual framework. 
4.3.5 Conclusions 
From the perspective of virtue ethics the ethical acceptability of PHM can be summarised as an 
if-then argument:  if PHM reduces the chances of being a virtuous physician, or for patients to 
be treated by virtuous practitioners, then it is ethically problematic because it reduces 
opportunities to ensure the patient’s entire physical and mental health and well-being 
achieved through treating the patient as a socially embodied person in the healing 
relationship.  The relative importance of maintaining ‘good’ medical practice in any particular 
situation in which PHM may be deployed remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis; 
what the account here explains is how PHM affects these goods, not the relative importance of 
their continued realisation by physicians. 
Virtue ethics suggests that PHM can be seen as ethically harmful if it undermines the 
realisation of virtues necessary to achieve the ends of medicine as a moral practice.  But how 
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exactly would PHM achieve this?  To answer this question, it is necessary to explore the 
implications of theories of surveillance for our understanding of PHM and how it may 
undermine the realisation of medical virtues in the healing relationship. 
4.4 PHM as Medical Surveillance 
PHM broadens the scope of health and medicine by allowing for various parameters of private 
life to be monitored in the pursuit of better health.  Previously closed off areas of life may be 
opened to medical scrutiny for the sake of identifying, treating and managing health 
conditions.  The quantity and quality of information available to clinicians and medical 
institutions in delivering care increases, and alternative means for care delivery and data 
collection are established.  PHM has the potential to fundamentally change the delivery of 
medical care through the creation, analysis and transmission of data about the private lives, 
environments and behaviours of patients. 
In these terms, PHM can be understood as a surveillance technology.  Following Lyon (2001a, 
p.2), surveillance is defined here as “any collection and processing of personal data, whether 
identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been 
garnered.”   
4.4.1 Big Brother 
In the reviewed literature, PHM was only rarely seen as a technology of surveillance (see: 
Section 3.2.1.2.1).  Much of the discourse employed the ‘Big Brother’ metaphor, based on 
George Orwell’s 1984, according to which users think PHM is deployed by a large ‘sinister’ 
organisation or government to monitor and control the private lives citizens (e.g. Welsh et al. 
2003; Brey 2005; Percival & Hanson 2006; Essén 2008; Bowes et al. 2011; Sorell & Draper 
2012).  This metaphor arguably bears little relevance to modern surveillance, which resembles 
an ‘assemblage’ of systems implemented by many small organisations and stakeholders for a 
variety of purposes (Haggerty & Ericson 2000).  For the metaphor to be true to the source 
material a state would need to have a policy of “policing…of people’s political opinions or 
personal views” through the use of PHM, which is not apparent in the UK (Sorell & Draper 
2012, p.40) or other European nations (see: Section 1.2.1).  Although the metaphor may help 
users express concerns over privacy and the implications of surveillance (Percival & Hanson 
2006; Sorell & Draper 2012), it detracts from current discourse by assigning an 
unsubstantiated desire for social control to service providers, which would require supporting 
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evidence from specific contexts of use, addressing the provider’s motives.  Sinister motives 
may also be attributed by users to technologies and organisations engaging in any level of ICT 
assisted monitoring (cf. Rule et al. 1991; Lyon 2007, pp.57–9), which distracts from the 
benefits of seemingly benign uses of personal data at an organisational level which assist in 
‘understanding’ data subjects through categorisation and prediction (Lyon 2007, p.162) (see: 
Section 4.4.3). 
4.4.2 The Panopticon 
Beyond ‘Big Brother’, several accounts of PHM as surveillance in current discourse can be 
traced to Foucault, by which PHM is a tool of disciplinary power and rational control (cf. 
Foucault 2012).  Kenner (2008) examined the politics of PHM as a surveillance technology 
supporting aging in place, with implications for the autonomy of the elderly in having their 
choice of behaviours at home limited, and the increased social control offered to medical 
professionals and carers by linking behavioural changes with health conditions via monitoring 
(Kenner 2008, p.263).  Elsewhere, in-vivo PHM was seen to limit how patients behave and self-
identify due to self-discipline stemming from the perception of always being watched (Light 
2010, p.594).  A similar type of control is seen when PHM is treated as ‘somatic surveillance’, 
defined as the practice of recording bodily information as data which can be transferred, 
effectively turning “bodies into ‘nodes’ on larger information networks.”  Once gathered, the 
information can be used to suggest interventions “into body functions through various 
sociotechnical feedback mechanisms,” exhibiting control over the behaviours and choices of 
patients (Monahan & Wall 2007, pp.154–5).  These accounts of PHM as bodily surveillance 
with disciplinary power are instructive, and necessitate closer analysis of the underlying 
metaphor of PHM as a type of modern panopticon (cf. Foucault 2012). 
The panopticon is a hypothetical prison imagined by Jeremy Bentham (1791).  In the 
panopticon cells are assembled around a central guard tower such that a single guard can see 
into all cells.  The tower has blinds or blacked out windows which prevent the prisoners from 
knowing when they are being watched, meaning they must assume they are always being 
watched and behave accordingly.  In the panopticon disciplinary power is exercised from 
within, as prisoners come to act as their own guards, constantly reminded of the possibility of 
being watched and the expectations of the watcher (Foucault 2012).  Prisoners “reflect upon 
the minutia of their own behaviour” in an attempt to actively transform themselves (Haggerty 
& Ericson 2000, p.607), internalising the disciplinary power represented by the tower (Foucault 
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2012).  When surveillance technologies are compared to a panopticon, attention is drawn to 
the potential for rational control, intended to shape the behaviours of the watched according 
to the values of the operator (Lyon 2001b, p.175). 
The panopticon metaphor is problematic when applied to PHM for several reasons.  First, it 
introduces an element of omniscience to surveillance, by which every action and private 
moment is perceived as being monitored, a state of affairs surely violating the privacy and 
comfort of individuals in modern society (Rule et al. 1991, p.321).  While such a state could 
theoretically exist with sufficiently pervasive PHM, perceived omniscience is not apparently a 
goal of modern systems targeting specific health parameters or, at most, behaviours (see: 
Chapter 2).  Second, it stresses the potential for rational control, distracting from the potential 
for PHM to subtly influence the behaviours and attitudes of users without overt discipline (cf. 
Lyon 2007, p.57).  Finally, the panopticon gives a one-way account of surveillance, in which the 
power to monitor and act lies solely with the prison guards, or operators of surveillance.  This 
account fails to recognise the power of the watched in limiting and consenting to surveillance 
(Lyon 2007, p.73), exercised at a minimum when consenting to health monitoring.  Beyond 
this, PHM data may help patients to express health concerns and ask questions in clinical 
encounters, with the data seen as an objective record providing evidence to support the 
patient’s claims.   
The panopticon is insufficient as a metaphor for modern surveillance (Haggerty & Ericson 
2000, p.607), such as PHM, in part because it ignores the possibilities of resistance unavailable 
to prisoners in a closed disciplinary space.  With the exception of in-vivo PHM (Light 2010), 
users can disable PHM or leave the monitored area (cf. Lyon 2007, p.59) or decline to adopt 
monitoring technologies.  This is true so long as surveillance is not ubiquitous (see: Section 
2.3.2.4), or rejection of monitoring carries with it such extensive burdens, for example denial 
of treatment, to make consent meaningless.  So long as the need for consent is upheld, PHM 
does not possess obvious disciplinary power through which the user’s attitudes and 
behaviours are changed by being ‘trapped’ in a surveillance space.   
The panopticon metaphor helps draw attention to the power implicit in perceptions of being 
watched, often linked by users to ‘Big Brother’ and a lack of control over PHM (e.g. Welsh et al. 
2003; Percival & Hanson 2006).  Behaviour inhibition linked to obtrusiveness (see: Section 
3.2.4) may be based on the perception of being watched, causing the user to change his 
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behaviour to better meet the expectations of the system or the operator.  However, other 
types of power flow through PHM which may cause users to change their behaviours and 
identities. 
4.4.3 Social Sorting: The Power to Categorise 
As a surveillance technology, PHM offers the power to sort and treat people differently based 
on oversight (cf. Gandy 1993; Lyon 2003), or the collection of personal information by which 
users can be categorised.  Surveillance is “a vital means of sorting populations for 
discriminatory treatment” (Lyon 2003, p.19).  This aspect of surveillance suggests ethical 
concerns do not centre around privacy (Lyon 2001b; Raab 2012, p.384), or the inability to 
retain control over personal data, but rather the consequences of being categorised (Gandy 
1993) by which individuals are placed into groups affecting their future choices in the 
utilitarian pursuit of efficiency or reduced costs (Lyon 2001b, p.177).  Increasing privacy to 
combat surveillance is not always beneficial to subjects of surveillance (Lyon 2003, p.19) (see: 
Section 3.3.4), because categorisation can be used to the benefit of those categorised, for 
example by directing relevant information or recommended interventions to patients.   
This type of categorisation is referred to as ‘social sorting’, defined as the classification of 
people with similar characteristics into groups for different treatment and management (Lyon 
2007, p.26).  Social sorting  draws attention the contribution of surveillance technologies to 
“the social and economic categories and the computer codes by which personal data is 
organised with a view to influencing and managing people and populations” (Lyon 2003, p.2).  
According to Lyon, the grouping of individuals by data collected about them is the primary, 
frequently automated function of modern surveillance (Lyon 2003, p.13).  In current discourse 
Lyon is used to support claims of living in risk-obsessed societies (cf. Welsh et al. 2003; Kenner 
2008), to suggest that specific applications can contribute to surveillance of users and carers 
(cf. Kenner 2008; Vuokko 2008; Monahan & Fisher 2010), or to argue that surveillance 
providers carers and family members power over homebound elderly patients (cf. Kenner 
2008).  The connection between PHM, social sorting, institutional and clinical power over 
patients has not yet been explored in academic discourse (see: Chapter 3). 
Surveillance as practiced today is undertaken by numerous unconnected agencies gathering, 
analysing and sharing data about individuals for purposes related to marketing, governance 
and control.  Profiles and risk groups are created from surveillance data of individuals and 
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groups in planning services, predicting behaviours and events, and preventing risks or 
undesirable consequences (Lyon 2003, p.13).  Populations are classified “according to varying 
criteria, to determine who should be targeted for special treatment, suspicion, eligibility, 
inclusion, access, and so on” (Lyon 2003, p.20).  Categorisation affects the information given to 
individuals, and the choices available to them in moving through social systems mediated by 
surveillance (Lyon 2003, p.13).  PHM offers medical institutions and clinicians the opportunity 
to categorise users according to their physiological readings and behaviours.  The power in this 
opportunity cannot be described merely as disciplinary power, through which the patient’s 
behaviours and identity are changed to better match the values of service providers. 
4.4.3.1 Bio-Power 
The identification of something as a disease, by which physiological patterns and social 
practices can be transformed into illnesses, is a power exercised by clinicians and medical 
institutions.  This bio-power is ‘disciplinary’, in the sense that clinicians can influence patients 
to behave or identify in a certain way in response to illness (Gastaldo 1997, p.114; Lupton 
1997, p.99; Press et al. 2000, p.239; Lyon 2007, p.84).  Bio-power can be linked to 
medicalisation (see: Section 3.2.9), by which medicine seeps into social life and defines 
“normal and pathological” parameters (Gastaldo 1997, p.116), making health an ethical value 
which redefines the goals and projects pursued in private life (Rose 2006, p.25).  Power 
practiced in this way is dependent upon the relationship between patient and clinician, in 
which the clinician’s training or expertise is acknowledged by the patient.   
Medical power is not possessed by clinicians and institutions and exercised over patients by 
right for purposes of domination or political goals, but rather is created through ‘collusive’ 
medical relationships in which the patient, clinician and institution must each play its role in 
acknowledging the power of the other (Lupton 1997, p.100).  What is missing from this 
account of bio-power is recognition of the power of patients beyond collusion—patients may 
argue for alternative treatments or actively resist the power of clinicians and institutions by 
refusing to follow ‘doctor’s orders’, or by not self-identifying as a patient.  Ultimately, it is the 
patient that chooses to engage in a medical relationship with a particular clinician and 
institution.  The power implicit in consent needs to be acknowledged, even where the patient 
is pressured by social norms and deference to expertise to behave in a certain way.   
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4.4.3.1.1 Risk Categorisation 
PHM contributes to the bio-power of clinicians and medical institutions by contributing 
personal data through which categories can be created and assigned according to health 
condition, physiological parameters, familial history, genetic predisposition or future risk of 
illness, creating a basis for recommending treatments and behavioural interventions to benefit 
the health of the patient.  Categories need not reflect actual health conditions currently 
inflicting the patient; in modern medicine, bio-power is often exercised by identifying patients 
‘at-risk’ of a future affliction.  As a form of social sorting, placing a patient into a risk category 
limits his future choices because such categories are “normalizing” (Clarke et al. 2003, p.173), 
meaning they are identities with certain characteristics into which patients are placed.  Once 
there, patients can be treated as mere representations of a risk identity or manifestation of a 
disorder (cf. Lyon 2003; Monahan & Wall 2007; Light 2010).  Monitoring data held in databases 
creates ‘data doubles’, or aggregates of personal data which, due to being made up of limited 
data from monitored parameters (and associated medical records), may fail to represent the 
socially embodied person the data is about (cf. Haggerty & Ericson 2000; Lyon 2007, p.55).  
These doubles are assigned to categories through which the user is identified as a certain type 
of person (van der Ploeg 2012, p.177), which affect how he is treated in the future by those 
with access to the data. 
Following on from Foucault, Armstrong (1995, pp.400–1) sees modern medicine operating 
under the paradigm of ‘surveillance medicine’, in which people are more or less ‘at-risk’ of 
becoming ill rather than being seen as healthy, necessitating mitigation of risks through 
medical interventions and ‘lifestyle’ changes.  For some, the rise of medicine as risk 
management eliminates the distinction between health and illness altogether, “since 
everything potentially is a source of ‘risk’ and everyone can be seen to be ‘at risk’” (Petersen 
1997, p.195).  The extension of medical expertise or ‘gaze’ to all people is justified when 
citizens are viewed as “asymptomatically or pre-symptomatically ill” (Rose 2006, p.19).  
Whereas in the past risk calculations have been useful only for epidemiology at the population 
level, sorting patients by categories of risk has moved statistical probability of potential future 
illness into the realm of individual diagnosis (Press et al. 2000, p.241; Clarke et al. 2003, p.173).  
Without downplaying the epidemiological opportunities afforded by PHM data to identify new 
risk factors and links between behaviours and health (cf. Petersen 1997, p.197), the assertion 
that risk has replaced health and illness as measures of well-being is unconvincing.  Ubiquitous 
surveillance would be required for all health concerns to be expressed in terms of risk.  More 
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importantly, risk can only dominate medical discourses where patients are willing to 
participate in a medical relationship in which they are increasingly identified by characteristics 
of their body or family history placing them ‘at-risk’, undermining the potential for resistance 
and medical relationships directed by the patient’s values. 
4.4.3.1.2 Implications for User Identity 
With that said, if PHM data can be used to identify health risks in users, it may influence users 
to increasingly view themselves as ‘at-risk’, affecting how they self-identify and behave.  
Grouping patients by risk is intended to justify preventative medical interventions or lifestyle 
changes on the basis of characteristics such as age, weight, blood pressure and family 
history(Rose 2006, p.72).  Being placed into a risk group can affect a patient’s identity as if the 
predicted health condition had already occurred, changing how the patient behaves and is 
treated by others in an attempt to appear ‘responsible’ (Rose 2006, p.75).  By creating 
opportunities to define new risk categories and place patients within them on the basis of 
monitoring data, PHM contributes to ‘prepatient’ identities, which are created, sustained and 
treated by health monitoring (cf. Rose 2006, p.94).  These identities are lived out in social and 
medical relationships with family, friends, clinicians and medical institutions, each of which 
respond to the patient differently according to their perceived identity.  Implications for 
identity were mentioned in the literature (see: Section 3.2.5), but the potential for PHM to 
contribute to the creation of new identities through risk categorisation was not mentioned.  
4.4.3.1.2.1 Biomedicalisation:  From Clinical to Self-Care 
An increasing emphasis on risk in medicine (Armstrong 1995), which can be mitigated through 
lifestyle choices and behaving according to clinical recommendations, shifts the burden of 
health away from medical institutions and the state to the individual (Petersen 1997, p.194; 
Press et al. 2000, p.241).  Risk management changes the goal of medicine from restoration of 
normality through clinical interventions to individual responsibility for the maintenance of 
health through mitigation of risks and self-governance (Clarke et al. 2003, p.165), revealing a 
desire for control over uncertainty central to risk as a concept (Press et al. 2000, p.242).  
Throughout the twentieth century this type of “self-maintenance” was extolled as an ethical 
value of good citizenship in Europe and North America (Clarke et al. 2003, p.172; Rose 2006, 
p.22), according to which citizens can be identified as ‘responsible’ or ‘good’ as far as they 
pursue health through risk management (Petersen 1997, p.204; Clarke et al. 2003, p.172; Rose 
2006, p.22).  Relationships between patients, clinicians and medical institutions are changed as 
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self-maintenance increasingly shifts care away from face-to-face encounters to patients 
utilising techniques and technologies for self-care and self-monitoring (Clarke et al. 2003, 
p.165). 
The promotion of personal responsibility for health is referred to as the biomedicalisation of 
life, by which individuals obtain “moral responsibilities [for health] to be fulfilled through 
improved access to knowledge, self-surveillance, prevention, risk assessment, the treatment of 
risk, and the consumption of appropriate self-help/biomedical goods and services” (Clarke et 
al. 2003, p.162).  Whether PHM reinforces biomedicalisation and self-maintenance as an 
ethical value is dependent on the culture in which it is used.  So far as PHM can contribute to 
the identification and mitigation of risk factors in patients, it can also support self-
maintenance.  It is therefore worth assessing in future deployments of PHM the extent to 
which it is used as part of an agenda of biomedicalisation, through which the burden of care is 
increasingly shifted to the patient and community by presenting usage as a moral 
responsibility. 
4.4.3.1.3 Power Relationships 
Biomedicalisation and the need for self-maintenance are reinforced by placing patients into 
risk categories and recommending self-care and lifestyle changes as mitigation techniques.  
The power to define risk categories therefore places great power into the hands of clinicians 
and medical institutions, but only if patients accept the categorisation and subsequent medical 
and lifestyle recommendations (cf. Lyon 2007, p.81).  In medical relationships the perceived 
expertise of the clinician provides incentive for the patient to follow his recommendations.  
PHM causes a subtle but important shift in power in this regard; if defining categories or 
placing patients into categories is left to specialists or institutions with which the patient has 
not traditionally had a face-to-face relationship, a new stakeholder with the power to 
influence the patient’s behaviours and self-identification enters relationships mediated by 
PHM. 
Even with such power for data custodians, surveillance is not distinctly beneficial or 
burdensome for service providers or users (Lyon 2001a, pp.136–7); sorting users into groups 
based on surveillance data, for example, can benefit users by directing them towards 
interventions perceived as helpful by service providers, while also burdening them by limiting 
choice to recommended treatments.  For the provider, sorting facilitates management of 
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patient populations according to organisational norms (e.g. recommended interventions).  
However, when providers present adoption as a tradeoff (e.g. Lyon 2001a, p.136), in which it is 
necessary for users to shoulder the burdens of surveillance to receive its benefits, the 
opportunity for users to affect how surveillance is carried out, potentially reducing the burdens 
placed on patients in the pursuit of organisational norms (e.g. efficiency), is diminished.  The 
‘ethical tradeoffs’ seen in current discourse (see: Section 3.3.2) demonstrate that users hold a 
normative view of the technology shaped by the underlying power relationships with service 
providers. 
4.4.3.1.4 The Need for Transparency 
Operators possess significant power to change the behaviours and identity of surveillance 
subjects through social sorting, which enables profiling and discrimination according to norms 
reflecting the political values of custodians (Lyon 2007, p.183).  For PHM, power may be seen 
in risk categorisation and care commissioning favouring specific patient populations.  This 
power is often realised in closed off databases away from public scrutiny (Lyon 2007, p.181).  
One way to curtail this power is by guaranteeing patients access to PHM data held about them.  
However, knowledge of how the data is being used by data custodians is also necessary.  
Transparency is therefore needed regarding the process of defining new categories within 
PHM-linked databases, as well as the process of matching users to categories (cf. Lyon 2007, 
p.177).  Categorisation can be seen as an ethical issue because categories define people in 
certain ways, affecting how they are treated by medical institutions and clinicians (cf. Lyon 
2007, p.192).  Monitored patients risk losing context-rich relationships with clinicians when 
medical care increasingly involves evaluation of fragmented data representations of patients, 
reducing opportunities to incorporate the patient’s values and expectations into care. 
4.4.4 Surveillance, Virtue and Colonisation 
So how do colonisation, virtue ethics and theories of surveillance combine to create a 
conceptual framework to understand the moral potential of PHM?  Some of the implications 
for colonisation in terms of virtue ethics were explored above (see: Section 4.3.5).  The 
surveillance theories reviewed here contribute further insights relating to the effects of 
surveillance in descriptive terms, often hinting at ethical issues but lacking an ethical 
framework against which the power granted to medical institutions and service providers by 
PHM can be criticised.  Conceptions of autonomy, human dignity, privacy and personhood may 
provide a basis for criticising surveillance of individuals, in the sense that personal freedoms 
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are curtailed through analysis of private data.  Where these concepts fall short is in providing a 
basis for assessing the ethical implications of PHM for medicine as a practice, seen in medical 
relationships between clinicians, patients and medical institutions.  Virtue ethics provides such 
a framework, meaning surveillance theory provides an explanation of how PHM may 
undermine the realisation of virtues and virtuous behaviour in medicine, damaging medicine 
as a practice and potentially harming patients. 
Quantification and categorisation of patients through monitoring allows for remote 
assessment based on ‘objective’ data, even when used alongside a patient’s verbal account in 
clinical encounters.  In a system flooded by longitudinal data representing the health of a user, 
the need to see patients as socially embodied persons is reduced, limiting opportunities for 
virtuous behaviour in face-to-face encounters.  The movement to ‘abstract decision-making’ 
can be seen as an ‘institutionalisation’ of medical practice, in the sense that institutions 
already manipulate data representations of patients to make decisions regarding care 
commissioning or the needs of patient populations; the better these decisions are made, in 
terms of efficiently meeting the needs of the patient, the more the institution sustains itself.  
The question can be asked, however, of whether this type of patient encounter undermines 
the ends of medicine for the sustenance of the institution when incorporated into the healing 
relationship (cf. MacIntyre 2007, p.194).  If decisions about the patient can be made on 
monitoring data alone, justified through utilitarian appeals to a ‘need’ for efficiency, there is a 
risk of limiting opportunities for virtuous behaviour in the healing relationship, which can only 
be realised when clinicians are forced to encounter the socially embodied patient.36  In such 
relationships, the patient is in a weaker position because his physical body is amenable to 
remote evaluation, from where the patient’s values and expectations cannot influence the 
healing process.  Social sorting based on PHM data allows for the substitution of the ‘data 
double’ (see: Section 4.4.3.1.1) in the healing relationship. 
What is lost by the exit of the socially embodied patient is the opportunity for physicians to be 
compassionate and gain the trust of the patient, and to demonstrate their concern for the 
patient’s interests.  In facing the potential institutionalisation of, at the very least, chronic 
illness management, physicians may need to exercise integrity, justice, truthfulness and 
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 A similar rationalisation of decision-making, in which certain types of information are favoured at the 
cost of eliminating other information from view, can be seen in business intelligence.  This idea is 




courage in reflexively rejecting certain forms of PHM which place too much space between 
physicians and patients, to be filled by other stakeholders and remote processes of data 
recording, analysis and recommendations. 
The changes to the healing relationship seen from the perspectives of virtue ethics and 
surveillance theory can be understood as outcomes of the colonisation of the patient’s 
lifeworld and clinical encounters by institutional values and expectations.  As described 
previously colonisation occurs when PHM acts as a mediator in medical relationships between 
patients, physicians and institutions, including the healing relationship, by providing 
monitoring data and analysis of the patient’s condition (see: Section 3.4.1.3).  External 
expectations can be embedded in systems which recommend certain behaviours or provide 
information for self-assessment, changing how the patient views himself, his personal space 
and his condition.  Colonisation brings with it many ethical implications for patients in terms of 
privacy, autonomy, safety and so on (see: Section 3.4.1.4).  Virtue ethics as a theoretical 
framework helps make sense of the meaning of these implications for how medicine will be 
practiced, and how it should ideally be practiced against an ethical standard.  It provides a 
basis for criticising the implications of PHM as something more than mere ‘costs’ of the 
perceived safety afforded by monitoring (see: Section 3.2.3).  It also helps picture the 
technology as more than a mere extension of existing treatments, and instead as a medium for 
new models of care in which the values of institutions and clinicians play a greater role in the 
‘private’ life of patients. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter a theoretical framework was developed based on virtue ethics, surveillance 
theory and colonisation of the lifeworld.  The framework, developed to respond to the 
perceived need to ethically assess the implications of PHM for medical relationships identified 
in the previous chapter (see: Section 3.5), assists in understanding the moral potential of PHM.  
Virtue ethics provides a counterpoint to utilitarian support for PHM based solely on economic 
or cost-efficiency concerns, while grounding an account of the ethical acceptability of new 
medical interventions in the ends of medicine as a moral practice.  Surveillance theory helps 
explain how PHM can be conceived of as surveillance, which changes how care is provided to 
patients by creating opportunities for categorisation and remote analysis.  The alterations to 
the healing relationship identified as ethically problematic from the perspectives of virtue and 
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surveillance can be understood as examples of the colonisation of the patient’s lifeworld by 
the concerns of the system, which travel through PHM in mediated care. 
It is difficult to assess the explanatory power of the framework for specific applications without 
context-specific analysis, in which it can be seen how patients, practitioners and institutions 
perceive the changes brought about by PHM.  As suggested above, ethical analysis should not 
be limited to theoretical analysis alone because issues occur in specific contexts of use and 
have implications for real people (see: Section 3.1.1).  Anticipatory actions can be taken to 
correct problematic ethical issues, or to prevent future harm, but only when the implications 
of the technology for potential users (and other stakeholders) are understood.  Recognising 
this, it would be helpful to study patient populations that are being targeted by PHM, to gain 
insight into the perceived ethical implications of PHM in terms of its effects on medical 
relationships.  
Conflicts may be evident between the norms which patients, clinicians and medical paying 
organisations expect to govern PHM mediated care (see: Section 3.4.1.1).  These norms are 
evident in attitudes towards PHM, including perceived benefits and problems with specific 
applications and uses of the technology and collected data.  To see how these norms shape the 
ethical implications of PHM in particular contexts of use, empirical research into stakeholder 
attitudes within a particular context of use or healthcare system is appropriate.  To begin to 
understand the context in such an empirical study which aims to address the third research 
question, an analysis of the strategic aims of that context’s medical institution(s) must be 
conducted prior to assessing the attitudes of patients and practitioners.  To this end the next 
chapter reviews England as a setting for such research, where PHM is seen by the National 
Health Service and Department of Health as a tool to drive down costs and shift care burdens 
to the community.  Institutional values can be seen in strategic support for PHM, which may 
conflict with the moral obligations of practitioners and the expectations of patients. 
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5 Chapter 5: PHM in England 
5.1 Introduction 
Before PHM is adopted across healthcare services in the EU, the ethical implications of PHM 
mediating care should be investigated.  Medical care occurs via relationships between 
institutions, clinicians and patients, which can be distinguished by characteristics of 
stakeholders, such as the medical needs of the patient, the training and values of the clinician, 
the structure and goals of institutions as well as the overall model of the healthcare system.  
The implications of PHM as a mediator will therefore depend upon the characteristics of the 
context in which a relationship occurs.  As an example, different issues will be faced in 
privatised versus national systems: in the former, extensive restrictions on the transmission of 
PHM data to third parties may be necessary to prevent monitored individuals from being 
denied insurance or ‘penalised’ with higher premiums. 
Empirical research into a specific context of use is therefore necessary to understand how the 
norms and contextual attributes governing medical relationships change how PHM and its 
ethical implications are experienced on a case-by-case basis.  The point of such a study is not 
to solve a particular ethical dilemma in a particular context, but to understand the implications 
for relationships according to the experiences and perspectives of actual stakeholders.  These 
implications may be comprehensible within the conceptual framework developed in Chapters 
3 and 4, or parallel to themes in the discourse, but may also reveal new insights or 
implications.  In general, empirical study will help demonstrate how the framework applies in a 
real context, and hopefully provide new insights which necessitate expansion or refinement of 
the framework.   
As a result of their broad European focus, the two FP7 projects framing this research were 
unable to closely examine implications of PHM in a particular context or health system, such as 
England’s National Health Service (see: Chapter 1).  The National Health Service (NHS) provides 
an ideal context for empirical study due to its size and strategic support for implementing PHM 
across a variety of health services.  With a responsibility for over 53 million citizens in England 
(Office for National Statistics 2012), the NHS is one of the largest national healthcare systems 
in the EU strategically supporting the implementation of PHM (see: Section 5.2).  This support 
can be seen in strategic aims set by the Department of Health (DH) which encourage remote 
monitoring of chronically ill and elderly patients.  Strategy is intended to ‘trickle down’ across 
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England through several levels of medical institutions, where aims are implemented by 
regional clinical commissioning groups (CCG), trusts and care institutions such as hospitals 
through care commissioning (or ‘purchasing’ medical services) and innovation adoption. 
England also has a recognised shortage of care facilities and services for chronically ill and 
elderly patients (Department of Health 2011b; Department of Health 2012a; Campbell 2013a; 
Campbell 2013b), which creates a context in which PHM may be seen as a solution to provide 
care with reduced human interaction, outside of hospitals and care residences.  PHM may also 
contribute to addressing the shortfall of professional carers for disabled individuals in England 
by which face-to-face care time is restricted (BBC News 2013; Leonard  Cheshire Disability 
2013); however, monitoring systems cannot replace the physical support provided by carers 
with daily tasks such as bathing , cooking or getting in/out of bed.  Reductions such as these 
can be seen as a method of shifting the burden of care onto the community, while potentially 
providing replacement technologies to manage shortfalls of human workers or medical 
resources.  The need for efficiency and resource savings potentially creates a conflict between 
utilitarian aims and the right to acceptable medical care (UN General Assembly 1948, sec.25), 
loosely defined as care which secures the health and well-being of the patient without 
imposing significant social or ethical burdens, for example by failing to respect the dignity, 
privacy, confidentiality and human rights of patients (The National Health Service 2013).   
England also has a long history with surveillance; as a country with less than 1% of the world’ s 
population (Office for National Statistics 2012), it possesses 20% of the world’s closed-circuit 
televisions (CCTV) as of 2007 (Lyon 2007, p.39).  This unique familiarity with everyday 
surveillance provides another incentive to study England, as it may translate into increased 
acceptance of surveillance in a medical context, or alternatively reactions against the privacy 
implications of PHM through comparisons to CCTV. 
As a site of empirical study, the NHS is a context in which medical relationships exist with the 
potential to be mediated by PHM.  Assessing the prospects of NHS support of PHM allows for 
analysis of medical relationships against a background of institutional strategies and values 
driving diffusion of PHM, and the goals and predicted outcomes of its use.  Some of the 
institutional values which may eventually colonise the patient’s lifeworld can be seen first in 
strategic support for PHM. 
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5.2 Strategic Support of PHM in England 
The reorganisation of the NHS under the Health and Social Care Act of 2012, along with 
changes to NHS information strategy (e.g. Department of Health 2011b; Department of Health 
2012a), can be seen as a response to financial challenges and predicted demographic shifts 
towards an increasingly elderly population, which is predicted to increase the burden on 
healthcare resources in the future (House of Commons Health Committee 2005; Department 
of Health 2011b).  Information and innovations in medical technologies and care are seen as 
the only way to meet these challenges (Department of Health 2011b), described as a “need” 
for “efficiency gains” while providing the same or better quality of care (Department of Health 
2010a, p.11).37  The gap between financial considerations and ‘best practice’ continues to 
shrink, as GPs and practice teams organised into GP consortia have taken over care 
commissioning budgets and responsibilities (Department of Health 2010a).  Consortia and 
practitioners are held financially accountable on the basis of the quality of care provided, 
guaranteed through inspections, adherence to ‘best practice’ guidelines and provisioning of 
budgets to meet local needs (Department of Health 2010a, p.27).  GPs will be responsible for 
the financial implications, or efficiency, of their practice, which is intended to encourage 
innovation and improved management of chronic illnesses and costly conditions.38  
PHM may contribute to meeting the information and financial needs of the NHS.  Resources 
are “directed towards priorities” to meet the “almost unlimited demand” on a national health 
system with limited resources (Fitzgerald et al. 2002, p.1443).  As a result, innovations in “non-
priority areas,” or ones which create additional demands on resources may fail to be adopted 
(Fitzgerald et al. 2002, p.1443), regardless of clinical effectiveness.  If PHM is linked with cost-
effective chronic illness management, then this strategic aim may be achievable through 
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 ‘Efficiency’ is an unclear concept within the NHS strategy documents reviewed.  The term appears to 
refer to attaining the maximum possible benefit in terms of quality of care while committing the least 
possible resources.  Efficiency could therefore be increased by eliminating redundant bureaucratic 
processes, or replacing an existing treatment with one which provides ‘better’ health outcomes at the 
same or reduced cost.  Defined this way, efficiency is a normative concept which relies upon the 
prescription of value to certain parameters to define desirable health outcomes.  Accordingly, a 
treatment which is more expensive but ‘better’ for the patient, compared with existing practice, may be 
treated as an efficient use of resources despite the higher cost. Far from a precise concept, even a 
general ratio between financial cost and patient benefit for an intervention to be viewed as efficient is 
not clear in the reviewed documents. 
38 The distinction between ‘purchasers’ and ‘practitioners’ has been collapsed in the move towards GP 
consortia, suggesting that financial considerations or the ‘efficiency’ of particular treatments may 
increasingly influence care.  This is not to say financial considerations directly influence treatments 
offered by practitioners to patients, but rather that practitioners are increasingly expected to adopt 
innovations and treatments in their practice which are seen as cost-effective at a commissioning level. 
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deployment of PHM, suggesting how PHM may be initially used by the NHS. 39  Strategy sets 
the stage for the rapid diffusion of innovations, such as PHM, which are believed to provide 
these benefits and equivalent care without raising costs.   
In strategy (Department of Health 2011b; Department of Health 2012a), telehealth, telecare 
and PHM are seen as a way to utilise information to reduce the costs of chronic illness 
management and consumption of acute care services (Department of Health 2010b; 
Department of Health 2011a; Department of Health 2011b; Department of Health 2012a).  
Predicted efficiency gains focus on fewer and shorter hospital stays for the monitored, and a 
reduced need for residential care achieved through patients increasingly ageing in monitored 
homes (Sorell & Draper 2012, p.38).  If chronic illness can increasingly be managed at home, 
hospital beds and resources available for acute care increase (Steventon et al. 2012).  Support 
for PHM is seen in financial incentives for telehealth and telecare systems, and the recognition 
of the value and importance of health data for driving economic growth in England as well as 
research and development of innovations in the NHS (Department of Health 2010a, p.25; 
Department of Health 2011b).  Telehealth and telecare are seen as a way to improve chronic 
disease management while reducing costs, with the aim of diffusing systems to three million 
users by 2016 (Department of Health 2011b, p.26; Department of Health 2012b).  PHM is 
broadly seen as a tool to meet the increasing financial and care burdens placed on the NHS by 
utilising information to increase efficiency. 
5.2.1 The Value of Information 
Cost-effectiveness is not simply a comparison of the costs of providing different treatments or 
systems to patients.  Under strategy, patient data is seen as a valuable commodity waiting to 
be exploited for gains in efficiency and quality of care (cf. Department of Health 2012a).  In 
recent years the DH has committed to developing an information culture characterised by 
“openness, transparency and comparability” between patient information from diverse 
sources (Department of Health 2010b; Department of Health 2012a).  Information has come to 
be viewed as a panacea to improve medical care and health outcomes, empower patients to 
control and make decisions about their health based on personal information, support 
                                                          
39
 The cost-effectiveness of PHM, and the ethical acceptability of introducing financial responsibility to 
practitioners, falls outside of the scope of the thesis.  For more on the influence of ‘efficiency’ and 
financial constraints on clinical encounters, see Appendix 4. 
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England’s economy, as well as drive research, innovation development and diffusion.40  Cost-
effectiveness must be understood as a measure of the value of innovations and information in 
these terms.   
The value of information is a measure of its contribution towards future innovations, research 
and economic growth, and towards improving the efficiency and quality of care in medical 
practices.  A prime example of the perceived value of information is the exploitation of patient 
data to support secondary strategic aims.  Anonymised patient records will increasingly be 
made available to the private sector to drive future “system improvement, care choices, 
efficiency, integration, research, and growth” in the NHS (Department of Health 2012a).41  
Leadership at all levels of the NHS have been called upon to support “efficient and effective” 
uses of information which “improve health care and outcomes.”  Specifically, data of interest 
will be linked across and between patient care records and used to “audit quality, improve 
services, guide commissioning, and identify trends and patterns of health” (Department of 
Health 2012a).  An emphasis is placed on the prevention of ill health and the efficiency of NHS 
organisations and practices at a local level, which are intended to allow practitioners to 
prioritise face-to-face contact for the neediest patients, with other needs being met in the 
community (e.g. self-care, informal care, home visits from professionals) or via remote 
monitoring (see: Section 4.4.3.1.2.1).  Information is said to help identify the most clinically 
effective treatments at a local and national level, and to match available resources with 
medical needs at a local level (Department of Health 2012a).  A context is thus created in 
which PHM data can be used to expand the informational basis for commissioning and care 
decisions, by identifying health patterns and individual histories across local patient 
populations.  It is unclear whether PHM data will be seen valuable in this regard, but 
information-centric strategy hints at the broader value of PHM beyond the immediate care of 
patients. 
                                                          
40
 The attitude taken towards information is overly optimistic and deterministic—information is seen as 
guaranteeing improved efficiency and the quality of care (cf. Fairweather & Rogerson 2001).  The 
possibilities of overwhelming practitioners with information, or alienating patients through the new 
emphasis on self-responsibility and prevention are not considered, to name only two of the many 
possible negative outcomes of the increasing emphasis on information in the NHS. 
41
 The strategies are implemented by the Clinical Practice Research Datalink and the Open Data Institute 
(UK Cabinet Office 2011; Department of Health 2011b), which provide linkage services between 
“unidentifiable, individual level” health data to support research and innovation in the NHS and the 
private sector.  Additionally, the Department of Health’s Health and Social Care Information Centre will 
routinely publish aggregate national data sets of anonymised linked information to support research, 
innovation and the presentation of information to the public (Department of Health 2010b). 
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5.2.2 Secondary Uses of Patient Data 
The value placed on patient information in strategy suggests that PHM creates new 
opportunities for ‘secondary uses’ of gathered data not directly related to the user’s care, such 
as grounding care commissioning decisions in the needs of local patient populations.  Beyond 
internal administrative uses, health data is increasingly viewed as a valuable commodity to be 
traded with private sector organisations and individuals (Department of Health 2012a).  
Although the primary purpose of the NHS is to provide sufficient healthcare for England’s 
population, a secondary role is in encouraging economic growth, particularly in supporting 
research and the health and life sciences industry (Department of Health 2011b) which are 
seen as critical to meeting the increasing demands placed on the NHS by financial and 
demographic trends (Department of Health 2010a, p.24).  Information is seen as the key to 
achieving these aims, which implies movement of patient information within and between the 
NHS, governmental bodies and the private sector, facilitated by the Health & Social Care 
Information Centre.   
Existing ‘patient-identifiable information flows’42 are evidence of this connection, including 
exchanges concerning adverse drug reactions, patient drug abuse, care needs including nursing 
home accommodation, disease registers, toxicity of newly marketed pharmaceuticals, and 
various “referrals and reports to non-NHS agencies,” all of which are transmitted from NHS 
bodies to various government bodies (e.g. social services, child protection services) as well as 
various ‘private-sector’ bodies including the health services industry, care services (e.g. private 
care residences), academics and researchers (The Caldicott Committee 1997).  Information 
flows change rapidly in step with reorganisation of NHS and governmental bodies and services, 
so these flows should not be considered an exhaustive list by any means.  Although not based 
on existing practice and thus unable to identify where specific misuses of PHM data could 
occur, historical flows demonstrate that various pieces of patient-identifiable information are 
already transmitted for secondary uses and stored in a multitude of databases across NHS, 
governmental and non-governmental sites.43  These types of information flows are examples 
                                                          
42
 ‘Patient-identifiable information’ is defined as information on any of the following: Surname, 
Forename, Initials, Address, Postcode, Date of Birth, Other Dates (e.g. death, diagnosis), Sex, NHS 
Number, N.I. Number, Local Identifier (e.g. hospital or GP Practice Number), Ethnic Group, Soundex 
code, or Occupation.  Any single piece of information from this list can potentially be used to infer the 
identity of the patient (The Caldicott Committee 1997, p.89). 
43
 Despite repeated attempts to find further details regarding information flows and specific databases 
in which PHM data may be transmitted and stored, nothing was found beyond those offered in the 1997 
report (The Caldicott Committee 1997).  Without overreaching, this finding suggests that the internal 
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of ‘secondary uses’ of data, defined as any use of a patient’s data to achieve aims beyond the 
immediate care of the patient. 
PHM has the potential to significantly increase the availability of longitudinal health data, in a 
sense opening up the lives and private behaviours of patients to commissioning, research and 
other secondary uses (cf. Section 4.4.3).  The possibility of secondary uses of anonymised and 
aggregated health data negatively impacting on patients remains unacknowledged by the 
Department of Health (cf. UK Cabinet Office 2011, p.5), despite granting significant power and 
new data sets for medical institutions to assess and understand the health and behaviours of 
patient (see: Section 4.4.3.1).  Longitudinal data enables the identification of health patterns, 
behaviours and risk factors.  On this basis, secondary uses of PHM data may lead to a greater 
categorisation of local health populations by risk or health patterns (cf. Clarke et al. 2003; Lyon 
2003), justifying further colonisation of the patient’s lifeworld, for example through monitoring 
or recommendations concerning newly identified personal health risks.  While this can be seen 
as beneficial in the sense that categorisation may allow for more efficient health planning and 
commissioning, or for epidemiological research into disease factors and health patterns across 
monitored populations, the potential for monitoring data to change how patients, 
practitioners and other medical professionals interact should be assessed before PHM is 
widely adopted; however, this ideal timeline appears to be reversed in England. 
5.3 Diffusion of PHM 
The strategic support seen for PHM is intended to encourage diffusion across NHS services.  
Standards of evidence are typically required to demonstrate clinical efficacy and cost-
effectiveness of any new innovation prior to diffusion, yet these standards are not apparently 
met as of yet with PHM.  ‘Evidence-based medicine’ has been strategically adopted by the NHS 
in recent years to support the best possible medical innovations and care, often relying on 
guidelines published by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) to 
establish ‘best practice’ as guidance for care commissioning (Department of Health 2010a, 
p.8). Innovations with proven clinical and financial efficacy will become increasingly important 
in the near future, as new ways are sought to provide sufficient medical care under 
demographic and economic demands. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
workings of the Health & Social Care Information Centre (and the Secondary Uses Service which it 
replaced in 2013) are not readily available to the public. 
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The push towards ‘evidence-based medicine’ (Department of Health 2010a, p.8) has changed 
how innovations are adopted within the NHS (Ferlie et al. 2005, p.118).  At both local and 
organisational levels, practitioners and professionals have been encouraged to adopt 
innovations with empirically proven clinical efficacy in comparison to existing and alternative 
treatments (Fitzgerald et al. 2002, p.1431; Ferlie et al. 2005, p.118).  Randomised clinical trials 
(RCT) are often seen as the ‘gold standard’ for evidence of clinical efficacy and cost 
effectiveness (Dudley 1986; Rosen & Mays 1998; Ferlie et al. 2005, p.130) in the “hierarchy of 
evidence” established under evidence-based medicine (Ferlie et al. 2005, p.130).  For some 
innovations, guidelines are established by the NICE to guide ‘best practice’ or establish quality 
standards (Fitzgerald et al. 2002, p.1431).  Innovations are intended to be judged against 
existing treatments in terms of clinical efficacy, costs and efficiency to determine best practice, 
although this approach risks minimising the importance of social and emotional aspects of 
health, such as physical touch, central to patient quality of life.   
In practice, this approach requires “the same or better clinical effects should be achieved at 
equal or lower costs” for an innovation to replace an existing treatment (Rosen and Mays 
1998, 104).  Financial incentives will often accompany NICE Technology Appraisals44 to 
motivate local adoption of specific innovations (Department of Health 2010a).  The assumption 
of such top-down approaches is that clinical evidence is a reliable and clear guide to ‘best 
practice’, or that scientific evidence will objectively indicate the most effective innovations, 
regardless of specific contexts of use as well as organisational, clinical and patient needs.  In 
practice, the assumptions behind this model of diffusion do not hold true; standards of 
evidence and ‘optimal’ solutions are not shared across medical professions,45 meaning value-
laden interpretation of bodies of ambiguous and contested evidence is required to identify 
‘optimal’ innovations (Fitzgerald et al. 2002, p.1437), as opposed to a single, unified and 
objective body of evidence pushing diffusion.   
                                                          
44
 Technology Appraisals are evidence-based assessments of pharmaceuticals, treatments and medical 
technologies which typically rely upon randomised clinical trials.  They are considered authoritative 
statements of ‘best practice’ by the NHS at a national level (Department of Health 2011b, p.15), 
although this does not necessarily translate into deferment to authority by local practitioners in judging 
evidence as credible and innovations as desirable. 
45
 The relative ‘credibility’ of evidence differs between medical professionals and specialities, which 
differ in terms of background knowledge, training and approaches to care (Fitzgerald et al. 2002, 
p.1438).  For example, results from RCTS are criticised due to a lack of generalizability between diverse 
contexts in which the innovation would be used, characterised by health professionals, patients and 
medical organisations with a diversity of needs and expectations (Rosen & Mays 1998, p.118).   
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Despite the alleged objectivity of diffusion, it has historically been politically malleable, with 
changes in “objectives, scope and emphasis” often mirroring changes in political power 
(Wainwright & Waring 2007, p.49).  As it actually occurs, diffusion is a “slow, complex and 
contested” process, as dependent upon evidence of clinical- and cost-effectiveness as on local 
and organisational politics and relationships between professional bodies (Fitzgerald et al. 
2002; Ferlie et al. 2005, p.123).  Linear models of diffusion (cf. Rogers 2003) in which diffusion 
proceeds on a series of linear steps fail to capture reality, in which diffusion processes are 
“erratic, circular or abrupt…[and] may come to a full stop or go into reverse” (Ferlie et al. 
2005).  Diffusion in the NHS is a local process, occurring within specific organisational and 
professional bodies or practices such as CCGs, subject to various expectations of evidence as 
well as top-down strategic and financial pressure to adopt.  The importance of this aspect of 
diffusion is in recognising that even though governmental strategy says that a technology or 
application will have effect X, Y and Z, the effects of PHM on medical professionals, 
practitioners and patients within specific contexts of use cannot be predicted deterministically 
at the technology-level.  Top-down strategic support for PHM is therefore not a guarantee of 
local diffusion across the NHS. 
5.3.1 Piloting PHM 
The case of PHM diffusion is somewhat unique, in that the DH has gone beyond strategic 
support by conducting an extensive pilot study of telehealth and telecare technologies closely 
related to PHM in terms of technological capacities and aims (e.g. Philips 2013).  In contrast to 
PHM the piloted technologies require patient interaction to take readings, answer questions 
and transmit data, although the general aim of remotely monitoring patients remains 
comparable.  Although not equivalent to PHM, piloting of such systems can be seen as further 
evidence of the DH’s desire to encourage broad adoption of PHM and related technologies in 
the near future.   The Whole System Demonstrator (WSD) programme consisted of a RCT in 
which over 3200 patients with COPD, heart failure or diabetes mellitus were provided with 
telehealth or telecare systems, or assigned to a control group receiving normal care 
(Department of Health 2011a).  The size and scope of the study was intended to assess the 
potential and implications of diffusing telehealth and telecare across England among a variety 
of local healthcare organisations, meaning that the WSD can provide an evidence-base for the 
DH’s telehealth and telecare diffusion strategy going forward.   
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Numerous secondary analyses of cost-effectiveness, psychological effects, quality of life, 
hospital admissions, mortality and other health outcomes of the WSD have been carried out, 
with results still forthcoming.  Available results are limited to telehealth, and indicate a mixture 
of outcomes: telehealth was shown to be more expensive than existing care and thus not cost-
effective (Henderson et al. 2013).  Telehealth also lowered emergency hospital emission rates, 
mortality and length of hospital stays for users compared to the control group (Steventon et al. 
2012).  Reductions in emergency admissions46 have been mirrored in other non-WSD piloting 
for COPD patients (Lomas 2009; Ure et al. 2012), albeit with concomitant increased utilisation 
of other care resources, including telephone contact with professionals (e.g. nurses) managing 
the system and hospital/outpatient admissions.   
Effects of telehealth on quality of life were less clearly positive in the WSD and related studies.  
Participants in a secondary study of the WSD surveyed via questionnaire indicated that 
telehealth did not make a difference in terms of quality of life and psychological effects 
compared with “usual care,” suggesting that claims that telehealth improves health-related 
quality of life for COPD patients are unfounded.  This finding is reinforced by three systematic 
reviews of the effects of telehealth on quality of life—two for COPD and one for diabetes.  In 
recognition of the ambivalence of current evidence, and the lack of research connecting 
quality of life to ethical implications including surveillance implications and “undermining of 
the traditional (face-to-face) therapeutic relationship” (Cartwright et al. 2013), further 
research is needed into the effects of telehealth in general and the WSD in particular in terms 
of the experiences of patients in these terms.47  
The need for such research is reinforced by another secondary study of individuals who 
withdrew or decided not to participate in the WSD, which provided insight into the link 
between social and ethical effects of telehealth and quality of life.  Reinforcing themes found 
in the discourse above (see: Section 3.2), respondents associated telehealth with dependency 
and illness, and sought to distance themselves from negative connotations of ageing by self-
identifying as too healthy, young or independent to use the systems.  Telehealth was believed 
to undermine existing methods of care, taking away the sense of control, independence and 
personal responsibility associated with self-care.  Medicalisation was also a factor (see: Section 
                                                          
46
 Telehealth and telecare are thought to reduce ‘just-in-case’ hospital admissions by creating an 
alternative contact method with practitioners (House of Commons Health Committee 2005, p.7). 
47
 The latter study quantitatively measured QALYs via a questionnaire, which may be an overly simplistic 
method to evaluate quality of life (cf. Edgar 1997; Edgar 1998). 
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3.2.9), as some respondents did not want to be reminded of their health or worry about the 
implications of readings taken by the systems.  Going forward, it was recommended that 
systems be tailored to specific contexts of use, and for the views of potential users and carers 
related to identity, independence and autonomy to be accounted for in developing and 
diffusing the systems (Sanders et al. 2012).  Although the study was concerned with barriers to 
adoption, it stopped short of assessing the implications of user and carer views from an ethical 
perspective, which raises the question of whether it is morally acceptable for the DH to 
advocate the diffusion of telecare and telehealth systems while implications for user identity, 
independence and autonomy are not yet understood from the perspective of users in the 
WSD. 
Despite full results of (secondary analyses of) the WSD  being unknown at the time 
(Department of Health 2011a), the DH pushed in 2011 to diffuse telehealth and telecare 
throughout the country as a means to reduce emergency hospital admissions, mortality and 
the length of hospital stays on the basis of limited ‘headline’ results (Department of Health 
2011a; Department of Health 2011b, p.26).  Telehealth and telecare are being supported to 
improve chronic disease management while reducing costs, with the aim of diffusing systems 
to three million individuals with social or home care needs, including those with diabetes 
mellitus and (potentially) dementia, by 2016 as part of the ‘Three Million Lives’ campaign  
(Department of Health 2011b, p.26; Department of Health 2012b).  This enthusiasm 
contradicts results from the WSD (published after 2011) which only show a reduction in usage 
of hospital resources and mortality for telehealth, with WSD evidence for telecare still not 
available to date.  The lack of evidence for claims of cost-savings is supported by a 2007 
systematic review of international clinical (60) and observational (30) trials involving telecare 
(Barlow et al. 2007), which concluded that cost-effectiveness varies according to context of use 
and specific telecare innovations, without a clear trend which would indicate telecare is a cost-
effective alternative to existing care.  On this basis it is clear that, despite lacking the standard 
of evidence enshrined in ‘evidence-based medicine’, the DH has pushed forward with its plan 
to diffuse telehealth and telecare across the NHS. 
The early push for telehealth and telecare is indicative of the influence of politics in the 
diffusion of innovations in the NHS, as the Department does not cite a background body of 
clinical trials or other evidence of clinical efficacy, cost-effectiveness and social, emotional and 
psychological outcomes for patients and providers, despite supposedly modelling diffusion of 
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new innovations in the NHS on ‘evidence-based medicine’ (Department of Health 2010a, p.8).  
The push for telehealth and telecare is, however, not a new phenomenon; the DH has been 
advocating adoption since 2004 with Preventative Technology Grants intended to support local 
development of telecare programmes (Department of Health 2004; Department of Health 
2005).  At this time telehealth and telecare were viewed as a means to “bring substantial 
benefits in providing people with greater choice over their care, assisting people to remain in 
their homes, reducing inappropriate admissions, facilitating discharge from hospital, and 
providing advance warning of deterioration in a patient’s condition” (Department of Health 
2004, p.68).  A later report by the House of Commons Health Committee (2005) noted the 
Department’s apparent lack of awareness of challenges accompanying telehealth and telecare, 
including the loss of human contact resulting from remote care and the greater burden placed 
on informal carers at home (cf. Palm 2011).  The WSD goes some way towards rectifying the 
apparent lack of evidence.  Despite this, the push to diffuse telehealth and telecare on a wide 
scale while simultaneously lacking a significant body of supporting evidence appears to be 
motivated not by evidence, but rather by strategic and political aims. 
5.4 Shifting Values in Medical Relationships in England 
The politically-motivated diffusion of PHM, perhaps fuelled by perceived resource shortfalls in 
coming years (e.g. Campbell 2013a; Campbell 2013b), indicates how institutional values and 
goals influence the delivery of care in England.  Strategy suggests that the mode of care for 
cohorts of patients will increasingly be modelled around efficiency, enacted through the 
adoption of PHM and similar technologies.  Long-term care and management of chronic 
illnesses are intended to increasingly involve remote monitoring of conditions at home, 
reducing instances of face-to-face encounters with practitioners (Department of Health 2011b, 
p.27).  Chronic illness management will increasingly take place not in physical spaces and 
encounters with practitioners, but in the transfer, storage and analysis of digital information, 
or remotely monitoring the patient for unexpected or undesirable parameters.  Telehealth and 
telecare are seen as a way to reduce ‘inappropriate’ face-to-face medical encounters with 
lower cost alternatives, with every 1% of reduction predicted to save up to £200 million 
(Department of Health 2011b, p.27).48  Although not mentioned in these forecasts, 
institutional values can be seen in the strategic framework into which telehealth and telecare 
fit, which involves not only increasing patient participation in medical decision-making, but 
                                                          
48
 How this figure was calculated, and whether it is an annual or one-off savings, was not explained in 
the report.  The concept of ‘inappropriate’ encounters was also not defined in the report. 
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also shifting a greater burden for medical care onto patients themselves.  It is worth noting, 
however, that institutional and clinical values can align in evaluating the effects of PHM—a 
reduction in face-to-face visits may free up the time of clinicians to prioritise patients with the 
greatest need, or reduce the amount of time spent travelling to care for homebound patients. 
5.4.1 The Influence of Institutional Values on Care 
The diffusion of technological innovations intended to meet changing demographic and 
economic burdens are simultaneously changing the relationships between patients, doctors 
and medical organisations (Lupiáñez-Villanueva et al. 2010).  Recent years have seen the “rise 
of managerialism, centralised control and an assault on, or an erosion of, power of the medical 
profession” in the NHS (Wainwright & Waring 2007, p.50), endemic of a morally problematic 
disregard for the central virtues or professionalism which characterises medicine as a practice 
and social good (cf. Pellegrino 2002; MacIntyre 2007).  Medicine in the NHS is becoming 
increasingly bureaucratic as a practice (Wainwright & Waring 2007), in the sense that 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness are deemed equally important as providing high quality care 
(Department of Health 2011b).  Although the former may be necessary to achieve the latter in 
a healthcare system characterised by increasing demand, bureaucratic ideals risk eclipsing 
values and virtues of ‘good’ or clinically sufficient medical practice, defined in isolation of 
resource constraints.  The shift to GP consortia may be seen as a fix for the perceived rise of 
managerialism; however, the increasing emphasis on efficiency and remote care suggests that 
the practice-internal norms by which good medical practice is defined are at risk (see: Section 
4.3.2.1). 
The strategic outlook of the NHS emphasises efficiency, in the sense that “processes” which no 
longer “add value” should be eliminated in patient care through innovations which provide the 
same or better care to the patient at equal or lower costs (Department of Health 2011b, p.8).  
While it is easy to take this language merely as a call to eliminate redundant bureaucracy, it 
raises a question over the ‘goods’ valued in the care encounter by the DH.  If, for example, 
PHM enables the treatment of a greater number of patients remotely at the same cost as 
existing face-to-face clinical practice or care encounters in the home, are the latter seen as 
processes which no longer add value?  There is a risk of reducing the needs addressed in care 
encounters to merely biomedical parameters, ignoring the social and emotional needs met 
through human care (see: Section 3.2.6) as well as the physician’s duty to physically examine 
the patient when necessary (General Medical Council 2013). 
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The bureaucratisation of care in the NHS signals a change in the relationship between 
patients/clinicians engaged in clinical encounters and medical institutions, by which the 
options available for long-term care are increasingly limited or guided by institutional strategy.  
If remote monitoring is seen as a cost-effective alternative to existing care, as suggested by DH 
support, then it would appear that clinical practice is being controlled to some degree by 
values set ‘from above’; PHM is strategically seen as a ‘best practice’ innovation, considered 
apart from its social and ethical ‘costs’ for patients.  
5.4.1.1 Shared Decision-Making 
One such ‘cost’ is the influence of institutional values on relationships between patients and 
clinicians, which are set to move towards a model of shared decision-making  in which patients 
are increasingly ‘empowered’ by the right to access care records and affect care decisions.  A 
central component of the new approach to information is the principle of ‘no decision about 
me without me’, by which patients are entitled to transparent access to their care record, and 
can choose with whom and when it is shared (Department of Health 2010c, p.22).  
Technologies which enable information sharing and patient access are seen as a way to move 
towards a patient-provider relationship characterised by shared-decision making (Department 
of Health 2012a), which is claimed to improve health outcomes, satisfaction with care, 
management of chronic illnesses and adherence to treatments among patients, while 
potentially delivering cost-savings.  The principle reflects a shift of power in the reorganisation 
of the NHS under the Health and Social Care Act of 2012, according to which the NHS and 
healthcare are becoming increasingly ‘patient-centric’, with patients being given more 
“information, choice and control over how their care is delivered” (Department of Health 
2010c, p.17).  The involvement of patients in clinical decision-making is seen as a way to 
improve the quality of care and clinical outcomes delivered by the NHS (Department of Health 
2010c, p.18), which implies that a paternalistic model of the patient-provider relationship is 
deficient in comparison (cf. Emanuel & Emanuel 1992; Kaba & Sooriakumaran 2007).49 
In a shared decision-making relationship, the patient is increasingly seen as personally 
responsible for the maintenance of health (Kaba & Sooriakumaran 2007), with implied duties 
                                                          
49
 The view that shared decision-making inevitably delivers better outcomes for all patients is 
problematic, as it relies upon the patient’s ability to understand information, make rational decisions 
based upon it, and to decide upon appropriate recipients of their care record.  Problems associated with 
the strategic shift towards shared decision-making are beyond the scope of the thesis.  For criticisms of 
the shared decision-making model of care described in NHS strategy, see: Appendix 5. 
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for self-monitoring and self-care to free up medical resources for those with urgent acute 
needs (see: Section 4.4.3.1.2.1).  In other words, NHS restructuring in the face of demographic 
trends shifts burdens which were previously fulfilled by medical institutions onto individual 
patients and the community.  The responsibility which accompanies increased power for 
patients is (unsurprisingly) not acknowledged at the strategy level, but is central to 
understanding how relationships between patients and providers are shifting, mediated by 
PHM. 
5.4.1.2 Towards Self-Responsibility and Self-Care 
In exchange for increased access to care records and decision-making power under the ‘no 
decision’ principle, the patient is expected to adhere to treatment programmes and accept 
responsibility for their choices, including lifestyle (Department of Health 2010a, p.16).50  
Although not explicitly stated in this position, the language of ‘personal responsibility’ suggests 
that limitations may be placed on the care that patients can expect to receive in the future 
from the NHS on the basis of the lifestyle and medical care they choose. 
A shift towards community and self-care is not necessarily problematic if the predicted 
benefits of a patient-centric care strategy come true.  Still, the community and individuals are 
implicitly expected to fill the gaps created by shared decision-making and a reduction in face-
to-face clinical encounters (cf. Department of Health 2011b).  Gaps include the increasing need 
for family members and friends to provide ‘informal care’ for dependent individuals at home 
(cf. Palm 2011), or for patient support groups to assist patients in understanding their care 
records (e.g. Department of Health 2010a, p.15).  New medical relationships are created 
between the patient, family members and the community, the burdens of which are not 
insignificant.  Informal care already accounts for a significant portion of care in England, where 
it is estimated that 36% of the £23 billion total costs associated with dementia in 2012 came 
from informal care inputs (Alzheimer’s Society 2012).  The financial burdens attached to 
informal care can be significant, with carers often having to cut back hours or stop working 
altogether (Palm 2011), resulting in an estimated £690 million in lost wages and £123 million in 
lost tax revenue in 2012 alone (Alzheimer’s Society 2012).   
                                                          
50
 It should not be taken for granted that patients want or require access to care records or greater 
decision-making power in the healing relationship.  While some patients will certainly desire greater 
access and responsibility, such as those preferring medical relationships modelled on the ‘informative’ 
or ‘deliberative’ model (Emanuel & Emanuel 1992), adapting the overall care strategy to this subset of 
patients conflicts with the expectations of users preferring a paternalistic model of care, or those 
preferring ‘happy ignorance’ (see: Section 9.3.1.1). 
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Informal care is merely one example of the implications of the NHS increasing the burdens 
placed on individuals and the community for adequate medical care.  PHM is seen as a method 
to shift care (and decision-making power) to the community in the name of efficiency and 
‘increased quality of care’ (cf. Department of Health 2012a) by acting as a ‘watchful mediator’ 
between clinicians and patients. 
5.4.1.3 Mediation of Relationships and Duties of Good Medical Practice 
The shift in care values evident in NHS strategy may change the duties of physicians in England 
in terms of ‘good’ medical practice.  Many of the medical virtues described previously (see: 
Section 4.3.3) are evident in codes of practice governing medical professionals in England, 
including the General Medical Council’s guidance emphasising physician competency, honesty, 
trustworthiness, integrity, compassion, concern for the safety and rights of patients to privacy 
and dignity, as necessary components of good medical practice (General Medical Council 2013, 
p.4) and continued trust in medicine as a profession (General Medical Council 2013, p.21).  The 
patient must be treated as a socially embodied individual, “taking account of their history 
(including the symptoms and psychological, spiritual l, social and cultural factor), their views 
and values” (General Medical Council 2013, p.07).  Importantly, these characteristics are not 
conceived of as virtues of good practice, but rather duties of the physician to patients and 
other members of the profession (General Medical Council 2013, pp.4–5).   
The treatment of medical ends as duties to patients, rather than virtues of the physician, 
means an official responsibility to resist the corrupting influence of institutional values in 
medicine does not exist for physicians in England.  These values come to colonise practice and 
the patient’s lifeworld through PHM (see: Section 3.4.1.3).  The conclusion can be reached 
then that the values governing medical relationships in England may be changed by PHM.  A 
virtue-based account (see: Section 4.3) helps explain how these changes occur, and how 
physicians and patients may resist colonisation through (demanding) virtuous behaviour.  
Virtues place the physician’s character as a defence against the institutional erosion of the 
profession, or practice (cf. MacIntyre 2007, p.194).  Duties defined by institutions necessarily 
incorporate goods external to medicine, without which the survival of the institution cannot be 
guaranteed.  The indication from this assessment of strategy is that the external goods which 
UK medical institutions are concerned with, chief among which is efficiency gains to reduce 
costs of care, may increasingly influence patient care, seen through the implementation of 
PHM in medical relationships.  In response, systems or strategy may need to change to ensure 
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the ends of medicine are fully met, and patients receive adequate care focusing not only on 
physiological parameters measured at a distance, but their complete set of values and needs 
as socially embodied individuals with physical and mental health and well-being. 
5.4.2 Conclusions 
Shifts in NHS strategy reflect how the model of medical care is changing in England.  PHM can 
be seen as a tool which makes these changes possible.  The DH has predicted changes to how 
care is delivered, such as reduction of face-to-face encounters and the formation of new caring 
relationships in the community.  The purpose of reviewing strategic support was not to 
criticise the ethical acceptability of the strategy itself, but rather to understand how PHM fits 
into strategy, and to identify the types of medical relationships which will be enabled and 
changed by PHM in England.  Institutional values which may come into conflict with patient 
and clinician norms of ‘good’ medical care were also identified in strategy.  Overall, the DH has 
broadly ignored the ethical and social implications of introducing PHM, such as the 
transformation of the home into a ‘virtual hospital’ and changes to medical relationships and 
social relationships (see: Section 3.2.9), as demonstrated by the lack of an ethical component 
in the WSD.  This failure to incorporate ethical reflection in strategy further supports the need 
for a conceptual framework for the evaluation of emerging PHM applications. 
A possible explanation for the lack of concern shown by the DH to the ethical implications of 
PHM is that the issues of importance to the DH in justifying medical strategy and associated 
technologies are limited to a very narrow range of political and economic concerns, 
particularly clinical efficacy and cost-effectiveness, through which the quality of care may be 
quantitatively assessed in terms of patients treated or hospital beds available.  It may 
therefore be necessary to create a ‘feedback loop’ to broaden the concerns of those 
responsible for diffusion by introducing the perspectives of ‘ethical experts’ and potential 
users of the technology, assessed through empirical study.  The inclusion of ethical expertise 
and lay perspectives in such a feedback loop ensures that both theoretical and pragmatic 
ethical perspectives are accounted for in analysis.  This is not to suggest a new formal 
arrangement for governance and strategic thinking is necessary, but rather that research 
providing such perspectives which responds to the limitations seen in strategy is necessary (cf. 
Shaw & Stahl 2011).  The research undertaken in this project can be understood as one 
possible way (among many) of beginning to address this gap. 
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DH strategy can be traced to demographic predictions which have spurred perceived need for 
and development of technological solutions to problems that may not actually occur in the 
future.  For this reason the demographic predictions (United Nations 2007; United Nations 
2008; Population Reference Bureau 2012) and perceived benefits of monitoring patients at 
home (Neild et al. 2004; Gaul & Ziefle 2009; Bowes et al. 2011; Palm 2011; Ure et al. 2012) 
which motivate support for PHM among developers and politicians (OECD 2010; Garcia-
Morchon et al. 2011) should not remain unchallenged.  PHM may fail to prove cost-efficient or 
safe, for example if an influx of health monitoring data increases the burden placed on health 
professionals (cf. Percival & Hanson 2006, p.901; Ure et al. 2012), potentially causing 
‘information overload’ (Himma 2007).  Monitoring data and systems found confusing by users 
may increase the demands placed on carers and call centres responsible for overseeing PHM 
programmes (Ure et al. 2012), fuelling rising costs.  Beyond this, advances in medical science in 
the coming decades may delay expensive health expenditures towards the end of life, or 
create increasingly healthy ageing populations with increased economic and social output 
(Palm 2011; Arrison 2011), which cannot be accounted for in the demographic forecasts that 
are often considered in isolation without awareness of advances in other fields (Palm 2011) 
upon which this claim depends. 
The ethical implications of PHM need to be understood as distinct from the accuracy of 
demographic predictions and perceived healthcare shortages.  While such shortages would 
certainly weigh heavily in a utilitarian calculus for distributing insufficient healthcare resources, 
the ethical implications of the technology itself should be understood apart from its economic 
effects (see: Section 4.2).  For instance, imagine that PHM is shown to provide a cheaper 
method of caring for elderly at home, thus allowing for a greater number of patients to receive 
care than would otherwise be possible.  While the utilitarian might argue that this fact 
provides a moral reason to use PHM, this line of reasoning does not explain how PHM will 
affect the quality of care experienced by the user.  It is in this sense that demographic 
predictions are only a secondary concern in the ethical analysis of PHM—the technology itself 
can imply benefits and burdens for users, healthcare professionals and medical institutions 
beyond the scope of cost-benefit analyses.  What requires further discussion, then, is the 
impact of PHM apart from its perceived economic benefits and burdens.  It may be revealed, 
for example, that PHM offers improved outcomes over all aspects of traditional treatments.  It 
should thus not be assumed that PHM implies an ethical tradeoff for users, by which users are 
expected to carry certain burdens for the benefit of the system (see: Section 3.3.2), until the 
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ethical implications of the technology are identified and compared with existing medical 
practice.  On the other hand, appeals to economic benefits of PHM in response to shifting 
demographics should not be taken as a compelling reason or ‘trump card’ for diffusion of the 
technology, unless a purely utilitarian approach is taken.51  The danger of relying upon 
demographic predictions to dictate ethically acceptable behaviour lies in overshadowing other, 
non-economic implications of the technology. 
5.5 Research Question 
The uncertainty of demographic predictions hints at the difficulties of ethical assessment of 
emerging technologies.  PHM is a new way of delivering medical care, complementary to the 
strategic movement towards shared-decision making, self-care and self-responsibility.  
Uncertainty prevails over how PHM will contribute to norms of ‘good’ healthcare and the 
changing values of patients, clinicians and medical institutions in this regard.  With widespread 
institutional support for PHM and strategic movement towards a model of care in which the 
community and patients are expected to shoulder a greater burden in terms of self-care and 
informal care of dependents (cf. Williams 2002, p.142), England offers an ideal site for study in 
which uncertainty can be reduced through ethical analysis informed by healthcare strategy.   
To move forward with the research and to answer the third research question posed above 
(see: Section 3.5.1), a methodology capable of assessing an emerging medical technology 
under conditions of uncertainty, which can unite theoretical and empirical perspectives, is 
necessary.  This need gives rise to the final research question addressed in this project:     
What methodology is capable of capturing and incorporating the moral beliefs of 
potential users of an emerging medical technology (such as PHM) into ethical 
analysis? 
This question requires answering in the context of the proposed empirical study, which aims to 
improve and refine the conceptual framework, and explore its explanatory power for 
implications perceived to arise in particular contexts of use, based on insights from targeted 
patient populations.  The framework is based on the connections between virtue ethics, 
                                                          
51
 Indications of the influence of utilitarian calculations on the restructuring of the NHS have been noted 
by (Tyler 2007).  Utilitarian arguments may provide a compelling reason to accept ‘ethical burdens’ of 
PHM (see: Section 4.2).  With that said, under many forms of utilitarianism appeals to economic benefits 
do not act as a ‘trump card’ (cf. Singer 1993; Mill 2002), suggesting the sort of economic calculus 
described in relation to the NHS is, at best, a very simplified form of utilitarianism. 
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surveillance theories and colonisation as a response to utility-based support (see: Section 
4.4.4).  As argued above (see: Section 3.4 and Chapter 4), these theories can help explain the 
moral potential of PHM.  This position does not mean other ethical and social theories are 
incapable of ‘making sense’ of PHM, but merely that these three theories are seen as helpful 
and have not yet been explored in PHM ethics discourse (see: Chapter 3).  The conceptual 
framework built from these theories, then, is intended to further PHM ethics discourse by 
introducing a new theoretical perspective which identifies unrecognised issues and provides a 
new perspective concerning the values and actions at stake when addressing the ethical 
implications of PHM. 
To test the framework the empirical study needs to examine the expectations of patients in a 
healing relationship with providers when care is mediated by PHM, revealing norms evident in 
their expectations of care, virtues which patients expect physicians to possess, or new 
concepts to improve the framework’s ability to explain the effects of PHM on the healing 
relationship and the institution’s place in it.  The test of explanatory power will be to 
comprehend the responses of potential users in terms of colonisation, virtue and surveillance 
and identify new ways in which colonisation presents an ethical risk to stakeholders and 
medicine as a practice that cannot be explained from these perspectives.  This is not to say 
analysis will be limited to these three theories, but rather that one of the explicit goals of the 
analysis is to ‘test’ whether viewing the data through these theoretical lenses helps identify or 
explain the values at stake in ethical issues associated with PHM.  In this way necessary 
refinements and limitations of the framework can be identified. 
5.6 Conclusion and Research Questions 
In this chapter evidence has been presented to explain the strategic context into which PHM 
will be introduced in England.  This context is characterised by strategic support for related 
technologies such as telecare and telehealth, despite unproven clinical efficacy.  By 
understanding the motivations behind support for PHM, insight is gained into how PHM may 
initially be deployed in England and whether the expectations of potential users and clinicians 
in this context conflict with institutional strategy.  The chapter has thus provided a necessary 




Chapter 5 marks the conclusion of the first half of the thesis.  The remaining five chapters 
discuss methodological and epistemological issues, before describing and presenting the 
results and recommendations of an empirical study with potential users of PHM.  The first half 
was concerned with defining the scope of the research project, in part through defining PHM 
and reviewing ethical implications of the technology seen in academic discourse.  The scope of 
the research project has been defined through four research questions posed above: 
1. How can PHM be defined? 
 
2. How can PHM be categorised to link potential ethical implications to specific 
emerging applications? 
 
3. What ethical considerations will arise when PHM is introduced into relationships 
between patients, clinicians and medical paying organisations? 
 
4. What methodology is capable of capturing and incorporating the moral beliefs of 
potential users of an emerging medical technology (such as PHM) into ethical 
analysis? 
With the scope of the project defined, research questions 1 and 2 answered (see: Chapter 2), 
and research question 3 beginning to be addressed (see: Chapters 3, 4 and 5), the next two 
chapters aim to answer research question 4.  Methodological and epistemological 
considerations necessary to meet the requirements of research question 4 are reviewed, in the 
process creating a methodology capable of contributing to answering research question 3.  A 
main component of the answer to question 3 posed thus far is the conceptual framework.  As 
of yet the explanatory power of the framework has not been tested in connection to specific 
PHM applications or contexts of use.  Therefore, to strengthen the conceptual answer to 
question 3, it must be shown how the created methodology can lead to empirical research 
amenable to exploring its explanatory power, identifying its limitations and suggesting 
necessary refinements.   
To succeed in refining the conceptual framework in this way through empirical study, the 
methodology must allow for in-depth discourse into the implications of PHM for medical 
relationships, through which the power of the framework to explain the perspectives of 
potential users can be explored.  As PHM is an emerging technology, the methodology must 
also be designed in such a way that uncertain normative claims about the future based on past 
experiences can be considered credible.  Finally, as the primary aim of the study is refinement 
and expansion of the conceptual framework, the methodology needs to enable the 
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combination of empirical and theoretical claims in an approach to ethical analysis.  A 




6 Chapter 6:  Hermeneutics and Empirical Methodology 
6.1 Research Methodology 
A methodology is required to capture and assess user attitudes towards the potential ethical 
implications of PHM, understood in terms of effects on medical and social relationships.  As an 
emerging technology the methodology must be amenable to future-orientated research, 
allowing for engagement of potential users of PHM.  To begin to understand the 
methodological challenges presented by ethically assessing an emerging technology, an 
exploration of philosophical paradigms which inform empirical research is required. 
All research is guided by basic beliefs about the organisation of the world.  These beliefs, also 
called a paradigm or interpretive framework, determine how a researcher views the world and 
influences the empirical questions he asks about it (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, p.19).  Paradigms 
encompass basic  epistemological, ontological and axiological commitments, all of which guide 
the actions of researchers and affect the relationships found in the world (Denzin and Lincoln 
2000, 157; Lincoln and Guba 1994, 105; Patterson and Williams 2002).  All paradigms rest on 
foundational assumptions about the ‘true’ epistemic and ontological nature of reality.   
Six philosophical paradigms can immediately be identified which can ground social research: 
positivism, postpositivism, interpretivism, hermeneutics, critical theory, and constructivism 
(Lincoln & Guba 2000, p.168; Schwandt 2000).  Qualitative and quantitative methods of 
empirical research are initially plausible in all of these paradigms.  Each is considered below 
regarding suitability for studying an emerging technology, which necessitates developing 
understand of potential futures. 
6.1.1 Positivism 
Positivism rests on the objectivist ontological assumption (sometimes called realism) that an 
external reality governed by “immutable natural laws and mechanisms” exists that can be 
examined by researchers (Huber 1995; Denzin & Lincoln 2000, p.9; Denzin 2001, p.21).  The 
natural world is seen to exist separately from humans, meaning it is orderly and amenable to 
‘objective’ empirical observation (Kuhn 1970; Oates 2006).  The province of positivistic 
qualitative research is the intersection of this world with the lived experiences (e.g. beliefs and 
actions) of individuals.  However, this province does not endorse the creation of reality, 
knowledge or meaning through individual interpretation, meaning positivism conflicts with 
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constructivist paradigms (e.g. interpretivism, hermeneutics) (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, p.8).  The 
belief in an external reality also necessitates the elimination of bias by keeping the researcher 
external from the phenomena studied.  Where researcher influence or ‘bias’ is detected, it 
may invalidate results.  Positivistic research strives towards the creation and testing theories 
generalisable across contexts which explain “the way things are” or how external reality 
operates through causal relationships (Lincoln & Guba 1994, p.109).  Only findings which can 
be replicated are ‘true’, representing the desire for objectivity in methods and results (Lincoln 
& Guba 1994, p.110).  As much as possible experiments are designed to isolate ‘confounding’ 
influences to reduce bias, even though these influences are part of the context in which a 
phenomenon occurs and can thus help explain it. 
6.1.1.1 Criticisms of Positivism, Objectivity, and Objectivist Ontologies 
Positivism has historically led to causal explanations of phenomena through observation.  The 
credibility of the process is linked to the objectivity of the method, in which existing 
phenomena can be observed and measured; studies are repeatable in this sense.  Objectivity is 
undermined by the interdependency of facts and theories, meaning facts only have meaning 
when viewed through a theoretical lens.  Under the positivistic definition of objectivity, 
“hypotheses must be stated in ways that are independent of the way in which the facts 
needed to test them are collected,” so if facts only having meaning within a theoretical 
framework, they cannot objectively validate hypotheses (Lincoln & Guba 1994, p.107).  
‘Objective’ facts are often value-laden (Molewijk et al. 2003), comprehensible only from the 
perspective of a particular theory of paradigm—the phenomenon observed is observed as 
something.  Objectivity therefore fails as a measurement of credibility in positivistic social 
research because the act of observation implies interpretation. 
Objectivity has also faced a problem of induction, referring to the claim that objective truth 
cannot be discovered by induction.  Theories cannot be created or verified through induction 
using a set of facts, as facts can be applicable to multiple theories, meaning ‘bias’ enters 
induction through the researcher choosing to explore or build a particular theory.  Attempts at 
the “discovery” of objective theory through induction, such as Strauss and Corbin’s Grounded 
Theory(s) (Strauss & Corbin 1994), would appear to fail in their search of systematic methods 
to describe objective truths.  As long as theories can only be falsified (as demonstrated 
through Popper’s observation that one cannot prove that all swans are white, only that the 
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existence of a black swan proves that all swans are not white) (Popper 1959), positivism can 
never arrive at universal truths via induction. 
For studying the future, a fundamental problem exists for positivism in social research.  
Positivistic inquiry can only observe phenomena known to the researcher in the present—the 
future cannot be foreseen, meaning observation is impossible.  Future occurrences can only be 
engaged through the claims of potential users of the technology, meaning understanding is 
developed through understanding the motivations and meaning behind the attitudes or 
normative claims of potential users.  If the technology does not yet exist, or is not yet used by 
the participants in a study, the researcher can only rely on open-ended questions posed to 
potential users which explore attitudes towards potential uses.  An empirically observable 
phenomenon does not exist, meaning positivism is incapable of studying the future 
implications of an emerging technology—the only source of data, pre-user attitudes, would be 
understood as a ‘confounding influence’ on causal explanations.  Furthermore, any resolution 
of this difficulty would collapse positivism into interpretivism because attitudes towards non-
existent phenomenon are social constructions without an associated observable phenomenon. 
As a result of these criticisms, positivism, objectivity and objectivist ontologies which are 
limited to the existence of an external social reality are inappropriate for studying an emerging 
technology.  Although attempts have been made to rescue positivism in social empirical 
research (e.g. postpositivism) (Wildemuth 1993; Fischer 1998), the above criticisms can never 
be fully overcome by any paradigm that embraces an objectivist ontology based around 
empirically observable phenomena.  Constructivist ontologies, which posit the existence of a 
social reality built and interpreted through human interaction (see: Section 6.1.3.1), may 
provide a way forward.  According to such an approach, attempts to understand social 
empirical data without acknowledgment of social and historical context result in incomplete 
understanding of the phenomenon.  It follows from this position that assessment of PHM 
necessitates engagement with and understanding of the social context in which PHM will be 
used. 
6.1.2 Interpretivism 
In contrast to the positivistic pursuit of objective truth, interpretivism is focused on non-causal 
understanding of human action.  To interpretivists, human action is inherently meaningful, 
meaning the intention behind it defines the kind of action it is, and that the action can only be 
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understood by accessing the system of beliefs and meanings in which it is formed (Outhwaite 
1975; Schwandt 2000, p.191).  To understand the content of a particular action, the researcher 
must interpret the intentions of the actor (Schwandt 2000, p.191).  Most interpretive 
approaches share these assumptions and a qualitative approach to research (Denzin & Lincoln 
2000, p.10; Schwandt 2000, p.189), but differ in methods of correctly interpreting the content 
of an action (cf. Schwandt 2000, p.192).  Interpretivist approaches to research are united by 
the claim that human subjectivity or intention is a central component to knowledge. 
Interpretivist approaches can be divided into ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ approaches 
according to the ontological position taken on the researcher’s ability to reconstruct the 
original meaning and intentions of actions.  Objectivist approaches claim intentions can be 
expressed in objective terms by an outsider that interprets and reconstructs the original 
meaning of the actions of others (Lincoln & Guba 1994, p.114; Schwandt 2000), whereas 
subjectivist approaches claim that understanding is unavoidably filtered through an 
individual’s perspective constituted by his unique history and values, meaning complete 
understanding of the perspectives, values and meaning attached to an action by others is 
impossible (cf. Gadamer 1976a; Widdershoven 2005).  This belief can be seen in references to 
taking the perspective of ‘others’ in ethnographic studies or interpreting interviews (Eisenhart 
1988; Walsham 1995; Atkinson & Hammersley 2007).  The reconstruction of the views of 
others is treated as the original meaning of the action (Schwandt 2000, p.192), despite the 
researcher being external to the action or original utterance (Garson 2006; Atkinson & 
Hammersley 2007).  This is not to say that the researcher is unaffected by the phenomenon, 
but rather that the researcher’s interpretation is attempting to reconstruct the phenomenon 
within the perspectives, values and background of others. 
6.1.2.1 Criticisms of Objectivist Interpretivism and Detached Observers 
Objectivist interpretivism may be rejected if the act of reconstruction is seen as inherently 
flawed, in the sense that the meaning and intentions the researcher ‘sees’ in an act or 
utterance are his own, and not identical to the subjective position of the actor.  The possibility 
of reconstruction is based on the claim that the observer can act externally to, or not influence 
or be influenced by, the phenomenon.  The researcher interprets the object of study within 
the context in which it occurs, discovering the original meaning and intentions attached to the 
object.  The researcher does not influence and is not affected by the phenomenon, thereby 
remaining external to it (Denzin 2001, p.74; Casterlé et al. 2011, p.234).  In this sense 
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understanding is seen as a process in which an outsider gains knowledge about a 
phenomenon.   
This approach does not allow for claim that studying a phenomenon inevitably involves 
interpretation and interaction with it as a necessary component of developing understanding.  
Rather, interpretation is seen as an object-oriented art that can be judged by the degree to 
which an observer remains separated from the actor and context during the process of 
interpretation (Bernstein, 1983).  Objectivist interpretivism can therefore be criticised on the 
same grounds as positivism as both operate within an objectivist ontology; in the same way 
that scientific facts pre-suppose particular axioms or theoretical frameworks in which a 
phenomenon is seen as something, so too does the interpretivist researcher view the 
phenomenon and actions of others through his unique perspective, built upon his personal 
background, values and training (cf. Olson 1986, p.161; Patterson & Williams 2002, p.22).  This 
is not to say that the researcher cannot try to take the view of others, but rather that even 
when doing so the researcher cannot escape his personal background through which 
understanding of the phenomenon develops—interpreting the utterances of an actor as 
evidence that the actor holds a particular value which the researcher must adopt to interpret 
his actions, for example, is itself an act of interpretation.  Beyond this, the researcher can 
never fully ‘become’ the actor, or internalise his unique history as his own because meaning is 
developed through the lens of history, culture and experience (Patterson & Williams 2002, 
p.23)—without sharing an identical background with the actor in these terms, the researcher 
can never interpret and understand the phenomenon in the same way.   
Even if the notion of a ‘detached observer’ is seen as valid, pragmatic reasons exist to reject an 
objectivist interpretivist approach to research.  As an emerging technology claims can only be 
made about potential uses of PHM, which are not based on past experiences with the 
technology.  Given that such claims are based upon potential futures, and therefore inherently 
uncertain, critical assessment of the structure, logic, assumptions and supporting evidence of 
the claim is necessary to understand how far a claim is based on a realistic picture of the 
future, meaning one supported by recent technological development, strategy or planning.  As 
these claims are prescriptive, or made about ethical implications of the technology, the moral 
values grounding the claim also need to be understood.  These two components of ethical 
assessment of an emerging technology means a method of data collection is necessary 
between the researcher and actor to clarify these points.  It is difficult to see how this type of 
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critical assessment could be carried out as a ‘detached observer’, unaffected by and not 
affecting the phenomenon under study; it would seem the researcher will necessarily have to 
probe, question and criticise the actor’s claims because only the actor can explain their 
foundation or underlying reasoning.  The possibility of detachment in such a dialogue is 
impossible—the researcher’s questions and probes inevitably influence the actor’s claims (cf. 
Widdershoven 2005).   
If these criticisms are valid, sufficient reason exists to reject objectivist interpretivism.  
‘Subjectivist’ interpretivist approaches, chief among which is hermeneutics53, may offer an 
approach better suited to the challenges of assessing an emerging technology. 
6.1.3 Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics is concerned with interpretation and meaning (Myers 2004, p.103), which 
differs from positivism and objectivist interpretivism in its ontological and epistemological 
commitments (Patterson & Williams 2002, pp.2, 9).  Although originally a method of 
interpreting texts, hermeneutics has been adapted to the social sciences for the study of social 
phenomena (Bauman 1978) through interpretation of various ‘texts’ (Myers 1995, p.56) 
including interview transcripts, audio recordings, videos, documents and observations, among 
others. 
Hermeneutics emphasises developing understanding through contextual interpretation of 
phenomena and human action, with due regard to the phenomenon’s unique place in a social 
and historical context.  The meaning of a phenomenon or action is grounded in “human 
experience…[as] a process of seeking understanding” through interpretation  (Widdershoven, 
2005, p.58, my brackets).  It stands in opposition to objectivist hypothesis testing and 
‘bracketing’ methods which remove phenomena from context (Patterson & Williams 2002, 
p.30), emphasising a person’s prior knowledge as the foundation on which the meaning of a 
phenomenon is built (Addison 1989, p.52).  Bracketing denies the fundamental nature of 
understanding (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.23), in which all understanding starts with 
reference to what is already known, which is then refined through consideration of further 
                                                          
53
 Hermeneutics has been subsumed under the interpretivist categorisation of paradigms by social 
researchers (Schwandt 2000), yet in acknowledging that “all human existence is hermeneutic in 
essence,” proponents of hermeneutics correctly identify it as the underlying paradigm of all 
interpretivist approaches to research (Butler 1998, p.298; Klein & Myers 1999; Myers 2004, p.105).  
Whether hermeneutics is the foundation of interpretivism, or interpretivism the foundation of 
hermeneutics, is a matter of debate.  While the debate has historical significance, its outcome is 
irrelevant to choosing a research paradigm fitting with the particular needs of the research project. 
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evidence, phenomena and beliefs.  Hermeneutics seeks contextual understanding as opposed 
to authoritative explanations of texts and phenomena (Kinsella 2006).  The inherent 
ambiguity of human interpretation and social interactions are central features of hermeneutics 
(Kinsella 2006).  Conclusive explanations consisting of causal relationships are not sought; 
rather, understanding or the “interpretation of meaning” is the goal (Bauman 1978; Butler 
1998, p.286).  This is not to say hermeneutics lacks a systematic approach to understanding 
social phenomena: 
"Rather, when properly conducted, [hermeneutics] is an empirical enterprise 
characterised by critical and ‘meaningful’ thought beginning with a particular 
perspective (the forestructure of understanding) progressing through a rigorous and 
systematic cyclical analysis (the hermeneutic circle) in which interpretations are 
evaluated and modified on the basis of the data that is then presented as evidence of 
the warrants for conclusions.  Thus, when properly conducted, hermeneutic 
research…is empirically grounded, subject to external critical appraisal, and is 
systematic and rigorous rather than selective in its analysis of data” (Patterson & 
Williams 2002, p.36). 
 
Hermeneutics thus provides a systematic, iterative and context-sensitive approach to 
understanding human interaction and the creation of meaning, which can provide insight into 
moral problems arising from social phenomena.  The focus on human interpretation means it 
can be easily adapted to ethical assessment of emerging technologies, although the likelihood 
of interpretations matching actual future occurrences is undercut by the inherent uncertainty 
of future phenomena, or the inability to experience and interpret them first hand.  Despite 
this, related existing practices provide a frame of reference through which uncertain 
normative claims can be passed; for example, experience with CCTV could lead a potential user 
of PHM to reject the technology based on privacy concerns and data sharing.  Hermeneutics 
therefore provides a paradigm through which the claims of potential users of a technology 
about the technology can be seen as initially credible, or based on related experiences (e.g. 
prior use of medical recording/testing devices, management of a chronic illness), while 
recommending in-depth dialogue with stakeholders to developing understanding and question 
their perspectives (see: Section 6.1.3.3).  On this basis hermeneutics is the preferred paradigm 
for the empirical study. 
Before the study can be designed, the ontological and epistemological details of hermeneutics 
need to be explored in greater detail so a study design can be chosen which is compatible with 
hermeneutics as a paradigm.  Categorisations of hermeneutics often divide the field into sub-
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disciplines, by author, normative commitments, or field (Butler 1998, p.286; Patterson & 
Williams 2002, p.9).  The approach described here most closely resembles the hermeneutics of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004) applied within the context of social research in information 
systems (Bauman 1978; Butler 1998).  This “antifoundationalist” version of hermeneutics has 
been acknowledged as the most suitable version in information systems research (Butler 1998, 
p.287), and empirically based ethical assessment (van Thiel & van Delden 2001; Widdershoven 
& Abma 2007; Widdershoven & van der Scheer 2008).  Gadamer’s hermeneutics differentiates 
itself from other disciplines through ontological commitments that acknowledge the 
unavoidable subjectivity of interpretation, by which the possibility of ‘external’ or ‘objective’ 
interpretations of texts or phenomena, achieved by stepping out of one’s frame of reference 
(or hermeneutic circle), is seen as impossible. 54 
6.1.3.1 Ontological Commitments 
From an ontological perspective, Gadamer’s hermeneutics supports a constructivist view of 
reality, a narrative view of human experience, and a meaning-based view of human nature 
(Patterson & Williams 2002, p.14).  According to this, humans both inhabit and create reality 
through interpretation, and give meaning to their experiences through the development of 
narratives and understanding.  Humans are not seen as rational, analytical information 
processors inhabiting an external, objective world—while external structure does exist as a 
sort of ‘situatedness’ in which experiences occur and are interpreted (Malpas 2013), multiple 
social realities are created, interpreted, and given meaning by humans within particular social 
and historical contexts subjectively understood by each interpreter.  Empirical research needs 
to account for this ontological position, with the implication that a prerequisite of 
understanding is exploration of context and the participants’ background frame of reference. 
While interpreted and given meaning by humans, reality is not purely a human construction, 
instead created through interaction between individual consciousness and the structure of the 
world.  The world is "co-constituted" by individuals and the world (Patterson & Williams 2002, 
p.14), meaning that experiences occur within a “situatedness”  (Malpas 2013) or external 
structure which is not created through social interactions.  Co-constitution should not be taken 
as dualism—the stance that an internal (consciousness) and external (structure) world exist 
independently of each other.  Rather, the two exist in a "mutually defining inter-relationship," 
                                                          
54
 The hermeneutic circle refers to the “whole” in which a “part” takes place, meaning the “intentions, 
beliefs, and desires or the text, institutional context, practice, form of life, language game and so on” in 
which a “specific sentence, utterance, or act” occurs (Schwandt 2000, p.193). 
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in which individuals orient themselves to a world which reveals itself to the individual 
(Patterson & Williams 2002, p.14; Malpas 2013).  Another way of expressing this relationship is 
through "intentionality," or the recognition that consciousness can only be conceived of when 
it has an object; conscious beings are ‘aware of’ something.  Structure exists beyond the reality 
created in social interaction, but the interpretation and meaning of both will be unique to 
individuals.  The structure cannot be understood or described outside of the various meanings 
given to it through interpretation, so describing it as an ‘objective’ external reality is 
inappropriate—the meaning of the structure is created through interpretation, and does not 
precede humans encountering it.55   
An epistemic implication of this ontology is that meaning cannot be created or completely 
understood outside a particular frame of reference, made up of experiences, cultural 
membership, value systems and other influences on subjective interpretation.  Phenomena do 
not therefore have universal meaning, shared among individuals within a particular context or 
society.  Meaning and interpretation are historically and socially situated—removing either 
from the context in which they occur hinders understanding (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.24) 
(e.g. Sections 3.3.4 and 4.3.1.2).  This position does not equate to the moral relativism 
sometimes associated with hermeneutics (cf. Habermas 1993; Edgar 2002, p.61) because it 
only requires meaning to be contextually situated—it says nothing of the relative credibility or 
truth of different interpretations (see: Section 6.3.1).   
6.1.3.1.1 Predictions of the Future and the Possibility of Hermeneutic Dialogue 
Co-constitution has implications for how the future can be reasonably studied.   Individual 
phenomena can produce multiple valid interpretations across a diversity of people, each with a 
unique set of prior knowledge, values and experiences.  Similarities can (and likely will) exist 
across their interpretations, especially within cultures and practices, because reality has 
structure shared between interpreters and experiences.  The existence of a structure for 
reality implies that a reasonable, albeit contextually interpreted basis exists for future-oriented 
                                                          
55
 An example of co-constitution is the role of language in the creation of meaning.  Concepts and phrases are not 
always perfectly translatable from one language to another, which leads to a loss of meaning.  An example is 
Heidegger's concept of "Gestell," which cannot be perfectly translated into English.  The original meaning can only 
be understood by members of the context (or culture) in which it was created; in this case, a non-German 
researcher would struggle to understand the meaning of the concept as defined by the culture that created it, 
without native fluency in the language.  The researcher's meaning, based on his interpretation of the concept within 
his own frame of reference, would therefore be different than the (original) cultural meaning.  In this case the 
concept and the culture which shapes meaning of the concept, both the ‘correct’ original meaning and the 
imperfect translation, are the structure given meaning by humans. 
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research.  The structure of a future phenomenon can be predicted, although the accuracy of 
such predictions remains unknown until the phenomenon comes into existence.  Within the 
context of emerging technologies, examination of the technological characteristics and aims of 
developing technologies; cultural, social and economic trends; and (potential) user 
expectations of the technology can provide insight into how the technology will be (initially) 
used and understood.  Foresight and future studies, as well as other approaches to ethical 
assessment of emerging technologies (cf. Brey 2011; Stahl 2011; Stahl et al. 2010; Cagnin et al. 
2008; Grunwald 2009) attempt exactly this kind of foresight, while realising that all such 
predictions are necessarily uncertain.  If technological forecasting and foresight research can 
provide accurate predictions of the future, as determined by their own standards of accuracy 
(Stahl 2011b), then it follows that descriptions of the future derived from these sorts of studies 
can serve as the basis for a hermeneutic dialogue in which the future is assessed. 
6.1.3.1.2 Human Experience, Meaning and Understanding as a Social Process 
Human experience or decision-making are ‘situated’ in the sense that they occur within the 
external structure of the world and the meaningful actions of others towards them.  Within 
the empirical study this ontological dimension of human experience is important to consider in 
the sense that the researcher needs to explore the restrictions placed upon the interpretations 
of the participant by their current social context (e.g. being a patient with diabetes mellitus).  A 
parallel can be found with critical hermeneutics (Habermas 1975; Klein & Huynh 2004), and its 
focus on social structures and power relationships which influence interpretation and self-
identity.   
The focus on the participant's frame of reference and understanding of (potential implications 
of) the technology facilitates understanding the rationale of his attitudes towards PHM.  With 
interpretation being affected by the actions of others, the role of the researcher in influencing 
others during study must also be recognised. 
As understanding develops through interaction, neither the participant nor researcher’s 
interpretation takes precedence in hermeneutics research—both contribute to understanding 
the phenomenon through unique perspectives.  The researcher is able to provide an 
alternative frame of reference in dialogue, providing a basis against which the interpretations 
of others can be challenged and mutual understanding created through dialogue.  To see how 
understanding develops through the encounter between actor and researcher, and why such a 
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process is a legitimate way of developing knowledge about reality, an exploration of the 
epistemological commitments of hermeneutics is necessary. 
6.1.3.2 Epistemological Commitments 
The epistemological commitments of hermeneutics relate to the nature of knowledge, and the 
process by which it is created.  Interpretation is the first step towards understanding and 
knowledge by attempting to “bring to light underlying coherence or sense” (Taylor 1976, 
p.153) of actions or a phenomenon.  Interpretation is based upon preconceptions, which leads 
people to view the same situation differently (Gadamer 2004).  People emphasise different 
aspects of the situation, while ignoring others.  Through this deliberate categorisation, 
situations are viewed “as something” (Widdershoven 2005, p.64).  Interpretation is analogous 
with the concept of a narrative, in the sense that both emphasise features of the phenomenon 
which are seen as relevant or important, at the cost of downplaying other features (Kinsella 
2006), to reveal the meaning or importance of the phenomenon.  Interpretation is thus an 
attempt to “make sense of” something unfamiliar, to reflexively place it within one’s 
preconceptions and come to understand it. 
Interpretation and understanding are the basis of knowledge.  Interpretation relies upon the 
interpreter’s frame of reference, or prior knowledge and past experiences which shapes the 
interpretation of confounding experiences (Gadamer 2004; Myers 2004, p.109).  Interpretation 
of a phenomenon can only occur if the interpreter has prior understanding of it 
(Widdershoven 2005), or a basis at which the interpretation starts.  Prior understanding is 
expressed as prejudices, or an initial explanation or judgment of a phenomenon based upon 
past experiences, prior knowledge and expectations (Gadamer 1976a, p.240).  Prejudices allow 
for the connection of events in a situation to the interpreter’s prior experiences, leading to 
interpretation and understanding.  Prejudices must be reflexively and critically examined in the 
face of unfamiliar phenomena to determine the prejudice’s truth (Widdershoven 2005, p.59) 
and to develop understanding of the phenomenon which confounds prejudices.   
Openness to other perspectives is a precondition to the development of understanding 
(Widdershoven 2005, p.65), because different perspectives highlight different aspects of the 
phenomenon.  Interpretation can be understood as a process through which certain aspects of 
phenomena are highlighted or ignored according to the prior knowledge of the interpreter.  
Viewed as a necessity of understanding, reflexivity fosters development of knowledge, in 
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which inappropriate or inaccurate prejudices and unsupported beliefs are eliminated.  
Addressing the gap between prejudices and confounding phenomena creates new 
understanding or knowledge.  The creation of the new framework in this gap, informed as it is 
by prejudices, is the explicit process of hermeneutic understanding (Winograd & Flores 1986, 
p.32).  However, prejudices are never totally open to reflection (both to the self and others), 
meaning the existence of a variety of perspectives and ambiguity are preconditions of 
understanding.  As a result, understanding is never complete (Widdershoven 2005, p.57).  The 
role of prejudices in understanding is illuminated in the comparison of methods of decision-
making employed by humans; prejudices are the initial reactions which guide daily behaviour 
as opposed to slower, goal-oriented reasoning guided by evidence. 
Understanding and openness, prejudices and new perspectives clash in encountering 
unfamiliar phenomena, which explains the difficulty of interpreting or researching potential 
futures (see: Section 7.3.1.1).  The encounter is described by Heidegger as the difference 
between ‘ready-to-hand’ and ‘present-at-hand’ phenomena (Heidegger 1967; Butler 1998, 
p.289).  Phenomena which are ‘ready-to-hand’ are not readily noticed and become ‘second 
nature’, or are seen as familiar and perfectly understood.  Events which challenge the actor’s 
understanding of the phenomenon break down the ‘ready-to-hand’ designation, requiring a 
reinterpretation of the phenomenon through consideration of alternative perspectives or 
horizons, if comprehension and understanding of the phenomenon are to be achieved.  The 
phenomenon becomes unfamiliar or ‘present-at-hand,’ requiring reinterpretation within the 
actor’s forestructure of understanding (Heidegger 1967), which is historically and temporally 
located.  Reinterpretation (or initial interpretation of an unfamiliar phenomenon) tests the 
legitimacy of the actor’s forestructure of understanding, transforming it as necessary to repair 
the “damage” caused by the ‘present-at-hand’ phenomenon (Heidegger 1967; Butler 1998, 
p.289).  In all of this prejudices provide initial understanding of the unfamiliar phenomenon, 
which is then challenged and revised until familiarity is re-established. 
Considering these factors, open-ended data collection and analysis methods which do not 
“narrowly predetermine the nature of responses” through rigid methodological standards are 
therefore consistent with the epistemological commitments of hermeneutics (Patterson & 
Williams 2002, p.39), which requires open-mindedness for the development of understanding 
(see: Section 6.1.3.2). 
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6.1.3.2.1 Fusion of Horizons 
The fusion of the perspectives of actor and researcher to create a new understanding of a 
phenomenon reducible to neither perspective alone, for example through dialogue, is known 
as a ‘fusion of horizons’ (Butler 1998, p.289).  In this sense a “horizon” is the understanding or 
interpretation of a phenomenon which is produced by the reflexive interaction between the 
interpreter’s prejudices and the ‘present-at-hand’ phenomenon (Kinsella 2006).  Fusion occurs 
within a dialogue, in which both participants are open to each other’s perspectives and 
revision of their own horizon and forestructure of understanding (Gadamer 1976a, p.269).  For 
qualitative research based on dialogue, the success of the dialogue can be assessed in terms of 
whether a fusion of horizons, or the emergence of new understanding, occurred.   
The completion of a single dialogue resulting in a fusion is not the end-point of hermeneutics 
research, however.  As with all knowledge in hermeneutics, a fusion creates provisional, 
context-specific understanding.  Provisional understanding undergoes further testing and 
reinterpretation as new phenomena and perspectives are encountered.  This process is known 
as the hermeneutic circle, and is a central concept in the iterative development of 
hermeneutic knowledge through research. 
6.1.3.2.2 Hermeneutic Circle as a Metaphor for Research 
The hermeneutic circle is a metaphor used to convey many aspects of the hermeneutics 
research process.  At its broadest, the hermeneutic circle refers to an "inter-relationship 
between the part and the whole" (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.26).  Phenomena are said to 
have multiple parts which are given meaning through comprehension of the phenomenon as a 
whole, “while at the same time the understanding of the whole is shaped by the parts” 
(Gadamer 1976a, p.117; Patterson & Williams 2002, p.26; Myers 2004, p.107).  As the meaning 
of the parts is comprehended, the phenomenon must be iteratively reassessed in light of the 
new meaning.  In encountering the phenomenon, the interpreter intuitively understands or 
anticipates the whole, and then closely interprets the parts to develop his understanding 
(Butler 1998, p.290).  The parts and whole are interpreted in an endless series of concentric 
circles, which incorporate new perspectives, evidence and phenomena as understanding 
develops.  The hermeneutic circle is an inescapable part of human understanding, meaning 
that “every interpretation relies on other interpretations” (Kinsella 2006).  This ontological 
condition explains the impossibility of achieving objectivity in perspective, or completely 
escaping one’s prejudices to take the perspective of another (cf. Schwandt 2000).   
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In contrast to other paradigms, hermeneutics research does not contain a finite endpoint such 
as theoretical saturation (cf. Strauss & Corbin 1994).  Rather, given the subjective, changing 
nature of reality over time, represented in individualised interpretations of phenomena, static 
conclusions about (social) reality remain elusively out of reach (Patterson & Williams 2002, 
p.27).  If research is viewed as a hermeneutic circle, in which (scientific) conclusions are reliant 
upon ever changing cultural, historical and technological understanding, then an open-ended 
approach is the only appropriate option which adheres to the ontological commitments of 
hermeneutics (Widdershoven 2005, p.65).  While open-endedness may appear to imply a lack 
of rigour, the illustration of empirical research as a hermeneutic circle demonstrates its 
iterative, critical approach to analysis, in which the researcher's preconceptions are not given a 
priori legitimacy over the data.  A related criticism is that temporary understanding implies 
relativism, for example in moral decision-making—how can a norm be criticised if any criticism 
is necessarily provisional and open to new interpretation or evidence?  Such a criticism would 
however be unfounded—provisional understanding only implies that criticism and weighting 
of values in ethical analysis need to be revisited as the phenomenon about which a decision is 
made changes over time, while saying nothing of the quality or normative force of the claim 
itself.  The hermeneutic circle is best understood as a description of the structure of dialogue 
(or moral deliberation) and the refinement of understanding over time, implying a need for 
open-ended reflexivity, rather than as an argument that all knowledge is inherently relative 
and therefore incapable of justifying prescriptive claims or actions. 
Hermeneutic understanding implies that no research methodology can provide universal and 
permanent understanding of a phenomenon.  However, hermeneutics can develop 
understanding far enough to provide justification for human actions and mutual understanding 
between stakeholders which facilitates cooperative living, and the resolution of competing 
normative claims.  It is this aspect of hermeneutics which qualifies it as an effective paradigm 
for future-oriented research.  Contextually situated provisional understanding of potential 
futures requires iteration to remain relevant, and cannot be understood as static predictions of 
an objective reality.  While hermeneutic foresight provides initial understanding useful for 
developing anticipatory actions, it must be recognised that understanding necessitates 
iteration to justifiably ground responses to the perceived problems of emerging technologies. 
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6.1.3.2.3 Validity of Claims 
Hermeneutics has been criticised for leading to political and moral relativism; the impossibility 
of escaping preconceptions in interpreting phenomena means that universal understanding or 
moral judgments are equally impossible.  Moral judgments would instead be mere subjective 
expressions of culturally-informed values (Edgar 2002, p.61).  As a form of emotivist moral 
deliberation, hermeneutics lacks a way to criticise interpretations as more or less credible. 
This criticism is limited in the sense that the hermeneutic circle metaphor makes clear that 
understanding does not flow directly from preconceptions; rather, ‘present-at-hand’ 
phenomena and perspectives are encountered as understanding develops, meaning a conflict 
is setup between preconceptions and clashing perspectives, perhaps held by members of 
different cultures.  The resolution of this conflict requires some form of deliberation to reach a 
new understanding, which is where relativism can be escaped by the need to justify decisions 
made in deliberation.  A critical component—the need to judge interpretations as more or less 
credible—is therefore introduced, although a method for deliberation in this respect is not yet 
clear.  On this basis the criticism may be successful in undermining the ability to reach justified 
moral decisions (for example) through a hermeneutic methodology.  However, the success of 
the criticism in terms of moral justification (Edgar 2002, p.61) does not undermine the 
hermeneutic account of human understanding, interpretation and the formation of 
knowledge, its appropriateness as a model for (non-deliberative) empirical study, and for the 
need to account for characteristics of specific social and historical contexts in developing 
understanding. 
Following on from this, the fact that all social agents can in principle interpret any social action 
suggests that all influences on the meaning of the action are apparent to interpreters 
(Habermas 1988, pp.171–5).  Critical hermeneutics and critical theory contradict this claim, 
saying that power relations and ideologies are hidden in much social action which, until 
revealed, cannot factor into the interpretation of social actors.  As a result, without a means 
for emancipation through revealing underlying causal forces on social actions, hermeneutics 
presents a problematic method for understanding social actions and phenomena. 
This criticism may be unfounded.  While claimed as a unique feature of critical disciplines, the 
need to distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘false’ prejudices is acknowledged by Gadamer 
(Gadamer 1976b, p.124).  While objective grounds for resolving moral disagreements do not 
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exist in hermeneutics, the possibility of judging interpretations as more or less credible exists, 
although the method for doing so remains unclear.  As suggested above, deliberation in this 
sense can be understood as a type of dialogue in which a fusion of horizons is sought, or new 
understanding through evaluating interpretations as more or less credible. 
6.1.3.3 Hermeneutic Dialogue 
Understanding cannot be derived uncritically from prejudices based on their past credibility.  
Rather, they require reconsideration and revision in the context of newly encountered 
phenomena and perspectives.  Gadamer advocated dialogue as a tool for the development of 
understanding (2004), through which the credibility of claims can be evaluated.  
Understanding develops in step with consideration of new or unfamiliar interpretations and 
evidence.  Hermeneutic dialogue aims to develop understanding through the fusion of 
horizons of actors with disparate backgrounds, personal experiences and cultural reference 
points. 
6.1.3.3.1   Truth and the Ideal of Rational Discourse 
Conceived as the search for understanding, dialogue provides justification for actions through 
“reciprocal acceptance of norms which will eventually guide the behaviour of negotiating 
partners.”  Hermeneutics is concerned with providing rational arguments for human 
behaviour, also called “norms of conduct” (Bauman 1978, p.241) or moral truth.56  Truth acts 
as a guiding principle for structuring communication between humans, allowing for consensus 
on correct interpretations of phenomena.  Truth therefore provides justification for action.57  
What is so far missing from this account of hermeneutics is an approach, perhaps a set of 
criteria, through which the truth of interpretations can be evaluated.  For this piece of the 
epistemic puzzle, an appeal must be made to the critical philosophy of Jürgen Habermas.   
An account of truth arrived at through communication is given in Habermas’ Theory of 
Communicative Action (TCA) and seen initially in the ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas 1984; 
Habermas 1985) (see: Sections 6.1.3.3.1 and 7.3.2).  According to the TCA human beings as 
social entities need to communicate in order to survive and prosper.  Humans have a range of 
possibilities of communicating, with communicative action being the best or most highly 
                                                          
56
 Truth is moral in the sense that it is a normative claim—it provides justification for human action.  It is 
contrasted with absolute truths, or statements about which we are certain.  Deductive reasoning may 
be capable of reaching absolute truths (Hume 1978). 
57
 For an explanation of how truth acts as a guiding principle for cooperative life and justified actions, 
see: Appendix 6. 
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developed.  Whenever human beings communicate a set of validity claims arise: truth 
(Wahrheit), rightness (Richtigkeit) and authenticity (Wahrhaftigkeit).  Communicative action 
requires the speaker to engage in a discourse whenever any of these validity claims are 
queried, meaning communication has broken down.  This implies a willingness to engage with 
the interlocutor, to take her seriously and to be willing to change one's positions in the light of 
that argument (Habermas 1997).58   
The TCA identifies standards which must be met in discourse for its outcomes to be considered 
true, or as justification for action.  Rational discourse is dialogue in which: 
“Validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or warnings are the exclusive object 
of discussion; that participants, themes and contributions are not restricted except 
with reference to the goal of testing the validity claims in questions; that no force 
except the better argument is exercised; and that, as a result, all motives except that 
of the cooperative search for truth are excluded” (Habermas 1975, pp.107–8). 
 
The process requires that all stakeholders affected by the discourse be involved (or at least 
given the opportunity), which guarantees that all “alleged interests” are considered in 
discourse regardless of the relative power or social status of participants—the only relevant 
“power” in rational discourse is that of the strength of arguments (Bauman 1978, p.242), as 
judged by its participants.  Resulting intersubjective agreement provides “normative status” or 
credibility to the “common interests” of the participants, because the interests were agreed 
upon in a process that precludes deception.  Interests are seen as common “because the 
constraint-free consensus permits only what all can want” (Habermas 1975, p.108).  Rational 
discourse is free of deception because the values or “interpretations of needs” of individuals 
are transparently discussed and refined in the discourse—the process thus leads to the 
refinement of individually held interpretations of personal needs through dialogue with other 
stakeholders (Habermas 1975, p.108).  In such a process, only those claims which can be 
communicated to other stakeholders in an intelligible way, which depend upon a shared 
cultural background or prior knowledge for comprehension, will find a place in intersubjective 
agreement.  Such claims will therefore represent “generalisable interests,” or those which can 
be “communicatively shared” and are found rational, convincing or otherwise in agreement 
with the developing interpretations of other stakeholders in the dialogue (Habermas 1975, 
p.108).  Rational discourse is thus meant as a process which will arrive at consensus resembling 
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 Part of this paragraph is taken from a manuscript currently under review for publication in Science, 




generalisable truths as justification for action, although this should not be taken as a 
positivistic, objectivist pursuit because the truths are imperfect and necessarily located in a 
historical and social context (Bauman 1978, p.14). 
Rational discourse provides criteria for evaluation of interpretations in hermeneutic dialogue, 
albeit criteria only comprehensible within the TCA.  Outcomes of a dialogue can therefore be 
judged as more or less valid by fulfilment of the ideals of rational discourse.  As a procedure for 
ascertaining truth and deciding between valid interpretations of phenomena, rational 
discourse cannot be met in practice, serving instead as a critical guide for evaluation of existing 
discourses (Gilder 1987; Huttunen 2000).  The importance of the TCA in terms of empirical 
research is that it can ground evaluations of the quality of research and dialogue (see: Section 
6.1.3.3.1).  From a theoretical perspective, it adds an evaluative component missing from 
hermeneutics. 
6.1.3.4 Conclusions 
To summarise, hermeneutic understanding is based on a fusion of preconceptions, 
confounded expectations and new perspectives.  As people inevitably bring different 
preconceptions to situations, it follows that differing interpretations of a situation are 
inevitable.  The existence of differing interpretations is both good and necessary within 
hermeneutics; in order to develop understanding, individuals must be open to different 
perspectives that can be incorporated into their interpretation of a situation (Widdershoven 
2005, p.65; Widdershoven, Abma, et al. 2009, p.239).  Without this openness, the individual 
will be unaware of meanings or interpretations of a situation that fall outside their 
forestructure, limiting their understanding.  This openness does not imply the uncritical 
acceptance of new perspectives (Gadamer 2004); rather, as Widdershoven (2005, p.66) 
explains it, “one does not put oneself directly in the place of the other but is prepared to hear 
what the other has to say and to acknowledge that it may be necessary to change one’s own 
views about the matter.”  This openness is the defining feature of hermeneutic understanding, 
which according to Gadamer (2004) requires a dialogue in which both individuals are willing to 
change their perspectives to improve their understanding of a situation.  In such a dialogue the 
participants are not expected to reach identical conclusions (Widdershoven 2005, p.66), but 
rather to find common points of view that can inform and improve their understanding of a 
situation.  Once this agreement has been reached in dialogue, a fusion of horizons has 
occurred (Gadamer 2004).  In fusion, new understanding is created.  It is important to conceive 
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of understanding in terms of communication, as opposed to control or prediction (Patterson & 
Williams 2002, p.29):  the hermeneutic researcher seeks to communicate a better theoretical 
or practical understanding of a phenomenon, and eschews control  over the phenomenon 
through rigid causal explanations.  In this sense understanding is open-ended communication:  
it remains open to revision as the phenomenon and its meaning, formulated by practitioners, 
change over time.   
In conceiving of the empirical study as a hermeneutic dialogue, its goal can be understood as 
the development of understanding of the perspectives of potential practitioners, which may 
not necessarily be comprehensible within the conceptual framework (see: Chapter 4).  The 
relative credibility of these perspectives can be assessed against the ideals of rational 
discourse.  Understood as an endeavour to provide critical insight rather than rigid explanation 
of phenomena, the fit between hermeneutics, rational discourse and ethical assessment of 
PHM within the conceptual framework (see: Chapter 4) is clear.  The insight provided by 
hermeneutic methods can be used to check the explanatory power of the conceptual 
framework from the perspectives of potential users of PHM, identifying weaknesses or areas 
requiring refinement or expansion in the process, while not accepting all claims regarding 
potential futures as equally credible (see: Section 7.3.2.3).  The framework is taken to 
contribute to future dialogue on the ethical implications of PHM, helping stakeholders to 
understand how PHM may change their relationships with medical practitioners and 
medicalise their relationships with others (see: Section 3.4.1.3). 
6.2 Empirical Study Design 
With the ontological and epistemological commitments of hermeneutics explained, along with 
the ideal of rational discourse and the role of dialogue in reaching understanding, it remains to 
be seen how hermeneutics prescribes the design of an empirical ethics study.  Hermeneutics 
provides an account of understanding in which “the context of the information system [PHM], 
and the process whereby the information system influences and is influenced by the context” 
was developed (Walsham 1993).  The translation of a hermeneutic epistemology and ontology 
into an empirical study design reflecting these commitments is described in this section. 
6.2.1 Qualitative vs. Quantitative 
Hermeneutics precludes the possibility of quantitative approaches to understanding the 
meaning of social phenomena.  Hermeneutic understanding requires texts or other objects of 
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research which provide words which can be interpreted.  As only qualitative methods can 
produce texts for analysis, the choice was straightforward.  Still, it is important to recognise 
the differences between the two approaches, as both were considered in the early stages of 
the research project. 
Quantitative methods are concerned with variables which can be measured “in terms of 
quantity, amount, intensity or frequency” (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, p.8).  These variables are 
often explained in terms of statistical relationships which presume regularity or predictability, 
often leading to claims of quantitative research being “value-free” or based on an objective 
external reality (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, p.9) despite criticisms of the alleged objectivity of 
numbers and statistical representations (Bauman 1978; Molewijk et al. 2003).  The focus on 
quantifiable data and statistical relationships contributes to a reductionist view of the social 
world, which precludes discussion of the rich context in which phenomena occur (Casterlé et 
al. 2011, p.234). As quantitative methods require measurement and the identification of 
statistical relationships, it is incongruous to imagine their use in uncovering unknown moral 
beliefs and ethical issues which are complex and embedded in a social and historical context.  
Even if moral beliefs could be explained in statistical terms, it is unclear how knowing the 
statistical prevalence of a moral belief could inform the ethical debate in deciding which 
actions should be taken.   
This is not to preclude statistical descriptions of normative positions; rather, the prescriptive 
weight that should be given to statistical representations is unclear.  The fact that a moral 
belief is held by a percentage of positions does not provide a normative reason to accept or 
enact that belief; a majority of people can hold a morally reprehensible belief.  To reason from 
statistics directly to prescription, an act akin to “might makes right,” is to misrepresent the 
purpose of ethics as a discipline, conceived of as the pursuit of a good life through moral 
actions based on a clear conception of right and wrong (see: Section 3.1.1).   
While populations may disagree on what constitutes a ‘right’ action, the need for normative 
claims, moral values, principles and theories to guide these decisions is clear.  Ethics would be 
an incoherent discipline if this were not the case.  If all that is needed to determine a morally 
correct action is a statistical survey of the beliefs of stakeholders, then moral disagreement 
would not exist; the mere existence of disagreement indicates that reasons beyond statistical 
prevalence constitute normativity, meaning that statistical representations in themselves do 
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not hold the key to right and wrong actions, or ethical acceptability.  As a result, quantitative 
methods do not provide a suitable approach (on their own) to identifying, analysing and 
comparing normative claims made in response to emerging technologies. 
In contrast to the weaknesses of quantitative methods in ethics research, qualitative methods 
emphasise “the qualities of entities and...processes and...meanings that are not experimentally 
examined or measured ...in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency.”  Qualitative 
methods tend to address social constructions, the relationship between researchers and these 
constructions, and how this relationship and other “situational constraints” affect inquiry, 
demonstrating that inquiry and knowledge are both value-laden (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, p.8). 
This type of context is gathered because, “human behaviour...cannot be understood without 
reference to the meanings and purposes attached by human actors to their activities” (Lincoln 
& Guba 1994, p.106).  As a result researchers often use qualitative methods within 
hermeneutic, interpretive, critical and constructivist paradigms to explore how social reality is 
created and given meaning by social actors (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, pp.8–9).  Methods of 
qualitative inquiry include structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, surveys, 
focus groups, and ethnographies. 
Qualitative research is often useful in forming knowledge about phenomena and beliefs about 
which little is known (van Hooren et al. 2008, p.167), such as the ethical implications of PHM.  
This usefulness is a product of the ability of qualitative methods to capture meanings 
participants assign to phenomena (Casterlé et al. 2011, p.234).  Meaning is captured through 
interviews, focus groups, ethnographies and case studies that focus on the context and beliefs 
of a group of practitioners (Lincoln & Guba 1994, p.106).  Qualitative methods therefore 
contrast the tendency of quantitative research to strip data of secondary variables or context 
that may ‘corrupt’ results in the pursuit of objective understanding.  Given the rejection of 
objectivist ontologies and the importance of contextual understanding in hermeneutics, a 
qualitative approach is the most appropriate for the empirical study. 
6.2.2 Case Study 
A case study is an intensive examination of one or a few selected instances, groups or events 
of research interest (Stake 1995, pp.435–7), often involving observation of stakeholders and 
examination of multiple sources of information including texts, memos, interview transcripts 
and others.  Cases can involve any number of actors, networks and events, but will typically 
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involve “individuals or organisations, simple through complex interventions, relationships, 
communities, or programs” (Yin 2003). 
In principle, case studies are very compatible with hermeneutics and empirical assessment of 
potential futures.  Analysis of changes in attitude over time can be pursued through prolonged 
interaction with a single case (Searle 1995), for example in studying attitudes pre- and post-
deployment.  Emphasis is placed on the interaction between researcher and participants 
because knowledge created in the case study is inevitably shaped by both the participants and 
the researcher interpreting their actions and opinions (Crabtree & Miller 1999; Baxter & Jack 
2008).  Context is acknowledged as central to the development of in-depth understanding 
(Lather 1992; Yin 2003; Baxter & Jack 2008), which provides both insight into current practices 
as well as a basis for creating and refining theoretical concepts.  Longitudinal data collection 
from multiple sources within the clearly defined parameters and goals of the study allow for 
in-depth understanding of the complex social relationships that occur within a phenomenon 
(Feagin et al. 1991, pp.6–7) or practice.  By focusing on a small number of data sources a depth 
of analysis is possible that is not practical in representative studies involving large samples.  As 
dialogue is the main tool of hermeneutics, a research format is required which allows for 
dialogue across multiple stakeholders sharing a background or frame of reference which 
shapes their prejudices—case studies achieve this through focusing on an individual practice, 
phenomenon or context.   
With its focus on in-depth, contextual understanding of social phenomena as the basis for 
theory, the case study method appears appropriate for the refinement of the conceptual 
framework through empirical assessment of existing relevant practices and practitioners (e.g. 
disease groups).  The study can be conceived of as a case study, albeit with significant 
qualifications.  As an emerging technology, data collection is limited to development reports, 
academic discourse and collection of attitudes regarding potential uses; user observation is 
largely precluded beyond pilot studies because the technology is not yet widely used or 
commercially available.59  Stemming from the impossibility of observation, longitudinal data 
collection is not desirable because potential users will not encounter the technology at any 
point in the study, meaning their attitudes would not be reflective of (and changed by) 
practical experiences with the technology (cf. Searle 1995; Latour & Venn 2002), limiting the 
value of repeated data collection.   
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 Ethnography was rejected as a design for the study on this basis. 
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Instead of longitudinal data collection, two instances can occur for each participant to allow 
for potential changes in attitude over a short period of time, caused by prior unfamiliarity with 
PHM.  As an emerging technology, PHM is likely to be unknown to most potential users prior to 
the start of the study, meaning a chance to reflect on the implications of the technology would 
be limited to the duration of a single data collection event.  Under the assumption that the 
formation of rational or well-informed attitudes requires reflection over time, a second 
instance of data collection appears justified.  This period of reflection should increase the 
quality of the data by expanding the range of issues and quality of arguments seen in dialogue 
with participants.  Based on these qualifications, it is perhaps more accurate to refer to the 
empirical study as an ‘exploratory case study’, focused on the refinement and expansion of 
theoretical understanding of the ethical implications of PHM. 
6.2.3 Sampling 
Qualitative research typically focuses on a small number of participants to develop an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon under study (Miles & Huberman 1994).  In line with this 
goal, purposeful recruitment according to sample criteria identified by the researcher as 
relevant to the research topic is typically preferred to a randomised approach (Mays & Pope 
1995, pp.109–10; Reed 1996, p.54; Tuckett 2004, pp.2–3).  According to Tuckett (2004) 
qualitative sampling is usually purposive60, in the sense that the sampling criteria can be 
iteratively revised as the study progresses.  This approach is coherent with the hermeneutic 
circle metaphor, in which new evidence and perspectives are constantly sought to expand the 
horizon of the researcher. 
In purposive sampling ‘representative types’ are used to define a desired sample.  
Representative types describe the experiences, beliefs or practices that make participants both 
interesting in the context of the research question, and unique among the sample (Patterson & 
Williams 2002, p.41).  Purposive sampling fits well with hermeneutics, which emphasises the 
role prejudices play in framing a person’s experience of reality, leading to unique 
interpretations and individualised perspectives of phenomena.  On this basis purposive 
sampling is the preferred method for the study, with recruitment criteria updated as the study 
progresses.   
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 Theoretical sampling is also often confused with purposive sampling in methodology literature.  Both 
types of sampling involve selecting specific participants based on criteria determined by the researcher, 
although theoretical sampling places more emphasis on the development of theory in participant 
selection.  See:  Morse 1991; Coyne 1997; Higginbotham 2001. 
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6.2.4 Data Collection 
Many methods of data collection potentially meet the commitments of hermeneutics, 
including focus groups and interviews.  Data collection methods can be judged as more or less 
suitable to hermeneutics research according to structure, limitation of topics and 
opportunities to question and criticise claims.  Structured methods including questionnaires 
(self-completion surveys) and structured interviews (Fontana 2000, p.649; Gilbert 2008) are ill-
suited to hermeneutics research due to worries that such approaches “impose the 
researcher’s concepts on the respondent,” prohibiting probing and clarification in the 
(misguided) pursuit of objectivity (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.25).  From the perspective of 
hermeneutics new understanding is achieved through open-minded dialogue (see: Section 
6.1.3.3), meaning the researcher must be willing to explore topics of interest to practitioners.  
Imagining research as a hermeneutic circle (see: Section 6.1.3.2.2), an iterative approach to 
data collection was required, in which “insights from earlier interviews are used to guide and 
improve subsequent interviews” (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.43).  Structured methods 
should therefore be rejected for studies designed as a dialogue because in the former the 
content of the research tool must remain the same throughout the study to reduce bias 
(Britten 1995; Fontana 2000, pp.649–51; Patterson & Williams 2002, p.27).  Rigid structure is 
incompatible with open-minded dialogue—static research tools limit the researcher’s ability to 
probe for further information and explore topics of interest to the participant during dialogue. 
For dialogue, semi-structured interviews are preferable because they avoid the limitations that 
come with preformatted questions and a limited set of topics, while providing enough 
structure to remain within a general topic (e.g. reactions to PHM).61   Through the use of an 
interview guide (Britten 1995, p.1; Gilbert 2008) listing themes and topics of interest, 
interviews can remain on-topic while the researcher remains free to explore topics of interest 
to the participant and probe for further contextual information including details regarding the 
participants social and medical relationships.  This freedom to follow tangents and topics the 
respondent finds important is a mechanism for identifying perspectives unforeseen by the 
                                                          
61
 The terminology in qualitative methodology literature is not uniform.  Interviews without pre-
formatted questions are alternatively referred to as semi-structured and unstructured (Britten 1995; 
Fontana 2000; Gilbert 2008).  The terminology is not of particular importance here, as long as it is clear 
that the interviews were conducted with an interview guide which listed topics and findings from earlier 
in the research cycle.  The interviewer was free to raise or ignore these topics, concepts and 
perspectives as he saw fit, depending on the proceedings of each interview. 
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researcher of relevance to the conceptual framework, and satisfies the ‘open-minded’ 
requirement for hermeneutic dialogue from the researcher’s perspective.   
Focus groups may also allow for dialogues between multiple participants, but in-depth 
questioning of claims may be more difficult in a group discussion (Kitzinger 1995).  Approaches 
based on hermeneutics involving the collection of empirical data in bioethics have used focus 
groups in the past as a way to involve stakeholders with contradictory interests in dialogue 
(Widdershoven & van der Scheer 2008; Widdershoven, Abma, et al. 2009).  This approach has 
been used to solve moral problems in a specific context in which contradictory claims or moral 
values must be reconciled, such as the use of coercion in mental health care (Widdershoven & 
van der Scheer 2008).  For an exploratory case study focus groups are inappropriate because a 
solution to a particular ethical issue is not sought, but rather refinement of the conceptual 
framework through insights from a variety of stakeholders speaking about potential (as 
opposed to existing) uses of a technology.  Even if focus groups can be used for ‘theory-
building’ in this sense, exploring individual claims in-depth to the same degree as is possible in 
one-to-one interviews is difficult with multiple participants in a dialogue; extended questioning 
of individual claims risks alienating other stakeholders or introducing confusion into the 
dialogue regarding the source or reasoning behind the original claim.  Focus groups are 
therefore an inefficient method to discover and understand perspectives not seen in the 
discourse (see: Chapter 3), or the moral claims, values and specifications of ethical concepts 
necessary to refine the conceptual framework.  Semi-structured interviews are therefore the 
preferred method for the study. 
6.2.5 Conclusions 
Based on the ontological and epistemological commitments of hermeneutics an appropriate 
method to engage patients with unique experiences relevant to PHM is a qualitative 
exploratory case study consisting of semi-structured interviews with a purposively recruited 
sample of potential users of PHM.  Although an empirical study is necessary to explore the 
conceptual framework’s explanatory power in practice, the researcher’s interpretation of the 
claims of participants cannot be accepted at face value; some criteria for evaluating the 
credibility or quality of the study’s findings are necessary.  Appropriate criteria must be 
sensitive to the decisions made in this chapter; judging a hermeneutic study by positivistic 
standards, for example, is inappropriate if different paradigms are seen as plausible 
approaches to research.  In this sense evaluative criteria are internal to each paradigm for 
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research.  While validity and rigour have been suggested as criteria for judging the credibility 
of quantitative and qualitative research in the past (Lincoln & Guba 1994; Mays & Pope 1995; 
Finlay 2006), neither correctly captures the ideals of rational discourse or the characteristics of 
hermeneutic understanding, suggesting that appropriate criteria must be built on a 
hermeneutic epistemology. 
6.3 Ensuring Research Credibility in Hermeneutic Research 
Widely accepted criteria to evaluate the quality of interpretivist and hermeneutic qualitative 
research, similar to those found in positivistic evaluations of validity or rigour (e.g. Popper 
1959), do not exist despite repeated attempts in recent decades to come to a consensus (Mays 
& Pope 1995; Finlay 2006).  That the study assesses an emerging technology, which by 
definition creates uncertainty, means that a clear approach to evaluating quality is especially 
relevant. 
6.3.1 Truth, Validity and Credibility 
It has been claimed  that the TCA (see: Section 6.1.3.3.1) can bring social research (and ethics) 
as close as possible to the standards of truth in the natural sciences (Bauman 1978, p.243), 
measured in terms of validity.  Whether or not this is true, it is not clear that ‘validity’ is an 
appropriate standard to judge the quality of hermeneutic research, despite its position in the 
TCA and rational discourse (see: Section 6.1.3.3.1).  The reason for this can be seen in the 
difference between absolute truth, or a correct description of external reality, and moral truth, 
or a justified reason to act.  The difference is expressed in the distinction between validity and 
credibility, understood as measures of truth claims in objectivist and constructivist ontologies, 
respectively.  Truth claims are essentially claims to knowledge, which was defined by Plato as 
“justified true belief,” or belief which is accompanied by justification in the form of reasons 
and rational argumentation (Plato 1987; Bostock 1991).  In a ‘situated’ conception of reality as 
existing between external structure and socially created realities (see: Section 6.1.3.1), validity 
and credibility can both ground truth claims: 
Validity – Defined here along critical rationalist lines in terms of falsifiability (Popper 2002).  
Something is valid only so far as it is falsifiable.  Claims to knowledge, or scientific theories, are 
increasingly valid as evidence accumulates in their favour, but they can always be proven false 
in the future (Popper 1959).  It is therefore never true—all human knowledge is irreducibly 
hypothetical because inductive reasoning cannot logically produce certainty, or truth, without 
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assuming the truth of the premise to be proven true (Hume 1978).  Certainty requires an 
infinite number of observations which can never be realised in practice.  Falsification is 
therefore preferred as a basis for validity because it recognises the provisional nature of all 
human knowledge, including scientific laws and theories, all of which can be proven false 
through a single counterexample.  Falsification can occur through empirical observation, which 
is impossible for future events.  Claims about the future cannot, then, be falsified and cannot 
therefore be valid.  With this said, claims may take valid (empirical) observations about existing 
phenomena and make judgments about the future on their behalf.  In this case the claims 
cannot be directly valid, as they describe the future, but their existing empirical basis may be 
valid.  Such future claims may, however, be simultaneously invalid and credible. 
Credibility – Credibility is a summarising judgment of the normative truth content of a claim, 
judged according to standards of truth accepted between and within individuals.  Credibility is 
not a binary judgment; claims are more or less credible according to how closely they adhere 
to the accepted standards of truth.  This is not to say that credibility brings us closer to 
absolute truth or certainty; to say something is credible is to say that we have reasons to act as 
if it is true.  Credibility thus brings us closer to moral truth, meaning it provides justification for 
action.  Norms of conduct can be derived or based upon credible claims (Bauman 1978, p.241).  
Depending upon one’s standards, validity, understood as a measurement of falsification, will 
also contribute to the credibility of a statement.  Many possible standards of credibility exist: 
persuasiveness, insightfulness, practical utility or trustworthiness, transparency, reflexivity and 
coherence (see: Section 6.3.2).  It is argued that all of these standards come into play in 
judging the credibility of the research project at multiple levels.  Persuasiveness, insightfulness, 
practical utility or trustworthiness, transparency and reflexivity are standards to judge the 
success of the researcher in providing a credible account of the moral beliefs of practitioners 
through empirical research. 
Positivistic measurements of validity in terms of bias, falsifiability and reproducibility (e.g. 
Popper 1959) should be rejected in hermeneutic research as contradictory to hermeneutic 
epistemology—interpretation and understanding are subjective and vary from person-to-
person and context-to-context, built as they are from prior knowledge and prejudices unique 
to individuals.62  Credibility is an expression of the force with which a belief is held; Habermas’ 
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 Attempts have been made to adapt positivist validity criteria to qualitative research by evaluating 
quality of in terms of ‘rigour’.  Such attempts have so far failed to establish criteria built around 
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validity claims (see: Section 6.1.3.3.1), despite their name, can be understood as an evaluation 
of credibility, not validity, in the terms described here because the purpose of discourse is 
justified action or moral truth.  Labelling a claim as credible identifies it as convincing or 
worthy of belief, or “that it is believed by an agent who is free not to believe it, that is, by an 
observer who, after exercising judgment and (possibly) intuition, chooses to accept the 
proposition as worthy of his believing it” (Weizenbaum 1976, p.16).  Criteria for establishing 
credibility must then focus on the act of interpretation as carried out by the individual.  
Credibility suggests that contextual understanding of the interpretations of participants should 
be sought through dialogue, resembling rational discourse as far as possible.  Dialogue requires 
close interaction between researcher and participant, so researcher influence or ‘bias’ should 
not be seen as a problem in hermeneutics research, although a reflexive account of how 
dialogue occurred and the researcher’s influence on the participant should be provided. 
Hermeneutics research pursues open-ended understanding as an ‘end product’, recognising 
that social interactions do not occur in a closed system with causal relations (Patterson & 
Williams 2002, p.28) amenable to prediction and reproduction of findings.  This is not to say 
hermeneutics research cannot produce theory or conclusions relevant to other similar 
contexts, but rather that a significant degree of uncertainty is necessary when generalising.  
Validity criteria are seen as reproducing “only a certain kind of science,” one that “silences too 
many voices” (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, p.10) in the pursuit of objectivity.  For research into 
social reality and interactions endorsing a constructivist or co-constituted ontology (see: 
Section 6.1.1.1) a static external reality against which validity can be defined in terms of 
falsifiability and reproducibility does not exist (Finlay 2006).  The co-constituted hermeneutics 
ontology necessitates rejection of validity criteria based on objectivist ontologies.  Alternative 
criteria for hermeneutic research are necessary which focus on the quality of the researcher’s 
interpretation of a phenomenon or social reality rather than predictive power, falsifiability or 
reproducibility. 
6.3.2 Criteria for Credibility in Hermeneutics Research63 
A central distinction for determining appropriate credibility criteria for hermeneutics research 
exists in the difference between methodological and outcome credibility.  Natural sciences and 
‘foundationalist’ researchers tend to emphasise methodological purity as a route to objectivity 
                                                                                                                                                                          
interpretivist and hermeneutic epistemologies.  For a summary of prior approaches to rigour and their 
relation to validity, see Appendix 7. 
63
 These criteria are meant to be applied to the findings presented in Chapter 9. 
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or ‘certainty in knowledge’ (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.35).  Hermeneutics asserts the 
impossibility of objectivity and truth through methodological rigour because human 
understanding is necessarily rooted to a particular perspective.  As a result, distance cannot be 
created between the self and personal perspectives or bias (Polkinghorne 1983, p.224).  To do 
so would be to transcend the limitations of human experience. 
Realising these limitations, credibility must be established in part through evaluation of the 
outcomes of research.  The following outcome-oriented criteria are proposed to evaluate the 
credibility of the empirical study: 
 Persuasiveness refers to the degree to which the reader of the research report can 
take the viewpoint of the researcher, and understand the reasoning behind his 
interpretations.  While the reader cannot empathetically completely take the 
researcher’s perspective, he should be provided with enough examples from the data 
to justify the researcher’s interpretation (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.33).  
Persuasiveness is therefore a judgment of the quality of the dialogue between reader 
and text, which depends on the quality of the researcher’s report of the results.  
Research which is successfully persuasive will contain enough detail for the reader to 
have a clear picture of the researcher’s role in the project, and influence over its 
findings (Butler 1998; Maxwell 1998, p.243).  Persuasiveness directs concerns over 
credibility away from predetermined levels of agreement between multiple 
independent analyses, and focuses instead on the conclusions reached in the research 
and the strength of arguments and evidence supporting those conclusions (Patterson 
& Williams 2002, p.33).  An evaluation of the reasoning and justification supporting the 
researcher’s interpretation of the data is central to the concept. 
 Insightfulness refers to the quality of the researcher’s interpretation, judged in terms 
of its ability to go beyond merely summarising the phenomenon by revealing a new 
insight or theoretical strand which presents the phenomenon in a new light (Patterson 
& Williams 2002, pp.34–5).  The researcher’s interpretation should therefore provide a 
unique theoretical perspective seen as convincing by the reader.  Insight involves 
connecting, interpreting and arranging data in a way that reveals new meanings or 
aspects of the phenomenon under study (Polkinghorne 1983, pp.238–9).  A qualitative 
study is considered insightful if the researcher’s interpretation increases the reader’s 
understanding of the phenomenon (Patterson & Williams 2002, pp.33–34).  
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Insightfulness is similar to prior accounts of ‘rigour’ as an evaluative mechanism for 
qualitative research (see: Appendix 7), intended to ensure “a plausible and coherent 
explanation of the phenomenon” (Mays & Pope 1995) is produced.  To be both 
persuasive and insightful, the reader must be interpretively “guided through the data 
in a way that produces an understanding of the phenomenon reflecting greater insight 
than was held prior to reading the research” (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.34).  Thus, 
the researcher provides new, interesting insights into the phenomenon, while 
providing enough of an ‘audit trail’ to allow the reader to reach subjective assessments 
of the researcher’s conclusions. 
 Practical utility is a functional criterion, by which the research is judged for its 
contribution of knowledge or an answer to the research question(s).  It has been 
related to ‘trustworthiness’, which refers to the soundness of the methods and 
interpretation of the researcher as judged by others familiar with the ‘tools’ and 
methods of research (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.35).  The research must therefore 
contribute to the discourse on the object of study to be deemed credible.  Recall that 
understanding is an end product of hermeneutics, meaning ‘addressing’ a problem 
does not necessarily involve a solution, but rather insights or understanding into the 
phenomenon.  To be considered useful, research must be ‘trustworthy’ by reviewing 
prior work in the field before designating a research question and interpreting the 
data.  Therefore, it would seem practically useful research must involve theoretical 
insights, such as those offered above (see: Chapter 4).   
The above criteria help evaluate the quality of the outcomes of empirical research within 
hermeneutics.  Complementary methodological criteria are necessary to define credible 
reporting of research conduct and results, allowing the reader to follow the experiences and 
reasoning process of the researcher in interpreting the data.  The following methodology-
oriented criteria are proposed: 
 Transparency refers to the level of detail provided about the method of the research, 
and the researcher’s reasoning process in reaching conclusions.  It can also be referred 
to as researcher ‘honesty’.  Although qualitative research is often described as a messy 
process, it should be clear how, when and by whom it was performed (Kuper et al. 
2008, p.688).  This is especially true of data analysis in which the source of 
perspectives and interpretations becomes paramount.  An “audit trail” is required 
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which allows the reader to understand how the research methodology was actually 
applied in the study (Guba & Lincoln 1985; Finlay 2006, pp.8–9).   The researcher must 
provide a detailed account of the hermeneutic dialogue and process of interpretation 
to explain how his understanding of the topic developed.  Sufficient detail and ‘raw 
data’ are necessary to allow the reader to follow the researcher’s reasoning process. 
 Reflexivity is the usage of critical self-reflection in the evaluation of a phenomenon 
(Holloway 2005; Finlay 2006; Stahl 2008).  In the case of qualitative research, the 
phenomena are the method and outcomes of the research.  Reflexivity is connected to 
transparency, in the sense that the former increases the latter.  A reflexive approach 
should be taken in reporting the proceedings of the study, by which the researcher 
critically evaluates the relative successes and failures encountered along the way 
(Guba & Lincoln 1985; Ives & Dunn 2010, p.261).  Reflexivity is an important ideal in 
writing up research findings to ensure the process of dialogue, interpretation and 
fusion of horizons are clearly transmitted to the reader, thereby contributing to 
persuasiveness and practical utility.  At a minimum, the researcher needs to provide a 
description of his prejudices at the beginning of the research study, and document 
how it changed through encountering alternative perspectives in dialogue.64  A critical 
perspective is necessary for self-evaluation, so the researcher should detail which 
perspectives were the most influential and those which he rejected.  Initial 
assumptions, beliefs and ideologies should be openly questioned (Stahl 2008), and 
apparent in writing up results.  A reflexive, transparent account of the research 
process ensures understanding did not stagnate at some point in the study, which 
should not occur if the research process is meant to be an ongoing hermeneutic circle. 
 
Reflexivity also refers to the consideration of alternative interpretations and 
perspectives in data analysis.  In a qualitative study it is unlikely that all the data will fit 
the researcher’s interpretation at the end of the study.  While it is tempting to ignore 
discrepant data undermining the researcher’s interpretation, both discrepancies and 
alternative interpretations of the data must be considered for a study to be reflexive 
(Maxwell 1998, p.245; Finlay 2006, p.10).  Evidence of this consideration is necessary; 
reasons for rejecting alternative interpretations and dismissing discrepancies may be 
enough.  Alternatively, the discrepancies can be presented to allow the reader to judge 
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 Such an account can be seen in Chapters 1 through 4. 
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for themselves whether the researcher’s interpretation is credible (Maxwell 1998, 
pp.244–245).  In the empirical study alternative interpretations were considered in 
dialogue, especially in specifying ambiguous ethical concepts such as privacy.  In a 
sense, reflexivity ensures that the conclusions reached on the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data are logical, by exposing the reasoning process to the 
reader’s scrutiny.  Logic, a cornerstone of philosophical justification (Ives & Dunn 2010, 
p.258), still exists within the concept of credibility, although it is focused on the quality 
of the individual hermeneutic interpreter, not a disembodied ideal of rationality; 
whether this is sufficient to justify the generalisation of the outcomes of the research 
across other contexts remains to be seen. 
The concept of reflexivity can be bolstered through connection with Habermas’ procedural 
approach to discourse described in the TCA (Habermas 1984; Habermas 1985) (see: Section 
6.1.3.3.1).  As a procedure for arriving at moral truth, rational discourse reminds us that 
credibility criteria cannot be entirely outcome-oriented.  By judging the outcomes of the 
empirical study according to the above criteria, the initial credibility of the empirical data can 
be demonstrated, assuming the study at least partially fulfilled the Habermas’ ideals for 
communicative action (cf. Habermas 1992).  The ideals of rational discourse therefore clarify 
the epistemic status of the outcomes of the empirical study.  To do so, they must be used to 
evaluate the method and outcomes of data collection.  The interviews and data analysis can be 
judged by these ideals to determine the credibility of the outcomes, according to how close 
the interviews came to Habermas’ ideals.  While the ideals are impossible to realise in practice, 
the researcher’s openness to alternative perspectives and the success of the best argument, 
regardless of its origin, can be evaluated in reporting the findings of the study.  This connection 
between the TCA and the epistemic status of claims encountered in the empirical study is 
expanded further below (see: Chapter 7) in relation to the difficulties of evaluating uncertain 
futures. 
6.3.2.1 Credibility and Review 
To ensure the researcher’s report is sufficiently persuasive, insightful, useful, transparent and 
reflexive, a review process should be implemented into qualitative empirical research based 
on hermeneutics.  Interpretations can be checked and alternative perspectives offered by a 
group of researchers, even if only an initial segment of the data is reviewed (cf. Mays & Pope 
1995).  Review can be seen as a continuation of the dialogue between researcher and texts 
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involving other members of the research team to consider new perspectives and potentially, 
although not necessarily, reach consensus on ‘correct’ interpretations of the data.  While the 
primary researcher’s perspective benefits from having participated in the original dialogue(s), 
it is still worthwhile to engage in dialogue with other researchers to consider alternative 
perspectives, theories and explanations of the participants’ claims.  The goal of review is 
therefore not validation through agreement upon correct interpretations, although this may 
occur, but to provide alterative perspectives to be considered in interpreting the data.65 
6.3.3 Generalisability in Qualitative Research 
Criticisms of a lack of generalisability in qualitative research are common (Mays & Pope 1995; 
Morse 1999).  Quantitative research is seen as a legitimate form of “hard science,” which 
reveals causal explanations of phenomena amenable to reproducibility and the evaluative 
standards of positivism.  In contrast, qualitative research “elicits the responses of a participant 
or researcher at a specific time and place in a specific interpersonal context,” precluding 
reproducibility and generalisation of findings from a single context to other dissimilar contexts 
(Finlay 2006, pp.4–5).  As a result, qualitative research can be incorrectly viewed as less 
valuable or rigorous than positivistic research. 
By exploring the perspectives of stakeholders and researchers in-depth, with intimate 
knowledge of context and social relationships, qualitative research can provide detailed 
understanding of a phenomenon through focusing on individual responses and specific 
occurrences, rather than broad populations (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.25).  It is therefore 
inappropriate to criticise qualitative research for a lack of acontextual generalisability because 
it is precisely what is not being sought (cf. Denzin & Lincoln 2000, p.10); qualitative research 
seeks to develop contextual, individualistic understanding, as opposed to group-level 
generalisations.  This aim does not mean that qualitative research lacks generalisability, but 
rather that generalisation must be separated from statistical significance.  The possibility of 
qualitative generalisation requires a better understanding of the types of generalisations that 
can be made across diverse contexts of study in which similar phenomena occur. 
6.3.3.1 Types of Generalisations 
The possibility for qualitative generalisation has been described as ‘transferability’ or 
‘resonance’ (Guba & Lincoln 1985; Marshall & Rossman 1999, p.193; Williams 2000; Finlay 
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 The review processed carried out in the research reported here is described in Section 8.5.2. 
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2006, p.10; Kuper et al. 2008, p.688), which refers to the applicability of findings from a study 
to similar contexts or phenomena.  In transferring findings such as theoretical insights to new 
contexts, consideration of the uniqueness of the new context compared to the original context 
of study is required before transfer is justified.   
In practice, transferability is assisted by reference to “the original theoretical framework” of 
the study whose findings are being transferred, in which it can be shown “how data collection 
and analysis [was] guided by concepts and models.”  Researchers can then compare 
phenomena and contexts falling within “the same parameters” to the original project, 
identifying theoretical and methodological similarities which justify transfer of conclusions 
from context to context (Marshall & Rossman 1999, p.193).  Qualitative generalisations 
therefore require the identification of common characteristics between contexts.  But what 
exactly is being transferred?  A classification of three forms of generalisation by Williams 
(2000, p.215) suggests types of statements or findings from hermeneutics research that can be 
transferred to other contexts: 
1.  Total Generalisations – Axioms, by which a situation is shown to be an example of 
a “general deterministic law.”  Total Generalisations are therefore not 
generalisations as such, but instances of a scientific law.  Williams gives the 
example of “the rate of cooling of an electric element is an instance of...the second 
law of thermodynamics.” 
2. Statistical Generalisations – Probabilities and predictions, “where the probability 
of situation S occurring more widely can be estimated from instances of s.  Resting 
on a probabilistic “relationship between sample and population,” Statistical 
Generalisations are the type most commonly made in the physical and social 
sciences, in instances in which relevant scientific or mathematical laws do not 
exist.  A researcher is thus able to “express statistically the level of confidence she 
has that her sample represents the population.” 
3. Moderatum Generalisations – Interpretive or theoretical generalisations, in which 
“aspects of S can be seen to be instances of a broader recognisable set of 
features.”  Researchers identify important interpretations, perspectives or 
features of a context or phenomenon which can then be transferred to other 
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similar contexts or phenomena, but not without supporting arguments and 
evidence that demonstrate shared characteristics (Williams 2000, p.215).66   
To apply this classification to the empirical study, technologies must be understood as 
embedded in social reality, rather than existing externally to it.  While technological artefacts 
exist beyond the social world in physical form, their meaning and importance is created 
through social interactions (cf. Latour & Venn 2002).  The process of meaning-making goes 
both ways—while humans attach meaning to technologies, interactions with the technology 
change the expectations and prejudices of humans.  Moderatum Generalisations are possible 
in qualitative hermeneutic research based on a co-constituted ontology, meaning reality is not 
entirely relative or purely socially constructed. 
Grounding Moderatum Generalisations are different types of “categories” which vary in 
transience and ontological status across contexts (Williams 2000, p.218).  Of these categories, 
those related to physical or technological characteristics are seen as the less transient, initially 
forming a more reliable basis for generalisations than interpersonal and cultural categories.  As 
an example, GPS devices share common technological characteristics regardless of the context 
of use, but the meaning and uses attached to the device will vary according to social, cultural 
and individual characteristics and goals.  However, generalisations of the type, “Most GPS 
devices include mapping functions,” are of themselves uninteresting in sociological and 
normative terms.  Moderatum Generalisations proceed beyond such simple statements about 
the likelihood of shared functional characteristics in generalising about social phenomena and 
contexts.  The legitimacy of Moderatum Generalisations can be grounded in “cultural 
consistency” (Williams 2000, p.220) which frames the variety and transformation of social 
phenomena and contexts.  Cultural consistency describes the shared terms, meanings, 
experiences or “social order” which makes social life possible, by creating a shared foundation 
upon which an individual’s forestructure of understanding is built.  Cultural consistency and 
                                                          
66 The debate over generalisations in qualitative research need not be viewed as a dichotomy according 
to this classification: proponents and critics are both correct, although about different types of 
generalisations.  Total and Statistical Generalisations are not made in qualitative research because 
qualitative data does not allow for quantitative measurement or calculation of probabilities.  If critics of 
qualitative generalisation (e.g. (Guba & Lincoln 1985; Mays & Pope 1995; Morse 1999) are referring to 
these types of generalisations in denying their possibility in interpretive research, then they are correct.  
On the other hand, Moderatum Generalisations can be made in qualitative research, and are seen as an 
appropriate research goal (Maxwell 1998, p.246; Morse 1999; Williams 2000, p.215; Patterson & 
Williams 2002).   
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technological characteristics can thus be viewed as part of the ‘structure’ spoken of in co-
constitution (see: Section 6.1.3.1).     
6.3.3.2 Moderatum Generalisations in Ethical Assessment of Emerging Technologies 
Moderatum Generalisations can be made about the future ethical implications of PHM (when 
it is seen as embedded in the social world) by identifying important features about its 
technological characteristics, contexts of use, and intended outcomes.  In preparing social 
responses to these features, ethics moves from a reactive to proactive practice, and may 
prevent ethical harm in the process.  Concerning ethical decision-making, cultural consistency 
is not the same as ‘common morality’ (cf. Beauchamp & Childress 2009); within a culture, 
individuals are free to have unique, equally legitimate experiences and interpretations, and to 
assign different value and specifications to normative concepts and issues.  For example, while 
individuals may share a concern for privacy, the content and relative value of the concept will 
vary.  Still, across the specifications of privacy a shared foundation must exist (or be assumed 
to exist) for individuals to understand each other in social interactions. 
It would appear that making legitimate generalisations, transferrable to other contexts with 
supporting arguments, in hermeneutic research assessing ethical implications of an emerging 
technology requires understanding the interpretations and experiences of participants, as well 
as the normative cultural consistency which makes possible social interactions.  While 
statistical probability is not attached to the generalisations, they provide a set of 
characteristics to which future instances of the phenomenon and context under study can be 
compared.  If similarities are found, conclusions matching or derived from the shared 
characteristics can be transferred and re-assessed in the new context.  As with Statistical 
Generalisations, Moderatum Generalisations do not say that the generalisations are absolutely 
true or will occur with any certainty; rather, they provide empirically grounded reasons for 
interpreting instances of a phenomenon in the theoretical framework established by the 
original study.  In this case, the generalisations made regard the identification and 
interpretation of ethical implications in potential future uses of PHM. 
6.3.4 Generalisations and Credibility 
This account of qualitative generalisation speaks to the implications of combining theoretical 
and empirical data in the construction of a conceptual framework for PHM.  The qualified 
generalisability of claims made in the empirical study ensures that refinement of the 
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conceptual framework on the basis of empirical findings is justified, and does not limit the 
applicability of the framework only to the participants or context studied here.  Assuming the 
methodology and outcomes of the study are judged credible, the combination of empirical and 
theoretical data for the construction of an ethical conceptual framework for PHM is 
methodologically sound. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The choice to engage in hermeneutic dialogue with potential users of PHM is intended to 
explore the ethical implications of PHM for medical and personal relationships.  Hermeneutics 
enables the researcher to critically assess the unique perspectives and prior knowledge of 
individuals resulting from their experiences with practices relevant to PHM, such as chronic 
illness management or caring for a dependent family member or friend.  The assumption of 
this approach is that the experience of having (or caring for someone with) a chronic medical 
condition informs the moral beliefs of practitioners when considering adoption of emerging 
medical technologies in the future—in this sense the ‘experience of disease’ or ‘experience of 
caring’ are the practices in which practitioners are engaged.  This assumption is justified 
according to hermeneutics, with its implications for the credibility of participant claims in 
ethical discourse explored below (see: Section 7.2.1).  By engaging with the researcher in 
dialogue and reflecting on future use of PHM in their lives, these practitioners provide 
perspectives against which the conceptual framework may be applied and refined.  Besides 
assisting in ‘theory building’ in this regard, the outcomes of the empirical study can be seen as 
qualified generalisations transferable to similar contexts and phenomena. 
The empirical methodology detailed in this chapter can be seen as responding to some of the 
requirements posed in research question 4 (see: Section 5.6).  At this point the methodology 
demonstrates how the moral beliefs of potential users of PHM can be captured through 
dialogue; however, the methodology does not yet explain how these beliefs can be considered 
in ethical analysis, or how the uncertainty of the future affects the credibility of the empirical 
data.   
To address these requirements, it is necessary to consider the methodology within a recent 
movement in ethics advocating the combination of ethical theory and empirical research in 
ethical analysis.  For empirical research into potential futures, this combination raises 
important questions related to the epistemic status of normative claims made under 
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conditions of uncertainty, and the importance they should play in understanding and 
responding to predicted ethical implications.  For uncertain claims gathered and assessed 
through empirical research to be used as a ‘test’ of the conceptual framework’s explanatory 
power and limitations, and to refine the framework against them, the epistemic status of 
uncertain claims relative to claims about existing practices must be clarified prior to 
application of the framework.  Failing to explain the relative epistemic status of uncertain 
normative claims to this extent would mean that the application of empirical data to the 
conceptual framework could not justify the framework as a credible way to explain, or ‘make 
sense’ of, the various ethical implications of PHM (see: Chapter 3).  Such an account, which 
expands the methodology developed here to respond fully to the requirements of research 
question 4, is detailed in the next chapter. 
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7 Chapter 7: The Problem of Uncertainty in Ethics of Emerging 
Technologies 
7.1 Introduction 
Ethical assessment can be seen as the basis of moral decision-making when attempting to find 
a solution or ‘right’ action for a particular case (see: Section 3.1.1).  However, ethical 
assessment also provides a basis for the development of theoretical understanding of a 
phenomenon, such as an emerging technology.  It is this latter aspect of ethical assessment 
which is pursued in this project.  To justify the refinement of the framework on the basis of 
empirical data uncertain normative claims encountered in the study need only be shown to be 
initially credible, or morally justified to some degree, to be used for this purpose.  Particular 
claims need not be endorsed as ‘correct’ in terms of moral decision-making because a 
particular case does not require resolution.  In other words, it must be shown that moral 
beliefs about potential futures possess some sort of value to be taken seriously in ethical 
discourse, thereby justifying the empirical study’s role in exploring and refining the conceptual 
framework.  The necessity of resolving this problem is not limited to the current study; any 
attempt to ethically assess emerging technologies, or to prescribe proactive actions intended 
to address potential ethical problems based on predictions about the future, implicitly requires 
that uncertain normative claims be seen as at least initially credible or plausible justification 
for action. 
The initial credibility of uncertain normative claims meeting certain conditions in ethical 
discourse is defended below.  The defence requires two distinct components; one relating to 
the plausibility of connecting theoretical and empirical approaches to ethical assessment 
requires exploration, and the other to the epistemic problems caused by uncertainty.  Without 
credible arguments for each the attempt to build and refine a conceptual framework based on 
a combination of theoretical insights and (un)certain empirical data cannot be 
epistemologically and methodologically justified. 
7.2 The Integration of Empirical Data and Theory in Ethical Analysis   
In recent years the combination of theoretical and empirical insights in ethical analysis has 
been advocated in applied ethics.  This movement, called ‘empirical ethics’, needs to be 
understood as a mindset towards ethics, not a method for doing ethics.  As a recent 
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development in the field of applied ethics it does not yet possess a standard methodology (Ives 
& Draper 2009; Hurst 2010; Dunn et al. 2012), although methodological unity is not necessary 
to argue for the inherent compatibility of theoretical and empirical approaches to ethical 
analysis.  
Historically, empirical data has had a supportive yet detached relationship with ethics.  Social 
scientists and ethicists have often worked separately on a project, with the former responsible 
for gathering empirical data and the latter responsible for analysis and drawing normative 
conclusions (Molewijk et al. 2003, p.71). This division of work stems from the fact-value gap 
(Hare 1952; Hume 1978), according to which the descriptive world remains the domain of 
scientists, while the normative world is the domain of ethicists (Molewijk et al. 2003, p.71).  
Under such a separation ethicists have been limited to using descriptive empirical data to (1) 
apply ethical theory in the context of a policy or action (Molewijk et al. 2003, p.71; McMillan 
2008, pp.17–18), or (2) to assess the validity of empirical assumptions upon which moral 
theories are based (Leget et al. 2009; De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.195), or (3) to gain insight into 
social practices for the identification of relevant cases and stakeholders in ethical deliberation 
(van Hooren et al. 2008, p.168).  Each of these examples upholds the epistemological 
distinction between description and prescription.  Facts and values still therefore fulfil very 
distinct and separate roles in the research; in these examples, researchers do not collect 
empirical data to identify or refine moral norms.  In this sense the theory is not changed 
through the process of empirical research, but rather made relevant to a specific context.  In 
these examples empirical data does not tell us how to understand and apply ethical theory in a 
context, but rather identifies when, where and to whom it can be applied.   
In contrast to the above examples, in recent years these methods of research have been 
challenged through the combination of empirical (typically social scientific) research with 
ethical analysis (Musschenga 2005, p.468; Hoffmaster & Hooker 2009; De Vries & Gordijn 
2009, p.193; Dunn et al. 2012).  This movement, called ‘empirical ethics’, has arisen from the 
recognition that empirical data can be usefully employed in ethical analysis to build and 
translate ethical theory into “middle-range principles”, refine ethically questionable practices 
and reach contextually-sensitive normative conclusions for practical purposes including policy 
guidance (Birnbacher 1999, p.321; Musschenga 2005, p.469; Hoffmaster & Hooker 2009; Leget 
et al. 2009).  Dialogue with individuals involved in a practice can lead to a need to refine the 
theory, as the application of theory to practical issues reveals its strengths and limitations 
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(Widdershoven 2005, p.72).  Alternatively, theory can reveal how mid-level principles are 
“differentiated, modified or contradicted by the lived experience of the persons concerned” 
(Casterlé et al. 2011, p.240), and translated into practice-internal norms of good conduct (see: 
Section 4.3.1.1).67  Such approaches ensures ethical theory, principles and norms are specified, 
or given meaning, within individual contexts and practices, while remaining open to revision or 
specification based on practice-internal experiences.68   
This ‘empirical turn’ in applied ethics is perhaps unsurprising when considering the prevalence 
of philosophical paradigms and ethical theories which implicitly support the integration of 
empirical data (e.g. information derived from moral wisdom or practice) in ethics.  Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics (see: Section 6.1.3) and its derivations assert the importance of ethics starting 
from the moral experiences of individuals confronting existing moral problems (Gadamer 
2004; Musschenga 2005, p.485; Widdershoven & van der Scheer 2008), which is related to the 
virtue of phronesis as a source of legitimate normative claims (Widdershoven & van der Scheer 
2008; van Thiel & van Delden 2010) (see: Section 4.3.1).  Integration is intended to ensure 
ethics is informed in some way by the social world as experienced by practitioners, whether to 
ensure that problems of practical importance are addressed or to treat practice as a source of 
morality (cf. MacIntyre 2007; Leget et al. 2009). 
Empirical ethics is best understood as a mindset guiding the use of empirical data in ethical 
analysis. Proponents are far from unified in terms of philosophical background and 
methodology, yet they tend to share three basic assumptions: (1) studying the moral beliefs of 
individuals in a practice yields meaningful information that should be a starting point for ethics 
(Borry et al. 2004, pp.39–40; Baldwin 2008, p.109; De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.193; Dunn et al. 
2012, p.471); (2) descriptive and normative approaches are inherently complementary; and (3) 
empirical ethics cannot rely on context alone for its determination of morality, but must 
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 Mid-level principles refers to principles such as those found in Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp 
& Childress 2009), in which four principles concerning respect for autonomy, beneficence, justice and 
nonmaleficence are balanced to reach ethical decisions.  They are defined in contrast to top-level 
principles in which one proceeds from a single theoretical premise (such as the utilitarian focus on pain 
vs. pleasure) to a conclusion. 
68
 For example, ethical principles may require specification when principles and practice-internal norms 
of good conduct, conflict.  Specification requires qualifying or otherwise reducing the scope of 
application or prescription of the principle to solve the conflict.  Rather than adding exceptions or 
reducing the content of the rule, the specification should reveal how the principle applies in a specific 
case.  The specification is thus “the same as the initial principle,” only with “clauses about the scope of 
the norm or the nature of the act or end enjoined or proscribed” added to it (Richardson 1990, p.292; 
Verweij 1998, p.36). 
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incorporate both empirical data and normative theory to avoid moral relativism (Borry et al. 
2004, pp.39–40; De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.193; Dunn et al. 2012, p.469).  The incorporation 
of empirical data, normative theory and contextual information in ethical analysis defines the 
empirical ethics mindset (De Vries & van Leeuwen 2010; Dunn et al. 2012).   
The majority of approaches to empirical ethics have been designed to solve practical moral 
problems or provide insight into a particular instance of a phenomenon, for example through 
dialogue with practitioners and stakeholders (e.g. Molewijk et al. 2004; Goldenberg 2005; 
Widdershoven & van der Scheer 2008; Ives & Draper 2009; Kon 2009; Leget et al. 2009; 
Widdershoven, Abma, et al. 2009; Hurst 2010; van Thiel & van Delden 2010).  These 
approaches focus on stakeholders coming to understand and consider each other’s 
perspectives in reaching pragmatic solutions.  PHM is not yet this kind of practice—it is not yet 
a diffuse technology with well understood ethical consequences (see: Section 3.3.6).  The goal 
of the research project is to fill this gap by viewing PHM as an emerging practice around which 
a conceptual ethical framework can be built to assist in future context-specific ethical analysis.  
Thus, the project does not seek to ‘fix’ an existing moral practice, but to develop insight into a 
future moral practice before problems occur.  The creation and application of a conceptual 
framework built from ethical theory and a discourse involving empirical research (see: Chapter 
3) can, however, be considered a form of empirical ethics when supported by empirical 
research to apply and refine the framework.  In this sense empirical ethics can both apply 
theory to a particular practice, or gain insights from a practice to build or refine theory. 
7.2.1 Moral Wisdom, Practices and Practitioners 
Using empirical research to generate legitimate normative claims implies that empirical 
ethicists attribute value to the moral beliefs of individuals involved in practices (or “moral 
practitioners”), because the practice provides them with unique “moral experiences” 
(Musschenga 2005; Abma et al. 2010, p.244).  If justificatory power for moral decision-making 
can be attached to the experiences of individuals with particular ‘moral experiences’ in the 
form of ‘moral wisdom’, then the refinement of the conceptual framework based on their 
perspectives has initial credibility. 
Moral wisdom is a product of ‘moral experiences’ from the lives of individuals involved in a 
practice (Widdershoven, Abma, et al. 2009; Abma et al. 2010).  During such experiences 
decisions are made and justified between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ actions.  Moral experiences are 
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those which contribute to a person’s understanding of right and wrong, or the good life, or the 
internal norms which govern the morality of a practice.  Moral experiences are practice-
specific; however, experiences occurring outside specific practices affect the development of 
the moral beliefs of practitioners towards those practices.  Moral experiences are “formative,” 
in the sense that moral wisdom develops over time as moral experiences occur, implying that 
participation in a moral practice will directly contribute to the development (or perhaps more 
accurately, refinement) of a person’s moral compass (DePaul 1993, pp.145–6). 
Normative claims are, therefore, a product not only of rationality and reason, but of moral 
experiences, wisdom, and other aspects of human experience which constrain interpretation.  
To understand this statement, it is necessary to recall that interpretation is filtered through 
prejudices.  Moral experiences, which require interpretation of an unfamiliar or imperfectly 
understood situation, are therefore framed by the prejudices of the practitioner, and 
contribute to understanding a phenomenon or the ends of a practice (e.g. Section 4.3.2).  
Normative claims influenced by moral experiences are likewise framed, becoming part of the 
practitioner’s prejudices which frame future moral judgment.  According to this, moral 
experiences play an important epistemic role in justifying specific normative claims (Audi 1998, 
p.363), as they form the “basis of knowledge or justified belief regarding one’s moral 
obligations” (De Vries & van Leeuwen 2010, p.493), thereby giving the normative claims of 
practitioners about the practice(s) in which they are involved, or through which moral wisdom 
has been gained, initial credibility.69 
As the source of initial credibility of normative claims, moral wisdom is related to phronesis, or 
practical wisdom gained from lived experiences and social interaction which teaches 
individuals to identify the morally relevant aspects of a situation (Widdershoven & van der 
Scheer 2008, p.31).  Wisdom enables individuals to choose between different courses of 
action, identifying the course of action which most closely resembles an ethical ideal or the 
‘good life’ (Abma et al. 2010).  Moral wisdom is derived from and unique to practices, meaning 
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 An epistemological defence of moral experiences and moral wisdom providing initial credibility in 
moral justification to the normative claims of moral practitioners is offered in Appendix 9.  The 
explanation of the initial credibility of such claims offered here may be vulnerable to criticisms of 
‘intuitionist’ approaches to moral justification.  With that said, the approach used here is not intuitionist 
because normative claims are only granted initial credibility for the purposes of building the conceptual 
framework and testing its explanatory power.  To be used in deciding the correct course of action in a 




individuals involved in practice X will have moral experience Y which is unique to practice X 
and cannot be experienced outside of it.  As a result, practitioners have unique moral beliefs 
informed by their practice which they can contribute in dialogue—their moral experiences 
have taught them to discern the morally relevant aspects of their practice (Widdershoven, 
Molewijk, et al. 2009, p.99).  It follows that ethical analysis can treat the moral beliefs of 
practitioners as an initially credible source of moral justification, assuming the beliefs are 
based on practical moral experience.  This is not to say that the actions recommended by 
practitioners are inherently justified, but rather that their experiences provide a reason to 
initially take their claims seriously regarding the moral acceptability of a practice or choice of 
action. 
This attribution of credibility to the statements of practitioners is coherent with (but not 
limited to) hermeneutics (Widdershoven & van der Scheer 2008; Mingers & Walsham 2010) 
because practitioners possess unique shared experiences or consistency across their 
preconceptions.  Consistency is a product of the experiences unique to a practice.  The 
background (or prejudices) of practitioners will therefore lead to unique insights about the 
morality of their practice and related phenomena.  Accordingly, empirical ethics affirms that 
credible normative empirical data can be collected, challenged and refined by engaging with 
moral practitioners. 
7.2.2 Practices and Empirical Ethics 
To distinguish empirical ethics as a new approach to ethical analysis in which theory and 
insights from practice are seen as inherently complementary and open to revision, it is not 
enough to classify research merely linking empirical research with philosophical ethical 
analysis as empirical ethics (cf. McMillan 2008; De Vries & Gordijn 2009). Rather, to make the 
distinction meaningful the defining feature of empirical ethics must be the constant, often 
iterative relationship between empirical data and ethical analysis.70  The relationship plays this 
central role because it collapses the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive 
statements in practice, also referred to in meta-ethics as the fact-value gap (De Vries & Gordijn 
2009).  A basic assumption of the iterative relationship is that descriptive and prescriptive 
approaches are complementary, meaning it is possible to gather empirical data with normative 
content.  Taking this assumption one step further, the distinction between description and 
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 Implications for this distinction in defining the empirical ethics mindset compared to current practice 
are reviewed in Appendix 8. 
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prescription may disappear in the data and subsequent analysis, thereby collapsing the 
traditional division of labour between scientists and ethicists in social research. 
7.2.3 Alleged Meta-Ethical Fallacies of Empirical Ethics 
The classification of empirical ethics as an iterative relationship between empirical data and 
ethical theory suggests that description and prescription may not only be complementary, but 
cease to exist as a distinction in empirical ethics studies.  Critics of empirical ethics are quick to 
point out two meta-ethical problems facing empirical ethics posed by this potential collapse: 
the is-ought problem and the fact-value distinction (McMillan 2008; De Vries & Gordijn 2009, 
p.196).71  Initial appearances suggest that empirical ethics derives normative conclusions from 
descriptive premises, meaning “empirical ethics would disregard the is-ought gap...and/or 
violate the fact-value distinction” (De Vries & Gordijn 2009) at the cost of its credibility.  These 
‘meta-ethical fallacies’ are the most common arguments against the use of empirical ethics. 
7.2.3.1 Is-Ought Problem 
The is-ought problem (or ‘Hume’s Law’), originally identified by David Hume in A Treatise of 
Human Nature (De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.196), is often used interchangeably with the fact-
value distinction.  In practice, the two are closely related.  According to Hume, the is-ought 
problem is a logical fallacy which occurs when inferring normative conclusions from facts alone 
(Hume 1978).  As a logical principle, the is-ought problem asserts that any amount of 
descriptive information, or a description of what is, can never by itself be used to infer how 
things ought to be (Hume 1978).72  In other words, “moral judgments cannot be deduced from 
statements of fact, not because the former are moral and the latter nonmoral, but because the 
former are evaluative and the latter are descriptive” (De Vries & Gordijn 2009).   
While the truth of this position in statements about social realities with implicit normative 
claims is questionable (cf. Searle 1964), it can nonetheless be avoided in practice through the 
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 A third fallacy, the naturalistic fallacy, is mentioned by De Vries and Gordijn but its relevancy to 
empirical ethics is quickly (and correctly) dismissed.  The naturalistic fallacy is not committed in 
empirical ethics as long as normative conclusions are not derived from uncritical moral beliefs of 
practitioners.  In other words, the beliefs of practitioners are not taken at face value—it is the reasoning 
supporting beliefs and practices, subjected to scrutiny and refinement via dialogue and moral 
experiences, which is seen as a legitimate source of morality. As long as the moral beliefs of 
practitioners are not granted foundational legitimacy as the sole source of morality, as is the case in this 
project, the naturalistic fallacy is not commited.  For a fuller discussion of the naturalistic fallacy see: (De 
Vries & Gordijn 2009). 
72
 The ‘is-ought’ problem is related to the ‘ought-can’ position, by which the prescription of a moral 
obligation to act in a certain way is only defensible if an actor can logically perform the prescribed act.  
For more on this, see: (Kant 2003). 
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combination of descriptive empirical data and normative premises.  The fallacy only exists if 
normative conclusions are drawn from descriptive statements alone, yet Hume’s account does 
not preclude the addition of an argument to the description, which leads to a normative 
conclusion (McMillan 2008, p.15).  In the empirical component of the research project, 
normative premises, concepts and theories were offered in the interview by the researcher 
and (occasionally) the participant to clarify and refine normative claims and descriptions of the 
practice (see: Section 8.5.1). 
While the is-ought principle is avoided in practice in this project, it is also rejected in principle. 
Acceptance of Hume’s Law is dependent upon certain axioms of normative ontology, chief of 
which is that ‘descriptions’ cannot contain normative content.  If normative descriptions exist, 
then it stands to reason that prescriptive statements can be deduced directly from them.  
Empirical ethics suggests that normative descriptions exist in the form of empirical data with 
normative content (see: Section 7.2.1).  Beyond this, the is-ought problem is incomprehensible 
from a teleological approach to ethics; virtues are defined against social roles and practices 
with preconceived ends or a telos.  It is therefore possible to evaluate something by making a 
descriptive statement; to use a famous example, it can be validly inferred from “He is a sea-
captain” that “He ought to do whatever a sea-captain ought to do”; in fulfilling this social role, 
the man accepts a normative responsibility to act well in achieving the ends expected of him as 
a sea captain (MacIntyre 2007, p.57).  Therefore, describing the man as a sea-captain is a 
description which also contains normative content—no further appeal is necessary to 
principles or duties which the captain may have violated to evaluate his behaviour.  
Evaluations of persons or objects which can be defined by a functional concept can therefore 
move from descriptive (‘is’) premises to normative (‘ought’) conclusions without appealing to 
further normative premises.  The fact that the object, or person, can be described in terms of 
its functions, or social role, means it is more or less ‘good’ according to how well it fulfils that 
role, understood as its telos (MacIntyre 2007, p.58).  From this perspective, the is-ought 
problem is seen as a relic of the confusion of the meaning and function of morality and its 
vocabulary which pervades moral discourse in recent centuries (MacIntyre 2007), and not as a 
valid logical fallacy in moral reasoning. 
7.2.3.2 Fact-Value Gap 
Despite the rejection of the is-ought problem in principle, it is important to also consider the 
meta-ethical implications of a mere avoidance of the problem in practice in case the principled 
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stance of the researcher is not accepted by the reader.  While the practical avoidance of the is-
ought problem is logically sound, it suggests that the fact-value gap is legitimate.  The fact-
value gap refers to the belief that the descriptive and normative content of empirical data, or 
descriptive science and ethics, can be cleanly separated into descriptive and normative parts 
(McMillan 2008, p.14).  Fortunately, the fact-value gap is best thought of as a meta-ethical 
position rather than a logical fallacy, which reduces the importance of taking a conclusive 
stance on the gap.73  Two versions of the gap exist: (1) that “no statement or concept is 
irreducibly” both descriptive and normative, or (2) that facts do not presuppose values, 
meaning science is value-free (De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.198).  The first version is best seen in 
“thick ethical concepts” and virtues, for example the terms “cruel” or “honourable” (De Vries 
& Gordijn 2009, p.198).  Proponents of the gap hold that “cruel” has both descriptive and 
normative components which can be separated cleanly, meaning the concept “cruel” is used in 
two distinct ways (Leget et al. 2009; De Vries & Gordijn 2009).  However, critics suggest that 
because cruelty has both descriptive and normative aspects, and because these aspects can be 
combined in a single concept, it must be irreducibly both descriptive and normative (De Vries 
& Gordijn 2009, p.198). 
7.2.3.2.1 Criticisms of the First Version of the Fact-Value Gap 
Critical of the first version of the fact-value gap, some empirical ethicists assert that empirical 
research can produce data that is inherently descriptive and normative (Molewijk et al. 2004; 
McMillan 2008, p.15), meaning the distinction between fact and value or descriptive and 
normative collapses within empirical research.  An example of this type of data is the moral 
beliefs of practitioners which are based on interpretation of social processes and events, such 
as that collected in the empirical study (see: Chapter 9).  In this type of data it is not clear 
where the line between descriptive and normative lies, as the interpretive process of 
developing understanding does not involve a clean separation of these two elements; nor is it 
clear why an attempt should be made to separate these elements at all in data with normative 
content.  Understanding is developed through dialogue, in which normative claims, values and 
principles are critically examined to reach a fusion of horizons.  Taken as a form of ethical 
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 It should be noted that the position one takes on the gap has implications for the legitimacy of the is-
ought problem—if irreducibly complex concepts exist which are simultaneously descriptive and 
prescriptive, as is suggested by theories of virtue (e.g. (Darwall 2003; MacIntyre 2007), the is-ought 
problem would not apply to such concepts (see: Section 4.3.1).  The classification of normative empirical 




analysis, it is unclear how the normative and descriptive aspects of the outcomes of dialogue 
(in this case, normative claims about future uses of PHM) could possibly be separated. If the 
first version of the distinction collapses, the is-ought problem is nullified because normative 
conclusions are not reached from descriptive statements alone; rather, the data being used to 
reach normative conclusions has inseparable descriptive and normative elements.   
Attempts to maintain the legitimacy of the is-ought problem by separating physical sciences 
from social sciences are revealing in terms of the importance of resolving the fact-value gap for 
empirical ethics.  One such attempt (Mackie 1980) which separates social reality from the 
external “objective” reality or structure upheld by scientific disciplines, claims that “social facts 
and human purposes are...implicitly normative” (De Vries & Gordijn 2009).  Seen as a meta-
ethical issues rather than a logical fallacy, it is unclear why empirical ethics needs to have a 
unified stance on the issue (De Vries & Gordijn 2009).  Meta-ethics operates at the level of 
theory, yet empirical ethicists need only show that description and prescription are 
intertwined in practice to justify the iterative integration of empirical data and ethical theory in 
ethical analysis.  Thick ethical concepts such as ‘cruel’ (MacIntyre 2007), virtues and empirical 
data with normative content all provide proof of this entanglement. 
7.2.3.2.2 Criticisms of the Second Version of the Fact-Value Gap 
The second version of the gap upholds the ideal of objectivity in the sense that scientific 
enquiry can lead to data and conclusions that are free from values.  However, a critic of this 
version would argue that science is bound by its own values, in the sense that it relies on 
standards such as falsification to ground truth claims (cf. Popper 1959; Popper 2002).  Critics 
can also assert that empirical data with normative content has a legitimate place in (social) 
science.  Both of these versions of the fact-value gap are meta-ethical views rather than logical 
fallacies.   
In recent years the assertion that science is value-free has been increasingly challenged by 
ethicists calling for new study designs and methods of data analysis in which empirical data is 
recognised as (implicitly) normative (Molewijk et al. 2003; Goldenberg 2005; Ives & Draper 
2009; Kon 2009).  Descriptive science claims to be value-free, yet the same cannot be said for 
social scientific data dealing with normative claims and moral beliefs, which is reliant upon 
interpretation framed by prejudices.  Indeed, the elimination of interpretive bias sought in the 
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positivistic paradigm is seen as an inappropriate and hopelessly flawed ideal in hermeneutics 
research (see: Chapter 3; Schwandt 2000).   
While the fact-value gap lies at the centre of an interesting meta-ethical debate, its resolution 
does not impact on the justification of empirical ethics and hence the research project, which 
is concerned with empirical data concerning social practices, normative claims and beliefs.  
Regardless of the meta-ethical position taken towards the fact-value gap in principle, the 
collapse of the gap in practice suggests that the separation into descriptive and normative 
parts in ethical analysis is unreasonable, overly atomistic and perhaps impossible (MacIntyre 
2007; McMillan 2008, p.16).74  Recognition of the entanglement of facts and values in 
hermeneutic dialogue is enough to justify the integrative approach taken to ethical analysis as 
well as application and revision of the conceptual framework.  
7.2.4 Empirical Ethics and Uncertainty 
Identifying the applicability of alleged meta-ethical fallacies to empirical ethics is important to 
justify the role given to the claims of moral practitioners in applying and refining the 
conceptual framework developed above (see: Chapter 4).  While these fallacies cannot be 
conclusively disproved, arguments have been offered to show that the claims of moral 
practitioners possess initial credibility or justificatory power in moral decision-making, upon 
which theory can be built.  The beliefs of practitioners can be treated in many ways in ethical 
analysis—as a legitimate source of morality, contextual information, specification of 
theoretical concepts, or evidence of the relative importance of ethical concepts—but their 
value is beyond question in empirical ethics.  However, as the claims are uncertain in the sense 
that they describe potential futures, their initial credibility cannot be equated to that of claims 
describing existing practices or the correct course of action in an existing case (cf. Tannert et 
al. 2007; Brey 2011).  In short, it is not yet clear how normative empirical data can contribute 
to truth claims about the future.  It is therefore necessary to explore the problems caused by 
uncertainty for ethical assessment of emerging technologies which incorporates the views of 
stakeholders potentially affected by the technology into assessment. 
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 Examples of research undertaken under the moniker of empirical ethics which demonstrate the 
unavoidable collapse of description and prescription are reviewed in Appendix 10. 
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7.3 Uncertainty and the Ethics of Emerging Technologies75 
It has long been established that technologies can cause ethical problems (Dusek 2006).  There 
is broad agreement that an early recognition of these issues may provide avenues to address 
them through anticipatory governance and design.  A core issue is that a tension exists 
between the empirical and the normative dimension of dealing with future and emerging 
technologies.  This is the heart of the Collingridge (1980) dilemma which states that it is 
impossible to know the consequences of an emerging technology at an early stage when it 
would be comparatively simple to change the technology’s trajectory.  Once the technology is 
more established and it becomes clearer what its social and ethical consequences are going to 
be, it becomes increasingly difficult to affect its outcomes and social context.  PHM can be said 
to exist at a middle stage in the terms of the Collingridge dilemma—the characteristics and 
intended uses of the technology (in England) are understood, but it is not yet widely used.  
Despite the fundamental problems posed by the Collingridge dilemma, there continue to be 
attempts to better understand future technologies and to predict the ethical issues they are 
likely to raise with a view to addressing them early through anticipatory policy, regulations and 
design, all of which are aided by early development of concepts and theories which explain the 
potential implications of the technology. 
There exists a rich history of attempts to develop epistemologically robust ways of 
understanding how emerging technologies will affect the future, for example in future studies 
or technology foresight (Cuhls 2003; Georghiu 2008).  Such approaches often attempt to 
provide an empirical basis for policy makers due to a growing demand for evidence-based 
policy (Banks 2009).  Despite this rich field of research, there is still no agreement on some of 
the conceptual underpinnings and the question of how our understanding of possible futures 
can or should be translated into theoretical insights or practical activities that will allow for the 
desirable shaping of future technologies. 
At the heart of the conceptual disagreement is a common epistemological problem: 
predictions and anticipatory action are based on normative evidence with problematic 
epistemic status.  This section seeks to address this problem from a Habermasian perspective 
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 Key ideas and wording of this section are taken from a forthcoming collaborative research paper on 
the epistemic value of normative claims about the ethics of emerging technologies under conditions of 
uncertainty.  Bernd Stahl and Ben Fairweather of the Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility at 
De Montfort University are co-authors of the paper.  The paper is currently under review for publication 
by Science, Technology & Human Values. 
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by arguing that researchers can base reasonable validity claims on the basis of normative 
empirical research on the ethics of emerging technologies while uncertainty still prevails, by 
treating claims about potential futures arising from empirical work in the same way as other 
contentious validity claims.  Habermas’ recent work on religion in public discourses is used to 
argue that normative claims about the future might count in a similar way to religious claims.  
This allows the incorporation of uncertain normative claims into ethical analysis of emerging 
technologies. 
The importance of the epistemic value of uncertain normative claims lies in the reliance of 
anticipatory action on moral justification.  To be justifiable, anticipatory decisions require a 
legitimate source of morality, as determined by the relationship between current and ideal 
practice, or facts and norms.  Conceptualising the appropriate interaction between facts and 
norms is a core problem of ethics and by no means novel.  According to the empirical ethics 
mindset, the introduction of normative empirical data into ethical analysis is appropriate.  
While empirical ethics has contributed to this debate within research into current practices, it 
has not yet turned its attention to the unique epistemic challenges presented by future 
practices or emerging technologies.  If empirical ethics is to be adapted to provide ‘evidence’ 
or a legitimate source of moral justification for theory building and anticipatory actions, the 
epistemic value of its uncertain normative claims must be made explicit. 
7.3.1 Methods of Emerging Technology Assessment 
To understand the problems caused by uncertainty, it is illuminating to consider how 
anticipatory governance actions to prevent ethical issues for emerging technologies are 
prescribed in support of normative empirical data of questionable credibility.  Even though 
improvements to governance are not sought in this project, the challenges faced in these 
approaches help explain the challenges of uncertainty.  These challenges are identical to those 
faced in justifying the refinement of the conceptual framework on the basis of normative 
empirical data of uncertain credibility.  Of the approaches prevalent in recent decades, the 
Precautionary Principle and Technology Assessment are perhaps the best known.  In 
understanding the challenges, it is important to note the difference between uncertainty and 




With uncertainty the probabilities of possible outcomes are unknown, whereas with risk “the 
probability distribution…is known or predictable” (Ahmed & Skogh 2006).  In looking at 
technologies still under development, researchers are often faced with uncertainties for which 
even the minimal data required for the maths of imprecise probability is unavailable (Tannert 
et al. 2007).  With this said, the paradigmatic case considered here (PHM) is a technology that 
is sufficiently developed for meaningful discourse to be possible about the nature of the 
technology and its initial uses, but where there is still uncertainty about its future implications.  
Under this type of uncertainty regarding future technologies, one can ask on which grounds 
theoretical and practical decisions can be made and justified, or how uncertain normative 
claims can be treated as credible. 
Uncertainty exists regarding the future consequences of emerging technologies because, in 
opposition to ‘technological determinism’, technologies are not fixed entities with 
predetermined outcomes (Stahl 2011b, p.97).  Rather, the effects of a technology within a 
given context are as dependent upon the actors and features of the context, as on the 
characteristics of the technology itself (e.g. Sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.4).  In this setting, 
uncertainty is a product of the interactions between complex systems (society and emerging 
ICTs) with nonlinear behaviour, which precludes prediction of outcomes through 
“deterministic reasoning and/or research” (Tannert et al. 2007, p.893).  This implies that 
descriptions of the future must be seen as predictions lacking certainty, although methods are 
required to separate credible predictions from wild fantasy. 
7.3.1.2 Technology Foresight 
One such method is technology foresight (Cuhls 2003).  Ethical assessment of emerging 
technologies requires a way of sorting predicted technologies from emerging ones, or those 
which are merely imagined from those that will likely be developed in the future.  Although 
“no absolute truth claims about the future are possible,” more or less credible predictions of 
possible futures can still be made.  To make credible predictions, foresight research abandons 
a deterministic view of a single possible future, focusing instead on the different pathways the 
future may take based upon actions in the present (Stahl 2011d, p.63).  Desirable futures can 
be separated from undesirable ones, while identifying recommendations for how to bring 
about the former.  Short of predicting possible futures with certainty, foresight research is 
seen to provide the following basis for assessment of emerging technologies: 
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• “To enlarge the choice of opportunities, to set priorities, and to assess impacts and 
chances 
• To prospect for the impacts of current research and technology policy 
• To ascertain new needs, new demands, and new possibilities as well as new ideas 
• To focus selectively on economic, technological, social, and ecological areas as well 
as to start monitoring and detailed research in these fields 
• To define desirable and undesirable futures 
• To start and stimulate continuous discussion processes” (Stahl 2011d, p.63). 
While not a methodology of ethical assessment of emerging technologies as such, foresight 
research prescribes norms by which desirable future states may be identified, and creates 
empirically informed descriptions of possible futures as influenced by current decisions and 
actions (Cuhls 2003).  Foresight research therefore provides a foundation upon which ethical 
assessment may occur.  PHM-Ethics and ETICA (see: Chapter 1), conceived as examples of 
foresight research, along with the findings of the literature reviews (see: Chapters 2 and 3), 
provide a basis for this project by describing current technological developments and potential 
implications.  In other words, foresight research provides reliable descriptions of the future, so 
far as they are possible, so that anticipatory ethical assessment of emerging technologies may 
occur while uncertainty still prevails. 
7.3.1.3 Uncertain Normative Claims 
In the context of ethical assessment of emerging technologies, uncertain normative claims are 
contentious arguments which describe the appropriate response to future social and ethical 
impacts of emerging technologies, or what “should” be done in the future.  Normativity refers 
to any declaration with prescriptive or evaluative content, including statements of moral 
evaluation (such as “this technology is good”) or prescription (such as “one should do …”).  As 
the future is inherently uncertain76, the claims are not epistemologically equivalent with claims 
based upon existing social practices (cf. Widdershoven, Abma, et al. 2009) or empirically 
observable phenomena (cf. Popper 1959).77  If uncertain normative claims are to be employed 
in future-oriented ethical assessment, an alternative account of their epistemic value is 
required which acknowledges the inherent uncertainty of the future. 
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 For an explanation of how certainty is derived from validity rather than credibility, see Appendix 11. 
77
 How validity derives from scientific observation is contentious question.  Here, Popper’s critical 
rationalist position, in which all scientific knowledge is provisional and held up to the standard of 
falsification, is adopted.  Certainty, then, refers to the falsifiability of a scientific hypothesis or theory. 
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7.3.1.4 Evidence-based Decisions under Conditions of Uncertainty 
In the past, the difficulties of predicting the future (uncertainty) have been addressed through 
the creation of decision rules, which guide decision making in absence of reliable empirical or 
statistical data concerning risks and impacts.  A notable early decision rule was the ‘rule of 
insufficient reason’ (“Laplace rule”) otherwise known as the ‘principle of indifference’ – that 
when we are too unsure about the probability of possible outcomes “we should treat them as 
if they were equally likely” (Sinn 1980; Goodin 1983, pp.165–6).  This has been shown to be 
inappropriate in very many circumstances; subsequent research has advanced on decision 
rules at varying levels of uncertainty in a number of ways, resulting in a “vast literature” 
(Ahmed & Skogh 2006, p.184) including, for example the ‘diversification theorem’, which 
explains why it may be wise to spread investments over a number of assets when the returns 
are uncertain. 
The uptake in research reflects the ongoing debate about decision rules under conditions of 
uncertainty, largely provoked by debates about policies for new technologies, and especially 
environmental policies during the late 20th and early 21st centuries.  A clear understanding of 
the epistemic value of uncertain normative claims becomes necessary to distinguish between 
credible and fanciful uncertain claims about the potential ethical implications of emerging 
technologies, and in developing theoretical understanding and practical anticipatory actions in 
response.  Opponents of regulation have time and again argued for a position that has been 
characterised (Wagner 2003, p.77 n.60) as saying that regulation should not occur because 
there is “not enough science to justify protective regulation.”   
In response proponents of regulation no longer rely entirely on trying to provide scientific 
proof that will satisfy their opponents.  Sometimes this is because “standards for the requisite 
evidence are never articulated” (Wagner 2003, p.77 n.60) and thus never met to the 
satisfaction of opponents of regulation.  Even without scepticism towards the tactics of 
opponents of regulation, proponents may have realised that requiring scientific proof of 
harmful relationships to justify regulation is inappropriate.  There are two fundamental 
reasons for this.  The first is the epistemic status of science: scientific theories are, 
fundamentally, provisional (awaiting falsification) (Popper 1959), so conclusive evidence to 
justify regulation would forever remain out of reach.  The second is because of the 
conservatism of science: in identifying relationships science does not work on the basis of 
balance of probabilities, but rather seeks to “minimise ‘false positives’”, even though in doing 
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so its “procedures increase the chance of ‘false negatives’, that is, failing to assert that there is 
a relationship when there is a relationship” (John 2010, p.5).  Rather than always seeking to 
provide scientific proof that will satisfy opponents, proponents of (for example) environmental 
regulation have looked for arguments that regulation should begin before there is certainty 
about the harmful effects of the processes they want regulated; in other words, they seek 
anticipatory decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 
7.3.1.5 The Precautionary Principle 
Taking a leading position among these approaches is the Precautionary Principle (PP), which 
came to global prominence with the Rio Declaration of 1992 (UNCED 1992).  Although a 
common definition is lacking (Gardiner 2006, pp.34–5), the core content of the PP is found in 
the Wingspread Statement (Wingspread Statement 1998) about environmental impacts of 
human activity: 
“When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships 
are not fully established scientifically.” 
From its creation the PP has had a severely poor philosophical reputation (Gardiner 2006, p.33; 
Hughes 2006, pp.448–9, 463), although recent adaptations have sought to improve its 
standing.  The poor philosophical reputation comes largely from the “paradox of precaution” 
(Morris 2000; Tannert et al. 2007).  The “paradox of precaution” arises if the PP is interpreted 
as saying that we must avoid harm by eschewing risky, but potentially beneficial technologies.  
Under this interpretation harm arises since the benefits of adopting the technologies are 
foregone with “for example… lost opportunities to prevent disease and death”, resulting in a 
“precautionary principle [that] would instruct us to refrain from implementing itself” (Hughes 
2006, p.449).  Beyond this, even enthusiastic advocates have been willing to accept it is “ill-
defined and imperfectly translatable into codes of conduct” (Jordan & O’Riordan 1999, p.15).  
Recent works (cf. Gardiner 2006; Hourdequin 2007; John 2010) have produced more 
philosophically robust formulations, which may give valuable guides to action in certain 
circumstances.  Gardiner’s (2006, pp.47–8) work turns on criteria for the employment of the 
PP.  A key insight from Gardiner is that the PP applies in conditions of uncertainty, but not 
when ignorance exists of the range of outcomes over which there is probabilistic uncertainty.   
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Unfortunately, the PP lacks a mechanism for identifying and normatively assessing potential 
outcomes.  Such an “identification mechanism,” guided perhaps by normative empirical 
research, would help identify possible outcomes under conditions of uncertainty.  Approaches 
to the ethical assessment of emerging technologies, including PHM, require such a mechanism 
which involves cross-referencing “descriptions of the technology...with ethical values and 
principles” (Brey 2011).  Identification mechanisms therefore not only identify a list of possible 
ethical outcomes, but give normative content to these outcomes by locating them within 
existing ethical theories and concepts.  The interplay between facts and norms can be said to 
exist in this process which relies upon normative empirical data.  Without such a mechanism 
the PP is of little use in evidence-based policy making and the ethical assessment upon which it 
is based, if only because it fails to explain how decisions should be made, or how to relate 
uncertain facts and norms in ethical assessment. 
7.3.1.6 Technology Assessment 
Descriptive and prescriptive information relating to the potential outcomes of emerging 
technologies is required to use the PP in decision-making.  Such information can be gathered in 
empirical ethics research, in which normative claims are made about emerging technologies.  
Of the approaches capable of collecting, analysing and applying such information under 
conditions of uncertainty, TA is perhaps the most widely used.  TA is a field which studies and 
evaluates the interaction between new technologies and the environment, industry and 
society (Tran & Daim 2008).  Similarities are found with other plausible approaches for 
responding to emerging technologies including participative design (Mumford 2003), value-
sensitive design (Friedman et al. 2008) and other socio-technical approaches (Sandberg 
1985).78  Studies engaging in TA often work on “known or potential applications” of emerging 
technologies as well as future and technological forecasting studies (Cagnin et al. 2008; 
Georghiu 2008; Brey 2011).  Crucially, TA includes an “identification mechanism,” a normative 
interest in future technologies, and a range of empirical methods to pursue this interest. 
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 It is worth noting that participatory TA (pTA) (cf. Joss & Bellucci 2002) has been recognised as an 
appropriate research methodology to respond to the uncertainty of emerging technologies.  Briefly, the 
benefit of pTA is the involvement of stakeholders who will be affected by the emerging technology in 
the near future.  Stakeholder involvement moves from reactive to proactive ethical assessment by 
anticipating impacts of the emerging technology according to ‘local knowledge’ (Stahl 2011b, p.104), or 
the context-specific values and experiences which will shape the moral character of future contexts of 
use.  Local participation therefore improves both normative insights into the technology, and the 
practical acceptability of proposed regulations and solutions to predicted effects.  The combination of 




The field emerged in response to experiences of undesirable or unintentional side effects of 
emerging technologies (Grunwald 2009).  TA comprises a family of approaches that aim to 
combine empirical research on likely consequences of technologies with normative insights.  
Its various flavours, including participative TA (van Eijndhoven & van Est 2002; Joss & Bellucci 
2002) and constructive TA (Genus & Coles 2005), employ a broad array of methods which 
include participation from a variety of stakeholders, most notably laypersons as 
representatives of future users of the technologies in question.  
By anticipating and responding to the challenges presented by emerging technologies during 
the development and early deployment cycles, TA studies aim to guide the development and 
regulation of technology in more desirable directions (Brey 2011).  TA is united as a field by its 
emphasis on the production and evaluation of knowledge concerning social, economic and 
environmental impacts for the purpose of providing recommendations to steer the social 
response to emerging technologies. 
7.3.1.7 Problems of Normative Evaluation in TA and the PP 
TA studies often refer to the PP in making recommendations for social response to the 
uncertainties of emerging technologies (Grunwald 2009, p.1108).  This situation creates a 
problem for TA as most versions of the PP lack guidance on how to balance contradictory 
uncertain normative claims.  The reliance on such an ambiguous decision rule may be a 
conscious decision—the social response must surely be sensitive to the context in which the 
technology will be used, which will influence the relative value of normative claims.  Still, 
accepting this limitation of the PP ignores a common problem of any approach to the 
assessment of future technologies.  Even if normative assessments give importance to context 
(which they should), there must be evaluative criteria by which the relative value of (uncertain) 
normative claims are determined.  While these criteria may change according to context, 
culture, religion, ethical viewpoint and so on, the need for an evaluative mechanism does not 
go away.  Balancing competing claims without knowledge of their epistemic value is akin to 
judging the scientific merit of a controlled trial without an understanding of how controls 
contribute to the scientific method (cf. Popper 1959)—the key piece of knowledge for 
determining the relative value of uncertain normative claims, their epistemic status, is missing.   
This problem with ethical assessment of potential futures created by emerging technologies 
applies equally to the development of theoretical insights into the technology such as the 
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conceptual framework—a mechanism is needed to determine the relative credibility of 
normative explanations of the future, or those which say the future ‘should’ be a certain way 
based on an uncertain description of it.  Without such a mechanism, it is unclear how to 
separate more or less ‘right’ or credible empirical data in determining whether the conceptual 
framework helps explain the ethical implications of the future, and in identifying its limitations 
in doing so.  Practitioners make claims about their attitudes towards potential futures, which 
are fundamentally uncertain because they are based in unreliable descriptions of the future, 
and how they will react to it at a future time.  A mechanism is required to make sense of these 
two forms of uncertainty in such a way as to allow proactive theory building based on 
normative empirical data from anticipatory empirical research. 
7.3.1.8 The Importance of Epistemology in Anticipatory Action and Theory Building 
To return to the original problem identified in this section, emerging technologies such as PHM 
can raise ethical issues that ethicists, policy-makers, developers and civil society would like to 
address proactively.  Being situated in the future gives such technologies uncertain outcomes.  
Despite this, empirical research is still conducted to determine the possible outcomes and 
norms which should guide future uses, development and regulation of the technology.  
However, as a result of the uncertainty of the future, such normative empirical research 
requires a different type of truth claim compared with objectivist research in the natural 
sciences, which bases truth claims in validity measured in terms of falsifiability (Popper 1959).  
While decision principles such as the PP can give some indication of appropriate evaluative 
mechanisms, these only take effect once stakeholders in decision-making agree upon a shared 
view of facts and norms.  TA and related approaches set out to provide empirical input into 
such policy development and decision mechanisms.  However, the question of the 
epistemological evaluation of the outcomes of TA and similar empirical research remains open, 
which precludes a shared foundation of facts and norms on which normative evaluation may 
occur.  In terms of the conceptual framework for PHM built here (see: Chapter 4), this problem 
means that the results of the empirical study cannot and should not be considered in refining 
the conceptual framework until their relative epistemic value is understood.  In the following 
section it is suggested that their value can be determined through ‘translation’ as described in 
Habermas' discourse ethics. 
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7.3.2 A Reconciliation of Norms, Facts and the Future: Discourse Ethics and the 
Interpretation of Uncertain Normative Claims 
The relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, the way in which empirical ethics deals with this 
relationship, and the broader context of ethics under conditions of empirical uncertainty have 
been considered thus far.  The purpose of considering these topics is to develop a sound 
theoretical basis that can be used to reconcile empirical research and normative aspects of 
emerging technologies.  For this purpose it now needs to be shown that the different aspects 
under consideration can be combined in a theoretically satisfactory manner to provide a 
coherent account of the epistemic value of normative empirical claims under conditions of 
uncertainty.  There are, no doubt, numerous ways of providing such theoretically sound 
conceptual foundations.  In terms of epistemic value, uncertain statements concerning 
normative aspects of emerging technologies can be treated analogous to religious statements 
which, according to Habermas (2008; 2011), should be included as legitimate interventions in 
public discourses.  This is not to say that uncertain normative claims and religious statements 
share similar foundations (e.g. faith, superstition), but rather that both possess inherent 
uncertainty which must affect how they are treated in discourse.  Certainty refers here to the 
possibility of falsification of the claim and its evidence base.  Uncertain normative claims are 
characterised by reliance upon descriptions of the future which are inherently uncertain, 
whereas religious claims rely upon faith or belief beyond empirically observable phenomena. 
One appropriate way of providing the necessary theoretical underpinnings for normative 
research on emerging technologies is to make use of existing work on discourse ethics.  The 
rationale for this choice is that discourse ethics is a well-established procedural approach to 
ethics (Edgar 2002, p.45) that deals with the relationship between normative and empirical 
statements.  Discourse ethics furthermore has an established track record of being applied to 
(human interaction with) information systems (Mingers & Walsham 2010).  Finally, recent 
developments in the broader political discourse theory as put forward by Habermas allow for 
the incorporation of statements that lack the epistemic certainty that can be expected in 




7.3.2.1 Discourse Ethics as a Theoretical Foundation for Empirical Ethics under 
Uncertainty 
The term ‘discourse ethics’ was originally coined by Karl-Otto Apel and was adopted and 
developed by Jürgen Habermas (Edgar 2002, p.44).  The Habermasian version of discourse 
ethics is used here.  Discourse ethics must be understood in the broader context of Habermas’ 
TCA (Habermas 1984; Habermas 1985) (see: Section 6.1.3.3.1).  Claims in communication are 
structured by three validity claims: truth (Wahrheit), rightness (Richtigkeit) and authenticity 
(Wahrhaftigkeit).  In terms of encountering uncertain claims, the TCA indicates that there is no 
fundamental distinction between normative and descriptive statements.  Any statement can 
raise validity claims relating to truth, normative rightness and the speaker’s authenticity.  All 
validity claims are subject to discursive questioning.79 
Habermas’ discourse ethics incorporates these principles of the TCA and uses them to develop 
an explicit ethical theory (Habermas 1992; Habermas 1993).  Discourse ethics is expressed in 
two basic principles, the discourse principle and the universality principle.  The discourse 
principle states that only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.  The 
universality principle goes beyond acceptability to the affected and states that the 
consequences and side effects arising from the general adherence of a norm have to be 
acceptable for all involved stakeholders and, ideally, for everybody (Habermas 1992, p.65). 
Individuals are stakeholders in a discourse when the outcome of that discourse affects their 
interests.  The boundaries of the definition of those ‘affected by’ a practice can be extended 
indefinitely;  in the case of hospice care, developers, friends, taxpayers, government, civil 
society and future patients could be ‘affected by’ hospice care in a national healthcare system.  
However, moral practitioners are stakeholders involved in the day-to-day activities of a 
practice, or those who have ‘moral experiences’ specific to that practice.  Moral practitioners 
can contribute normative claims with initial credibility to a discourse based on relevant 
experiences in the practice concerned (see: Section 7.2.1).  For this reason moral practitioners 
are sought to participate in the empirical study, conceived of as an ethical discourse. 
As a procedural approach, discourse ethics does not prescribe moral truths, but rather 
describes a procedure for communication which arrives at moral truths.  Agreeing upon claims 
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 By the vocabulary used Section 6.3.1, validity claims are a type of credibility claims. 
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fulfilling standards of validity in discourse brings participants closer to justified actions, or 
moral truth (Habermas 1984, pp.99–100).  Despite the ‘universality’ of the method, rational 
discourse can produce local agreements understood as ‘true’ only within particular contexts or 
practices (Mingers & Walsham 2010, p.844), similar to MacIntyre’s practice internal goods 
(see: Section 4.3.1), making discourse a plausible model for applied ethical analysis.  To arrive 
at any agreement, discourses need to resemble as closely as possible the “ideal speech 
situation,” a model for perfect discourse, in which all participants are allowed free and equal 
participation, questioning and introducing claims in the discourse.  The discourse can be 
distorted through strategic action, coercion of participants or claims to truth by social position 
or rank (Habermas 1992, p.86).  Habermas intends the ideal speech situation to be a 
“normative guide rather than a practical reality” (Jones 2001, p.70), although the requirements 
of ideal discourse are taken to be “presuppositions of rational argument itself” (Mingers & 
Walsham 2010, p.840), meaning by entering the discourse participants are bound by the logic 
of rational argumentation to adhere to its ideals in the search for truth.  It is not meant to be 
operationalised to create ideal discourses; rather, it is an ideal framework of communication 
against which actual discourses can be criticised to reveal “systematic distortions, ‘ideology’ or 
‘false consciousness’…[or] distortions of communications by powerful groups” (Jones 2001, 
p.70). 
The value of discourse ethics with regard to ethical assessment under conditions of uncertainty 
is that it overcomes the limitations of the ‘is-ought problem’ and provides a theoretical 
position that enables empirical ethics research.  The discourse and universality principles 
provide an evaluative mechanism for normative as well as empirical interventions (see: 
Section 6.1.3.3.1).  To design interventions, practical discourses are required which support the 
voicing of empirical observations as well as normative positions. 
7.3.2.2 Uncertain Normative Claims in Discourse 
According to the TCA any validity claim can be queried, and then needs to be defended using 
good arguments in a discourse.  This raises the question of how to evaluate and defend 
statements about the future that are fundamentally uncertain. 
Within the framework of discourse ethics and the TCA at least two strategies are possible.  One 
can use a methodological argument that defends statements with reference to the credibility 
of the methodologies that were employed in arriving at the statements.  A statement about an 
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expected social or ethical consequence arising from an emerging technology could thus be 
defended by explaining the methodological approach that led to it.  This is a rational way of 
dealing with the uncertainty of the future but it has the disadvantage that it can turn 
discourses about the ethical aspects of emerging technologies into discourses on 
methodologies for researching the future. 
Recent work by Habermas (2008; 2011) points to a better way of incorporating uncertain 
normative claims into ethical discourse and anticipatory decision-making by treating uncertain 
normative claims as analogous to religious beliefs.  The relationship between the two is that 
they occupy similar epistemological territory.  Both types of claims rely upon or describe states 
of existence that are logically unknowable—metaphysics for the former, the future for the 
latter.  As a result, neither can be falsified or tested through scientific observation.   
The motivation for Habermas’ interest in religious claims was the result of the continuing 
prevalence of religious interventions in modern political discourses and the recognition that 
these interventions must be taken seriously because they can be strong motivators of political 
action and the basis of legitimate democratic positions.  Habermas’ question is how a post-
metaphysical nation-state, or a state that is not based on religious convictions or traditions, 
can react to and incorporate religious positions.  He argues that such a post-metaphysical state 
needs to be secular and neutral towards religious convictions, in order to facilitate the 
peaceful co-existence of different, possibly contradictory religious positions.  Religious citizens 
in a secular state have a duty to translate their religious positions into a secular form 
(Habermas 2008; Habermas 2011).  At the same time, non-religious citizens have the duty to 
accept that religious positions can be rational and have a right to be heard.  There is thus the 
possibility of a discourse despite the fact that some participants do not share the basic 
premises of the interventions recommended by others.  This view can be interpreted as the 
implementation of the principles of the TCA in cases of principled disagreement over validity 
claims contained in statements made in the discourse. 
This principle can be extended to cover uncertain normative claims arising from empirical work 
on future technologies.  Such statements do not have the same epistemic status as statements 
about empirically observable phenomena.  At the same time, they carry meaning and initial 
credibility where participants are involved in relevant associated practices (see: Section 7.2.1), 
and may fruitfully contribute to ethical-political discourses that shape the development of such 
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technologies.  What is required from the different participants is (a) the ability and willingness 
to translate these uncertain normative claims into practically relevant statements and (b) the 
willingness by participants who doubt the credibility of such claims to listen to the translation 
in the attempt to use discourse to come to a better shared view of the social reality in which 
the discourse participants find themselves. 
7.3.2.3 Translation 
To make rational discourse possible by this account, participants in a discourse have a duty to 
translate uncertain claims into terms that can be understood by participants not sharing their 
basic premises, such as religious belief.  Translation requires the reconstruction of uncertain 
normative claims into ‘legitimate normative claims’, which are comprehensible and 
acceptable to participants and stakeholders in discourse (cf. Habermas 1975, 108).  Normative 
claims about future states are vulnerable to propaganda, misinterpretation of evidence, faulty 
reasoning and ignorance.  Accordingly, it would be foolish to apply a kind of ‘Laplace rule’ and 
view all uncertain claims as equally valid without further analysis.  Two steps are necessary to 
translate such beliefs into legitimate normative claims that can be subjected to discourse.  
First, the justificatory evidence base upon which uncertain normative claims are constructed 
must be understood so formative experiences, flaws in reasoning or false statements can be 
identified.  Second, the ‘normative truth content’ of uncertain normative claims must be 
understood.  To unpack this concept, it is helpful to review Habermas’ position on the utility of 
religious beliefs within a secular political society.  Much as religious beliefs may rely upon 
adherence to questionable comprehensive doctrines, uncertain normative claims may be 
founded upon indefensible or selfish premises.  However, both types of beliefs may contain 
legitimate conclusions or ‘normative truths’, albeit by reliance on questionable premises.  
Translation identifies the normative truth of questionable beliefs and translates it into an 
acceptable claim by, in the case of religious beliefs, translating it into secular terms or, in the 
case of moral beliefs, relating it to moral arguments, ethical concepts or principles, or 
empirical evidence seen as legitimate by other participants in discourse.  This allows the 
different participants to agree or disagree on the content of the claims on the basis of mutual 
understanding, rather than rejecting uncertain claims outright due to a lack of shared basic 
premises such as religious belief or agreement on the shape of the future. 
The translation of uncertain statements is the key to considering uncertain normative claims 
about emerging technologies as credible in ethical analysis and refinement of the conceptual 
201 
 
framework.  Translation plays a critical role in ethical assessment under conditions of 
uncertainty clarifying the epistemic value of uncertain normative claims.  To adhere to ideals 
of rational discourse, participants are required to translate their uncertain claims into terms 
understood by other participants by relating claims to shared premises, beliefs or evidence.  
The premises, evidence and conclusions which constitute the uncertain claim can be assessed 
during translation to identify the pieces of a claim which rely upon uncertainty, facilitating 
questioning of particular validity claims rather than the uncertain claim as a whole.  In this way 
the normative truth content of uncertain claims is separated from the uncertain framework in 
which it resides.  It is the act of separation which constitutes translation—a claim is broken 
down into its constitutive parts which are acceptable and comprehensible to stakeholders for 
further assessment in discourse.  Translation thus allows for uncertain claims to be questioned 
in two different ways in discourse: first, are the uncertain descriptions of the future plausible 
given current empirical evidence and indications of the shape of the future?80  Second, are the 
normative position which rely upon the uncertain descriptions of the future themselves 
acceptable to stakeholders, apart from the uncertain elements of the claim? 
In a sense, claims are turned into ‘if-then’ statements: if a certain state of affairs occurs in the 
future, then (credible) prescriptive statement X is applicable.  By separating claims into two (or 
more) constitutive parts, the validity of each can be considered separately in discourse.  
Discourse can then reveal incomplete, poorly supported or otherwise deficient uncertain 
claims, while refining and strengthening claims with a credible empirical or normative 
foundation.  The importance here is on translation as a process in which uncertain claims are 
separated into premises for further assessment, rather than as a set of universal criteria by 
which uncertain claims are proven certain.  Stakeholders bring into discourse various criteria 
for questioning and accepting the truth of a statement.  Translation is the process which allows 
for these diverse criteria to be applied to uncertain claims in discourse, by separating the 
normative truth content of the claim from its uncertain framework.   
This raises a number of follow-up questions, such as—what constitutes a successful 
translation?81  Who needs to translate what and to which degree?  How does translation occur 
                                                          
80
 Criteria to determine credible predictions of the future will vary among stakeholders in discourse and 
between disciplines.  The determination of acceptable criteria in this regard is a separate issue from 
establishing the need for and process of translation. 
81
 To the author’s knowledge, a ‘methodology of translation’ does not yet exist.  Habermas has not 
elaborated the concept or provided examples of successful translations. 
202 
 
in practice?  Multiple credible answers may exist to these key questions.  A more fundamental 
issue is that it remains to be seen how the legitimacy of the evidence base and normative truth 
content of uncertain claims should be judged.  Standards of legitimacy are required to 
determine if a translation has been successful. 
7.3.2.4 Standards of Legitimacy 
With an answer now posed to the epistemic problem posed by normative claims about the 
future, the problem turns to working out the standards by which translation can be deemed 
successful.  This area has not been elaborated upon by Habermas, so the usefulness of 
translation as a method for establishing the credibility or unpacking the normative truth 
content of uncertain normative claims is still in question.  As hinted at above, standards of 
legitimacy refer not to the ‘truth’ of uncertain claims, but rather to the quality of the process in 
which claims are questioned according to the diverse criteria of truth brought to discourse by 
stakeholders.  The ideal of rational discourse is instructive in working out the requirements for 
successful translation.  As previously mentioned the TCA identifies three types of ‘validity 
claims’ which arise in discourse, which operate as standards for judging the truth of a 
statement, or “norms of conduct” (Bauman 1978, p.241) (see: Section 6.1.3.3.1). 
For validity claims to be questioned in a non-deceptive discourse, the statements of 
participants must be communicated intelligibly to other participants; this is a minimum 
requirement of the logic of rational argumentation (cf. Mingers & Walsham 2010, p.840), 
meaning participants entering the discourse are bound to communicate claims so they can be 
questioned fairly.  The form in which statements are communicated is linked to the 
identification of “generalisable interests,” or those found rational according to the developing 
interpretation in discourse (Habermas 1975, p.108).  For such communication to occur, 
statements must possess a basic level of comprehensibility so as to be understood, if not 
agreed upon (or found rational) by participants in the discourse.  The communication of 
statements demonstrates the two step process by which statements enter and are queried in a 
discourse: they must first be communicated in a comprehensible manner before their validity 
can be assessed.  This distinction between validity claims and the proceedings of discourse 
remains useful.  Through this distinction the credibility of a claim in discourse can be 
separated from its legitimacy, understood as its acceptability and comprehensibility to 
participants when presented in a discourse.   
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The success of translation is determined by the legitimacy, and not the credibility, of 
translated claims.82  Judged in terms of legitimacy, translation allows for a plurality of moral 
beliefs while leaving judgment of the credibility of any particular belief subject to further 
discourse.  Legitimacy refers to the comprehensibility and acceptability of claims in 
discourse—are the constitutive parts of the translated claims able to be understood and 
further assessed in discourse?  Comprehensibility refers to whether participants are capable of 
understanding a claim based upon how it is expressed in the discourse.  Acceptability refers to 
the expression of the claim in a vocabulary (terms, concepts and values) shared by the 
participants in the discourse, which allows for mutual understanding of the normative content 
of the claim and, therefore, fair discourse. 83  Acceptability does not relate to agreement on 
the validity of a claim.  Translation is not merely an exercise in deconstructing statements, but 
requires translating a claim into pieces understood within the frames of reference of the 
stakeholders in a discourse.  Standards of legitimacy must therefore ensure that claims are 
translated in such a way that they are comprehensible and acceptable to individuals coming 
from myriad theoretical and personal backgrounds.  
A claim can only be queried and taken seriously in discourse once shown to be legitimate 
(Habermas 1975, p.108), or comprehensible and acceptable to its participants.  For ‘certain 
claims’, legitimacy can be derived directly from validity.  In the case of ‘uncertain claims’, 
legitimacy can be established through translation.  In both cases the epistemic value of the 
claim is derived from its legitimacy, but in the latter the extra work of translation must be 
undertaken to demonstrate the legitimacy of the uncertain claim. 
7.3.2.5 Translation in Practice 
Uncertain normative claims regarding the ethical implications of emerging technologies 
contain three overlapping parts, each of which can be questioned in discourse.  Consider the 
statement made by a daughter caring for her mother with dementia when asked about GPS 
tracking: “I wouldn’t feel comfortable putting a GPS tracking chip under the skin of my mother 
in the future. I would feel like I was spying on her.  I know she would hate it because she is a 
very private person.”  In this example, the following three types of claims are evident: 
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 As a reminder, Habermas’ ‘validity claims’ are understood as an evaluation of credibility, not validity, 
in the terms used here. 
83
 Of course, the vocabulary used in discourse must not merely consist of shared words and phrases, but 
meaning as well.  While identical meaning is impossible according to hermeneutic ontology, it can still 
be pursued as an impossible ideal.  Participants can attempt to understand and discuss the meaning of 
shared terms, concepts and values to others through dialogue. 
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1. Characteristics of the Future- The technological characteristics, capacities or uses 
of the technology in the future the respondent believes will occur, e.g. “GPS 
tracking chip under the skin.”  These are descriptive statements of possible futures 
which can be evaluated for accuracy in light of technological forecasting studies, 
development trends and the political values or strategies which are intended to be 
met by using the technology.  This component describes how the future will be, or 
what kind of technologies will emerge, based on ‘evidence’ available to the 
interlocutor. 
2. Reaction – The respondent’s reaction to a particular use, e.g. “I wouldn’t feel 
comfortable...I would feel like I was spying on her.”  These are local concerns and 
reactions based on perceived uses, and cannot be disproven initially because only 
the respondent is capable of saying how she will react (however, in due course 
these claims can prove false if the respondent reacts differently than she expected 
once the technology is experienced).  Where a reaction is based on implausible 
futures or misunderstanding of the capacities of the technology, the respondent 
can be prompted to amend or clarify the reasoning behind their reaction. 
3. Values – The moral beliefs or values which ground and explain the reaction, e.g. “I 
would feel like I was spying on her...she was a very private person.”  Here the 
respondent is claiming that ‘spying’ is wrong, in part because her mother is 
entitled to some degree of privacy.  This part of the statement expresses 
evaluations of right and wrong, alternative conceptions of morality and ethical 
values.  The movement from values or conceptions of morality to a reaction and 
normative claim can be critically questioned. 
 
This model of the structure of uncertain normative claims reveals how translation can be put 
into practice in analysing normative empirical data.  Parts 1 and 2 are the source of uncertainty 
in normative claims about the future—is the respondent’s description of the future plausible?  
Would interaction with the technology change how the respondent reacts to it (by changing 
her values)?  Parts 2 and 3 constitute the normative truth content of an uncertain normative 
claim—so long as the description of the future in part 1 is credible, the reaction to it in part 2 
based on the values evident in part 3 must be taken seriously in discourse.  In other words, 
assuming part 1 is correct or at least plausible based on (for example) technological forecasting 
or current development, parts 2 and 3 create a legitimate normative claim that can be treated 
as equivalent to other types of normative claims about the present. 84 
Some consistency can be seen between current and future technologies in terms of their 
normative dimensions.  For instance, fear related to privacy violations resulting from 
inappropriate sharing of data are equally applicable given current and future technological 
capacities.  This consistency can thus be used as a basis to judge the future claim as legitimate; 
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 This argument for legitimacy is similar to the ‘basing requirement’ in coherentist approaches to moral 
justification, according to which “a person’s beliefs [should] be based in an appropriate way on her 
evidence, if the beliefs are to count as justifiably held” (Sayre-McCord 1996, p.14). 
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if the future incident were to occur today, would the normative claim be justified?  In this case, 
the temporal aspect of the incident becomes more or less irrelevant in terms of the credibility 
of the claim.  While the future incident will undoubtedly have a unique character or degree of 
seriousness (e.g. much more sensitive data may be at risk in the future due to PHM), and the 
user’s values or attitudes towards the technology may change over time from exposure to it 
(cf. Latour & Venn 2002), the consequences of the privacy violation can still be understood 
initially and expanded upon in understanding the normative importance of the claim about the 
future. 
For the three component parts to be open to discursive questioning, translation requires 
interpreting claims with due regard to frame of reference of participants in the discourse, so as 
to ensure the meaning of the concepts and terms employed in the translation are shared as far 
as possible (recognising that identical meaning is impossible). To be successful, the translation 
must not only emphasise features deemed relevant or important by the translator, but explain 
these features using a frame of reference (language, culture, history, concepts) that are 
familiar to the interpreter.  As Habermas explains, the translation of religious beliefs in secular 
political discourse must discard controversial features such as “faith” and “miracles” which are 
unlikely to be considered relevant or important by members of society which do not share 
cultural consistency with the person making the claim (Habermas 2011).  The same can be said 
for uncertain claims made on the basis of foundational beliefs, rumours, misunderstanding of 
the capacity of emerging technologies, or perceived uses with little empirical support from 
foresight studies, policy positions, or other indicators of future contexts. 
This account clarifies the components of an uncertain normative claim which are being 
questioned in discourse based on the TCA’s three validity claims.  Questions over the validity of 
each part of an uncertain claim can raised, meaning uncertain claims can be treated the same 
as any other claim in discourse.  Translation clarifies the epistemic status of uncertain claims 
by distinguishing the relative certainty of each part.  Mutual understanding is facilitated by the 
location of common basic premises between the values grounding each respondent’s reaction 
to a potential future, even where these values lead to contradictory normative claims.  The 
problem of uncertainty is not eliminated in the sense that the respondent’s description of and 
reaction to the future may prove to be incorrect; however, the values grounding this reaction, 




7.3.2.6 Responsibility for Translation 
As is the case with transferring findings from qualitative hermeneutic research to other 
contexts and phenomena (Kinsella 2006), the responsibility for translation belongs to all 
participants in the discourse.  The author of the claim, by right of participation in the discourse, 
needs to translate the claim into a frame of reference which resonates with other participants, 
which requires engaging other participants in dialogue regarding an accepted vocabulary or 
shared framework.  Suggestions for building such a framework were given in the preceding 
section, although the details of the framework will vary.  The need for such a framework 
implies that part of the responsibility for translation also belongs to other participants in the 
discourse. 
However, beyond the desire for rational discourse and argumentation shared in principle by all 
participants in a discourse, the author is motivated by the desire to have his normative claim 
taken seriously.  Responsibility for translation is placed upon the author in light of the 
normativity of his claim—the claim that a certain state of affairs ‘should’ occur means that the 
translator has a vested interest in making that state of affairs occur, through convincing other 
stakeholders of his perspective. 
7.3.3 Translation and Credibility in Discourse 
By reframing uncertain claims in terms legitimate in a specific discourse, translation opens the 
possibility of evaluating the credibility of uncertain claims.  Translation reveals the evidence 
base and reasoning processes behind uncertain normative claims for further analysis in 
discourse, clarifying their epistemic status compared to claims about current practices or 
phenomena.  In this sense translation serves a critical role—it exposes weak and unfounded 
claims which can be discarded due to a lack of credibility.  As previously mentioned a shared 
purpose of hermeneutic dialogue and rational discourse is to facilitate cooperative life rather 
than discover absolute truths (see: Section 6.1.3.3); the same can be said for translation—to 
be successful it need only be comprehensible and acceptable to others, allowing them to 
understand the motivations and evidence behind a claim, which opens the possibility of 
revision and acceptance in discourse. 
In establishing the epistemic status of uncertain normative claims, translation distinguishes 
between legitimate and illegitimate claims requiring evaluation in discourse.  The range of 
claims encountered in empirical research can be narrowed to those which are potentially 
207 
 
credible, meaning those capable of providing justification for actions.  Translation therefore 
helps identify claims encountered in the empirical study which should be considered in 
applying and refining the conceptual framework by distinguishing between the uncertain 
components of a claim and the moral values informing it.  As the purpose of the empirical 
study is to identify moral values, ethical concepts and other perspectives indicating potential 
ethical implications of PHM, and to assess whether these components can be explained 
through the conceptual framework or, rather, indicate a need to refine it, the separation of 
uncertain claims into uncertain and certain components through translation is therefore a 
crucial step to how ‘theory building’ or refinement of the framework will occur in practice (see: 
Chapter 9).  The purpose here is not to judge the relative credibility of any particular statement 
as would be required in moral decision-making for a particular case, but rather to gain a 
broader perspective on the range of relevant considerations which should be accounted for in 
a conceptual framework built to improve future discourses. 
7.4 Conclusion 
The empirical methodology described in the previous chapter has been expanded in this 
chapter with further epistemological and methodological considerations, relating to the 
difficulties posed by uncertainty and the possibility of combining ethical theory and empirical 
data in ethical analysis, respectively.  The approach described in this and the previous chapter 
is designed to ‘test’ the explanatory power and identify potential refinements for a conceptual 
framework, which was constructed to help identify and explain ethical issues in future contexts 
relating to medical relationships.   
In Chapter 6, hermeneutic dialogue was suggested as an appropriate method for empirical 
research in which the perspectives of potential users of PHM can be critically assessed.  In this 
chapter, discourse ethics was used to create an epistemic framework to justify serious 
consideration of uncertain normative claims in dialogue (or discourse).  The ideal of rational 
discourse detailed in the TCA provides a critical standard against which the legitimacy of 
uncertain claims can be judged through translation.  According to translation, claims must be 
comprehensible and acceptable to the stakeholders involved in a discourse to be legitimate, 
while a responsibility exists for participants in a discourse to translate uncertain claims.  
Discourse ethics, through the need for translation of uncertain claims, provides a way to 
critically question and clarify the epistemic value of components of uncertain claims, 
separating legitimate and illegitimate components distinct from their relative credibility in the 
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discourse.  Considered together, these elements create an epistemic framework justifying both 
the outcomes of the empirical study as legitimate (and initially credible) as well as their 
inclusion in ethical analysis.  Testing and refining the conceptual framework against the 
fieldwork is therefore justified.   
If the defence offered above is seen as credible, it follows that the construction and 
refinement of the conceptual framework is methodologically and epistemologically sound.  To 
proceed with development of the framework an empirical study was carried out, in which 
potential users of PHM were engaged in hermeneutic dialogue (see: Section 6.1.3.3) to gather 
the sort of normative empirical data necessary for ethical analysis under the empirical ethics 
mindset.  The following two chapters describe the study and its results, and how the 
methodology and epistemology of the preceding chapters were translated into practical 
research activities valuable to improving the conceptual framework. 
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8 Chapter 8:  Description of the Study 
8.1 Introduction 
To help understand the applicability and limitations of the conceptual framework to the 
experiences of potential users of PHM, a qualitative interview-based empirical study was 
carried out between May 2011 and July 2013 in England looking at the ethical implications of 
PHM mediating relationships between NHS patients, clinicians and care commissioners.85  
Ethical assessment focused on the perspectives of stakeholders in PHM-mediated relationships 
by engaging potential users, data custodians and service providers in a hermeneutic dialogue.  
The case study examined the perspectives of potential users of PHM based at three NHS sites 
in the East Midlands.  The study sample consisted of clinicians and care commissioners working 
for these sites, as well as patients accessing their care. 
As explained in Chapter 6, the empirical study can be seen as an ‘exploratory case study’ in 
which potential implications of an emerging technology are assessed.   Case studies typically 
assess a historical project or use of a technology (see: Section 6.2.2); the study here is 
exploratory in the sense that potential uses of an emerging technology are assessed, based on 
analysis of strategy in England describing perceived uses and benefits of the technology, and 
perspectives of potential stakeholders in future uses.  Although the moniker ‘case study’ is not 
perfect, it highlights the potential for medical relationships between participants despite 
reigning uncertainty over future uses of PHM in any particular NHS institution. 
8.2 Sample 
An overwhelming focus on the ethical implications of PHM as experienced by elderly patients 
was revealed in the literature review (see: Section 3.3.1).  The empirical study was designed to 
broaden the discourse by engaging with potential users of all ages, as well as carers, clinicians 
and care commissioners.86  Reflecting the effort to identify unforeseen ethical implications for 
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 The study built upon a pilot study, details of which can be found in Section 8.5.1.1. 
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 The literature review identified that the ethical implications for healthy users of PHM are not well 
studied (see: Section 3.3.1).  Although this group would have made for an interesting study sample, they 
were not recruited on the basis that piloting by the NHS focuses on chronic illness management, which 
provides the best indication of how PHM will be initially used (in medical care) in England in the near 
future.  With this said, ‘healthy’ PHM may experience rapid uptake in the near future for uses outside of 
medical care provided by the NHS.  This is however merely speculation: the literature review revealed 
few ‘healthy’ PHM applications or uses of the technology for healthy individuals (see: Appendix 1 Table 
1.2), so pursuing speculation in the research project could not be justified. 
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medical relationships outside of the framework developed in Chapter 3, the study sample was 
diverse, incorporating experiences and expertise of those living with, caring or commissioning 
for a variety of health conditions. 
8.2.1 Criteria for Participation 
Criteria for participation in the study were initially broad.  ‘Patients’ needed to be diagnosed 
with diabetes mellitus or hypertension, or be responsible for caring for someone with 
dementia.  Prior experience with any type of home health monitoring, not limited to PHM or 
related technologies, was not a prerequisite for participation but was desirable.  ‘Clinicians’ 
needed to have a consultancy role for one of the three conditions at a medical centre based in 
the East Midlands, show interest in the potential of PHM for providing care, and be willing to 
help with recruitment.  ‘Care commissioners’ needed to fulfil a role in a local NHS trust or CCG 
responsible for purchasing or commissioning medical care or technologies, preferably with 
experience in piloting PHM through telehealth or telecare schemes. 
8.2.2 Participant Groups 
Participants were divided into two broad groups: ‘patients’ and ‘professionals’.  For patients, 
sub-groups were defined by health condition, resulting in three ‘patient’ sub-groups: diabetes 
mellitus, hypertension and dementia.  For professionals, sub-groups were defined by 
professional role in healthcare, resulting in three ‘professional’ sub-groups: disease specialists, 
service officers and care commissioners.  Different perspectives were expected for each group 
based upon their medical experiences. 
8.2.2.1 ‘Patient’ Groups 
PHM applications and implementation are designed around the medical needs of target 
audiences.  Realising this, the sample was designed against the target audience of emerging 
PHM applications, designed either for monitoring patients with specific medical conditions, or 
physiological parameters relevant to the management of the chosen conditions.  To make the 
study’s results relevant to foreseeable uses of PHM in England, individuals were recruited with 
health conditions matching those found in existing development (see: Chapter 2) and NHS 
piloting (see: Section 5.3.1).  Chosen conditions needed to present opportunities for 
monitoring which contributed to (in)formal medical care.  Ethically interesting characteristics 
of the condition which created unique opportunities for monitoring (e.g. wandering tracking 
for dementia), based on the review of the discourse in Chapter 3, were also considered.  This 
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approach identified patient groups for whom future medical interactions mediated by PHM 
are likely to give rise to ethical issues. 
Dementia, hypertension and diabetes mellitus represent a cross-section of medical conditions 
targeted by early uses of PHM in England.  Each of these conditions offers unique experiences 
and medical requirements which make them desirable for empirical study.  These conditions 
were chosen over others involved in NHS piloting, such as COPD, due to these characteristics.87  
All three conditions require longitudinal management of symptoms and are generally 
incurable, meaning they are a long-term burden on NHS resources, thereby fitting into the 
DH’s strategy of telehealth and telecare support to reduce costs in long-term care (see: Section 
5.2).  Each condition is seen as uniquely valuable to the study on the basis of how PHM may be 
incorporated into longitudinal management of the condition, and the potential implications 
this has for medical relationships. 
8.2.2.1.1 Dementia 
Dementia is a group of degenerative neural symptoms affecting approximately 800,000 people 
in England.  The condition is most common in people above the age of 65.  Symptoms include 
an ongoing decline in brain activities, including “memory loss, thinking speed, mental agility, 
language, understanding, judgment,” problem solving or tasks requiring concentration, as well 
as the capacity to make autonomous decisions (Choices 2013a).  Symptoms progress at 
different speeds in different patients, and may be temporarily controlled or slowed with 
medication; most types of dementia are, however, incurable.  Changes in the personality and 
sociability of the patient are common, including difficulty with controlling emotions, engaging 
in social situations, lying, apathy towards activities, and a loss of empathy or compassion 
towards others.  Independent living can become a challenge, including making decisions and 
plans about the future, which often leads to the need for a live-in carer or occasional visits 
from family and friends to help with daily activities, such as cooking and cleaning (Choices 
2013a).  In some cases, a decision-making proxy is necessary when the person is believed to 
have lost their capacity for independent decision-making. 
                                                          
87
 From a pragmatic perspective, COPD initially came to the author’s attention with the publication of 
the results of WSD in 2012-13 (cf. Steventon et al. 2012; Cartwright et al. 2013).  Altering the sample at 
this late stage of the project would have required reapplication for NHS ethical clearance, which was not 
feasible in the project’s timeframe (see: Section 8.4).   
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Dementia was chosen for the study because symptoms present unique opportunities for 
health monitoring, including tracking the location of the patient to prevent wandering (cf. 
Robinson et al. 2007), memory aides to assist with daily activities such as taking medication, or 
in-home sensors to detect behaviours deemed problematic or symptomatic of a developing 
health condition (cf. Mahoney et al. 2007).  These types of features present unique ethical 
issues relating to the privacy and autonomy of individuals with impaired mental facilities, and 
appropriate levels of monitoring in the pursuit of safety.  Other types of PHM applicable to a 
wider elderly audience are also relevant to PHM, such as smart homes and fall detectors (cf. 
Frisardi & Imbimbo 2011).  The applicability of a wide range of PHM applications, some of 
which overlap with applications designed for the elderly in general, meant that including 
dementia carers in the study allowed for exploration of ethical issues both unique to the 
mentally impaired and shared with dependent elderly users. 
PHM (or telecare) is seen as a method to enable dependent elderly individuals, such as those 
with dementia, to age-at-home independently for an extended period of time before requiring 
live-in care or a move to residential care (Department of Health 2011b).  Dementia therefore 
fits the requirement of the ‘Three Million Lives’ campaign to support telecare usage among 
patients with social and home care needs (see: Section 5.3).  The move towards in-home 
monitoring for ageing-at-home needs to consider the impact on family members before being 
pursued further, as an increase in care at home will increase the need for informal carers as 
long as face-to-face care is deemed necessary to fulfil medical or social needs (Palm 2011).  In 
this sense, PHM implies a greater care burden for family and friends of dependent elderly 
individuals.  Informal carers, or family and friends undertaking ‘voluntary’ care, often 
experience significant changes in their personal relationship with the patient, resulting in 
antipathy, role reversals and loss of social contact (Palm 2011).  However, PHM may affect how 
relationships between carer and patient develop, perhaps alleviating some of the care burden 
through technological monitoring and thus relieving the effects on social roles.  When live-in 
care is unavailable or impractical, PHM may provide a means to monitor the safety and activity 
of the individual with dementia in their home without the need for constant human presence.  
On this basis PHM may affect how relationships between patients, family and friends change 
with the onset of dementia; reducing dependency on human care through remote monitoring 
may relieve some of the burdens placed on carers, but potentially at the cost of the patient’s 
well-being (see: Section 3.2.6).  This situation provides a reason to study the implications of 
PHM on the relationships between dementia patients, carers and clinicians. 
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For reasons connected to ethical approval, it was not possible to recruit patients with 
dementia to the study.  Instead, individuals caring for someone with dementia were recruited.  
To avoid confusion these carers are referred to as ‘patients’ when speaking of the participant 
groups, despite not having dementia themselves. 
8.2.2.1.2 Diabetes Mellitus 
Diabetes mellitus is a progressive condition affecting approximately 2.9 million people in 
England in which blood sugar (glucose) levels are elevated due to an imbalance of insulin in the 
blood or the development of insulin resistance in the body’s cells.  Elevated glucose levels 
sustained over a long period of time can damage organs, nerves and blood vessels.  The most 
common form of diabetes mellitus is Type 2, affecting over 90% of all diagnosed individuals, in 
which the pancreas fails to produce sufficient insulin.  Type 1 diabetes mellitus is characterised 
by the pancreas failing to produce any insulin, necessitating daily glucose monitoring and 
insulin injections to maintain acceptable levels of glucose in the blood.  Type 1 diabetes 
mellitus typically develops during teenage years, whereas Type 2 is typically diagnosed in 
individuals over the age of 40, although younger people have been increasingly diagnosed in 
recent years.  Type 2 is often associated with obesity, and is sometimes accompanied by 
hypertension or high blood pressure (Choices 2013b), suggesting that a crossover may exist 
between the patient groups recruited to the study. 
Although diabetes mellitus is incurable, Type 2 can often be managed through lifestyle 
changes, including diet and exercise.  As the condition progresses monitoring blood sugar 
levels may become necessary, along with the introduction of medications and insulin injections 
designed to bring blood sugar to normal levels.  Type 1 diabetes mellitus requires these sort of 
interventions throughout the life of the patient (Choices 2013b), whereas not all Type 2 
patients require monitoring because symptoms can be managed through lifestyle choices. 
Both types of diabetes mellitus present opportunities for PHM to assist in the management of 
lifestyle changes and monitoring of glucose levels.  Lifestyle monitors (cf. Ganti et al. 2010; 
Bowes et al. 2011) can help patients manage exercise routines and diet, and provide feedback 
on activities based on recommendations from a GP or other practitioner.  Body area networks 
(cf. Jones et al. 2010) and in-vivo glucose monitors could provide constant monitoring of blood 
sugar levels (cf. PositiveID 2011), and perhaps be combined with an in-vivo insulin pump (cf. 
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LaVan et al. 2003) to automatically regulate insulin levels from inside the patient’s body based 
on real-time data. 
In terms of inclusion in the study, diabetes mellitus was chosen in part because of piloting in 
the WSD targeting the condition (see: Section 5.3.1), which suggests PHM may be used in 
diabetes management in the near future.  Beyond pragmatic reasons, the implications of 
lifelong monitoring and management of symptoms on PHM mediated relationships remains 
unclear.  Prior monitoring of glucose levels may affect attitudes towards longitudinal 
monitoring offered by emerging PHM.  For example, a patient accustomed to monitoring 
glucose levels daily may be less critical of PHM because monitoring is already part of his daily 
routine.  It may also be more difficult for those accustomed to daily glucose monitoring to 
grasp the differences between PHM and existing arrangements in terms of the type of data 
gathered and the implications of sharing it with the NHS.  For individuals without such a 
routine, longitudinal collection and transmission of personal health data may be considered a 
form of medicalisation, with the monitor viewed as a reminder of a health condition or as a 
symbol of practitioner expectations of healthy behaviour (cf. Kaplan & Litewka 2008).  The 
feedback loop inherent to lifestyle monitors, by which lifestyle recommendations can be made 
on the basis of real-time data, raises questions regarding autonomy and coercion of patients to 
adhere to treatment recommendations.  Such coercion may be self-imposed through 
expectations of self-care or self-monitoring accompanying power shifts towards shared 
decision-making, as is implicit in the Department of Health’s information strategy (Department 
of Health 2012a), or explicit through clinicians referring to PHM data as an ‘objective’ record of 
the patients behaviour.  All of these implications suggest changing locations of power and 
responsibility for care in relationships between patient, clinician and the NHS. 
8.2.2.1.3 Hypertension 
Hypertension is the clinical name for high blood pressure, a condition in which the pressure or 
force with which blood presses on the walls of the arteries when being pumped around the 
body is consistently above a ‘normal’ range.  To qualify as elevated, multiple blood pressure 
readings must register above 140/90mmHg (millimetres of mercury) over an extended period 
of time.  Hypertension does not have any obvious symptoms, but increases the likelihood of 
other complications including cardiovascular diseases, heart attack, stroke, kidney disease and 
complications stemming from diabetes mellitus.  Individuals with diabetes mellitus will often 
develop high blood pressure at some point in their life, leading to other medical complications.  
215 
 
Unlike dementia and diabetes mellitus, hypertension can be ‘cured’ by returning blood 
pressure to a ‘normal’ range, although individuals with high blood pressure will typically 
require monitoring and management throughout their life to ensure readings stay within the 
acceptable range.  Treatments are often based on lifestyle changes including weight loss, 
exercise, diet, and reductions in smoking and consumption of alcohol.  Medication may also be 
used to lower blood pressure, particularly among patients for whom lifestyle changes are 
ineffective.  Hypertension affects around 30% of the English population and can be diagnosed 
in individuals of all ages, but the risk of developing hypertension is seen to increase with age, 
particularly above the age of 65 (Choices 2013c).  
Despite the ability to ‘cure’ hypertension, most patients experience it as a long-term condition 
requiring lifelong management (Ramsay et al. 1999).  Monitoring occurs through regular blood 
pressure checks, often carried out at regular visits to the GP, although some patients monitor 
on a regular (sometimes daily) basis at home (Choices 2013c).  Different types of monitors can 
provide different types of readings regarded as more or less accurate representations of the 
patient’s ‘true’ blood pressure (White et al. 1990).  Blood pressure fluctuates naturally 
throughout the day, which suggests that readings taken at regular, short intervals are 
increasingly accurate representations of the patient’s true blood pressure.  Recognising this, 
manual readings are often taken twice in quick succession following a period of rest to find a 
‘true’ reading (Ramsay et al. 1999).  Longer term monitoring is occasionally necessary to find a 
true reading, often over a period of 24 hours (Stergiou & Bliziotis 2011), during which the 
patient wears a device which automatically takes readings at set intervals (e.g. every 30 
minutes for 24 hours).   
Based on existing medical practice, a need exists for regular monitoring of blood pressure in 
hypertensive patients.  Frequent monitoring is believed to provide a truer representation of a 
patient’s blood pressure over time; despite this, such monitoring is typically limited to 
infrequent instances of 24-hour monitoring with automated blood pressure cuffs (Stergiou & 
Bliziotis 2011).  PHM applications applicable to hypertension include wrist watch style devices 
(cf. Laurance 2011) and body area networks consisting of multiple wireless sensors monitoring 
various physiological parameters including blood pressure (Milenkovic et al. 2006; Jones et al. 
2010; Pantelopoulos & Bourbakis 2010).  As with diabetes mellitus, individuals with 




In terms of inclusion in the study, hypertension was chosen in part because of DH piloting of 
blood pressure monitors in the WSD (see: Section 5.3.1).  Positive results connected to blood 
pressure monitors in the WSD (Steventon et al. 2012) suggest that the technology will continue 
to be supported and perhaps piloted in other contexts, such as hypertension management 
(Department of Health 2011a).  With this said, a primary aim of the WSD was to measure the 
effect of telehealth on the reduction of emergency hospital admissions in monitored patients 
(Steventon et al. 2012), so it remains unclear whether this outcome would motivate 
deployment of monitors to hypertension patients.  From a clinical perspective 24-hour 
monitoring data is seen as a more accurate representation of the patient’s blood pressure over 
time compared to one-off readings (Stergiou & Bliziotis 2011), so PHM applications providing 
such data have at least one clear benefit to patients and may gain clinical support as a result. 
Beyond NHS and clinical support, hypertension was chosen because self-management of the 
condition, often through blood pressure monitoring and lifestyle, is already common.  It stands 
to reason that PHM applications which provide feedback on the impact of lifestyle choices on 
blood pressure over time would be attractive to patients attempting to self-manage their 
condition; whether such self-reliance is safe or part of a desirable change to the doctor-patient 
relationship is an open question.  
8.2.2.1.3.1 Links between Hypertension and Diabetes Mellitus 
Hypertension was chosen based on its similarity to diabetes mellitus, in the sense that both 
types of patients may have prior experience with monitoring.  With this said, the two groups 
are different in terms of the importance of recognising abnormal readings and intervening 
quickly, which may affect attitudes towards longitudinal or constant monitoring.  Glucose 
levels fluctuate and are categorised as normal or problematic by individual readings at any 
given time; one-off readings can indicate a serious health risk, such as a hypoglycaemia attack 
(Choices 2013b).  Both high and low blood glucose levels can cause tissue damage and other 
complications in a relatively short period of time (e.g. hours) (Ferry 2013).  Abnormal levels can 
be treated immediately through insulin injections or medication, suggesting that constant 
readings combined with appropriate interventions (e.g. insulin injections) could reduce the 
complications experienced from high or low blood sugar.  For blood pressure, the same is not 
true; a single elevated blood pressure reading does not indicate hypertension (Choices 2013c), 
and thus does not create a need for immediate corrective action.  However, longitudinal 
readings at short-term intervals may provide a more accurate picture of blood pressure over 
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time (cf. Stergiou & Bliziotis 2011).  As a result, diabetes mellitus and hypertension patients 
may have different attitudes towards monitoring based on the different uses of monitoring 
data regarding condition management. 
8.2.2.2 ‘Professional’ Groups 
Medical professionals were recruited to the study to provide perspectives from the ‘other end’ 
of the healing relationship.  In other words, professionals provided information about the 
perceived uses of PHM from a clinical and commissioning perspective, which helped clarify 
how PHM may be used in the future care of individuals with dementia, diabetes mellitus or 
hypertension.  Three types of professionals were recruited, each with unique insight into how 
PHM can change relationships between themselves, patients, and the NHS based on their 
existing role in medical care. 
8.2.2.2.1 Disease Specialists 
Disease specialists are clinicians, typically a GP, consulting physician or specialist nurse, 
responsible for working with patients to manage a chronic illness through face-to-face clinical 
encounters, treatment and lifestyle recommendations.  For the study, specialists can speak to 
how PHM applications may be used in treating chronic patients, including concerns or benefits 
with PHM mediating the patient’s care which may limit face-to-face encounters.  Specialists 
also have insight into using PHM data in managing a patient’s condition, perhaps by providing 
feedback directly to the patient without clinical intervention.  
Beyond clinical care, specialists can also speak to interactions with medical institutions, and 
the influence of institutional strategy and policies on clinical care.  Given the potential for PHM 
to move the location of care out of surgeries and hospitals, clinicians are uniquely positioned 
to speak to the ethical desirability of increasingly putting patients on treatment regimes 
involving monitoring and self-management. 
8.2.2.2.2 Service Officers 
For reasons explained below (see: Section 8.4), recruitment of a disease specialist for dementia 
was not possible.  A suitable replacement was found in non-NHS professionals responsible for 
organising community support services, which support informal dementia carers by organising 
support groups, listening to carer concerns and disseminating information about care services.  
The organisers of these services, with expertise in the needs of dementia carers and the 
availability of professional care and support services, are referred to here as ‘service officers’. 
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For the study, service officers provide insight into the needs and experiences of dementia 
carers, as well as shortfalls in existing NHS and social care services to meet these needs.  As 
organisers of support services these individuals have insight into problems faced by dementia 
carers, such as those of time management and emotional stress from the change in character 
of a loved one as dementia progresses.  Information carers are responsible for a majority of 
dementia care in England, so the insight of professionals with knowledge of their concerns is 
valuable in understanding how PHM may change the relationship between patients and family 
members providing care.  Service officers also occupy a unique place between informal carers 
and the NHS from which they can identify shortfalls in professional care services potentially 
met by monitoring, and the implications for human interaction in care of installing a monitor. 
8.2.2.2.3 Care Commissioners 
Care commissioners recruited to the study to provide insight into the attitude of NHS 
organisations towards PHM, or the context in which patient attitudes can be assessed.  
Specifically, care commissioners help explain local strategy supporting diffusion of PHM, or 
how the technology and its data may come to be used in the near future in the care of patient 
participants.  Commissioners are uniquely placed to provide transparency regarding the 
decision processes which lead to PHM being offered to patients in clinical care, processes 
which have historically been difficult to understand from outside the NHS (Jones et al. 1995; 
Wade et al. 2006).  Recognising that diffusion is a complex and contested process, not 
following a linear path (see: Section 5.3), commissioners can also discuss the influence of DH 
strategy and NICE guidelines on local commissioning.  Beyond this, the reasoning behind 
commissioning decisions reveals aspects of PHM seen as valuable at an organisational level, for 
example the reduction of hospital admissions (cf. Ure et al. 2012).  Commissioners may also 
have experience with the barriers and benefits faced in piloting PHM, or related technologies 
such as telehealth.  Finally, commissioners have insight into the role PHM data may play in 
future commissioning decisions, and the extent to which data will be strategically used to 
encourage self-management among patients. 
8.2.3 Summary 
The sample consists of 23 people, including fifteen patients and eight professionals.  Fifteen 
participants are women and eight men, aged between 36 and 82 years old, with a median age 
of 62.  Of the fifteen ‘patients’, five have diabetes, five have hypertension, and five care for 
someone with dementia.  Of the eight professionals, three are care commissioners and three 
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are disease specialists with NHS organisations from the same region, while two are service 
officers at a dementia charity.  Of the disease specialists, one is a consulting specialist in 
hypertension, one is as a consulting specialist in diabetes mellitus, and one is a diabetes 
specialist nurse. 
Of the patient sample, two individuals with diabetes and one dementia carer have prior 
experience with using health monitoring (glucose monitoring and fall detectors, respectively).  
All five patients with hypertension currently monitor their blood pressure at home, or have 
done so for extended periods of time in the past (see: Table 8.1).   
Identifier Group Health Monitoring at Home 
DP1 Diabetes Mellitus None 
DP2 Diabetes Mellitus Manual glucose monitor and insulin pump 
DP3 Diabetes Mellitus Manual glucose monitor (not current) 
DP4 Diabetes Mellitus None 
DP5 Diabetes Mellitus None 
HP1 Hypertension Blood pressure cuff with log, pulse monitor 
HP2 Hypertension Blood pressure cuff with log (not current), 24-
hour monitor (one time use) 
HP3 Hypertension Blood pressure cuff with log, exercise monitor 
wrist watch and belt 
HP4 Hypertension Blood pressure cuff with log 
HP5 Hypertension Blood pressure cuff, 24-hour monitor (one time 
use) 
DC1 Dementia Care None 
DC2 Dementia Care None 
DC3 Dementia Care Automatic medication dispenser 
DC4 Dementia Care None 
DC5 Dementia Care None 
Table 8.1 - Patient Participants 
All disease specialists, service officers and care commissioners are familiar with PHM and are 
currently involved with health monitoring to some degree (see: Table 8.2).  One care 
commissioner is currently working with a related technology as manager of a telehealth 







Identifier Group Health Monitoring in Professional Role 
DS1 Disease Specialist – Diabetes 
Mellitus 
Short-term ‘always on’ glucose sensors 
for patients with erratic glucose levels.  
Limited uses.  Food/exercise/insulin 
diary. 
DS2 Disease Specialist – Diabetes 
Mellitus 
Analyses manual blood pressure (BP) 
and glucose monitoring data provided 
by patients.  Food/exercise/insulin 
diary. 
HS1 Disease Specialist – 
Hypertension 
One-off 24-hour home blood pressure 
monitor for difficult cases of 
hypertension. 
DM1 Service Officer – Dementia Recommends assistive technologies for 
dementia patients including door 
sensors, smart pillboxes and fall 
detectors. 
DM2 Service Officer – Dementia Recommends assistive technologies for 
dementia patients including door 
sensors, smart pillboxes and fall 
detectors. 
CC1 Care Commissioner Involved in strategic planning for 
telehealth, telecare and other care 
services. 
CC2 Care Commissioner Manages a small-scale telehealth 
programme for the local CCG. 
CC3 Care Commissioner Designed a telehealth programme for a 
local NHS trust.  Involved in planning of 
telehealth initiatives at the trust. 
Table 8.2 - Professional Participants 
As mentioned above (see: Section 6.2.2), the study can be conceived of as an ‘exploratory case 
study’.  A further qualification to this concept is necessary because the study did not look at a 
single case based on the recruited sample; rather, it included three broad groups of 
participants, with patients sub-divided into three disease groups.  It therefore cannot claim the 
sort of in-depth examination of a single case or systematic examination of multiple data 
sources (e.g. observations) typically associated with the case study method.  This decision 
should not be seen as a weakness; it was decided to include multiple participant groups 
because all participants were potential as opposed to actual users of PHM.  If a single case had 
been chosen, the study would have risked studying a phenomenon that never occurred.  
Furthermore, in the place of multiple data sources, participants were recruited to provide 
patient, clinical and institutional perspectives, all of which were considered within the context 
of strategic support and proposed uses of PHM in England.  The study therefore still provided 
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in-depth analysis of a particular context, albeit without the uses of multiple data sources 
gathered during the study itself.   
8.3 Location 
The case study involved patients and professionals from the East Midlands.  The context of the 
study is two NHS trusts and one CCG covering a region in the East Midlands. Disease specialists 
and care commissioners were recruited from these NHS organisations, which are currently 
implementing a telehealth programme for chronic illness management.  Similar to the WSD, 
the programme provides ‘question-and-answer’ telehealth systems to COPD patients aimed at 
reducing the length and frequency of hospital admissions.  Elsewhere in the region, local 
councils provide assistive technologies for elderly individuals with social care needs, including 
fall detectors, motion and weight sensors, and emergency alert systems.  However, these 
systems lack longitudinal monitoring capabilities, being limited to one-off alerts to carers. 
As the sample needed only to consist of potential users of PHM with diabetes mellitus, 
hypertension or experience with dementia care, no appreciable differences are evident 
between the East Midlands and other regions of England.  Choice of location would have 
assumed greater importance had existing users of telehealth and telecare systems related to 
PHM been sought from existing pilot programmes  (e.g. Department of Health 2011a; Ure et al. 
2012) (see: Section 10.5). 
8.4 Recruitment and Research Ethics Approval 
Recruiting the sample started with the identification of diabetes mellitus, hypertension and 
dementia specialists at local NHS hospitals, who were sent invitation letters with details of the 
study and a request for assistance with recruitment (see: Appendix A14.18 and A14.19).  After 
initial enquiries, specialists in dementia, hypertension and diabetes mellitus were found 
through inter-organisational recommendations.  Verbal agreements to assist in recruitment of 
patients were obtained, contingent upon research ethics approval from De Montfort 
University (DMU) and the NHS.  According to DMU regulations, any research involving human 
participants requires Human Research Ethics approval to assess the potential risks of 
participation.  The study initially obtained Human Research Ethics (HRE) approval from DMU in 
May 2011 (application no. 1011/014).  It was made clear in the application that the NHS would 
be approached to assist with recruitment.  As a result, DMU HRE clearance was contingent 
upon approval from the NHS National Research Ethics Service (NRES). 
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An application for NRES approval was submitted to the Leicester NRES research ethics 
committee (REC) in September 2011 (application no. 11/EM/0352) following six months of 
preparation of the application and supporting documents (e.g. consent forms, information 
sheets, invitation letters; see: Appendix 14).  The application was rejected in October 2011, on 
the basis that the ‘disease groups’ identified in the sample were too broad to allow for the 
committee to give an informed decision.  Including dementia patients in the study was viewed 
as the primary issue due to a potential lack of capacity to consent, which would have required 
the involvement of a practitioner in the study to assess capacity on a patient-by-patient basis.  
The committee recommended that the research team (e.g. the researcher and the supervisory 
team) attempt to recruit patients from local patient support groups, which would eliminate 
the need for NRES approval.  When queried about the need for NRES approval to speak with 
NHS practitioners and care commissioners, the REC indicated that NRES approval was 
unnecessary. 
The research team was sceptical that support groups would provide sufficiently diverse 
participants, meaning a sample recruited entirely from support groups would be biased 
towards patients fitting a certain profile (cf. Taylor et al. 1986).  As a result, a second NRES 
application was prepared while searching for appropriate patient support groups.  Receptive 
diabetes mellitus and hypertension groups were quickly identified in the East Midlands, while a 
dementia support group proved more difficult to find.  After reviewing the REC’s reasons for 
rejecting the application and discovering that local dementia charities also required NRES 
approval, the research team decided to switch from recruiting dementia patients to dementia 
carers, who present fewer ethical barriers to research found with dementia patients lacking 
the capacity to consent (cf. Berghmans & Ter Meulen 1995).  Reflecting this, the study was re-
approved by DMU in March 2012 without contingencies (application no. 1112/082) following 
the shift in recruitment. 
The decision to recruit carers was also made based on conversations with the dementia 
disease specialist, who indicated that recruitment of ‘early-stage’ dementia patients with the 
capacity to consent to participation would be difficult through NHS channels because 
dementia is typically only diagnosed in mid to late stages, when cognitive decline becomes 
increasingly apparent.  Additionally, as a consulting specialist her patient pool consisted of 
‘special’ or ‘problematic’ cases, meaning the majority of her patients (and thus the potential 
223 
 
sample) have severe dementia and would therefore be ineligible for the study due to a lack of 
capacity to consent.   
Following the change, support groups for informal dementia carers were identified, as 
opposed to those supporting patients. Agreement to assist in recruitment was quickly 
obtained from an interested dementia carer charity.  Once the decision was made to focus on 
carers, the inclusion of a disease specialist in dementia was re-evaluated due to her expertise 
being in medical treatment of dementia, not dementia live-in care.  On this basis she 
voluntarily ended her participation in the study.  Two service officers working for a local 
dementia charity providing support services were recruited in her place, each with expertise in 
dementia care services and needs gained through regular contact with medical and social 
service organisations regarding the services offered to carers. 
The first round of patient recruitment took place at support group meetings for each disorder 
between October 2011 and April 2012, during which invitation packets containing an invitation 
letter and information sheet (see: Appendix 14) were distributed following a brief presentation 
on PHM and the aims and structure of the study.  Participants were directed on the invitation 
to contact the researcher if interested in the study, avoiding the need to access identifiable 
information to identify potential participants.  Presenting the study to potential participants 
prior to recruitment helped limit the sample to participants interested in PHM, which may 
contribute to a higher quality dialogue during interviews, hopefully eliminating participants 
that have no opinion or interest in the technology which would lead to meaningless results.  It 
is, however, recognised that volunteers may also have been motivated by other interests, such 
as a desire to help with research perceived to be socially valuable.  In total twenty-three 
volunteers were identified via support groups, eleven of which eventually participated in the 
study.  This stage of recruitment occurred at support groups for all three disorders, although 
the ethics review process was only relevant for diabetes mellitus and hypertension. 
While support group recruitment was occurring, the diabetes mellitus disease specialist 
confirmed the research team’s concerns of sample bias based on his experience with local 
support groups.  Specifically, he suggested that the sample would be limited to patients with 
an interest in managing their condition and the initiative to attend monthly group meetings.  
These concerns were added to the revised application for NHS ethics approval, which was 
submitted shortly after support group recruitment concluded.   
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A revised NRES application was submitted to the Nottingham REC in January 2012 (application 
no. 12/EM/0064) in response to the changes suggested by the Leicester REC.  The change of 
RECs was based solely on the Leicester REC not having an available slot to review the 
application in the next monthly meeting, while the Nottingham REC had a slot available.  This 
seemingly minor change proved to add difficulties to the study, as the criteria for review were 
not standardised between the REC as would be expected of a national service.  The application 
was rejected by Nottingham soon after being received.  The REC was confused by the structure 
of the study, in part because of the changes requested by the Leicester REC.  Additional 
supporting documents were also requested which had not been requested by the Leicester 
REC.  Importantly, the Nottingham REC informed the research team that information sheets 
and invitation letters for medical staff would be necessary if they were being interviewed in 
the study.  This position suggested to us that REC approval would be necessary to recruit and 
interview consulting specialists and care commissioners as planned.  In itself this may not be 
surprising; however, the Nottingham REC’s advice directly contradicted the advice given to the 
research team by the Leicester REC, who informed us during review of application 11/EM/0352 
that REC approval was not necessary to interview NHS staff. 
Following rejection of 12/EM/0064, another revised application was submitted to the Leicester 
REC in March 2012 (application no. 12/EM/0160) with the additional supporting documents 
requested by the Nottingham REC.  The research team attended the meeting at which the 
application was reviewed.  During the meeting, the Leicester REC again confirmed that REC 
approval was not necessary to interview NHS staff, contradicting the advice given by 
Nottingham.  Following minor amendments requested by the Leicester REC, application 
12/EM/0160 was approved in May 2012 (see: Appendix 19). 
The next step in the NRES process was Research and Development (R&D) approval from each 
NHS site from which participants would be recruited.  From June to October 2012 R&D 
approval was sought from three NHS trusts based around the East Midlands.  During this time, 
various forms, applications and training programmes needed to be completed, including 
obtaining a Research Passport, a Good Clinical Practice Certificate, and training on taking 
consent.  Finally, in late October 2012, the NRES approval process was completed and 
recruitment could commence via the chosen NHS sites.88 
                                                          
88
 The NRES approval letter can be found in Appendix 19. 
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Recruitment of care commissioners and patients via NHS channels could only commence after 
REC and R&D approval of the study.  Care commissioners were recruited by contacting local 
trusts and CCGs with a request to interview someone responsible for commissioning or 
purchasing care services or technologies, and preferably involved with telehealth or telecare 
piloting.  This method led to the identification of ten suitable individuals through 
recommendations by colleagues within each trust, three of whom agreed to participate. 
The second round of patient recruitment occurred between October 2012 and February 2013. 
Consulting clinicians were instructed to distribute invitations to participants matching an ‘ideal 
participant profile’ created by the researcher, based upon gaps in the sample identified after 
the first round of recruitment (see: Section 6.2.3).  The profile described characteristics or 
experiences of an ‘ideal’ participant which were not well represented.  Different profiles were 
created for diabetes mellitus and hypertension based upon the background and perspectives 
of first round participants from these groups.  In this way purposive sampling was used to 
identify participants with general attitudes towards medical ICT (e.g. ‘concerned’, ‘dismissive’, 
‘confused’, ‘responsive’, ‘motivated’) missing from the first round, as assessed by the 
consulting clinician responsible for their care.  A profile was not used for dementia carers 
because a channel for recruitment beyond support groups was not available.  This did not 
weaken the sample, however, as the attitudes of the recruited carers were found to be diverse 
in terms of relative support or scepticism towards the utility and benefits of the technology 
(see: Section 9.3.4). 
The profile was intended to change as the study progressed and participants with certain 
characteristics were required for purposive sampling.  However, as a result of the lengthy NRES 
approval process, the profile was not revised.  Based on assessment of participants recruited 
via support groups, the specialists were directed to identify patients who were frustrated by 
the results of their attempts to manage their condition, and who had an interest in or were 
wary of medical technologies.  With this profile four additional patient participants were 
recruited, two with diabetes mellitus and two with hypertension.  The profile was not updated 
and further patients were not recruited due to the timeframe of the study, which needed to be 
completed by October 2013.  The last patient was recruited in June 2013.  Ideally, further 
patients matching a revised profile could have been recruited following analysis of interviews 
with patients recruited during the second round.  
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8.4.1 Criticism of NRES 
Recruitment and the makeup of the sample were greatly hindered by the NHS research ethics 
review process.  Preparation of the application for approval started in the first year of the 
project and was allocated 18 months in the project plan based on the supervisory team’s prior 
experience with NRES.  Even this lengthy period proved to be insufficient given the difficulties 
faced in the approval process, which was seen as inherently flawed, unnecessarily complex and 
internally inconsistent, views shared by others in England’s medical research community (cf. 
Kerrison & Pollock 2005; Masterton & Shah 2007; Elliott & Hunter 2008; Fistein & Quilligan 
2011).   
Inconsistencies are apparent between the approval requirements of regional RECs, as seen in 
the contradictory advice given by the Leicester and Nottingham RECs which resulted in a delay 
of several months.  Even after REC approval is granted, each research site requires separate 
R&D approval, which involves submitting non-standardised applications to each site which are 
judged against different and occasionally contradictory requirements, for example when 
different supporting documentation is requested by each R&D department.  For academics 
outside the NHS, deciphering the requirements for each REC and R&D department is extremely 
difficult due to the poor quality of official guidance available via public channels.  The guidance 
available on the main NRES portal (IRAS, http://www.myresearchproject.org.uk) fails to 
establish clear guidelines on participant groups (e.g. NHS professionals, clinicians) requiring 
approval, the expectations of the RECs regarding supporting documentation, and how to 
proceed with R&D applications following REC approval.  This confusion may be shared by 
committee members, as shown in the conflicting advice given by RECs within the same NRES 
region.  
In a system which claims to be unified and hierarchical, with common requirements for 
approval and standards of practice passed down from above, the extensive inconsistencies and 
duplication of work experienced in the process indicate a lack of hierarchical control, in effect 
erecting a major barrier to medical research in England (cf. Masterton & Shah 2007; Fistein & 
Quilligan 2011).  Whether this bureaucratic barrier is intentional is unclear, although the 
experiences of the research team suggest it was not erected by chance.  In general the RECs 
were overly defensive and quick to absolve themselves of responsibility to approve a study 
with any chance of harming patients, no matter how remote, as seen in the advice given by the 
Leicester REC to pursue recruitment via patient support groups to eliminate the need for REC 
227 
 
approval.  This assertion is supported by the supervisory team’s prior experiences with NRES, 
in which similar defensiveness was experienced.  Regardless of the motivations for the 
bureaucracy, NRES proved to be a major hurdle to overcome in completing the research 
project89, and severely limited the time that could be dedicated to data collection and analysis, 
particularly for interviews with NHS disease specialists and care commissioners. 
8.4.2 Consequences for the Sample 
NRES limited purposive sampling, which given more time would have allowed for recruitment 
of younger patients not well represented in the discourse (see: Section 3.3.1), particularly 
those with Type 1 diabetes mellitus which tends to be diagnosed as a younger age than the 
other disorders (Choices 2013b).90  The sample was not intentionally biased towards older 
users; rather, the attendees at support groups and the patients identified by specialists were 
all incidentally from an older demographic.   
Despite the lack of younger participants, there is no a priori reason why this limitation of the 
sample would weaken or bias the results.  Attitudes towards medical technologies, including 
telehealth and telecare, can be linked to age (cf. Gaul & Ziefle 2009; Steele et al. 2009), 
although a causal relationship between age and technical literacy, or interest in medical 
technologies relevant to one’s care, is not immediately evident.  It could still be argued that 
the study is biased towards older chronically ill patients, weakening its generalisability.  Within 
a hermeneutic perspective the experiences of chronic illness management which inform the 
perspectives of the sample are not a source of bias, but rather the framework through which 
they interpret the world.  It would therefore be inappropriate to generalise the study’s results 
to patients lacking similar experiences or backgrounds which define the context in which 
meaning is created (see: Section 6.1.3.1).  In this sense, limitations imposed by NRES did not 
weaken the generalisability of the study.  Rather, the demographic limitations may strengthen 
the immediate credibility of the study to England, as the primary demographic targeted in 
piloting telehealth and telecare devices in England match the demographic sampled (see: 
Section 5.3.1). 
                                                          
89
 The experiences of the research team may have been different had the study been initially approved 
via ‘proportionate review’.  The implications of this process for approving qualitative studies with little 
chance of harming patients, which emerged while the application was under review, are reviewed in 
Appendix 12.   
90
 In the pool of patients available to the diabetes mellitus specialist who dealt with difficult cases and 
complications of diabetes mellitus, young Type 1 patients were rare.  Although the specialist distributed 
invitations to a few younger patients, none subsequently contacted the author. 
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8.5 Data Collection 
A total of 33 semi-structured interviews were completed.  Participants were provided with 
information and consent sheets at least 48 hours prior to the interview (see: Appendix 14).  
Interviews lasted anywhere from 25 to 75 minutes, with most interviews running around 45 to 
50 minutes.  Each patient participant was intended to complete two interviews, with the first 
focusing on introduction of the technology, the patient’s background, and initial reactions, 
with the second pursuing ethical implications for relationships in more detail.  Professional 
participants were only expected to complete one interview on the basis that each had prior 
knowledge of telehealth and telecare, and therefore did not require a first interview to 
introduce the technology.  Each professional was sent an executive summary of PHM and the 
aims of the study prior to the first interview (see: Appendix A14.22) to ensure the definition of 
PHM used here was understood and applied in the interviews so as to avoid limiting the 
discussion to telehealth and telecare.  Additionally, interviews with professionals were 
typically longer (45-75 minutes), meaning the combined interview length between patients 
and professionals was comparable.   
Of the patient participants, four dementia carers, three diabetes mellitus patients and three 
hypertension patients completed two interviews, while the remaining five patients completed 
one.  These five only completed one interview for a variety of reasons—two patients were 
repeatedly contacted for a second interview but failed to respond, two patients were recruited 
via the NHS in June 2013 and did not have time to complete a second interview, and one 
patient withdrew from the study following the request for a second interview due to a death in 
the family.  The two patients which failed to respond for a second interview showed a lack of 
interest in the technology and could not see any personal use for it, which may explain their 
reluctance to participate further in the study.   
The study was designed around two interviews occurring 4-6 weeks apart to allow for a period 
of reflection between the interviews, based on the assumption that participants would be 
unfamiliar with PHM and therefore find it difficult to identify ethical implications or construct 
reasoned responses to scenarios posed by the interviewer in the first session.  In practice, this 
assumption did not hold; patients were able to identify problems with the technology during 
the first interview and answer the researcher’s follow-up questions.91  A second interview with 
                                                          
91
 A possible explanation for this finding is that most patients first learned of PHM during presentation 
of the study at patient support groups (see: Section 8.4), instead of the first interview. 
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all participants would have been ideal to allow participants to change their minds or self-assess 
the basis of their reactions to PHM, potentially identifying a greater quantity of ethical 
implications of PHM as a mediator in medical relationships.  However, each claim made by the 
participant was independently justified throughout both interviews, meaning the interviews 
can be divided into separate claims with supporting evidence, reasoning and values.  In this 
sense the quality of the discourse was not degraded, but rather the quantity of claims 
encountered was reduced.  Additionally, claims justified by participants were only one way in 
which perspectives relevant to the conceptual framework were identified; occasionally an 
unjustified claim or statement unrelated to ethical aspects of PHM would ‘trigger’ the 
researcher to identify an unforeseen issue, concept or specification.  In both cases the 
credibility of claims encountered in the study and their relevance to the conceptual framework 
in terms of explanatory power and expansion were not derived from participation in a second 
interview. 
8.5.1 Structure of the Interviews 
Interviews were loosely structured around an interview guide designed to keep the discussion 
on-topic while allowing for participant leadership in terms of topics discussed (see: Section 
6.2.4).  The guide was built initially upon the findings of the literature review (see: Chapter 2) 
and the conceptual framework (see: Chapter 4), and iteratively updated with findings from 
prior interviews (Patterson & Williams 2002, pp.43–4).92  The guide was not a rigid list of topics 
to discuss, but rather general themes to pursue depending upon the interests and background 
of the participant.  Although the interviews were guided by an interview guide as well as topics 
and claims raised by the participant as opposed to a pre-defined list of questions, in practice 
they followed a general pattern within each participant group.  For patients, the first interview  
started with questions about (1) the participant’s personal background, (2) medical history and 
(3) prior experience with monitoring, followed by the researcher describing (4) PHM 
applications that might be relevant to their  medical or care needs.  Mock-ups of PHM data 
were shown to participants when describing applications relevant to their personal 
background (see: Appendix 15).  The mock-ups served as a starting point for the rest of the 
interview as (5) a dialogue about ethical implications of the described applications, in which 
the participant described what they found appealing and problematic about the application.  
The researcher would then ask follow-up questions to understand the values that informed the 
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 The first iteration of the interview guide can be seen in Appendix A14.23. 
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participant’s judgment of right and wrong, and to discover the specific implications or 
technical capacities of the system that they found troubling.  To help analyse the data within 
the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3, follow-up questions often focused on the 
patient’s reaction in terms of the impact of the technology on their home, relationships with 
family and friends, implications of sharing data with third parties, or how their GP or disease 
specialist would react to the patient using the technology.  In this way medical relationships 
served as a thematic focal point in questioning. 
The PHM applications and mock-ups described during step 4 were posed as scenarios in which 
monitoring was installed into the user’s life to varying degrees, and with a variety of purposes.  
These scenarios were created around the specific background and medical needs of the 
participant.  Increasingly pervasive or ethically questionable forms of monitoring and uses of 
data were posed in an attempt to incite moral judgments in reaction to the scenarios 
described.  The scenarios used to elicit moral judgments were based on monitoring systems 
and goals of monitoring found in the reviewed literature (see: Chapter 3), and when possible 
were imagined as part of NHS piloting or strategy (see: Chapter 5).  As the interview proceeded 
the scenarios were modified to explore the particular values on which judgments were based, 
or to modify a particular technological characteristic, usage of the gathered data, or goal of 
monitoring to which the participant objected. 
As an example, a patient requiring blood pressure monitoring to control his hypertension was 
first offered a 24-hour blood pressure wrist watch, seen as ‘unobtrusive’ by most participants.  
The need for behavioural data to better understand the background influences on the patients 
BP was then explained, followed by a variety of behaviour monitoring systems, from a basic 
accelerometer/pedometer to an in-home motion and pressure sensing system and finally, an 
in-home system with video cameras.  By offering increasingly provocative scenarios the values 
and reasoning by which participants made moral judgments was increasingly understood and 
questioned.  A ‘line’ past which monitoring was no longer ethically acceptable was frequently 
discovered (often in connection to cameras), followed by exploration of the distinction 
between acceptable and unacceptable monitoring.   
Where a second interview occurred, the researcher briefly reviewed topics and the 
participant’s claims from the first interview.  Follow-up questions were similar to those in the 
first interview, but also addressed whether the participant’s claim or attitude had changed 
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over time, as well as the background reasoning or evidence which supported the participant’s 
ethical judgments.  The latter step was crucial because the participant’s claims were 
hypothetical, based upon descriptions of emerging technologies with which they did not have 
hands-on experience.  To improve the translation of such uncertain claims, the underlying 
reasoning and evidence needed to be understood. 
Interviews with professional participants followed the same basic structure, although steps 1 
and 2 were replaced with questions about the participant’s professional background and 
professional responsibilities in providing medical care, support to patients or commissioning.  
Step 4 was adapted to the needs of professional’s patients.  Telehealth and telecare systems 
previously used by the participants were also used as examples in the dialogue, with 
hypothetical modifications to meet the definition of PHM when necessary, such as the 
replacement of a manual blood pressure cuff hooked to a telehealth system with a body area 
network with blood pressure sensors. 
Topics, concepts and perspectives from earlier interviews were discussed in subsequent 
interviews when relevant to the ongoing dialogue.  Open-ended questions, non-verbal cues 
and summaries were used to encourage participants to lead the dialogue in terms of topics 
discussed (Britten 1995; Patterson & Williams 2002, pp.44–5; Gilbert 2008), while probes 
forced participants to further explain the beliefs and moral values underlying their answers, 
uncovering issues and perspectives unforeseen by the researcher as relevant to the conceptual 
framework. 
8.5.1.1 Piloting 
The interview and analysis methodology built upon the results of a pilot study conducted 
between June and July 2011.  Eight interviews were conducted with Health & Life Sciences 
faculty members at DMU to help develop the researcher’s interviewing abilities, refine the 
study methodology and narrow the scope of the research project.   Members of the faculty 
were recruited on the basis of their prior professional experiences in medicine, which 
facilitated understanding the technological capacities and (hopefully) ethical implications of 
PHM, even though none of the pilot participants had prior experience with the technology.  As 
former clinicians or medical support staff, the participants were able to speak from both a 
professional and patient perspective.  The pilot sample was distinct from the main study 
sample in the sense that participants lacked experience with chronic illness management as 
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well as expertise in the chosen diseases.  This difference was logically unavoidable—piloting 
helped identify the need to recruit individuals (responsible for the care of individuals) with 
chronic illnesses.  As the piloting data is not analysed in combination with the main study (see: 
Chapter 9), the mismatch between samples does not have any appreciable implications for the 
outcome of the research. 
The pilot interviews were not fundamentally methodologically different from the interviews in 
the main study, although at the time the methodology was based on Denzin’s interpretive 
interactionism (2001).  Piloting revealed that interpretive interactionism was inappropriate for 
interviews in which an ‘epiphany’, or transformative moment of sudden realisation and change 
which changes a person’s life or their view on a subject forever (Denzin 2001), is not the 
phenomenon under study.  Attitudes towards future use of PHM do not inherently contain an 
epiphany moment.  A shift to hermeneutics as philosophical paradigm occurred after piloting.  
The paradigm shift did not create a need to radically redesign the study or interviews, as 
hermeneutics and interpretive interactionism are seen as inherently compatible (Wilford 
2004). 
During the first round of pilot interviews participants struggled to understand the researcher’s 
verbal description of PHM.  In response, scenarios of use (see: Section 8.5.1) were adapted to 
the personal, medical or professional background of the participant during the second round 
of interviews, which improved the participants’ grasp of PHM applications.93   
8.5.1.2 PHM Charts 
Despite the improvements gained from personalised scenarios, participants still struggled to 
understand the implications of PHM data in terms of the information it could reveal about 
them to others, for example through combination with other data already held by the NHS.  
On this basis, mock-ups charts of PHM data were created showing various health and 
behavioural parameters tracked over time and in combination with other types of data (see: 
Appendix 15).  The charts were validated by Mark Shaw, a medical doctor on the supervisory 
team. 
                                                          
93
 This improvement influenced the decision to make a brief presentation about PHM to potential 
participants prior to distributing invitation packets (see: Section 8.4).  The presentation included pictures 
and descriptions of PHM applications relevant to each patient group. 
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A total of eight charts were used in the study.  Four charts were created by the researcher, two 
of which showed blood pressure and glucose readings over time combined with activity logs.  
Two other charts shown together to participants represented pedometer readings and weight 
measured over a year (see: Appendix A15.1 to A15.4).  An additional four charts were taken 
from a prior study (Beaudin et al. 2006a) into the perceived benefits and concerns attached to 
longitudinal health monitoring at home with ubiquitous computing systems (see: Appendix 
A15.5).  The borrowed charts showed how connections can be made between behavioural and 
physiological data, as well as differences between traditional clinical or one-off monitoring and 
longitudinal monitoring. The study recognised that participants struggle with discussing and 
relating certain “home health tracking concepts” (Beaudin et al. 2006a) to their personal 
background:  
“ 1. Data collected over time can reveal patterns of change. 
2. Context can be used to interpret reasons for change. 
3. Comparisons can be made with population norms, personal goals/estimates, and 
peers’ values. 
4. Quantitative data can be used in combination with qualitative data (eg, journal 
entries). 
5. Multiple metrics can be applied to assess health and behaviour change. 
6. Data can be used to motivate by highlighting the extent of a problem or 
documenting progress. 
7. Data can be used to problem solve and evaluate interventions. 
8. Data can be subjectively reported or objectively observed. 
9. Data can be reviewed at specific times and locations. 
10. Data can be organized in ways other than by time. 
11. Data tracking may not be constant, instead triggered by directed investigations. 
12. Data can be reviewed in isolation or in relationship to other variables” (Beaudin et 
al. 2006a). 
Although the charts were created to represent these health tracking concepts in visual form, 
discussion of the charts with participants was not limited to these twelve concepts.  As a result 
of the interviews being participant-led (see: Section 6.2.4), different concepts were discussed 
in different interviews.  The mock-ups were not used in piloting, but helped participants in the 
main study understand the scope and types of information potentially collected and shared by 
PHM. 
8.5.2 Review 
An initial sample of interviews were reviewed by the supervisory team to ensure the 
researcher was engaging participants in ethical dialogue which would provide data related to 
the research questions (see: Chapter 6).  A risk existed that, because participants were given 
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such freedom in deciding topics of conversation, the dialogue would often stray entirely away 
from normative issues of PHM.  It was therefore seen as the researcher’s job to direct 
conversation back to ethical implications and moral claims (e.g. right/wrong) wherever 
possible, without forcing pre-determined issues and concepts such as privacy into the 
interview.  Questions such as “How would being monitored make you feel?” or “Why does that 
bother you?” were used to re-focus the dialogue onto the morality of PHM for the participant.  
The review process was in place to ensure that the interviews were on-topic; the success of 
review can be judged by the quality of the dialogue concerning ethical aspects of PHM (see: 
Chapter 9). 
8.6 Conclusion 
An empirical study designed to test the conceptual framework developed above (see: Section 
3.4 and Chapter 4) has been described in this chapter.  The framework acts as an interpretive 
guide for the perspectives of participants, meaning the empirical study explores whether the 
framework is able to coherently explain ethical implications perceived by stakeholders in terms 
of colonisation.  If outlying issues and concepts are found, refinement or demarcation of the 
framework to certain ‘types’ of ethical issues will be necessary.  The study therefore acts as a 
tool of validation and refinement for the conceptual framework through which new issues and 
concepts not seen in the PHM ethics discourse (see: Chapter 3) or accounted for in the 
framework may be discovered.  The empirical study described here therefore provides a data 
set against which the framework’s explanatory strengths, limitations and areas requiring 
revision can be identified.  The next chapter presents the results of the study, and relates them 
to these aspects of the conceptual framework.  The impact of the study on the linkages 
identified between ethical themes in the reviewed literature is also considered, as these 
connections can help identify new or important concepts which should be accounted for in the 
framework.  Before presenting the results of the study in these terms, the method for 
analysing assessing the empirical data is first reviewed. 
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9 Chapter 9:  Data Analysis and Results 
9.1 Introduction 
In order to test and refine the conceptual framework for PHM, an empirical study of potential 
users of PHM concerning personal and medical relationships was conducted.  The process of 
refining the conceptual framework on the basis of the empirical study can be conceived of as a 
discourse between the researcher and the participants in the study.  Rather than accepting 
and rejecting the various claims made in terms of credibility or validity, the discourse only goes 
so far as to translate uncertain normative claims.  Those found to be legitimate by the criteria 
described above can then be included in the framework, meaning the researcher will explain 
how the claim is explained by the framework.  If the framework cannot account for a claim, it 
will instead be considered how the framework needs to be expanded.  This is not to say the 
framework will be expanded endlessly to cover the myriad potential ethical implications of 
PHM, including all those seen in the reviewed literature (see: Chapter 3).  Such an expansion 
would be necessary for a comprehensive theoretical framework of PHM, through which all of 
its implications can be explained.  To ensure the quality of the framework, it will only be 
expanded to account for legitimate normative claims concerning implications for personal and 
medical relationships, where legitimacy is determined through translation (see: Section 
7.3.2.4). 
The refinement discourse is limited to determining the legitimacy of claims through translation 
(see: Section 7.3.2.3)—it is not a complete discourse because evaluating the credibility of 
claims, or moral decision-making, is not undertaken.   The discourse must be limited in this 
way because the conceptual framework is meant to assist in future context-specific discourses 
relating to ethical implications of PHM—the empirical discourse in which the framework is 
refined does not decide on the correct course of action in a specific case, and thus does not 
need to evaluate the credibility of legitimate claims.  This approach allows for expansion of the 
conceptual framework to include a variety of ethical frameworks, principles and moral values, 
without endorsing any particular one as correct. 
While the approach taken is holistic, it is not morally relativistic (see: Section 3.1.1) because it 
only acknowledges the initial credibility of the many approaches to moral evaluation taken by 
participants in the study, while saying nothing of their credibility for moral decision-making in 
a specific case.  In other words, the approach does not claim that all of the ethical frameworks 
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and moral values encountered in the discourse are equally credible, but rather to be useful in 
the future the framework must account for the various approaches brought to future 
discourses.  The purpose of the framework is to help participants in ethical discourse 
understand the implications of the technology by drawing attention to implications beyond 
those recognised in common approaches to ethics, which emphasise privacy, autonomy or 
moral principles such as respect for autonomy or beneficence.  In doing so the framework does 
not endorse any particular solution or response to potential implications; future solutions will 
depend upon the outcome of future ethical discourses in specific contexts of use. 
9.2 Data Analysis 
In order to test and refine the framework, a data analysis method complementary to the 
empirical methodology described above (see: Chapters 6 and 7) is necessary.  Methodological 
choices have been made which reflect the researcher’s epistemological and ontological 
commitments.  A method of future-oriented ethical analysis has been described, along with 
standards of moral justification and credibility.  Within this methodological framework a 
complementary approach to empirical data analysis is required. 
The analysis of qualitative data typically involves reducing, categorising or otherwise 
organising the data in such a way that links or themes can be identified.  Coding or “identifying 
meaning units” is perhaps the most common way to start analysis (Denzin & Lincoln 2000; 
Patterson & Williams 2002), during which the researcher reads and re-reads the texts and 
begins to abstract and summarise the data.  The process of analysis is often iterative, opaque 
and without a clear methodology, but this ‘inherent messiness’ is not necessarily a weakness 
(cf. Marshall & Rossman 1999, p.153).  Attempts have been made to ‘clean up’ qualitative 
research to meet positivistic ideals of rigour (Strauss & Corbin 1994; Mays & Pope 1995; 
Urquhart & Fernández 2006; Jones & Alony 2011), yet under the hermeneutic paradigm such 
attempts are misguided and harmful to the outcomes of qualitative research.94 
9.2.1 The Organising System 
The central structure of hermeneutic analysis is the organising system (Tesch 1990), which 
provides a framework for the organisation, interpretation and presentation of the interviews 
                                                          
94
 For example, Grounded Theory attempts to eliminate bias by standardising the steps of data analysis 
to allow themes to ‘emerge’ from the data and not the researcher’s interpretation.  For more on the 
problems of such attempts to increase the rigour of interpretive research through the elimination of 
bias, see Appendix 13. 
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(Patterson & Williams 2002, p.45).  The creation of an organising system, with categories, 
themes and relationships, is analogous to the process of data analysis.  The final organising 
system is the product of data analysis, which should provide a “thick description” of the 
themes found in the interview data (Patterson & Williams 2002, pp.45–46).  At its most basic, 
the organising system should structure the phenomenon under study in such a way that new 
insights are revealed. 
The organising system which structured analysis is the conceptual framework developed above 
(see: Section 3.4 and Chapter 4).  The data was analysed to make a distinction between claims 
made by participants which can be understood as effects of PHM on personal and medical 
relationships, and those that cannot.  For claims concerning relationships, data analysis 
involved testing the explanatory power of the framework to ‘make sense’ of the concerns of 
participants, identifying limitations and potential ways to improve the framework in the 
process.  In presenting the results of the study a clear distinction is made between findings 
falling within the framework and outliers suggesting limitations or areas for refinement. 
9.2.2 The Steps of Data Analysis 
 The data analysis method used in the empirical study was inspired by the approach outlined 
by Patterson and Williams (2002, p.46), with modifications to address the epistemic difficulties 
of uncertainty. 
Data analysis was carried out systematically to ensure all data was given equal consideration.  
This is not to say all the data was weighted equally in the researcher’s final interpretation, but 
rather that the steps of data analysis which led to that interpretation (coding, categorising, 
identification of themes and relationships) were carried out systematically and rigorously, 
involving iteration and revisiting texts as the researcher’s understanding of the data developed 
over time.  As such, the findings should be taken as a fair representation of the range of data 
collected and themes identified.  Variations on themes are presented when found in the data, 
and outlying cases are mentioned.  A systematic method was, however, not adopted as a 
means of freeing the interpretation from the researcher’s influence (see: Section 6.1.1.1). 
Analysis started while data collection was still underway.  The empirical study was iterative 
(see: Section 6.1.3.2.2), meaning initial analysis was used to refine interview topics, categories 
and specifications of ethical concepts and principles.  The interview transcripts are referred to 
here as ‘texts’, in line with the recognition of the applicability of hermeneutic analysis to social 
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phenomena and non-text sources of information (see: Section 6.1.3).  For participants who 
completed two interviews, both transcripts are considered as a combined single text. 
9.2.2.1 Step 1 – Transcription 
In line with ‘best practice’ in qualitative research (cf. Crabtree & Miller 1999; Marshall & 
Rossman 1999), all interviews were recorded on an audio device and transcribed as soon as 
possible after they occurred.95  All interviews were transcribed in their entirety, including 
pauses, laughter, conversational fillers (e.g. ‘umm’, ‘uhh’) and stumbling over words. 
9.2.2.2 Step 2 – Initial Reading 
Next, the interview transcript was read once to provide an initial understanding of the text.  
For participants completing two interviews the transcript from the first interview was re-read 
before reading the second transcript to remind the interviewer of the participant’s background 
and previous answers. 
9.2.2.3 Step 3 – Identification of Meaning Units 
Sentences were chosen as the “meaning units” for coding (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.47), 
or statements that, according to the researcher’s interpretation, provide insight into the 
phenomenon being studied.  In this step sentences were identified for subsequent coding.  
Sentences were chosen because they represent complete thoughts or claims.  Sentences were 
often grouped together to reflect more complex claims, or analysed with attention to their 
location in a paragraph and the interview as a whole so as to understand the context in which 
the statement was made.  After an initial reading, sentences of interest for further analysis 
were marked in the transcript.   
The meaning given to sentences was located within a holistic view of the text (Patterson & 
Williams 2002, p.47).  Sentences identified as meaning units contained information about the 
participant’s personal, professional or medical background, or made reference to moral values, 
ethical concepts, normative claims or opinions stemming from the participant’s reaction to 
PHM and the scenarios posed by the researcher (see: Section 8.5). 
9.2.2.4 Step 4 – Organisational Coding 
The next two steps involve sorting or labelling the meaning units based on the researcher’s 
interpretation of the text, which has developed over the previous 4 steps, through the 
                                                          
95
 Two sample interview transcripts are provided in Appendix 16. 
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application of codes.  While meaning units are the empirical statements to which codes are 
applied, codes are the researcher’s interpretation of “what the meaning units reveal regarding 
the phenomenon being studied” (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.48).  This type of coding is a 
common step in many qualitative research methodologies (cf. Tesch 1990; Strauss & Corbin 
1994; Patterson & Williams 2002).  Codes allow the researcher to group meaning units by 
common themes, content or meaning for further analysis. 
In Step 4, ‘Organisational Codes’ (OC) were applied to the meaning units to summarise the 
content of each unit in the words of the participant.96  OC served as labels for statements in 
need of further analysis, or those containing background, demographic or other contextual 
information relevant to understanding the meaning of the participant’s claims (Maxwell 1998, 
p.237).  These codes emerged directly from the data, in the sense that the participant’s words 
were used to give each code a name.  The purpose of these codes was to create a shorthand 
way of viewing the data in the words of the participant, allowing for comparison between the 
participant’s literal statements and the researcher’s interpretation of the meaning of the 
statement.  These codes were not revised as analysis proceeded, so as to not lose the ‘original’ 
meaning expressed in the participant’s words.  OC ensured the participant’s voice was retained 
in presenting the findings of the study, while recognising that that meaning given to a 
statement by a participant cannot be perfectly recreated in interpreting and coding the data. 
OC were divided into two types:  Biographical and Normative.  Biographical OC contained 
content about the personal or medical background of the participant, and were referred to in 
finding connections between the texts of multiple participants sharing a similar experience or 
characteristic.  Normative OC contained content related to a normative claim about PHM 
which required further analysis.  In practice this meant that each Normative OC was assigned 
at least one Substantive Code in the next step of analysis. 
9.2.2.5 Step 5 – Substantive Coding 
Substantive coding involved the researcher interpreting the meaning of the sentences labelled 
with a Normative OC.  Substantive Codes (SC) make claims about the data, or represent 
interpretations of the data, and can thus be proven wrong in a way that OC generally are not 
(Maxwell 1998, p.237) because the latter are intended to be a shorthand summary of the 
                                                          
96
 Tone, speed of delivery, sarcasm and emotions in the audio recording of participants cannot be easily 
represented in transcripts, yet these elements can radically change the researcher’s interpretation of a 
meaning unit.  In recognition, the interview was played back while coding the data.   
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participant’s words rather than a meaningful interpretation of the words by the researcher.  
Substantive codes are the researcher’s interpretation of the data and are iteratively revised as 
analysis proceeds by revisiting texts throughout the analysis process.  Ideally, codes become 
increasingly specific as analysis progresses, showing that the researcher’s understanding of the 
data is developing.  The researcher’s interpretation is based on his preconceptions (Maxwell 
1998, p.237) of PHM (as seen in the framework of ethical issues, concepts and values 
developed in Chapters 2 and 3), and his familiarity with each participant developed through 
the interviews themselves as well as reading and re-reading the interview texts and field notes.  
SC went beyond the words of the participant and brought in themes from the conceptual 
framework and literature review such as privacy, surveillance and data control review (see: 
Chapter 3), although SC went beyond these themes and concepts when the meaning of the 
participant’s statement did not match either.  In this way substantive coding was guided by but 
not limited to the conceptual framework and literature review. 
SC were assigned by reviewing each meaning unit assigned a Normative OC (see: Figure 9.1).  
In this way the participant’s words influenced the researcher’s interpretation of the 
participant’s statements.  This aspect of coding prevented the researcher from ‘forcing’ units 
into his framework of prejudices. 
 
 
Figure 9.1 - Iterative Analysis of a Text 
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Coding was iterative, meaning codes were shared across the sample, texts were revisited, and 
codes were revised, further specified and grouped as analysis progressed (see: Figure 9.2).  In 
practice, meaning units for a single code were frequently reviewed and revised as 
contradictory meaning arose within a single code, necessitating the creation of two or more 
new, more specific SC.  The concept of meaning units as presented in Patterson and Williams 
(2002) is somewhat problematic, as sentences are described as “complete thoughts,” implying 
a sentence has a single clearly defined meaning.  In research in which participants are exposed 
to unfamiliar phenomena such as PHM, contradictions and incomplete thoughts should be 
expected as the participant comes to understand the new technology.97  Recognising this, 
multiple SC were often assigned to a single meaning unit to show different possible 
interpretations, reflecting the fact that meaning units are not subject to a single ‘correct’ 
interpretation. 
Participants occasionally shared experiences that revealed an interesting aspect of their 
background as a caregiver, patient or healthcare provider.  Although not explicitly a claim 
about PHM, these types of statements were important in understanding the meaning behind 
the participant’s other statements. 
9.2.2.5.1 Step 5a - Translation98 
To assess the legitimacy of claims made during interviews, translation occurred during 
substantive coding.  Translation is both a description of how uncertain normative claims are 
evaluated in a discourse, and a procedural step to be undertaken in substantive coding.  The 
procedure required identifying the ‘normative truth content’ of claims made in a discourse 
about uncertain future events.  Legitimacy was assessed according to the components of an 
uncertain normative claim described above, concerning characteristics of a particular future, 
the participant’s reaction to it and the values grounding the reaction (see: Section 7.3.2.5). 
To ensure the normative truth content of a translated claim is as accurate as possible, flaws in 
the participant’s description of the future were discussed whenever possible during the 
                                                          
97
 Contradictions may also signal an ethical tradeoff or ‘inherent duality’ (see: Section 3.3.2).  
Contradictions were practically useful in the sense that they indicated topics the researcher should 
probe further during interviews.  Incomplete thoughts and contradictory positions are important in this 
regard to hermeneutics dialogue as a process in which participant and researcher interpret and discuss 
unfamiliar phenomena, hopefully emerging with a ‘fusion of horizons’ in which both have reached a 
novel understanding of the phenomenon under discussion. 
98
 Translation is only necessary when researching ethical aspects of potential futures, whereas the rest 
of the analysis method is applicable to other types of qualitative hermeneutics research.   
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interview to ensure the reaction of the participant was not based on fantasy or 
misinterpretation of the technology’s potential.  Factors that may have changed the 
participant’s reaction were also discussed, such as the (mis)match between patient values and 
the strategies of medical institutions and clinicians concerning PHM (see: Section 5.2), the 
expectations of patients regarding ‘good’ healthcare, and the potential uses of the technology.  
The role of telehealth and telecare in DH strategy was discussed with some participants to 
ground the discussion in potential implications within the English context. 
Translation helped eliminate uncertain claims based on misunderstandings of the potential of 
PHM or descriptions of how PHM may be used in the future which lacked even a minimal 
grounding in current development or NHS strategy.  With such ‘implausible normative claims’ 
separated, the remaining ‘legitimate normative claims’ were understood as reactions to 
potential futures with at least minimal plausibility.  Following this, translation was completed 
by assigning substantive codes to the claims describing the participant’s reaction to a potential 
future and, whenever possible, the value(s) underlying the reaction according to the 
participant’s responses to questioning in the interview. 
Substantive coding and translation marked the final steps in the analysis of any single text.  A 
visual representation of the analysis of a single text can be seen in Figure 9.1.  A brief summary 
of the issues, concepts and claims made by the participant was written after analysing each 
text.  The following steps moved on to comparing codes and identifying relationship between 
multiple texts. 
9.2.2.6 Step 6 - Grouping  
During and immediately following the substantive coding of a text, initial groupings of SC 
consisting of legitimate normative claims were created and iteratively revised as analysis 
proceeded, using headings such as ‘privacy’, ‘clinical relationship’, ‘data processing’, 
‘surveillance’ and other elements of the conceptual framework and themes identified in the 
literature review.  The purpose of grouping was to iteratively identify relationships between 
the codes as the researcher moved between texts to assist in further analysis and the 
identification of new insights in the next step of analysis (see: Figure 9.2).  Groupings were 




Figure 9.2 - Iterative Analysis of Multiple Texts 
9.2.2.7 Step 7 – Final Review and Identification of Outliers 
During final review, SC were placed into final groupings created from the conceptual 
framework and results of the literature review.  An ‘outliers’ group was created to account for 
claims which could not be understood through the conceptual framework or themes from the 
literature review.  In this way the increasingly specific SC were reconstructed into meaningful 
groupings that revealed possible approaches to understanding the meaning of a particular 
ethical issue or concept according to participants.  The strength of this approach is that it 
requires a clear distinction for claims concerning relationships between those which are 
explicable within the conceptual framework, and those outliers challenging its explanatory 
power. 
9.2.3 Discussion of Analysis Method 
As hinted at in the figures above, the method of data analysis can be understood as a 
hermeneutic circle (see: Section 6.1.3.2.2), meaning data collection and analysis were iterative.  
The hermeneutic circle describes the structure of the hermeneutic dialogue which occurred 
during data collection and data analysis, in which the researcher's preconceptions and the 
phenomenon studied interact (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.27).  The structure of analysis as 
presented in Figures 9.1 and 9.2 shows a type of hermeneutic circle, in which the researcher’s 
understanding of potential ethical implications of PHM concerning personal and medical 
relationships develops iteratively through analysing and revisiting the texts of local 
practitioners.  In this sense the hermeneutic circle is a name given to hermeneutic data 
analysis, which proceeds through a simultaneously holistic and deconstructive reading of a 
text.  A holistic view of the text provides an initial understanding of the phenomenon to the 
researcher, and informs the interpretation of separate parts of the text (Patterson & Williams 
2002, p.27).  The process becomes a circle when the interpretation of separate parts of the 
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text leads to re-interpreting the text as a whole, and the interpretation of other texts leads to 
reinterpreting the original text. 
9.2.3.1 Reviewing Hermeneutic Interpretation 
Although all forms of interpretive research recognise the inherent subjectivity of explanations 
of the world, validation, or the search for common ground between these explanations that 
convince us of their credibility, cannot be abandoned entirely if pragmatic evaluations of the 
relative credibility of research are to be possible.  Particular interpretations cannot be seen as 
absolutely or objectively true—hence the picture of understanding as a never-ending circle in 
which the understanding of a phenomenon improves through endless openness to new 
interpretations and evidence.  Despite never arriving at static conclusions, hermeneutic 
understanding (and research) can facilitate ‘cooperative life’ by establishing mutual 
understanding through dialogue (see: Section 6.1.3). 
Recognising this, some form of review was required if the analysis of the empirical data is to be 
seen as reliable and persuasive (see: Section 6.3.2).  Interpretations of claims can be more or 
less credible according to how close the researcher’s interpretation comes to the ‘original’ 
meaning of the participant, supported by the text itself and the participant’s other claims.  
Review steps were built into analysis to force the researcher to compare his interpretations of 
the meaning of the participant’s statements against the participant’s actual words.   
Review occurred in three ways.  First, in the analysis of any individual text, substantive coding 
was not the endpoint.  The text was re-read as a whole to check that the researcher’s 
substantive codes represented a reasonable interpretation of specific statements within a 
holistic view of the text.   Second, as substantive codes were revised and grouped across 
multiple texts, individual examples of each code were compared against the matching 
organisational code to check that the revised code or grouping still matched the participant’s 
words.  When it did not, either a new substantive code was created or a note was made which 
explained the reasoning behind the researcher’s interpretation despite the mismatch.  Third, 
the researcher’s coding was reviewed by the supervision team to ensure the coding 
represented a reasonable interpretation of the data, even when other plausible 
interpretations were identified.  The possibility of alternative interpretations is to be expected 
among individuals with different backgrounds which provide a different ‘lens’ through which 
the data can be viewed.  The review process ensured that alternative interpretations of the 
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data were considered, helping the researcher to arrive at increasingly credible interpretations 
of the data through dialogue with reviewers. 
Credibility as used here is not a synonym for ‘true’.  Rather, it means that the researcher’s 
interpretation matches the words of the participant in some way.  As an example, the 
statement “I am a very private person” uttered in response to a question about being 
‘watched’ by a camera could be reasonably interpreted as meaning “I value being left alone,” 
or “I value my independence from others,” or “I don’t want to be watched” if it was uttered in 
response to a question about surveillance.  Interpreting this same statement as “I dislike the 
company of others” or “Privacy is my most important value” is less reasonable because the 
statement does not compare the relative importance of particular values or refer to social 
attitudes beyond the immediate topic of dialogue (surveillance).  Reasonable interpretations 
rely upon an understanding of the text as a whole and the participant as a socially embodied 
person with a particular history and set of values.  Supporting arguments are required when 
interpretations vary significantly from the actual words uttered by the participant. 
9.2.3.2 Theoretical Outliers in Coding 
Coding with two types of codes to separate the participant’s voice from the researcher’s voice 
facilitates reflexivity in the presentation of results.  OC and SC can be understood as the 
difference between the researcher describing the participant’s world as accurately as possible 
for the reader (imperfect as this account necessarily must be), and the subsequent 
interpretation of that world within a specific framework of prejudices.  This is not to suggest 
the former is objective and the latter subjective; the researcher’s prejudices necessarily 
influence any encounter with and interpretation of the participant’s lifeworld.  Instead, the 
difference is that SC attempt to fit the participant’s statements into the researcher’s 
framework of understanding so as to identify outliers or unfamiliar experiences and 
interpretations which can subsequently expand the conceptual framework beyond its current 
limitations. 
9.2.4 Conclusions 
The data analysis method described above allows for fair consideration and questioning of 
uncertain normative claims in discourse (see: Figure 9.3).  The outcome of this method for data 
analysis is testing and refinement of the conceptual framework concerning ethical implications 
of PHM for personal and medical relationships.  The purpose of the study was to identify the 
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current limitations of the conceptual framework.  Recognising this, the discussion of results 
distinguishes between claims about relationships which can be explained within the current 




Figure 9.3 - Data Analysis Method and Outcomes 
9.3  Results 
As the approach to data analysis taken here is based in hermeneutics, a clear distinction 
between ‘results’ and interpretation or ‘discussion’ of results would be inappropriate; instead, 
analysis of claims made by participants are considered alongside the claims themselves.  
Interpretive presentation of empirical results has been called for in qualitative hermeneutics 
research (Patterson & Williams 2002, p.63).  In line with the ‘persuasiveness’ quality criteria 
described above (see: Section 6.3.2), the quotes and summaries of the data presented here are 
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meant to show how the researcher reached his interpretation of the claims made by 
participants. 
The results are discussed from the perspective of ethical implications of PHM on personal and 
medical relationships.  In practical terms this means that wherever possible participants’ 
claims are related back to relationships and the conceptual framework.  Not all of the claims 
made by participants can be understood in terms of implications of PHM on relationships.  In 
itself this was not a surprising result because interview topics were participant-led (see: 
Section 6.2.4).  The presentation of results is limited to those claims which relate to ethical 
aspects of personal and medical relationships mediated by PHM.  Results concerning 
relationships were considered within the conceptual framework.  Connections between the 
framework and results are identified in terms of the framework’s ability to explain the 
concerns expressed by participants.  Where the framework lacks explanatory power, the need 
to refine the framework on the basis of the claims of participants is considered.  The need for 
refinement is identified whenever a legitimate normative claim about PHM-mediated 
relationships is encountered which cannot be explained within the conceptual framework in its 
current form (see: Chapter 7). 
9.3.1 Self-Care vs. Improved Care 
PHM was viewed by many participants as justified if it benefits the user’s medical care.  A 
common assumption was that PHM data would be sent to the GP to improve the user’s care, 
which justified its adoption: 
DP4: “That would be okay because basically he's [the GP] here to help me, so anything 
I can do to help him to help me, it's got to be a good thing, doesn't it?... I can see that 
is to my benefit, because if they weren't happy with any of that, I assume that they'd 
go right to me and say you need to make an appointment…I can't really think of 
anything that a monitor would monitor that I may not want them to know, because I 
just feel at the end of the day that it's to my benefit.” 
 
DP1: “Well, yeah, because he's treating me, he's trying to make me better.  What's the 
point of him not knowing what I'm really doing?” 
 
The position taken by DP1 suggests that monitoring in the patient’s lifeworld is justified 
because it provides clinicians with a better, or more complete, picture of the patient’s health, 
tracked through physiological and behavioural monitoring.  The assumption that PHM is 
primarily used to improve medical care conflicts with the strategic justification for monitoring 
concerning efficiency, where (technologies enabling) shared responsibility for medical care are 
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increasingly valued (see: Section 5.4.1.2).  Evidence of the strategic movement towards self-
care seen above was seen in the responses of some of the professional participants.  PHM was 
described as a tool to provide increasingly interactive services to patients: 
CC2:  "It's being able to work with patients to create a capacity, a service by which we 
can all work together to manage the condition." 
 
CC3:  "There is scepticism in the UK about using health monitoring systems and 
actually delegating care to patients, to be much more involved and responsible for 
their care.  So we've moved away I think in the UK from a paternalistic model of care 
to much more engagement."  
 
CC3 described this movement towards patient engagement as desirable, with PHM being one 
tool among many to encourage personal responsibility and self-care.   CC2 believed PHM helps 
patients take control of illness management and medical relationships by being able to contact 
their care team when something is wrong, either according to how they feel or to the readings 
taken by PHM.  This attitude is informed by her experience managing a telehealth programme 
for COPD patients, which involved regular contact with a nurse practitioner via a screen 
connected to the device.  The potential for PHM to increase contact with health professionals 
cuts both ways—patients may have an easier time contacting providers, but providers may 
simultaneously be overwhelmed by requests from patients (for example, based on worries 
relating to normal fluctuations), inhibiting the prioritisation of provider time for the ‘neediest’ 
patients.  While it is assumed in strategy that patient engagement leads to better health 
outcomes, the potential for PHM to overwhelm care services through patient engagement and 
data collection suggests controls are necessary to limit the newly created burdens placed on 
clinicians and institutions to protect against reducing the quality of care provided. 
9.3.1.1 Patient Feedback 
A central component of self-care which gives rise to the above risks is personalised feedback 
based on PHM data, which was seen as desirable by five patient participants due to the 
possibility of personalised recommendations for illness management outside of clinical 
encounters.  Feedback was seen as improving the user’s feeling of controlling their illness, 
quite apart from whether physiological changes actually result from lifestyle modification, 
because it allows for comparisons between perceived and actual behaviours as captured by 
the system.  As explained by DP3, a ‘behaviour log’ allows the patient to identify 
inconsistencies between perception and reality in terms of, for example, miles run, calories 
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eaten or time spent on the couch.  With that said, feedback does not automatically improve 
illness management or increase motivation for self-care: 
DP1:  “Do you think people would use it for that? Because people, I mean, I know 
people who've got the machines now that test the blood and do the strips. And they 
monitor their sugar levels are high but they don’t actually do anything to rectify it.” 
 
In contrast to the supportive attitude shown by many participants towards feedback and self-
care, as suggested by DP2 feedback may be seen as ‘nagging’ by individuals less motivated to 
change their behaviour in response to a health condition.  These claims suggest PHM may be 
welcomed by motivated patients as a tool of self-care or reassurance, but seen as annoying by 
others. 
Feedback may also contribute to health obsession in users (see: Section 3.3.5), particularly if 
users can access raw data rather than clinical analyses of the data (see: Section 9.3.3.1).  HP1 
and HP5 felt ‘always-on’ blood pressure monitoring should only be offered as a temporary 
measure because of the potential for users to become obsessed with minor fluctuations in 
readings.  Similarly, DC5 felt preventative monitoring would lead to paranoia and health 
obsession, saying that in some cases “the less you know, the better” because you worry less 
about potential health complications.  CC1 mirrored this sentiment, saying PHM can ruin this 
“happy ignorance” by revealing unknown health conditions or showing that a treatment or 
lifestyle choice is not as helpful as originally thought. 
9.3.1.2 Information Overload and the Burdens of Providing Feedback 
PHM may improve relationships with patients by collecting clinically relevant data (DS1).  This 
line of reasoning is only coherent if the data provided by PHM can be incorporated into clinical 
encounters effectively, meaning sorting and analysis does not overburden the clinician.  The 
potential for information overload was recognised by all of the disease specialists and care 
commissioners as a serious risk associated with PHM—primary care is said to already be 
“drowning in data” (CC1).  The risk is so great because without effective data handling 
feedback cannot be provided to patients, degrading the healing relationship: 
CC1: “The more data we generate, the implication is that somebody's going to do 
something, somebody's going to look at it and do something with it and it only 
becomes meaningful when you attach a meaning to it...what's concerning for 
everybody is the idea that if we deploy at scale a variety of devices and people are 
doing as we ask them to do, that is ‘I'd like you to use this device, I'd like you to upload 
some of your data’, then the implication is that somebody's going to look at that and 
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somebody's going to analyse it and evaluate it and attach a meaning to it, and that 
consequent upon that meaning being identified somebody's going to feedback to the 
patients.” 
 
Questions were raised by patients regarding the capacity of clinicians to analyse the data: 
HP3: “Would my GP want to look at it? [pause] You know, if all the patients had 
something like this, he'd spend all his time looking in the screen, wouldn't he? 
Different data for different patients. Would he bother to do that, do you think?” 
 
DP4: “And there's no chance of them checking it [PHM data], because you saw how 
busy GPs in the surgeries are, because they’d be annoyed if you sort of did it, and then 
they just said, oh, that, yeah, well we haven't got time to look at that.” 
 
An example of the burden created by PHM data can be seen in current handling of glucose 
monitoring data.  According to CC1, when glucose readings are brought to a clinical encounter 
by patients they are rarely analysed by the clinician due to a lack of time—“there’s a big loop 
there to be closed, that’s a real concern.”  This problem can be transferred to PHM which 
provides users with greater quantities of clinically relevant readings.  As mentioned by DS2, 
the burdens of processing PHM data create a need to “pass responsibility to patients” for care 
wherever possible.    
9.3.1.3 Decontextualisation and Access to Medical Records 
Other practical risks relate to how PHM data is treated by care teams responsible for remote 
monitoring, assessment and feedback.  Unless PHM is deployed in a “clinically coherent” way, 
it may create more work and make the patient more anxious without actually delivering on 
efficiency goals in terms of hospital admissions or other factors (CC1).  Concerning the 
possibilities for decontextualisation created by PHM, CC1 felt that clinicians assessing PHM 
data will require access to the user’s complete care record to account for effects of other 
medical conditions or history.  The patient may have other conditions or symptoms unrelated 
to the condition for which they are given telehealth.  Any deployment of telehealth requires 
complete clinical information so that correct meaning can be attached to the readings.  As a 
result, patients may be forced to accept further sharing of personal health data to ensure 
assessment of PHM data is personalised to the patient’s unique medical history. 
9.3.1.4 Losing the Socially Embodied Patient in Commissioning PHM 
CC1 described how commissioning operates with regards to determining the cost-effectiveness 
of a device used to justify its usage.  The costs of certain outcomes such as emergency 
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admissions are clearly measurable so the outcomes of PHM in this regard can be computed 
and figured into business cases.  Things that cannot be 'costed' so easily, such as the ‘value’ of 
human touch and speech or the quality of a clinical encounter, are more difficult to ‘weigh’ 
against other outcomes of PHM and may be given less importance when choosing how and 
when PHM will be adopted through commissioning.  This aspect of commissioning suggests 
that social, emotional and psychological aspects of health and medical care do not inform 
institutional decisions to use PHM to the same degree as cost-effectiveness factors.  This 
situation creates the possibility for unjustified deployments of the technology inappropriately 
matched to contexts of use, and can be seen as an example of decontextualisation in 
technology deployment or care commissioning.  The danger presented is that monitoring may 
be seen as justified in terms of costs, when aspects of health care that cannot be easily costed 
have not been given fair consideration in the decision to deploy monitoring because they 
cannot be conceived of in terms of quantities or cost-effectiveness. 
9.3.1.5 Improved Clinical Outcomes and Ethical Tradeoffs 
By introducing PHM into medical relationships for the sake of efficiency, NHS health 
professionals and medical institutions may be forcing users into adoption decisions 
characterised by ethical tradeoffs (see: Sections 3.2.3.1 and 3.3.2).  Among participants who 
hypothetically agreed to adopt PHM when asked, most saw monitoring as justified when it 
makes a clear difference to the health of the user, meaning health (or safety) overrides the 
ethical concerns seen above relating to control, privacy, autonomy, medicalisation, behaviour 
inhibition and other concerns expressed in the study.  For example, DC5 was troubled by a 
perceived loss of privacy through monitoring, but saw it as justified for her husband whose 
dementia justified the intrusion.  For her, being monitored for health is being monitored “for 
the right reasons.”  DP1 similarly saw monitoring as violating her privacy and the privacy of 
people entering her house, but felt its benefits in terms of providing behavioural feedback and 
potentially improving self-management of her diabetes outweighed these problems (cf. 
Courtney et al. 2008, p.198).  HP4 expressed the tradeoff as the “intrusiveness” of 
physiological monitoring being justified if it provides her GP with a better idea of why her BP is 
high. 
CC1 spoke of an “unspoken psychological contract” which exists between patients and 
clinicians when entering into medical care, described as a type of “bargain” in which the 
patient relinquishes private information to the clinician for medical care: 
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CC1: "It's something peculiar about the nature of healthcare, we make those bargains 
all the time, we give up a certain amount of autonomy or independence or privacy or 
in some cases a little bit of dignity, and we imagine that the tradeoff is that this is part 
of what's necessary for me to either be reassured about my health or actually treated 
or monitored...it's an interesting question how we sell these things at the outset.  We 
have a negotiation that goes on when we introduce the device...there probably needs 
to be some kind of conversation." 
 
The bargain described is similar to the healing relationship described above (see: Section 
4.3.2.1).  PHM is seen as requiring the same type of bargain in which the user must 
“accommodate the device” to receive care.  CC1 compared PHM to existing intrusions by 
district nurses into the homes of patients requiring in-home care.  Such intrusions (PHM 
included) are justified because the nurses, or PHM, are there “by invitation,” meaning the user 
consents to their presence.  A clear connection can be seen with ethical tradeoffs described 
above (see: Section 3.2.3.1), although this sort of bargaining was rarely mentioned by 
participants in the study. 
9.3.2 Surveillance 
Many of the claims raised by participants can be understood within theories of surveillance 
included in the conceptual framework (see: Section 4.4).  Patients overwhelmingly expressed 
concerns over surveillance and cameras through invoking ‘Big Brother’, which  was identified 
earlier as an inappropriate metaphor of PHM (see: Section 4.4.1).  For example: 
DC1: “I have quite contradictory reaction to it, to be honest.  Uhh..on the one hand, it 
sounds very Big Brother, you know, ‘1984’ (pause) and I can see that it could be seen 
as an invasion of someone's privacy and then also, dignity for people.”  
 
By definition ‘Big Brother’ refers to a centralised form of surveillance; in Orwell’s 1984 
surveillance is carried out by the four government ‘Ministries’ to monitor and control the 
thoughts and behaviours of citizens.  In transferring the metaphor to medical care in England, 
patients appear to be envisioning centralised surveillance carried out by the NHS or the 
government unified under a single organisational hierarchy.  In reality, the implementation of 
PHM is heterogeneous, carried out by diverse NHS trusts, CCGs or other medical institutions 
(see: Section 5.3) with only strategic support for diffusion being centralised (see: Section 5.2).  
In part this confusion may be explained by patient ignorance of how commissioning and 
diffusion processes work in the NHS, seen for example in DC1’s concern that “some nebulous 
person” would hold be able to collect and store data about her via PHM.  However, the view of 
centralised surveillance taken by patients may be realistic if data is increasingly centralised by 
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the NHS for cost-savings or security (e.g. Department of Health 2010b).  If centralised 
databases are also searchable, surveillance is increasingly possible.  Similar outcomes are 
possible if care commissioning is increasingly centralised, for example through adherence to 
NICE guidelines (see: Section 5.3). 
A perception of being watched was connected to the Big Brother metaphor.  DC5 described 
monitoring behaviour and health patterns as a “bit like Big Brother watching you.”  HP3 
thought monitoring would be “intrusive” because “you couldn't do anything without being 
monitored all the time.”  HP4 identified problems specific to behaviour monitoring, describing 
it as “weird” because “it’s a bit like Big Brother watching you.”  Similar concerns were not 
expressed over blood pressure monitoring, despite recognising that physiological monitoring is 
“the same.”  DP4 described monitoring as “feeling kind of like being watched 24/7,” despite 
recognising that it may be used for her benefit.  Similarly, DC1 thought that monitored 
individuals “would think they are being watched all the time” to monitor adherence to 
recommended interventions, such as an exercise regime. 
9.3.2.1 Behaviour Modification  
The perception of being watched was perceived by participants as inhibiting their autonomy or 
behavioural freedom.  Many participants claimed that the feeling like they were being watched 
through the monitors would cause them to change their behaviour in response, similar to what 
was described as colonisation above (see: Section 3.4.1): 
DC2: “You wouldn't want to think that people were looking at you in your own home.  
And, so if, if someone's looking in your home, then you feel that you have to do 
something differently.”  
 
Environmental monitors were seen as ‘controlling’ the user, meaning the monitoring system 
was seen as inhibiting decisional and behavioural freedom: 
DP1: “I'm not the sort of person that likes to be controlled. You know what I mean? I 
like to know what I'm doing and be myself, be able to sort things out without 
interference.” 
 
DP3 claimed that monitors would prevent her elderly father “from relaxing, from being 
himself” in his home.  She went on to say PHM would feel like "Little Brother" or a third person 
constantly present in the home, comparing it to staying in someone else's home or acting in 
different ways depending on who is in her house:  “As much as they want you to be 
relaxed...you are different."  This inability to relax in the home was described as a form of 
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stress induced by monitoring, and was a main reason why DP3 rejected the prospect of 
monitoring the home with environmental monitors. 
The potential for behaviour modification was not seen entirely negatively, as suggested by 
enthusiasm for personalised feedback contributing to desirable changes in lifestyle among 
users (see: Section 9.3.1.1).  For instance, HP4 thought monitors may have a positive effect on 
behaviour by making users more active if they feel they are being watched.  Similarly, 
providing PHM data to clinicians was thought to create a pressure on patients to adhere to 
treatment recommendations.  The pressure would not necessarily be unwelcome or change 
HP4’s relationship with her GP. 
9.3.2.1.1 Acclimation to PHM 
Although PHM may initially inhibit behaviour due to the perception of being watched, the 
effect of PHM on behaviour may fade over time as the user ‘gets used to’ PHM (see: Section 
3.2.4): 
DC2: “It's sort of somebody in your home, I suppose. I don't know. Yes, I suppose you 
wouldn't be acting naturally, unless, of course, you got used to it after a time, like 
everything.” 
 
DC5 and DP4 made similar claims, with the latter comparing PHM to a smart water meter 
which causes the person to use less water (or change their behaviour) when first installed, but 
after a time the user will “forget it’s there.”  Once PHM has been ‘forgotten’, normal behaviour 
may resume: 
DP4: “So I think you can live more normally once you've got accustomed to having it 
there. You know, rather than thinking, better be careful cause I've got the camera 
there.” 
 
DC1: “I suppose in time, you’d forget the cameras were there and you’d behave 
perfectly normally.” 
 
An interesting aspect of the concerns relating to behaviour modification is that PHM was often 
described as a ‘camera’; five participants specifically mentioned that cameras were not 
acceptable as part of a monitoring system, distinguishing visual data from other types of data 
collected by PHM.   In comparing PHM to CCTV, the ‘camera’ metaphor suggests PHM requires 
a human operator or ‘watcher’ to work.  For instance, DP3 saw PHM as “other humans beings 
monitoring and discussing and watching” the user, which implies that an interested human 
watcher will be on the other end of the monitor either actively watching or analysing the 
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incoming data.  This perception conflicts with the worry that GPs will not have time or a desire 
to analyse PHM data as seen above (see: Section 9.3.1.2).  
9.3.2.2 Social Sorting 
Social sorting, or categorising users according to PHM data which may fail to present a full 
picture of the user’s situation, was recognised as a problem by commissioners.  CC1 agreed 
that social sorting is a potential risk for PHM, meaning a patient’s identity may be affected in 
terms of self-identity or how the patient is viewed by health professionals if patients are 
sorted (for example, in PHM trials) according to pre-existing groups defined against clinical 
characteristics.  According to CC1 it is not always clear whether commissioners create “silos” or 
categories into which patients are forced because they fit the aims of the commissioners, or 
whether these groups are well-defined against clinical evidence. Providing someone with PHM 
designed to treat a certain type of patient (or as part of a programme targeting certain 
patients) classifies them as, or causes them to be viewed as an example of, that clinical 
category.  This in turn has implications for the identity of the user, who may come to identify 
as that categorisation, which may be influenced as much by the politics of commissioning as it 
is by clinical realities.  This problem can be understood as impinging the user’s ability to control 
self-identity; PHM data allows for the patient to be increasingly clinically categorised, 
colonising the patient’s identity with medical concerns and limiting how they are treated by 
medical professionals with access to their medical record.  Patients come to be seen and 
treated ‘as’ a certain type of patient. 
According to CC2, the greatest potential for PHM to contribute to categorisation of patients 
exists in relation to systems currently used for risk stratification by GPs.  If PHM data can be 
‘fed’ into these systems to help in identifying risk factors, the potential for PHM data to 
connected to existing health records and used to categorise patients into clinical categories 
greatly increases.  As argued above (see: Section 4.4.3), the categorisation of patients 
according to risk is problematic in the sense that it limits the choices available to patients and 
contributes to colonisation of self-identity with medical concerns. 
9.3.3 Control 
The themes identified thus far have been explicable within the conceptual framework.  In 
contrast, a recurring theme throughout the data which suggests limitations of the framework 
is how PHM affects ‘control’ exercised by patients, clinicians and institutions in relationships.  
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Control is related to power in personal and medical relationships.  In exercising control over 
PHM or its data users are inhibiting the actions of others towards them; a comparison with 
patient empowerment in doctor-patient relationships is appropriate (cf. Emanuel & Emanuel 
1992).  For instance, if a user chooses to switch a monitor off for a period of time, data 
custodians are denied information about the patient during that period, meaning the patient 
cannot be evaluated. 
Control can relate to physical control over PHM systems, the collection and transmission of 
data including when and how monitoring occurs and how the data is used in medical care, and 
the shifts in power seen in PHM-mediated relationships in which stakeholders gain greater 
relative access to information or opportunities to influence the behaviour of others.  PHM was 
seen in several contexts as enhancing the user’s ability to control or manage their illness 
through monitoring physiological parameters and the effects of interventions, for example as 
mentioned by DP1 in relation to PHM providing real-time glucose monitoring.  For DP2 using 
PHM would be justified if it allowed for earlier preventative measures or interventions, for 
example by providing an earlier warning of a hypoglaecemic attack.  In this sense control is 
linked both to illness management and the perceived benefit to the health and safety of the 
user. 
9.3.3.1 Empowerment and Honesty 
Control can contribute to patient empowerment in the doctor-patient relationship.  Three 
participants viewed unrestricted user access to PHM data as a necessity in maintaining control 
over the doctor-patient relationship, meaning the patient would be on an equal playing field in 
terms of access to evidence used in support of a diagnosis or treatment recommendations.  
This is not to say patients require access to potentially confusing raw data—rather, data should 
be provided matching the patient’s level of expertise.  For DP2, who has extensive experience 
with home glucose monitoring, access to the raw data provided by a PHM glucose monitor was 
seen as necessary to provide him with an equivalent evidence-base for argumentation when 
disagreements occurred with his physician.  This concern presupposes a model of the doctor-
patient relationship in which the patient is an equal partner in decision-making (cf. Emanuel & 
Emanuel 1992), rather than the patient deferring to the expertise of the physician as a matter 
of practice.  For HP1, access to simplified PHM data via a blood pressure chart mapped across 
‘normal’ ranges (e.g. Appendix A15.1) was seen as acceptable because it would allow him to 
locate where exactly in the ‘normal’ range his readings fell.  A similar attitude was evident in 
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DP1 who prefers “specifics to a general ‘You’re OK’” when monitoring exercise as part of her 
current treatment regime. 
In all three situations access to the data empowers the patient by keeping the doctor ‘honest’ 
in the healing relationship (see: Section 4.3.3), meaning the patient is provided with sufficient 
data to understand and question the doctor’s assessment.  DP1 saw PHM data as allowing her 
to question her GP’s assessment of her blood pressure: 
DP1: “Do you know what I mean? I-, I would be interested in it all, that's the thing. 
Umm, so, yeah, I mean, I don't think I would be happy with, 'Your blood pressure has 
been OK for this month.' Uhh, because OK can be top of the OK range, it could be 
lower.” 
 
HP1 thinks this use of PHM data can help “keep doctors honest because they won’t say 
something is fine when a reading is not.”  This type of empowerment is interpreted as a form 
of control because in negotiating access to his data, the user is learning what the monitoring 
system is telling others about his health and behaviour.  Access to data is seen as necessary to 
feel “in control” of the relationship, meaning the patient is in a better position to understand 
and question the physician’s assessment.  Although physicians may wish to limit user access to 
data to safeguard patients from making bad decisions without the input of a clinician, for DP1 
this model of data access is ethically problematic because it takes control of the relationship 
away from the user. 
Alternatively, PHM data can be used to keep patients honest in clinical encounters by 
demonstrating whether they have done what they claim, limiting the patient’s ability to lie to 
clinicians.  In this sense the patient’s account is controlled by the physician, again forcing an 
honest discourse.  For DS1 this aspect of PHM may prove very beneficial to clinical encounters 
because it allows clinicians with limited time to prioritise care to patients willing to ‘make an 
effort’ and follow recommendations.   According to DS1 clinicians already know that patients 
lie in clinical encounters but often lack a way to broach the subject—PHM data could therefore 
provide a means for identifying inconsistencies in the patient’s verbal account “allowing an 
honest discussion.”  Honesty would be beneficial for patients in terms of health outcomes 
while allowing clinicians to prioritise time to needy patients.  DS1 went as far to recommend 
specifically monitoring treatment adherence, allowing for consequences for non-adherence in 
clinical encounters.  However, DS1 was doubtful that patients would initially understand that 
PHM provides clinicians the opportunity to identify lies.  While this could potentially violate 
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the patient’s ‘right’ to lie to clinicians, for DS1 and CC1 the need to consent to monitoring 
means the patient is also consenting to having their ability to lie reduced by sharing PHM data 
with clinician—however, this position is only tenable if consent is truly uncoerced. 
This attitude towards the patient’s right to lie is problematic because it does not recognise the 
patient’s need to hide embarrassing or sensitive information, which is instead revealed by 
PHM.  By taking away control over what data is shared, PHM is potentially embarrassing or 
distressing the patient.  Furthermore this position presumes forcing the user into a tradeoff 
between monitoring and controlling dissemination about one’s behaviours is ethically 
acceptable.  This effect of PHM can be seen as reducing the patient’s control over their verbal 
account to clinicians by providing an alternative set of data for evaluation of the behaviours of 
the patient outside of the hospital or GP office, while potentially improving diagnosis and 
treatment by preventing unjustified increases in medication doses due to perceived 
ineffectiveness based on the patient’s verbal account, for example.  For DP2 the patient must 
be provided equal access to their data so that the patient has evidence to argue from when 
disagreements occur. 
9.3.3.2 The Need to Disable Monitoring 
Control was also seen in relation to physical control over monitors.  The simple ability to switch 
off monitoring is central to maintaining control over PHM.  Four participants identified an 
‘on/off’ switch as a necessary feature because it would allow them to disable monitoring when 
desired, allowing the user to retain a sense of control over the home, for example by disabling 
monitoring when family members or friends are present: 
DC1: “The other thing I think you see is, that there will be occasions when there’s not 
just you, the person with dementia and the carer in the home.  There will be instances 
when friends will be visiting or relatives, or, you know.  Uh, and, again, you know, is it 
an invasion of that privacy?” 
 
Disabling monitoring was linked to lessening privacy concerns by DC1 and DC5 by allowing the 
user to switch off data collection during private or embarrassing moments.  Concerning the 
type of data collected, HP3 felt a “cut-off point…an area that you don’t go beyond for personal 
reasons” would be required to prevent monitoring users at inappropriate times, such as in bed 
or in the bathroom, which could be accomplished through pre-defined temporal or spatial 
limitations on monitoring, or a manual on/off switch. For HP1 the ability to disable monitoring, 
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described as a “correct safeguard” that should be built into monitoring systems, is equivalent 
to the user “having control over the monitors.” 
The ability to switch off PHM may compromise the integrity of data or analysis reliant upon 
changes to physiological parameters over time, meaning its inclusion would create a conflict 
between personal interests in control and clinical interests in high quality data.  In other 
words, each time a user switches off monitoring the quality of service may be degraded.  
Whether uninterrupted data collection is central to quality of service remains to be seen; 
frequent but not constant collection of BP readings, for example, may provide a sufficient basis 
to track fluctuations throughout the day and assess the effectiveness of pharmaceutical or 
behavioural interventions. 
9.3.3.2.1 Inadvertent Monitoring 
A preference for wearable monitors may follow from the need for an on/off switch (see: 
Section 2.3.3).  According to DC1 wearable monitors would be “personal to” her and less likely 
to be “intruding on anyone else.”  Wearable monitors were seen as easily removed or disabled 
compared to environmental monitors: 
DP1: “I would prefer to wear something because then I would feel it wasn’t as 
intrusive because if it decided I didn’t want to use it, I could take it off… I feel as if it’s 
not in my control if it was in the house whereas if it was on me, it’s in my control… I 
think control would be an issue for me.” 
 
Inadvertent monitoring of others (see: Section 3.2.4) may be mitigated by wearable monitors 
or user control over the system, suggesting that systems must be designed so that monitoring 
can be temporarily suspended at the user’s request.  Such a feature allows the user to 
maintain personal relationships with individuals not wishing to be monitored.  DC2 and DP1 
believed that some form of consent should be sought from visitors to monitored environments 
if inadvertent data collection is a possibility.  Even if the potential for inadvertent monitoring is 
eliminated in PHM systems capable of distinguishing between the user and visitors, DP1 felt 
the mere presence of the monitoring system may still make visitors uncomfortable. 
9.3.3.3 Identity of Data Custodians 
Control can also be conceptualised in relation to data sharing.  In this context control can refer 
to choosing which clinicians and institutions receive PHM data, and what type or amount of 
data is transmitted.  The professional role of custodians involved in handling and processing 
PHM data emerged as an important concern.  Four patients indicated that the identity of data 
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custodians must be known before PHM will be adopted.  Medical professionals were 
overwhelmingly accepted as data custodians, with those in the patient’s existing care team 
preferred.  Acceptability was linked to medical training to ensure data custodians possess the 
necessary expertise to assess the health of the user: 
DP4: “As long as I know it's only going to medically trained people or similar, people 
who maybe they're not doctors but they've got the ability to sort out the data and 
everything else.”  
 
Acceptable data custodians beyond the care team were variable across the patient sample.  
When asked, most participants found sharing anonymised data with researchers and NHS 
administrators for secondary uses acceptable.  Private companies were rejected by all 
participants asked about the ethical acceptability of transmitting data beyond NHS institutions.  
HP4, DC2 and DP3 expressed a concern that private companies given identifiable data would 
attempt to “fix” medical problems faced by patients, leading to undesirable advertising 
focused on a patient’s personal medical history.  Similar concerns were not raised about the 
handling of PHM data by the NHS, suggesting broad public health measures (which also seek to 
persuade patients to some degree) are more acceptable than targeted advertising.  
Alternatively, this lack of concern may be explained by the NHS operating on a ‘not for profit’ 
basis, whereas private companies and medical institutions typically operate ‘for profit’. 
9.3.4 Informal Care Relationships and Burdens of Monitoring 
Another theme in the data which reveals limitations of the conceptual framework relates to 
the ethical implications of PHM for informal carers.  Dementia carers involved in the study 
spoke about the burdens faced in adapting to an informal care role and the potential for PHM 
to support carers or create new burdens.  Becoming an informal carer for a person with 
dementia requires coming to understand the disease and its effects on a loved one, and the 
new burdens which must be shoulder in shifting roles from, for example, ‘wife’ or ‘sister’ to 
‘carer’ (cf. Palm 2011).  The introduction of monitoring systems was thought to exacerbate 
changes to the relationship between carer and patient which started when the need for care 
first arose—DC1 saw the technology as “just another symbol” of the changes already occurring 
in the relationship, which can be understood as an example of medicalisation which may 
increase if dependent patients are increasingly kept at home supported by health monitoring 
(see: Sections 5.2 and 8.2.2.1.1): 
261 
 
DC1: “The other thing that does concern me a little bit is that, I know the meaning is to 
keep people with dementia in their home as long as possible, in the community as long 
as possible, but I can't help feeling that, you know, the home almost becomes 
hospitalised, you know, when you start getting these, all of these different aids and 
adaptations to your home… it’s something that (pause) affects not just the person 
being cared for, but the carer, you have to adapt to that, you have to adapt to the fact 
that your home is becoming medicalised.” 
 
Adjusting to a carer role was described as a “slow change.”  DC2 and DC3 compared caring to 
taking care of a child, needing to anticipate dangerous or irresponsible things the patient may 
do as the disease progresses.  Three of the carers interviewed emphasised the difficulties of 
coping with the burdens of caring, while identifying a need for greater support for informal 
carers (e.g. respite services, professional care) from social services or medical institutions, 
perhaps through PHM. 
Informal carers make significant social, economic and emotional sacrifices to provide care, 
such as moving in with an elderly parent to provide care or adjusting work and social schedules 
to the needs of the patient (cf. Palm 2011): 
DC1: “I feel that there's a tremendous loss of identity once you become a carer, you 
know particularly if you had to give up a job to do it.  And with the social isolation that 
often comes with being a carer.  Anything that you feel that robs you of your identity 
that makes you a number I don't know, I don't like the thought of someone being able 
to collect data on me.” 
 
PHM is seen here as contributing to the loss of identity central to caring. A related problem to 
which PHM contributes is the medicalisation of the home through installation of assistive 
devices for the patient.  These types of burdens show that PHM installed to help a dependent 
patient invariably has implications for informal carers as well.  
9.3.4.1 Lack of Choice for Carers 
Carers reported feeling pressure to accept ethical burdens of monitoring for the sake of the 
patient.  According to three carer participants, informal carers cannot seriously consider 
rejecting PHM if monitoring is in the best interests of the patient, suggesting that the burdens 
of monitoring for the carer may become a new unavoidable aspect of informal carer 
relationships: 
DC2: “If it helps the person concerned, then I suppose we [carers] would go along with 
it, with these things.  And if it just keeps them out, people, old people, all the people 
out of these awful homes, then yes, I suppose, yes, we would go along with anything 




DC3: “But it’s, it’s, it’s like having a spy in the house, you know, that’s where the 
stumbling block is, isn’t it?... I'd just feel as though I was just spying. Rather than 
actually making sure she was all right, I would feel as though I was spying on her…I 
would get over it.  Because I would realise that this is necessary and it has to get 
done… I suppose you grow up with it: you don’t spy on people.  It’s not the right thing 
to do.  And I suppose that’s what’s gotten into my mind and I’ve got to get past that.  
For my mother’s safety, and for my peace of mind.” 
 
To extend the lack of choice to the conceptual framework, accepting monitoring for the sake 
of the patient and putting asides one’s interests in privacy or a home free from colonisation 
may become a de facto moral obligation of informal care.  As this suggests the ethical 
implications accepted along with monitoring are not simplistic; PHM may benefit the carer and 
patient, while simultaneously violating the carer’s norms of acceptable behaviour (e.g. not 
‘spying’ on others) or imposing new burdens such a loss of privacy in the home.  The burdens 
of monitoring may also be tangible; DC1 compared the installation of monitoring to installing 
medical devices in the home which help keep the patient safe, but medicalise the home: 
DC1: “It’s like, you know, if you have to put a stair gate in. (pause) I’m not saying it’s 
wrong to do that, I’m just saying, it’s something that affects not just the person being 
cared for, but the carer, you have to adapt to that, you have to adapt to the fact that 
your home is becoming medicalised.” 
 
Although the default position in this ethical tradeoff appears to favour the interests of the 
patient over the carer, this in itself does not justify the burdens placed on the carer—
alternative solutions which reduce the burdens may be possible, including alternative methods 
of supporting the carer and patient (see: Section 3.3.2).  In England carers are implicitly 
expected to increasingly shoulder the burdens of care in the community (cf. Palm 2011; 
Section 5.4.1.2), which may include monitoring for the sake of the patient. 
9.3.4.2 Evaluations of Informal Care 
One of the perceived burdens accompanying PHM was the potential for external evaluations 
of the quality of informal care, against which DC1 was very critical: 
DC1: “It would be fine as long I as I didn’t feel people were looking at it and making 
judgments…home is a very private part of your life, isn’t it?  It’s the one place where, 
you know, uh, you can escape from the world.  I suppose, what I think might be an 
issue would be if, if people felt that this data was being used to judge how good a job 
they were doing with caring for someone.  Like, you know, if it was picking up all the 
person’s stress levels or high anxiety levels, they obviously can’t care for this person 
properly.  Or, you know, this, this person’s wandering about the house and the carer’s 
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still in bed…It smacks of Big Brother to me.  It smacks of people making judgments 
without having the full picture, without knowing the individual who's doing the caring.  
And so, yeah, I don't like the fact that this data could be used to make a judgment 
about how effective someone is as a carer.”   
 
While recognising the need to protect patients from inadequate care, she felt using PHM in 
this way would result in inconclusive or decontextualised evaluations because the context in 
which the care is provided would not be transmitted via monitoring.  The prospect of data 
being out of her control was seen as a problem, meaning she worried that data custodians 
would draw overly critical conclusions of her ability to care based on an incomplete picture of 
the care environment, perhaps without her being aware such decisions are being made by 
data custodians.  DC1 later described this possibility, should it occur, as a “gross invasion of 
[her] privacy.”  Although this can be described as an example of decontextualisation, this 
concept has not yet been applied in the reviewed literature (see: Chapter 3) to informal care 
relationships or a professional medical institution evaluating the care provided by an informal 
carer.   The possibility of ‘decontextualisation in informal care’ can therefore be considered a 
new dimension of the concept, and should be given attention in future research, development, 
deployment and governance of PHM in informal care situations. 
9.4 Discussion 
As the primary purpose of the study was to test and refine the conceptual framework, the 
themes discussed above need to be connected to the explanatory power and limitations of the 
framework in more detail.  Before addressing the framework directly, it is worth considering 
the impact of the findings of the empirical study on the linkages between ethical themes 
identified in the reviewed literature above (see: Section 3.4.2).  Connections identified as 
important or absent from the map according to the findings of the study can help identify 
potential limitations of the framework. 
9.4.1 Cognitive Map 
The results of the empirical study confirm the importance of certain concepts and connections 
in the cognitive map of ethical linkages (see: Figure 9.4), originally created through analysis of 
the reviewed literature above (see: Section 3.4.2), while also requiring certain revisions.  In 
terms of areas confirmed in the findings of the study, the importance of autonomy was 
reaffirmed by patients emphasising the need for feedback to see benefits and feel in control of 
PHM (see: Section 9.3.1.1).  The importance of links between surveillance, medicalisation, 
obtrusiveness and visibility was reaffirmed, as participants expressed concerns regarding the 
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potential for behaviour modification if systems were perceived as ‘spying’ on them, or 
particularly visible or physically/psychologically obtrusive (see: Section 9.3.2).  The power given 
to carers, clinicians and institutions was reaffirmed by concerns over social sorting when PHM 
data is shared with these stakeholders, confirming the link between data sharing, power and 
autonomy (see: Section 9.3.2.2). 
In considering the concepts and links mirrored in the findings of the study, it is worth 
remembering that the data was analysed to test the explanatory power and limitations of the 
framework, meaning known concepts seen as existing beyond the framework (such as privacy) 
may have been important to participants, but not given much attention in the analysis.  This 
potential limitation was an inevitable outcome of focusing on the conceptual framework, while 
seeking to identify unforeseen concepts or issues beyond those seen in the reviewed 
literature.  These ‘outlying’ findings suggested the need for revisions to the map and 
framework alike. 
In terms of revisions, the power of informal carers was separated from that of clinicians and 
institutions to draw attention to the predicted growth in importance of informal carers in 
PHM-mediated relationships with dependent users, and to identify informal carers as non-
professional stakeholders in medical relationships.  A duplex connection was established 
between carers and clinicians/institutions to reflect that as one takes on a greater role in the 
medical relationship reflected in the sharing of PHM data, the role of the other is likely to 
reduce, even if only in terms of the relative proportion of care provided to the patient.  Data 
sharing was linked to feedback to represent the opportunities for clinicians and institutions to 
provide feedback to patients when data is shared among providers of medical care.  Feedback 
contributes to autonomy and control both because it was perceived as empowering the 
patient with greater access to information about their health, creating opportunities for 
behaviour modification, but also because feedback and access to PHM data was perceived as 
keeping clinicians honest (see: Section 9.3.3.1).  Control was added to autonomy to reflect its 
importance in the data (see: Section 9.3.3), despite similarities between the concepts. 
An explanation of the relationship between the cognitive map and conceptual framework has 
been offered above (see: Section 4.1).  The original map created in Chapter 3 (see: Figure 3.2) 
was created solely from the perspective of colonization of the lifeworld, which is related to 
medicalization.  This updated map (Figure 9.4) reflects new links and concerns identified 
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through consideration of the conceptual framework, and the concerns raised by participants in 
the empirical study.  The map, as a tool built from the framework, is intended to assist in 
application-specific analysis in the future by translating the conceptual framework into a ‘mid-
level’ tool more easily applied to the analysis of applications in specific contexts of use.  For 
example, it may be useful to doctors, potential users, developers, or policy-makers to 
understand how different implications of PHM for medical care connect to or contribute to 
each other, thereby helping explain the implications of a specific application in a specific 
context.   
 
Figure 9.4 - Revised Cognitive Map of Linkages between Ethical Themes from the Perspective 




9.4.2 Explanatory Power of the Framework 
Of the claims encountered in the study concerning aspects of relationships, a majority were 
explicable within the conceptual framework (see: Sections 9.3.1 and 9.3.2), suggesting the 
framework is a helpful theoretical tool for understanding the moral potential of PHM.  
Concerning the motivations behind diffusion of PHM (see: Section 9.3.1), a gap exists between 
the motivations for using PHM perceived by patients and professionals.  For patients, PHM is 
seen as a tool to improve clinical care—the purpose of monitoring is to improve the patient’s 
health and medical care.  This finding reaffirms the importance of virtuous medical practice, in 
particular concerning the virtues of fidelity to trust and beneficence (see: Section 4.3.3).  While 
professionals recognise the potential to improve medical care, the primary motivation evident 
in the responses of care commissioners, seen also in DH strategy (see: Section 5.2), is to meet 
efficiency goals, for example reducing the length of hospital visits for COPD patients (cf. 
Steventon et al. 2012) or consumption of residential care resources.  In discussing the 
possibility of PHM with patients, clinicians may have a duty to be honest about the motivations 
behind support for PHM beyond any potential clinical benefits.  Without such honesty 
informed consent cannot be achieved, and practice may fail to be virtuous. 
In the language of cost-efficiency the possibility for PHM to reduce the quality of care is 
evident, meaning reductions in quality may be justifiable by increases in quantity.  Put another 
way, reduced costs may justify reduced quality at sufficient savings levels.  This is not to 
suggest the care commissioners involved in the study are guided by utilitarian calculations 
alone, but rather that the potential for efficiency gains is a chief motivator behind institutional 
support for PHM. 
The conceptual framework helps explain the potential problems caused by this gap; patients 
may be unaware of qualitative changes in the medical care they receive motivated by 
efficiency, assuming instead that PHM, as a new medical technology, must be better than 
existing practice in terms of the quality of care provided.  The importance of efficiency as 
motivating PHM diffusion can be conceptualised as institutional values colonising the internal 
goods of medicine, which while not unprecedented, remains ethically problematic if PHM 
inhibits virtuous practice in the healing relationship, as suggested above (see: Section 4.3.4).  
The risk presented here is that patients may be ‘blissfully unaware’ of the analysis and 
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categorisation made possible by PHM, conceived as a surveillance technology, while being 
reassured of the quality of care provided by PHM by institutional support for the technology.  
Users may not be equipped to understand the ethical implications of PHM in this regard, 
defaulting instead to a position of trusting institutions and clinicians to have their best 
interests in mind in providing care (see: Section 4.3.2.1). 
Concerning the prospects of feedback (see: Section 9.3.1.1), the conceptual framework helps 
explain why PHM creates ethically problematic opportunities for health obsession or 
uninformed decision-making among users.  In existing healing relationships patients access the 
expertise of physicians in clinical encounters, during which the physiology and concerns of the 
patient are assessed and, if necessary, diagnosed.  PHM creates new opportunities for medical 
ICT to analyse health data and feed results back to the user without the oversight of a clinician.  
In contrast to ideal clinical encounters, information received in this way may be misunderstood 
by users, potentially leading to decisions to alter behaviour or interventions ‘uninformed’ by 
the expertise of a clinician.  If clinicians are closely involved with PHM, meaning systems are 
restricted from providing feedback to users without clinical oversight as recommended by care 
commissioners in the study (see: Section 9.3.1), a conflict is created between institutional and 
user interests.  The need for control realised through unrestricted access to personal data 
means that systems cannot be simultaneously restricted and open, making an ‘ideal’ 
deployment respecting the interests of both parties impossible; a balance must be struck 
between the conflicting interests in patient safety and patient control.  This type of balance is a 
new problem for the healing relationship based on PHM acting as a mediator capable of 
providing ‘medical expertise’, or at least personal health information, directly to the patient. 
The framework also helps in understanding the implications of information overload.  To ‘close 
the loop’ concerning the increased work of assessing PHM data,  a member of the care team 
will need to analyse incoming PHM data and contact the patient with feedback and 
recommendations, which creates a significant amount of additional work.  If PHM is to be used 
on a large scale this problem must be addressed.  A possible solution is for PHM to undertake 
some aspect of data analysis, perhaps presenting simplified data or reports to clinicians rather 
than raw data.  However, this possibility raises questions over the algorithms responsible for 
analysis—in effect clinical judgments would be made in proxy by the developers (of PHM 
systems and analysis procedures) who program the system to view a set of data in a certain 
way, for example classifying a particular physiological reading as an emergency requiring 
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immediate attention from health professionals.  Furthermore, institutions which offer 
feedback directly from PHM systems risk liability for incorrect or confusing information causing 
medical problems for patients.  Another possibility is that PHM systems are designed to 
provide information and feedback directly to the users who assume a more prominent role in 
their care, using PHM to support self-care.  In both cases the removal of the physician to some 
degree from the healing relationship suggests ethical problems may arise as new relationships 
are formed between users, systems and non-clinical service providers; for instance, low quality 
feedback or data analysis based on outdated clinical knowledge may be provided to patients.  
At the same time the role of the physician in the healing relationship changes, inhibiting 
realisation of practice internal goods through virtuous behaviour when contact with the 
patient is reduced. 
Decontextualisation was identified as a related problem to information overload.  To combat 
decontextualisation in medical care, access to the medical record is needed by stakeholders 
involved in the analysis of PHM data or providing feedback to users (see: Section 9.3.1.3).  
PHM therefore necessitates patients consenting to broader access to their personal medical 
record.  Even if access is granted, it is unclear how access to the patient’s complete medical 
record can account for social effects on health, for example if a patient’s blood pressure is 
temporarily elevated because he forgot to take his tablets or is experiencing stress at work.  
The conceptual framework helps explain the ethical implications of this proposed solution to 
decontextualisation; a risk is created of losing the socially embodied patient in PHM-mediated 
care if access to medical records is seen as a sufficient remedy, reducing the importance of 
social, emotional and psychological aspects of health.  These aspects of health also retain 
reduced importance in care commissioning (see: Section 9.3.1.4), which within the conceptual 
framework can be seen as an example of institutional values, or those outcomes of PHM which 
can be ‘costed’, inhibiting the realisation of practice internal goods related to non-quantifiable 
aspects of medical care. 
Concerning ethical tradeoffs ‘forced’ onto users through PHM adoption (see: Section 9.3.1.5), 
the conceptual framework suggests that tradeoffs are created by the pursuit of institutional 
values within medicine, rather than internal goods of the practice.  In seeking efficiency 
through PHM new ethical issues, such as those identified above, are created, meaning users 
consent to a ‘bargain’ in which they must accommodate PHM to receive its benefits (e.g. 
perceived improvements in the quality of care).  Institutional values are accepted into the 
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patient’s lifeworld through such bargains, although this form of colonisation is qualitatively 
different than that accepted in receiving traditional face-to-face care because of the constant 
presence of the monitor, and the medical concerns it represents, in the lifeworld. 
9.4.2.1 Surveillance 
Claims regarding surveillance were entirely comprehensible through the theories of 
surveillance considered above (see: Section 4.4).  As seen in academic discourse (e.g. Welsh et 
al. 2003; Percival & Hanson 2006) ‘Big Brother’ proved a common metaphor for surveillance 
despite its inaccuracies concerning the infrastructure through which PHM is adopted.  For care 
commissioners the potential for social sorting explored above proved relevant to explaining 
how categorisation of patients on the basis of PHM data may affect the patient’s self-identity 
and treatment at the hands of medical institutions and health professionals (see: Section 
9.3.2.2). 
It is notable that PHM was only spoken of as surveillance by patients.  Among professionals, 
only one dementia service officer referred to PHM as surveillance, describing video monitoring 
as “like Big Brother, an invasion of privacy” (DM1).  The fact that patients speak of PHM as a 
type of surveillance, which when described in terms of ‘Big Brother’ takes on a distinctly 
negative connotation, suggests that a gap exists between how patients and health 
professionals view the moral potential of PHM.   For patients, PHM as ‘Big Brother’ is a tool 
which allows monitoring of patients and their behaviours, creating an initial perception of 
being watched by ‘others’.  For health professionals, PHM is yet another tool to assist in 
providing medical care, creating new means of data collection, analysis, contact and feedback 
with patients. 
Although PHM is not obviously sinister in an Orwellian sense, problems can occur when 
patients perceive themselves as being watched through PHM.  Behaviour modification was 
linked to the mere presence of a monitor in the home or on the body, which serves to remind 
the user of their condition and the potential of a third party ‘watching’ them through the 
monitor (see: Section 9.3.2.1).  Modification can be thought of as a form of control or bio-
power exercised by monitoring systems and their custodians over users.  As behaviours are 
changed based solely on the perception of being watched, it is irrelevant whether actions are 
taken in response to monitoring data.  Although behaviour modification can be related to 
issues of stigma and surveillance, an account of control linked to ideas of autonomy or 
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freedom of choice, each of which may be inhibited when users behave differently based on the 
perception of being watched, is necessary to conceive of behaviour modification as an ethical 
issue.  This limitation of the conceptual framework suggests how its explanatory power may be 
improved through minor refinements. 
9.4.3 Limitations of the Framework 
The link between control and autonomy seen in the study (see: Section 9.3.3), through which 
control enhances the user’s ability to define and pursue personal values and projects free from 
external interference, suggests that the conceptual framework could be improved through the 
inclusion of a theoretical account of autonomy and its role in relationships mediated by PHM.  
Such improvements will complement the virtue-based approach to medical relationships by 
explaining how power is exercised.  Understood in these terms, the need for control reveals 
norms of acceptable PHM-mediated relationships, with each aspect of control mentioned 
helping to explain the expectations of patients in relationships with clinicians and institutions 
mediated by PHM.   
9.4.3.1 Control and Autonomy 
The prevalence of control in the claims of participants in the study exposes a limitation of the 
conceptual framework.  An appropriate concept or theoretical framework to ‘make sense of’ 
the desire for control is missing, suggesting the need for further refinement.  One possible way 
forward, albeit a preliminary one at this stage, is to connect the desire for control with 
autonomy.   
Autonomy is an exceedingly broad concept referring to some aspect of human character which 
is self-determining.  Among different approaches to philosophy there are innumerable 
specifications of the concept (Dworkin 1988, p.9).  Autonomy can be defined as “self-
governance, that is, the ability to construct one’s own goals and values, and to have the 
freedom to make one’s decisions and perform actions based on these decisions” (Brey 2005, 
p.160).  A fundamental link exists between control and autonomy at a conceptual level, as 
both relate to freedom of choice or action on some level.   
Adding autonomy or a related concept to the framework to make sense of the desire of users 
for ‘control’ is not a simple task, as any theoretical position must be reconciled with the other 
theories present in the framework.  The purpose of focusing on autonomy as a candidate is not 
to champion any particular conception of autonomy and explore its implications for the 
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framework; to do without first assessing the nature and importance of control in other 
contexts of PHM usage would be premature.  Without the benefit of such research, the best 
that can be accomplished is initial speculation as to the role autonomy could play within the 
framework as a way to explain the desire for control over PHM and medical relationships.   
9.4.3.1.1 Control and Relationships 
As an example of how control relates to autonomy as such, PHM can be seen as undermining 
the patient’s ability to decide what personal information to share about oneself.  Control over 
information is traditionally initially strong in the healing relationship, during which the patient 
chooses how far to ‘expose’ his body and history to the physician.  Autonomy can be expressed 
through feeling ‘in control’ of one’s health or medical conditions, or management of 
(information about) health or conditions. 
As used by participants, control reflected a desire for greater influence over PHM systems, 
extending to being able to limit the movement of data about the user.  Although control 
reflects a desire for greater influence in medical relationships to some degree, this should not 
be taken as equivalent to a desire for self-care or self-responsibility, such as that seen in 
England (see: Chapter 5).  Rather, through its connection with autonomy, control can be 
understood as a desire to maintain some degree of freedom in the lifeworld and choices in 
medical relationships, while not necessarily reflecting a desire to take greater responsibility for 
one’s healthcare. 
The desire to control data flows seen in the study can also be understood in terms of self-
responsibility for health care (see: Section 9.3.3).  Data privacy (see: Section 3.2.1.1) can be 
connected to control and autonomy in the sense that the user can restrict the power of others 
by limiting the availability or movement of personal data (cf. Nissenbaum 2004, 131).  In 
relation to PHM, the restriction of information implies that the user’s future actions are 
comparatively less restricted by the desires of third parties, such as carers or clinicians, who 
would otherwise act on the information.  Autonomy could therefore have dire consequences 
for the patient, who retains independence in actions at the cost of third party interventions 
designed to benefit his health. 
9.4.3.1.2 Control and Virtuous Practice 
It can be argued that patients exercising greater control in PHM-mediated relationships will act 
as a counterbalance to a potential loss of ‘good’ medical practice, or a healing relationship in 
272 
 
which the internal goods of medicine are realised, caused by PHM (see: Section 4.3.4).  The 
ideal of ‘self-responsibility’ for health under the self-care model (see: Section 5.4.1.2) can be 
taken to mean that patients must exercise greater control in the relationship to maintain 
adequate medical care when faced with the prospect of reduced contact with physicians and 
other health professionals morally obligated to pursue the internal goods of medicine.  
However, it is doubtful that all users of PHM will understand the greater responsibility that 
accompanies control over PHM and its data.   
While control can lead to greater autonomy in PHM-mediated relationships for patients, it is 
not a guarantee of ‘good’ medical care, when ‘good’ care is of a sort which can only be 
provided, or at least identified, by practitioners familiar with (methods to achieve) the internal 
goods of medicine as a practice (see: Section 4.3.1).  It is therefore ethically problematic to 
assume PHM, users, service providers, data custodians or other medical stakeholders lacking 
the experience necessary to grasp the internal goods of medicine (see: Sections  4.3.1.1 and 
4.3.2) can replace the loss of opportunities for virtuous practice, where such loss is brought 
about by providing care remotely to decontextualised patients amenable to social sorting and 
physiological categorisation.  That patients may need to exercise greater control over the 
healing relationship, understood as an expression of autonomy, means that some of the 
responsibility for ‘good’ medical care is passed to patients. 
9.4.3.2 Informal Care and the Conceptual Framework 
Beyond the need for patient control in PHM-mediated relationships, limitations can be seen in 
the framework’s treatment of informal medical relationships, such as those engaged in by 
informal dementia carers.  Of the ‘patient’ participants in the study, dementia carers provided 
the richest data in terms of understanding the implications of PHM for personal and medical 
relationships.  This finding may be explained by the involvement of informal carers in existing 
relationships which blur the boundary between ‘personal’ and ‘medical’, as well as their insight 
into the needs of the patient in terms of care and for support for the carer in coping with the 
burdens of care.   
In discussing the ends of medicine in the conceptual framework (see: Section 4.3.2), 
insufficient attention was paid to alternative medical relationships occurring between patients 
and non-professionals such as informal carers, charity workers or service providers.  Informal 
carers are not bound by the same moral obligations as clinicians or professional carers (cf. 
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Palm 2011), in part because entering into informal care is not always a freely made choice 
equivalent to joining the medical profession.  The framework could be improved by addressing 
the unique shift from personal to medical relationship which characterises the move to 
informal care, seen for example in the perceived impossibility of rejecting PHM which is 
beneficial for the patient, itself requiring an account of autonomy.  Without such an account it 
is unclear how the virtues and internal goods of medicine, best seen through the healing 
relationship, can be applied outside of the patient-clinician-payer model.  As care is 
increasingly shifted to the community and patients in England, non-professional medical 
relationships are likely to become increasingly important in the delivery of medical care.   
While an account of the moral obligations of family members and friends to provide medical 
care goes beyond the scope of this thesis, on the surface parts of the account of the healing 
relationship offered above (see: Section 4.3.2.1) appear to transfer cleanly to informal care 
relationships.  The account would require modification with regard to patients seeking out 
informal carers not for medical expertise but for support in activities they can no longer 
achieve alone.  Additionally, it is not clear that informal carers must always prioritise the 
interests of the patient above their own, suggesting a revised account of the need for self-
effacement among informal carers.  Despite these initial limitations, the patient’s position in 
the healing relationship does not obviously change, characterised as it is by vulnerability, the 
necessity of trust, and the desire to return to a state of equilibrium. 
9.5 Conclusion 
The empirical study demonstrated the explanatory power of the conceptual framework.  
Limitations and areas in need of refinement were identified concerning patient control and 
autonomy in PHM-mediated relationships, and the ethical implications of PHM for informal 
carers not bound by the moral obligations of medicine, or versed in its internal goods.  
Although initial amendments have been offered, the process of refining the framework must 
continue in response to future developments in PHM and strategic support. 
The empirical study fulfilled the requirements of the hermeneutic methodology for empirical 
ethics analysis under conditions of uncertainty described above (see: Chapters 6 and 7).  At the 
beginning of the project the researcher created an account of his prejudices (see: Chapters 1 
to 4).  Modifications to these prejudices and the developing understanding of the ethical 
implications of PHM for relationships can be seen throughout the project, up to and including 
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the discussion of results in this chapter.  The interviews were modelled on hermeneutic 
dialogue, in which a ‘fusion of horizons’ (see: Section 6.1.3.2.1) was achieved through dialogue 
between the researcher and participants.  Data analysis consisted of a subsequent dialogue 
between the empirical texts and the researcher, in which the researcher exercised reflexivity 
to identify and understand his prejudices in developing understanding of the phenomenon 
(see: Section 6.1.3.2.2).  The revised understanding of the phenomenon can be seen in the 
conceptual framework and the interpretation of empirical data. The fusion of horizons 
continued throughout the subsequent dialogue with the texts, seen in the developing 
understanding of the ethical implications of PHM for personal and medical relationships, and 
in testing and revising the framework.   
The purpose of the empirical study was to expand the researcher’s understanding by 
identifying local concerns according to different potential users.  Activating this feedback loop 
which expands the range of known ethical concerns is important to improve the quality of 
ethical discourse and understand potential limitations of the conceptual framework.  The 
contributions of potential users of PHM in the empirical study, and their ability to participate 
in ethical analysis through hermeneutic dialogue, demonstrates that ethical discourses need to 
include both experts and laypeople, who can offer theoretical and local perspectives 
respectively, to achieve comprehensive analysis in which both types of issues are identified 
and specified.  In keeping with the hermeneutic paradigm, the understanding of the ethical 
implications of PHM developed so far is incomplete and open to alternative perspectives and 
evidence in the future.  In recognition of this, before concluding the project consideration 
must be given in Chapter 10 to whether the discourse established here sufficiently answered 
the research questions posed, and how PHM ethics discourse can be advanced in the future. 
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10 Chapter 10: The Moral Potential of PHM 
10.1 Introduction 
Throughout the research reported in this thesis, a range of methods have been used to 
investigate the moral potential of PHM, or its potential to ‘cause’ ethical problems in the 
future.  The empirical study described above was built upon a systematic review of academic 
literature and theoretical analysis responding to perceived gaps in the discourse.  Each of these 
methods was meant to explore the moral potential of PHM to change how patients experience 
personal and medical relationships with others when such relationships are mediated by PHM. 
The research was designed in response to perceived procedural and substantive gaps in 
existing PHM ethics research, expressed through research questions throughout the project.  
To evaluate the outcomes and credibility of the project, it is necessary to consider how each 
research question, built upon a perceived gap in the discourse, was answered through the 
research activities described here.  In answering the questions posed in the first half of the 
thesis (see: Section 5.6), the research made a significant contribution to explaining the moral 
potential of PHM. 
10.2 Addressing the Research Questions 
The project answered four research questions posed in response to perceived gaps in 
academic discourse and prior research addressing ethical implications of PHM: 
1. How can PHM be defined? 
 
2. How can PHM be categorised to link potential ethical implications to specific 
emerging applications? 
 
3. What ethical considerations will arise when PHM is introduced into relationships 
between patients, clinicians and medical paying organisations? 
 
4. What methodology is capable of capturing and incorporating the moral beliefs of 
potential users of an emerging medical technology (such as PHM) into ethical 
analysis? 
The first two questions were addressed through review of academic research discussing ethical 
aspects of PHM (see: Chapter 2).  PHM was defined as any electronic device or system with the 
capability to collect, store and transmit data about a health-related aspect of an identified 
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user’s life outside a hospital or similar medical environment (see: Section 2.2).  A 
categorisation of PHM was built upon the location of sensors to help identify connections 
between technological characteristics and ethical implications (see: Section 2.3).  The 
categorisation is complementary to the taxonomy developed in PHM-Ethics (see: Section 
1.2.1), which in addition to location also categorises PHM according to field of application and 
technological features. 
Following on from a gap identified during the literature review, the third question was 
answered through the conceptual framework which is the main contribution of the research 
project.   The conceptual framework was initially constructed from theoretical perspectives 
concerning colonisation of the lifeworld, virtue ethics and surveillance theory.  As the gap in 
the discourse concerned relationships between lay persons and experts, or patients, clinicians 
and institutions, a need was identified to test the framework’s ability to make sense of the 
perspectives of potential users of PHM.  An empirical study was conducted in response to this 
need, through which the framework was refined. 
To design an appropriate empirical study and to answer the fourth research question, a 
methodology capable of combining empirical and theoretical perspectives in ethical analysis 
under conditions of uncertainty was developed (see: Chapters 6 and 7).  The methodology was 
developed within the philosophical paradigm of hermeneutics and supported by an epistemic 
framework based in discourse ethics, which responded to the epistemic challenges presented 
by uncertainty.  An approach to ‘translation’, a concept originally developed but not 
subsequently unpacked by Habermas in response to the need to include religious claims in 
secular political discourse (see: Section 7.3.2.3), was developed to distinguish between 
uncertain and legitimate components in normative claims encountered in the study. 
10.3 Contributions of the Research 
In providing answers to the research questions the research project has made a conceptual 
contribution to PHM ethics discourse, a methodological contribution to empirical ethics, and a 
methodological/epistemological contribution to the ethical assessment of emerging 
technologies.  As an emerging technology, PHM exists in a ‘conceptual vacuum’ (see: Section 
3.3.6).  PHM enables tracking the health and behaviours of users, creating opportunities for 
secondary uses of unprecedented levels of personalised health data.  Intended or not, it 
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creates opportunities for the fulfilment of medical (monitoring) needs by technological 
applications, rather than human involvement.  
The primary contribution of the research project to conceptual understanding of the ethical 
implications of PHM was the creation of the conceptual framework, which helps explain the 
moral potential of PHM as a group of technological applications with similar technological 
characteristics and uses.  The framework is novel in the sense that it connects and explores 
theoretical perspectives not considered in PHM ethics discourse (see: Chapters 3 and 4).  
Surveillance theory was connected to Habermas’ concept of ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’, and 
used as a way to understand how PHM mediates medical relationships and introduces 
institutional values into the patient’s lifeworld and medical practice.  MacIntyre’s virtue ethics 
was then applied to show how colonisation through PHM as a mediator undermines the 
practice-internal norms of medicine.  
These three theoretical perspectives form a compatible and novel conceptual framework in 
which specific PHM applications and uses can be evaluated in future ethical discourses (see: 
Section 7.3.2.1).  Each theory helps identify, explain and connect ethical implications beyond 
those currently considered in academic discourse (see: Section 3.3.6).  The framework provides 
a theoretical lens through which the implications of removing or replacing clinicians and carers 
with monitoring technologies can be understood, creating pathways or new relationships 
between patients, institutions and service providers.   The creation of such a framework also 
responds to some degree to the need for context-specific ethical analysis of future PHM 
applications, identified by both research projects framing this thesis in relation to a lack of 
context-sensitivity in governance (see: Section 1.2.5).   
A secondary contribution of the project is a novel methodology for empirical ethics analysis, 
and a supporting epistemological framework for empirical ethics assessment of emerging 
technologies.   The methodology can be viewed as a continuation of the empirical ethics 
movement (see: Section 7.2) which recommends combining empirical data and ethical theory 
in ethical analysis.  It is novel because it is supported by an epistemological framework 
explaining how empirical ethics analysis can be conducted under conditions of uncertainty, or 
concerning future states.  While the methodology is built around analysis of emerging 
technologies, the epistemic justification for taking uncertain claims seriously in discourse, 
based on Habermas’ concept of translation, may be a valuable contribution to the 
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epistemology of other forms of proactive ethical analysis or governance such as Technology 
Assessment.  
The categorisation of PHM (see: Section 2.3.2) which complements the PHM-Ethics taxonomy 
(see: Figure 10.6) is intended to be used alongside the conceptual framework in future 
discourses.  The combination of the two creates a hierarchy along which ethical implications 
are inherited.  Increasingly complex systems can be mapped on the hierarchy, identifying 
applicable implications associated with simpler systems.  The categorisation can be used to 
map all types of ethical implications (see: Chapter 3), not only those associated with 
relationships as understood through the conceptual framework (See: Section 3.4 and Chapter 
4). 
10.4 Recommendations 
Although the conceptual framework was developed primarily as a tool to enhance future 
context-specific discourses concerning ethical implications of PHM, it can be applied in the 
present to recommend anticipatory actions among care commissioners, clinicians and 
institutions faced with the prospect of deployment of PHM in England.  The potential for PHM 
to form a pathway between patients and medical institutions, as well as patients and industry, 
suggests that the expertise of physicians in recognising and working towards the internal 
goods of medicine are lost to some degree in the healing relationship (see: Section 4.3.2.1).  
Stakeholders responsible for deciding how, when and where PHM will be deployed, how its 
data will be passed on and the purposes for which it will be used, must recognise and respond 
to this loss of ‘expertise of the virtues’.  While uncertainty prevails over the future course of 
PHM it is practically impossible to put this loss into clinical or practical terms for outcomes 
which primarily affect the patient, but other stakeholders as well.  However, if the virtues are 
recognised as inherently valuable in the sense that they are conducive to the goods of a 
practice, and if it is recognised that opportunities for virtuous medical behaviour are lost by 
the ‘exit’ of the clinician from the healing relationship mediated by PHM, then we have 
established a position from which to ethically assess future deployments of the technology as 
more or less ethically acceptable.   
From a practical perspective, stakeholders responsible for deployment should strive to include 
clinicians in PHM mediated relationships as far as possible.  Clinician involvement can include 
analysing PHM data, providing feedback and follow-up to patients, answering questions and 
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concerns, and as far as possible emulating the face-to-face clinical encounter through remote 
monitoring.  Clinicians or other health professionals may also be required to train patients on 
the operation of PHM applications, as well as obtaining consent and explaining potential 
implications of monitoring to patients.  A primary ethical risk is to view PHM as a technological 
means to reduce costs or the need for health professionals in medical care, while still providing 
the same quality of care; the inhibition of virtuous behaviour suggests doing so is impossible 
because the technology does not replace the lost expertise regarding realisation of the ends of 
the healing relationship.  
Several recommendations were made throughout the research project based on review of 
academic discourse, theoretical and empirical analyses.  The recommendations addressed 
issues which should be addressed in the deployment, design, analysis and usage of PHM 
systems, as well as protection mechanisms and research into ethical issues of PHM.  Several 
recommendations addressed issues which should be addressed when choosing how and why 
to deploy PHM: 
 The ability of PHM to colonise and medicalise the patient’s lifeworld with institutional 
concerns, increasingly shifting attention to medical concerns and making patient’s 
responsible for medical care in private life, must be recognised and reduced when 
possible.  Practically speaking, PHM should only be deployed when a clear need exists, 
to avoid ‘monitoring for monitoring’s sake’ (see: Section 3.4). 
 
 The greater responsibility placed onto patients for medical care by some PHM 
applications, seen as part of the strategic shift towards self-care, self-responsibility and 
care needs fulfilled by community rather than medical resources, needs to be 
recognised so sufficient support or compensation is made available to newly burdened 
individuals (see: Section 5.4).  The burdens placed on informal carers by PHM are 
especially relevant (see: Section 9.3.4). 
 
 In forthcoming DH and NHS strategy and assessments of the clinical and cost efficacy 
of PHM, the quality of care provided should not be assessed only in utilitarian terms, 
or according to factors which can be ‘costed’, such as length of hospital stays or the 
cost of care per patient (see: Section 5.2).  For example, the value of the expertise of 
health professionals concerning the internal goods of medicine and the virtues 
necessary to realise them should be recognised as a valuable factor affecting the 
effectiveness of PHM (see: Section 4.3). 
 
 Ethical issues can be mapped across categories of PHM (see: Section 2.3), which assists 
in the identification of ethical issues in specific contexts for specific PHM applications 
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when considering deployment.  A taxonomy or categorisation such as the one 
developed here should be used in designing deployment programmes. 
 
 Ethical tradeoffs in adopting PHM should not be accepted as inevitable ‘costs’ of using 
the technology; rather, systems and deployment programmes should be designed to 
address the ethical implications of PHM as far as possible, while still recognising that 
certain tradeoffs may be inevitable (see: Sections 3.2.3.1 and 3.3.2). 
Other recommendations concerned problems that can be addressed through system design: 
 The potential for PHM to medicalise the lives and spaces of users should be 
recognised, and reduced where possible by designing systems to reduce physical and 
psychological obtrusiveness (see: Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.9). 
 
 The potential for behaviour modification should be reduced by designing systems to 
monitor users through the least obtrusive means possible (e.g. video data vs. 
movement data), as well as training users to have realistic expectations regarding the 
ability of service providers to monitor them through PHM applications (see: Section 
9.3.2.1). 
 
 Systems and care plans should be designed to respond in some way to the need for 
user control over PHM systems as an extension of maintaining power in medical 
relationships with clinicians and institutions (see: Section 9.3.3). 
Still other recommendations addressed issues to be addressed by data custodians or system 
operators responsible for analysis and usage of PHM data: 
 Transparency is required regarding the data held by the NHS about PHM users, the 
identity of data custodians (see: Section 9.3.3.3), the process of defining new 
categories within PHM-linked databases, as well as the process of matching users to 
categories (see: Section 4.4.3.1.4). 
 
 The power granted to medical institutions through PHM data to monitor and 
categorise users according to groupings reflecting institutional or clinical concerns 
should be recognised by data custodians and clinicians as not reflecting the entirety of 
the user’s experience.  The ‘socially embodied patient’ may be missing from the data 
representation (see: Section 4.4.3). 
 
 Going forward, the possibility of decontextualisation in monitoring informal care 
relationships through PHM should be recognised and addressed through alternative 
methods of gathering contextual data before assessing the performance of carers (see: 
Section 9.3.4.2). 
Two recommendations were made concerning limitations of protection mechanisms: 
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 Tangential health data, such as behavioural data collected by PHM which does not 
concern a physiological parameter of health, should be recognised as ‘health data’ 
deserving stringent protections under existing and forthcoming data protection 
legislation (see: Section 3.3.3.2). 
 
 The difficulties of obtaining informed consent due to the inherent uncertainty of the 
future should be recognised, meaning systems should be presented to potential users 
as having uncertain implications (see: Section 3.3.3.1).  Practically speaking, a ‘veneer 
of certainty’ should not be presented by developers and health professionals over the 
future implications of the technology and its data for users. 
Finally, five recommendations targeted issues with existing research into the ethical 
implications of PHM: 
 The technical and demographic scope of ethical analysis of PHM should be expanded 
to address for demographics of potential users largely ignored thus far in the discourse 
(see: Section 3.3.1). 
 
 In the future a common definition of PHM should be adopted in academic discourse to 
facilitate ethical analysis of systems with similar technological capacities and potential 
uses in medical care and lifestyle monitoring.  A definition and categorisation of PHM 
was developed to this end (see: Chapter 2). 
 
 PHM ethics discourse should provide information on the theoretical background 
informing empirical research or conceptual analysis (see: Section 3.3.6).  This 
recommendation is especially relevant to privacy discourses among developers and 
security experts, which currently suffers from ‘privacy myopia’, failing to recognise 
privacy norms as context-specific (see: Section 3.3.4). 
 
 In future discourses concerning surveillance aspects of PHM, the ‘Big Brother’ and 
panopticon metaphors should be replaced with metaphors which better describe 
existing PHM deployments and strategy (see: Section 4.4). 
 
 Future ethical assessment of emerging medical technologies, including empirical ethics 
and Technology Assessment, should acknowledge the epistemic difficulties caused by 
uncertainty, and work to develop methodologies capable of distinguishing between 
certain and uncertain components of normative claims about potential futures.  Such a 
method has been recommended above (see: Section 7.3). 
All of these recommendations seek to improve future discourses concerning ethical 
implications of PHM by explaining the moral potential of PHM at different stages of design, 
deployment, usage and research.  In discourses concerned with justifying usage of PHM in a 
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particular context, the recommendations may change how the effectiveness of PHM is 
assessed, with the aim of preventing problematic ethical issues from occurring. 
10.5 Limitations 
Despite the significant contributions and recommendations made by the project, some 
limitations can be identified.  Limitations are seen in relation to a potential lack of context-
specific empirical analysis based on the makeup of the study sample, the applicability of results 
beyond the context of study, and the restrictions created by NRES. 
10.5.1 Context-Specificity and the Sample 
As hinted at above (see: Section 10.3), the empirical study somewhat lacked context-specificity 
due to not examining an extant use of PHM.  While the study did not look at the implications 
of any particular PHM application or context in which PHM is currently used, its results were 
used to refine the conceptual framework which is designed to contribute to future context-
specific discourses.  On this basis the research was only context-specific in a theoretical sense, 
while lacking the context-specificity achievable only through examining an extant use of the 
technology.  The lack of a sample of existing users of PHM precluded context-specific ethical 
assessment with non-experts. 
It may be argued that if a sample was recruited with prior experience with PHM, the credibility 
of the empirical study would have improved because of the link between experiences within a 
practice and the credibility of normative claims (see: Section 7.2.1).  As the study stands, the 
claims of potential users of PHM have initial credibility based on experiences with practices 
relevant to PHM, such as informal care or chronic illness management.  Alternatively, current 
users can relate normative claims to experiences with the technology, making them more 
credible than claims based on hypothetical scenarios.  Implications concerning relationships 
actually affected by existing uses of a PHM application could have been identified by current 
users, providing a credible basis to refine the conceptual framework without the need for 
translation.  As PHM comes to be deployed in England, opportunities to recruit such a sample 
to a similar study in the future will arise. 
A sample of existing users would also increase the comprehensiveness of the study by allowing 
for a larger sample with similar background experiences.  As it stands the study sample was 
relatively small in the sense that five patients were recruited from each ‘disease group’, along 
with two disease specialists, two service officers and three care commissioners.  Such diversity 
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in a relatively small sample increases the difficulty of finding meaningful relationships and 
themes within the data, if only because the background social and professional experiences of 
the participants are so diverse.  For the exploratory case study method employed a larger 
sample size would have been ideal, with more participants from each participant group; 
however, the size had to be limited due to the research being carried out by a single 
researcher, and involving up to two interviews with each participant. 
10.5.1.1 Users of Related Technologies 
While it could be argued that a sample of users from pilot studies of related telehealth and 
telecare technologies (see: Section 5.3.1) could have provided data grounded in practical 
experience with remote monitoring, the fact that the piloted systems were related to but not 
examples of PHM limits the weight of this argument.  Compared to PHM, piloted systems 
lacked longitudinal and semi-constant monitoring without active interaction from the user 
(e.g. answering questions and taking measurements).  At best, when compared with the actual 
sample of patients with a chronic illness, prior users of systems related to PHM could make an 
equivalent claim to the initial credibility of claims about PHM.  Such a claim would be based, 
from the view of ‘moral wisdom’ (see: Section 7.2.1), on their having past experiences which 
inform their claims about PHM.  In other words, the ‘tangential’ experiences of chronic illness 
management and telehealth/telecare can equally base credibility claims concerning 
statements made about PHM, as both are related but not equivalent to PHM usage.  With 
regard to PHM, experiences with telehealth/telecare are not self-evidently of greater value in 
terms of grounding credibility claims than experiences with chronic illness management or 
other forms of health monitoring (see: Section 8.2.1).  
10.5.1.2 Advantages of Potential Users 
With that said, recruiting potential users to the study did generate certain advantages; for one, 
the experiences of the sample were not limited to a single PHM application, covering instead 
multiple hypothetical systems based on current development.  This approach is well-suited to 
testing and refining a conceptual framework built upon theoretical perspectives not 
encountered in existing PHM ethics discourse because it is conducive to identifying unforeseen 
ethical implications relevant to the technology, but not necessarily a particular application.  
For example, interviewing users of a blood pressure wrist watch could reveal implications 
relating to behaviour monitoring or pressure to adhere to recommended treatments, but say 
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nothing of the implications of environmental monitoring with the potential for inadvertent 
monitoring of non-users. 
10.5.2 Context of Study 
Another potential limitation of the study is that the findings of the empirical study may be 
limited in applicability to England, based on the existence of a national health service with 
common resources and structure across the country.  It is unclear whether the results of the 
empirical study can be applied further afield than England or even the East Midlands (see: 
Section 8.3).  Potential users in contexts with similar national health services with a remit for 
providing adequate care for all citizens within a set pool of resources may have similar 
perspectives to those studied here; however, the findings cannot be directly applied to other 
countries without supplementary analysis of strategic support, piloting and existing uses of the 
technology.  Data analysis conducted in this study gave attention to the strategic framework 
and health infrastructure into which PHM is being deployed, meaning that any attempt to 
transfer the results of the study to another context will require a similar analysis. 
With that said, the conceptual analysis undertaken in the project may more readily transfer to 
contexts beyond England and the NHS.  The framework is based on theories of virtue, 
surveillance and colonisation not bound to any particular context (see: Section 4.4.4).  If 
similarities can be identified between contexts in terms of the colonisation of the patient’s 
lifeworld by institutional medical concerns, the ends and virtues of medicine, the healing 
relationship, or implications of collecting and storing monitoring data such as social sorting of 
users,  then the theories should apply equally well to other contexts.  Additionally, the 
applicability of the conceptual framework across contexts is reliant upon the usage of similar 
technologies as defined through the categorisation of PHM developed above (see: Chapter 2).  
The fact that PHM is not developed for use in any particular country, and that the theories 
bound together in the conceptual framework are not dependent upon any particular location, 
gives reason to believe the conceptual contributions of the project are applicable beyond the 
context of study. 
10.5.3 NRES 
Finally, the NHS ethics approval process (NRES) proved a significant limitation to the research 
(see: Section 8.4.1).  Taking more than 18 months from start to finish, the lengthy process 
curtailed the design of the study in terms of data collection and recruitment (see: Section 
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8.4.2).  NHS telehealth and telecare pilot programmes providing alternative channels for 
recruitment, assuming a sample consisting of users of technologies related to PHM would be 
desired (see: Section 10.5.1), were eventually identified after speaking with local care 
commissioners in the final stages of the study (see: Section 5.3.1).  Conversations with 
commissioners could only commence once NRES approval had been granted, so even if 
recruitment of samples from pilot programs would have been desirable, it could not have been 
carried out without submitting a revised NRES application.  While this did not prove a 
significant limitation for the quality of the study considering the limitations of recruiting a 
sample of telehealth or telecare users (see: Section 10.5.1), it did limit the range of potential 
samples, and therefore must be mentioned as a limitation.  Ideally NRES would be revised to 
significantly shorten the time between application and decision, allowing research to be 
carried out on current topics or technologies of interest prior to or soon after deployment. 
10.6 Future Research 
The limitations identified above suggest future avenues for research.  Building on the results of 
this research, future qualitative hermeneutic studies of patient attitudes regarding ethical 
implications of PHM for personal and medical relationships can be conducted with current 
users of the technology.  Opportunities for such research will continue to increase as PHM 
broadly moves from piloting to deployment.  This type of research can reveal whether the 
attitudes encountered here are shared across different samples experienced with different 
PHM applications.  Other cohorts of patients can also be researched, particularly those 
targeted by current piloting such as COPD.  The importance of control and other themes  seen 
in the fieldwork conducted here can be explored in such studies, providing a basis for 
expanding the conceptual framework to include autonomy or other concepts which help make 
sense of the desire for control (see: Section 9.4.3.1) 
At a broader level, research should be conducted concerning patient attitudes towards the 
shift to self-care and self-responsibility enacted through technologies such as PHM, as it may 
conflict with the ideal model for medical relationships favoured by patients (see: Section 5.4).  
The existing assumption is that patients will welcome monitoring if it is presented as improving 
the quality of care they receive; whether patients will accept the underlying sense of self-
responsibility to monitor their health is unclear. 
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Aspects of the research described here can also be expanded going forward.  Research into the 
reasons for the superficiality of privacy discourses among PHM developers and security 
architects (see: Section 3.3.4.1) would be helpful in prescribing solutions to the problem; for 
example, ethics may be viewed as a ‘checklist’ in system development, whereby claiming that 
the system is privacy enhancing or secure is sufficient for the system to be considered ‘ethical’.  
The existence of similar theoretical superficiality in discourses concerning related (emerging) 
technologies could also be investigated. 
Finally, the main type of research which will be required in the future will concern the 
applicability of the conceptual framework to future discourses concerning the ethical 
implications of PHM in particular contexts.  As recommended by the framing projects and the 
research reported here, future context-specific ethical assessment is necessary to respond to 
the ethical problems caused by future PHM applications, the details of which cannot be fully 
anticipated proactively.  In other words, proactive ethical assessment is not enough—it 
provides a foundation for future ethical analysis.  As suggested throughout, the conceptual 
framework provides a theoretical lens through which future context-specific research can 
occur, with the aim of helping stakeholders to understand one dimension of the moral 
potential of PHM: its implications for personal and medical relationships.  In future research, 
the framework may help make sense of the ethical issues and normative claims encountered in 
relation to specific applications, both for researchers and stakeholders involved in ethical 
discourses. 
10.7 Conclusion 
The research described in this thesis contributes significant theoretical and empirical 
understanding to the moral potential of PHM in terms of implications for personal and medical 
relationships.  Through a variety of research approaches the understanding developed is 
credible in both a theoretical and methodological sense, providing a new contribution to 
knowledge in several areas:  (1) an ethical categorisation of PHM; (2) a conceptual framework 
for understanding one dimension of the moral potential of PHM which is amenable to future 
research; (3) an epistemological explanation of the difficulties and possibilities for ethically 
assessing the future through empirical research; (4) and a methodology for combining 
empirical and theoretical data in ethical analysis.  The research leading to these contributions 
was methodologically rigorous and appropriately informed by existing research and 
background ethical, social and epistemological theories.  An approach based on self-criticism 
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(see: Section 6.1.3.2) was taken to reflexively identify the prejudices implicitly in coming to 
understand the research topic, and to understand the importance of such prejudices in 
producing credible research. 
As should be the case with self-aware research, the understanding developed here is not seen 
as an endpoint, representing instead a starting point for further research informed by a 
theoretical understanding of the moral potential of PHM.  The research has gone some way in 
filling the ‘conceptual vacuum’ into which PHM continues to emerge; development must 
precede theoretical understanding of a technology (see: Section 7.3), but ideally the vacuum 
will be filled to a sufficient degree before widespread usage.  In responding to the difficulties 
of uncertainty, such theoretical understanding goes some way to proactively identifying and 
responding to ethical implications in future contexts.  The project therefore made 
contributions of practical utility to future research, development and governance by providing 
a novel theoretical lens through which the technology may be viewed.  While the practical 
utility of the project’s contribution to future research and discourses must remain to be seen, 
the outcomes of the project should be seen as highly credible, produced through a 
theoretically and methodologically rigorous approach to ethical analysis of PHM operating 
within the limitations posed by uncertainty.  As has been said before, the position of uncertain 
proactivity is preferable to reacting to ethical problems as they occur (Stahl 2011a); the 
research conducted here gives a practical demonstration of how proactive assessment can 
advance ethical understanding of emerging medical technologies, employing a novel 
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al. 2011; Giannetsos et al. 2011; Kovach et al. 2011; 
Mana et al. 2011; Mittelstadt et al. 2011; Rhode 
2011; Nordgren 2012 
Environmental 
Monitors (n = 82)  
Devices and 
sensors 
embedded in an 
environment, 
such as a home, 
vehicle, or 




Lyon 2001; Welsh et al. 2003; Demiris et al. 2004; 
Hilty et al. 2004; Melenhorst et al. 2004; Neild et al. 
2004; Agree et al. 2005; Brey 2005; Beaudin et al. 
2006a; Caine et al. 2006; Tentori et al. 2006; 
Ahamed, Talukder & Haque 2007; Ahamed, Talukder 
& Kameas 2007; Coughlin et al. 2007; Courtney et al. 
2007; Friedewald et al. 2007; Fugger et al. 2007; van 
Hoof et al. 2007; Lauriks et al. 2007; Mahoney et al. 
2007; Martin et al. 2007; Rashid et al. 2007; Rigby 
2007; Bagüés et al. 2007b; Casas et al. 2008; Chan et 
al. 2008; Courtney 2008; Courtney et al. 2008; 
Demiris et al. 2008; Essén 2008; Fellbaum 2008; 
Kenner 2008; Mitseva et al. 2008; Rialle et al. 2008; 
Srinivasan et al. 2008; Stuart et al. 2008; Vuokko 
2008; Armac et al. 2009; Caine 2009; Chan et al. 
2009; Coughlin et al. 2009; Demiris 2009; Demiris & 
Hensel 2009; Dorsten et al. 2009; Gentry 2009; Islam 
et al. 2009; Little & Briggs 2009; Massacci et al. 
2009; Acharya 2010; Acharya & Kumar 2010; Bagüés 
et al. 2010; Busnel & Giroux 2010; Giannotti & 
Saygin 2010; McIlwraith et al. 2010; Nefti et al. 2010; 
Niemeijer et al. 2010; Ojasalo et al. 2010; Remmers 
2010; Stowe & Harding 2010; Tiwari et al. 2010; 
                                                          
99
 These categories occasionally overlap, as some devices do not neatly fit in either such as assistive 
robots (Wu et al. 2012) or a smart pill box (Kosta et al. 2010).  Furthermore, individual systems (e.g. 




Wilkowska et al. 2010; Ziefle & Röcker 2010; Bowes 
et al. 2011; Ding et al. 2011; Elkhodr et al. 2011; van 
Hoof et al. 2011; Leone et al. 2011; McLean 2011; 
Mittelstadt et al. 2011; Niemeijer et al. 2011; Palm 
2011; Rhode 2011; Rigaud et al. 2011; Sadri 2011; 
Townsend et al. 2011; Ziefle et al. 2011; Zwijsen et 
al. 2011; Collste & Verweij 2012; Nordgren 2012; 
Sanders et al. 2012; Sorell & Draper 2012; Wu et al. 
2012 
Implantable 
Monitors (n = 4) 
In vivo monitors. Friedewald et al. 2007; Monahan & Wall 2007; Gaul 
& Ziefle 2009; Dhukaram et al. 2011 
Other/Ambiguous 





telecare), but not 
specific 
applications.100 
Hensel et al. 2006; Percival & Hanson 2006; Pallapa 
et al. 2007; Kaplan & Litewka 2008; Wang et al. 
2008; Garcia-Morchon et al. 2009; Steele et al. 2009; 
Subramaniam et al. 2010; Salih et al. 2011 
 
                                                          
100
 The distinction between technology, artefact, and application describes a spectrum of developments 
from generic to specific.  Ethical issues arising from specific contexts of use can only arise at the 
application level.  For more, see: Brey 2011. 
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Table 1.2 - Demographics of Target Users101 
Demographic Description References 




Welsh et al. 2003; Demiris et al. 2004; Melenhorst et 
al. 2004; Neild et al. 2004; Agree et al. 2005; Caine et 
al. 2006; Hensel et al. 2006; Percival & Hanson 2006; 
Ahamed, Talukder & Kameas 2007; Coughlin et al. 
2007; Courtney et al. 2007; Friedewald et al. 2007; 
Fugger et al. 2007; van Hoof et al. 2007; Lauriks et al. 
2007; Mahoney et al. 2007; Martin et al. 2007; 
Melander-Wikman et al. 2007; Rashid et al. 2007; 
Robinson et al. 2007; Bagüés et al. 2007b; Casas et al. 
2008; Chan et al. 2008; Courtney 2008; Courtney et al. 
2008; Demiris et al. 2008; Essén 2008; Fellbaum 2008; 
Kenner 2008; Rialle et al. 2008; Stuart et al. 2008; 
Armac et al. 2009; Caine 2009; Chan et al. 2009; 
Coughlin et al. 2009; Demiris 2009; Demiris et al. 
2009; Demiris & Hensel 2009; Dorsten et al. 2009; 
Gaul & Ziefle 2009; Gentry 2009; Islam et al. 2009; 
Little & Briggs 2009; Massacci et al. 2009; Steele et al. 
2009; Busnel & Giroux 2010; Landau, Auslander, et al. 
2010; Landau, Werner, et al. 2010; McIlwraith et al. 
2010; Nefti et al. 2010; Niemeijer et al. 2010; 
Remmers 2010; Stowe & Harding 2010; Tiwari et al. 
2010; Wilkowska et al. 2010; Ziefle & Röcker 2010; 
Bowes et al. 2011; Ding et al. 2011; van Hoof et al. 
2011; Leone et al. 2011; McLean 2011; Mittelstadt et 
al. 2011; Niemeijer et al. 2011; Palm 2011; Rigaud et 
al. 2011; Sadri 2011; Townsend et al. 2011; Ziefle et al. 
2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011; Collste & Verweij 2012; 
Nordgren 2012; Sanders et al. 2012; Sorell & Draper 
2012; Wu et al. 2012 
Non-
Elderly/Ambiguo




Berdichevsky & Neuenschwander 1999; Hilty et al. 
2004; Beaudin et al. 2006a; van De Garde-Perik et al. 
2006; Tentori et al. 2006; Ahamed, Talukder & Haque 
2007; Bagüés et al. 2007a; Friedewald et al. 2007; 
Monahan & Wall 2007; Pallapa et al. 2007; Yuan et al. 
2007; Fellbaum 2008; Jea et al. 2008; Kaplan & 
Litewka 2008; Mitseva et al. 2008; Srinivasan et al. 
2008; Stuart et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2008; Caine 2009; 
Garcia-Morchon et al. 2009; Moncrieff et al. 2009; 
Pentland 2009; Acharya 2010; Acharya & Kumar 2010; 
Bagüés et al. 2010; Fragopoulos et al. 2010; Giannotti 
& Saygin 2010; Kosta et al. 2010; Lim et al. 2010; 
                                                          
101
 Samples often fit into multiple demographic groups for a single study, which is reflected in Table 2.  
The difference between samples involving Chronic or Acute Patient and Healthy samples is important: it 
demonstrates that not all PHM is being designed to enhance or supplement medical care, but also to 
provide feedback loops of behavioural and lifestyle information.  For such systems, users need not be 




Ojasalo et al. 2010; Subramaniam et al. 2010; Agrafioti 
et al. 2011; De Bleser et al. 2011; Boulos et al. 2011; 
Chakraborty et al. 2011; Dhukaram et al. 2011; 
Elkhodr et al. 2011; Garcia-Morchon et al. 2011; 
Giannetsos et al. 2011; Mana et al. 2011; Mittelstadt 
et al. 2011; Salih et al. 2011; Ziefle et al. 2011; 
Nordgren 2012 
Chronic Patients 
(n = 41) 
Target audience 
with a chronic 





Welsh et al. 2003; Caine et al. 2006; van De Garde-
Perik et al. 2006; Ahamed, Talukder & Kameas 2007; 
Friedewald et al. 2007; van Hoof et al. 2007; Lauriks et 
al. 2007; Mahoney et al. 2007; Martin et al. 2007; 
Rashid et al. 2007; Robinson et al. 2007; Bagüés et al. 
2007b; Casas et al. 2008; Fellbaum 2008; Kenner 
2008; Rialle et al. 2008; Stuart et al. 2008; Armac et al. 
2009; Chan et al. 2009; Coughlin et al. 2009; Gentry 
2009; Islam et al. 2009; Massacci et al. 2009; Busnel & 
Giroux 2010; Fragopoulos et al. 2010; Landau, 
Auslander, et al. 2010; Landau, Werner, et al. 2010; 
McIlwraith et al. 2010; Ojasalo et al. 2010; Wilkowska 
et al. 2010; Dhukaram et al. 2011; Leone et al. 2011; 
Mittelstadt et al. 2011; Niemeijer et al. 2011; Rhode 
2011; Rigaud et al. 2011; Ziefle et al. 2011; Collste & 
Verweij 2012; Nordgren 2012; Sanders et al. 2012; 
Sorell & Draper 2012 
Acute Patients (n 
= 15) 
Target audience 
with an acute 
health condition. 
van De Garde-Perik et al. 2006; Beaudin et al. 2006b; 
Friedewald et al. 2007; Monahan & Wall 2007; Rigby 
2007; Fellbaum 2008; Pentland 2009; Kosta et al. 
2010; Wilkowska et al. 2010; Agrafioti et al. 2011; De 
Bleser et al. 2011; Giannetsos et al. 2011; Kovach et al. 
2011; Mittelstadt et al. 2011; Nordgren 2012 
Healthy/Ambiguo
us (n = 9) 
Target audience 
not described in 
terms of health 






Berdichevsky & Neuenschwander 1999; Hilty et al. 
2004; Beaudin et al. 2006b; Bagüés et al. 2007a; 
Monahan & Wall 2007; Jea et al. 2008; Pentland 2009; 









Table 1.3 - Ethical Themes 
Theme Issues/Concepts References 
Information 








Melenhorst et al. 2004; Neild et al. 2004; Beaudin et 
al. 2006a; van De Garde-Perik et al. 2006; Percival & 
Hanson 2006; Tentori et al. 2006; Ahamed, Talukder & 
Haque 2007; Ahamed, Talukder & Haque 2007; 
Coughlin et al. 2007; Friedewald et al. 2007; van Hoof 
et al. 2007; Pallapa et al. 2007; Rashid et al. 2007; 
Bagüés et al. 2007b; Chan et al. 2008; Courtney 2008; 
Essén 2008; Jea et al. 2008; Mitseva et al. 2008; Stuart 
et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2008; Armac et al. 2009; Caine 
2009; Chan et al. 2009; Coughlin et al. 2009; Demiris & 
Hensel 2009; Dorsten et al. 2009; Garcia-Morchon et 
al. 2009; Little & Briggs 2009; Massacci et al. 2009; 
Moncrieff et al. 2009; Pentland 2009; Acharya 2010; 
Bagüés et al. 2010; Busnel & Giroux 2010; Fragopoulos 
et al. 2010; Giannotti & Saygin 2010; Kosta et al. 2010; 
Lim et al. 2010; Remmers 2010; Stowe & Harding 
2010; Subramaniam et al. 2010; Wilkowska et al. 
2010; Agrafioti et al. 2011; Chakraborty et al. 2011; 
Dhukaram et al. 2011; Elkhodr et al. 2011; Garcia-
Morchon et al. 2011; Giannetsos et al. 2011; Mana et 
al. 2011; McLean 2011; Mittelstadt et al. 2011; Rhode 
2011; Sadri 2011; Salih et al. 2011; Townsend et al. 
2011; Ziefle et al. 2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011 
Personal Privacy 
(n = 30) 
Right to be left 
alone, free of 
unwanted 
attention, lack of 
surveillance, right 
to personal space 
Welsh et al. 2003; Neild et al. 2004; Beaudin et al. 
2006a; Percival & Hanson 2006; Bagüés et al. 2007a; 
Coughlin et al. 2007; Friedewald et al. 2007; Pallapa et 
al. 2007; Rigby 2007; Courtney 2008; Essén 2008; 
Demiris 2009; Demiris & Hensel 2009; Gaul & Ziefle 
2009; Little & Briggs 2009; Giannotti & Saygin 2010; 
Kosta et al. 2010; Landau, Werner, et al. 2010; Ojasalo 
et al. 2010; Remmers 2010; Stowe & Harding 2010; 
Tiwari et al. 2010; Wilkowska et al. 2010; Bowes et al. 
2011; Ding et al. 2011; Mittelstadt et al. 2011; Sadri 
2011; Ziefle et al. 2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011; Sorell & 
Draper 2012 









Welsh et al. 2003; Brey 2005; Beaudin et al. 2006a; 
Percival & Hanson 2006; Friedewald et al. 2007; 
Fugger et al. 2007; van Hoof et al. 2007; Martin et al. 
2007; Monahan & Wall 2007; Rigby 2007; Robinson et 
al. 2007; Essén 2008; Kenner 2008; Demiris 2009; 
Demiris & Hensel 2009; Dorsten et al. 2009; Gaul & 
Ziefle 2009; Gentry 2009; Islam et al. 2009; Steele et 
al. 2009; Busnel & Giroux 2010; Kosta et al. 2010; 
Landau, Auslander, et al. 2010; Landau, Werner, et al. 
2010; Remmers 2010; Stowe & Harding 2010; Tiwari 




Niemeijer et al. 2011; Rhode 2011; Townsend et al. 
2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 2012; Sorell & 
Draper 2012 
Obtrusiveness & 












Demiris et al. 2004; Melenhorst et al. 2004; Neild et al. 
2004; Brey 2005; Hensel et al. 2006; Courtney et al. 
2007; Robinson et al. 2007; Courtney 2008; Demiris et 
al. 2008; Essén 2008; Fellbaum 2008; Kaplan & 
Litewka 2008; Kenner 2008; Demiris 2009; Demiris & 
Hensel 2009; Landau, Werner, et al. 2010; Tiwari et al. 
2010; De Bleser et al. 2011; Bowes et al. 2011; van 
Hoof et al. 2011; Mittelstadt et al. 2011; Townsend et 
al. 2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011 
Stigma & Identity 












Percival & Hanson 2006; Beaudin et al. 2006b; 
Coughlin et al. 2007; Courtney 2008; Essén 2008; Gaul 
& Ziefle 2009; Steele et al. 2009; Remmers 2010; 
Tiwari et al. 2010; Bowes et al. 2011; Ding et al. 2011; 
van Hoof et al. 2011; McLean 2011; Mittelstadt et al. 
2011; Rhode 2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 










Beaudin et al. 2006b; Chan et al. 2008; Courtney et al. 
2008; Demiris & Hensel 2009; Gentry 2009; Bowes et 
al. 2011; Mittelstadt et al. 2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011; 
Sanders et al. 2012 










Demiris et al. 2004; Agree et al. 2005; Percival & 
Hanson 2006; Friedewald et al. 2007; Chan et al. 2008; 
Kaplan & Litewka 2008; Demiris 2009; Gentry 2009; 
Pentland 2009; Niemeijer et al. 2010; Stowe & 
Harding 2010; Tiwari et al. 2010; Bowes et al. 2011; 
van Hoof et al. 2011; McLean 2011; Mittelstadt et al. 
2011; Palm 2011; Sadri 2011; Zwijsen et al. 2011; 
Collste & Verweij 2012; Nordgren 2012; Wu et al. 
2012 
Delivery of Care 








Percival & Hanson 2006; Monahan & Wall 2007; 
Kaplan & Litewka 2008; Kenner 2008; Vuokko 2008; 
Niemeijer et al. 2010; Remmers 2010; Tiwari et al. 










Need (n = 14) 
Misdiagnosis, 







and well-being,  
Neild et al. 2004; Lauriks et al. 2007; Courtney 2008; 
Courtney et al. 2008; Kaplan & Litewka 2008; Dorsten 
et al. 2009; Gammon et al. 2009; Landau, Auslander, 
et al. 2010; Landau, Werner, et al. 2010; Tiwari et al. 
2010; Ding et al. 2011; Niemeijer et al. 2011; Rhode 
2011; Sorell & Draper 2012 
Risk (n = 6)  Hilty et al. 2004; Little & Briggs 2009; Lim et al. 2010; 
Nefti et al. 2010; Dhukaram et al. 2011; Giannetsos et 
al. 2011 
Other (n = 22) Informed 
consent, data 






Informed Consent:  Neild et al. 2004; Bagüés et al. 
2007a; Martin et al. 2007; Kaplan & Litewka 2008; 
Kenner 2008; Chan et al. 2009; Demiris et al. 2009; 
Demiris & Hensel 2009; Gammon et al. 2009; 
Remmers 2010; Stowe & Harding 2010; Bowes et al. 
2011; Mittelstadt et al. 2011 
 
Data Mining:  Fellbaum 2008; Pentland 2009; 
Remmers 2010; Bowes et al. 2011 
 
Equity of Access:  Demiris 2009; Kosta et al. 2010 
 
Surveillance:  Friedewald et al. 2007; Mahoney et al. 
2007; Monahan & Wall 2007; Pentland 2009; 
Monahan & Fisher 2010; Remmers 2010 
 
Behavioural Monitoring:  Berdichevsky & 




Appendix 2:  Data Protection Regulations 
A2.1  UK Data Protection Act of 1998 
In the UK, it is unclear how the UK Data Protection Act of 1998 governing personal and medical 
data will apply to data collected by PHM.  In particular, it is not clear if data collected by 
lifestyle monitoring systems which can record “every move, every action, many bodily 
functions, activities of daily living, whereabouts, [and] comings and goings from the house” 
(Bowes et al. 2011), will be classified as ‘personal data’ or ‘sensitive personal data’ as defined 
by the Act.  This confusion is the result of the complex definitions of “personal data” and 
“sensitive personal data” found in the Act.  Under the Act’s definition, PHM data will be 
“personal data” if it is accessible by parties other than the patient and contains identifying 
information such as name, contact information, patient number, etc.  By this definition it is 
likely some PHM data will be classed as “personal data” and therefore afforded limited 
protection in comparison to “sensitive personal data,” which is restricted to a greater degree.  
In this context PHM data will become “sensitive personal data” if it relates to the health of an 
identifiable individual; what is not clear is whether information relating to the daily 
movements, actions and bodily functions of individuals will be included in the Act’s definition 
of “health.”  As a result, the possibility of misuse or undesired access to personal data is raised.  
This could be a significant ethical issue following widespread implementation of PHM (Bowes 
et al. 2011). 
A2.2  EU General Data Protection Regulation 
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (henceforth referred to as the ‘EU Regulation’), set 
to come into full effect in 2016, is intended to simplify and unify data protection regulation 
across the EU.  The EU Regulation, issued in draft form by the European Commission in 2012, is 
set to replace the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995 (European Commission 2012).  The 
change from a directive to regulation is significant; the EU Regulation will be immediately 
applicable to member states as a piece of legislation, whereas the directive merely directed 
member states to enact specific data protection measures at the national level.  As such, data 
protection expectations need to be unified at a European rather than national level to avoid 
conflicts between the EU Regulation and existing legislation at the national level, such as the 
UK Data Protection Act of 1998.  Currently, conflicts between national data protection 
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measures may occur when personal health data crosses national borders.  A unified European 
approach would, ideally, solve such issues through a single legislative approach. 
The EU Regulation appears to resolve the ambiguity seen in the DPA in the definition of 
personal health data, which suggests that it affords greater protection to PHM data, although 
this conclusion is based on an interpretation of the language in the EU Regulation by which 
attributive and referential uses of (anonymised) data are restricted (cf. van den Hoven 2008, 
pp.309–10).  ‘Attributive’ uses of personal data may go unprotected under the Regulation, 
which is problematic because attributive uses of anonymous data can lead to identification, as 
in homeland security investigations and marketing (van den Hoven 2008, p.310). 
Under the provisions of the EU Regulation, any data related to health is considered a ‘special 
category of personal data’ (European Commission 2012, Article 9), which is restricted to a 
greater degree than other types of data.102  Assuming a link between behaviours and health 
can be established, it would appear that processing of pervasive behavioural data will be 
restricted to a greater degree at the EU level.  However, even if PHM data falls under this more 
restrictive categorisation, possibilities remain for data misuse and processing which redefines 
the ‘legitimate interests’ of the user.103  For instance, Article 81 specifies that personal data 
related to health may be processed as long as it meets the ‘legitimate interests’ of the user, 
and is necessary for “other reasons of public interest in areas such as social protection, 
especially in order to ensure the quality and cost-effectiveness of the procedures used for 
settling claims for benefits and services in the health insurance system” (European Commission 
2012, Article 81).  While the language used requires interpretation, the EU Regulation appears 
to allow the processing of PHM data for personalised health insurance claims and premiums.  
This provision creates potentially conflicts with the user’s right to freedom from profiling 
intended to predict health (European Commission 2012, Article 20), although the right only 
exists in the context of ‘automated processing’ and can be dismissed in cases in which a 
contract exists between user and data custodian which requires profiling.  On this basis, it 
would appear that the forthcoming EU Regulation offers little protection against personalised 
                                                          
102
 In the Data Protection Directive of 1995, personal data related to health is referred to as ‘sensitive 
personal data’ (Article 8). 
103
 The term ‘legitimate interests’ is used throughout the General Data Protection Regulation, but is 
never defined.  It appears to refer to the interests different parties have in the lawful processing of data.  





health insurance premiums and the pervasive profiling of PHM users into predictive health 
categories.  
Another provision with potential implications for user expectations of privacy is the long-term 
storage of identifiable personal health data, which is allowed for research, statistical, or public 
health purposes (European Commission 2012, Articles 5, 83).  As the research aims of the 
future cannot be known with certainty in the present, it is impossible for users to foresee the 
social and medical implications of research involving PHM data.  Future research can impact on 
the medications and treatments available to patients in different healthcare systems, and 
contribute to new categories of disease or health profiles by which patients are diagnosed and 
treated. 
The potential for violations of expectations of privacy may be mitigated through the rights 
attributed to users in the EU Regulation, including the aforementioned right to freedom from 
profiling, as well as the ‘right to be forgotten’.  The latter gives users the right to request 
deletion of their data at any time.  It also specifies that personal data must be deleted when it 
no longer serves a legitimate purpose for the data custodian.  While this right initially appears 
to grant users a powerful mechanism of data control, it relies both upon the user being aware 
of his rights granted under the EU Regulation, and understanding the content of the data 
stored about him, and by whom.  In a future increasingly characterised by ambient and 
ubiquitous computing, in which the frequency of data collection and processing is predicted to 
greatly increase (cf. Brey 2005), it is unclear that users will know the identity of data 
custodians, and the extent of personal data held.  While the ‘automatic deletion’ of data may 
protect the right to be forgotten in some instances, the opportunity exists for extensive, 
indefinite storage of personal health data on the basis that it may be useful for research or 
public health purposes in the future. 
Given the possibility of user ignorance of the potential uses and value of PHM data, and the 
dubious protection afforded by the right to freedom from predictions of health against uses of 
personal health data beyond those found acceptable by users, it seems appropriate to 
advocate privacy protecting mechanisms beyond the provisions present in the EU Regulation.  
While the EU Regulation is built around ‘fair information’ principles which restrict the 
interaction between data custodians and creators (cf. The Caldicott Committee 1997), ensuring 
(for example) that appropriate consent procedures are followed and data collection has an 
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explicit purpose and endpoint, these principles do not appear to address the concerns 
identified above.  Other protection mechanisms, including security measures such as 
encryption algorithms and system architectures which protect against data interception and 
manipulation (cf. Acharya 2010; Elkhodr et al. 2011), do little to assuage these concerns which 
are unrelated to the security (or quality) of data. 
A2.2.1 Data Protection and Security 
Security measures, such as encryption algorithms and system architectures which protect 
against data interception and manipulation, are insufficient by themselves to guarantee the 
privacy of data (Giannotti & Saygin 2010, p.77).  The risks mentioned here in relation to data 
protection legislation present privacy risks unrelated to the security (or quality) of data.  
Principles of data processing and storage, such as those found in the EU Regulation, are 
needed to protect data privacy beyond the affordances offered by security measures.  As seen 
in the reviewed literature, current discourse is overwhelmingly focused on ‘designing for 
security’; future system and security design needs to adapt to the ‘fair information’ principles 
and provisions adopted in the EU Regulation.  The challenges presented by pervasive 
collection, processing and storage of personal health data necessitate a holistic approach in 
which systems incorporate features and security architecture designed to promote the privacy 
rights of users as outlined in relevant data protection legislation.  DP mechanisms are lacking 
which empower the user to restrict predictions made about their health, and enforce temporal 
limitations on their data when lacking knowledge of where and how their data is being stored.  
User-end privacy policies may provide the type of user empowerment which appears 
necessary to overcome the ambiguities of the protection mechanisms, or ‘rights’, set to be 
enacted by the EU Regulation (see: Section 3.3.3.2), although the difficulties of informing users 





Appendix 3:  Awareness and Expectations of Privacy 
The problem of whether users must ‘care about’ privacy violations hints at the how violations 
of privacy can be understood (within the limits of PHM discourse) as a reflection of the 
individual’s expectations.  According to Nissenbaum (2004), to say privacy is violated is to say 
context-specific norms of privacy have been violated.  Another way of expressing this idea is 
that the user’s expectations of privacy are violated.  Individuals define subjective limitations on 
acceptable modes of access and influence others can have over (information about) them—
these are expectations of privacy.  In this way Physical Privacy (see: Section 3.2.1.2) can be 
enforced by locked doors which the user expects others not to open without permission; Social 
Privacy (see: Section 3.2.1.2) can be enforced by turning off a mobile phone with the 
expectation that others will be unable to contact the user; Informational Privacy (see: Section 
3.2.1.2) can be enforced by signing a user agreement which limits the ability of a data 
custodian to disseminate personal information to other parties beyond the expectations of the 
user outlined in the agreement.  In each of these examples the user is taking actions which 
reflect expectations of privacy appropriate to his subjective, context-specific needs (cf. 
Nissenbaum 2004). 
Conceiving of privacy as enshrined in user expectations helps clarify whether awareness of the 
privacy violating act is necessary to say a violation has occurred.  The case of a peeping tom 
peering into a private space, such as a bedroom, is illustrative.  If the peeping tom is caught in 
the act, the user becomes aware of violations of his expectations and a violation of privacy has 
occurred.  If, on the other hand, the peeping tom is not caught in the act, it can still be said 
that a privacy violation has occurred because the user’s expectation of the bedroom as a 
private space (e.g. Physical Privacy), free from outside view, has been violated. 
But what if the user does not care about privacy?  What if, for example, the user views the 
bedroom as a public space and is happy to have the peeping tom looking in?  In this case it 
would appear that the same act violates expectations of privacy for one person, but not for the 
other.  This is to be expected when individuals are free to define context-specific expectations 
of privacy (cf. Nissenbaum 2004), but there is a catch; for the second case to be justified, it 
must be assumed that the user is aware of the potentially privacy violating act, and has been 
able to define expectations of privacy with regards to it.  It is necessary to draw a distinction 
between not being bothered by a particular act, and being unaware of the act, as in the case of 
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PHM which creates easily minable data.  To ‘not be bothered’ a user must be aware of the 
potential for privacy violations stemming from an act, for example choosing to use PHM, and 
form expectations of privacy by which the problematic acts are not seen as such within the 
user’s subjective conception of privacy.  If the user has not had this opportunity, then they are 
unaware of the act which potentially violates their privacy; in the case of the peeping tom, 
someone is looking into their bedroom without first knocking on the window to ask for 
consent.  The former act can be justified, but the latter cannot. 
A right to privacy can then be conceived of as a right to specify informed expectations of 
privacy in the face of unfamiliar phenomena, such as emerging technologies.  The ‘existence’ 
of a privacy right is separate from the ‘experience’ of privacy.  The importance of the 
distinction between the ‘existence’ and ‘experience’ of privacy lies in the analysis of privacy 
implications of technologies.  Technologies, situations, social interactions and actions can be 
analysed in terms of privacy to identify when a violation of privacy may occur.  Whether or not 
the violations identified are actually ‘experienced’ is irrelevant—the purpose of identification 
is to expose the ‘trade-off’ that occurs to realise the benefits promised by the technology.  The 
trade-off itself may be morally desirable—on balance, the violation of privacy may be 
insignificant compared to the benefits offered by the situation, as is typically the case when 
personally identifiable information is required in healthcare interactions.  However, tipping the 
balance in favour of the benefits of the technology does not diminish or eliminate its privacy 
implications.  The same can be said for the ‘experience’ of privacy—not caring about or not 
experiencing a loss of privacy does not diminish or eliminate the loss at a philosophical or 
theoretical level (excluding the exceptions of Social and Physical privacy mentioned above).  It 
is therefore coherent to speak of privacy violations apart from the cognitive experiences of 
user. 
This is not to say that PHM must be halted based on the herculean task of ensuring users have 
the necessary information to specify ‘informed’ expectations of privacy; pre-defined privacy 
rules, set out in user agreements or consent forms, may be an acceptable middle ground which 
ensures sufficient ‘user awareness’ of potential violations of privacy.  Rather, it is to point out 
that a significant potential exists to violate the privacy of users ‘behind closed doors’, or on the 
basis of information collected about users which is analysed beyond their awareness.  If users 
are to be given a chance to specify expectations of privacy for PHM, they must be made aware 




Appendix 4:  Tension between Cost-Effectiveness and Clinical 
Efficacy 
A clear tension exists in decisions to adopt, reject or limit the use of innovations between 
clinical efficacy and costs.  Recent NHS strategy documents emphasise the need to meet 
increasing care demands without concomitant increases in healthcare resource expenditures, 
both in terms of money and manpower (Department of Health 2010a; Department of Health 
2010b; Department of Health 2011, p.8; Department of Health 2012).  However, the influence 
of financial constraints is not as clear as this position suggests, as practitioners are urged 
elsewhere to identify clinical best practice apart from financial concerns, while simultaneously 
providing ‘financially responsible care’ along ‘pre-determined care paths’ (Department of 
Health 2011).  In practice, clinical and financial efficacy may be considered together at the level 
of care commissioning, but not during clinical practice.  The choices available to practitioners 
would then be constrained by financially responsible commissioning, while actual treatments 
and care pathways within the range available to practitioners would not account for finances.  
A tension exists, then, between providing appropriate treatments and tools for clinically 
effective care while commissioning in a financially responsible manner, and in drawing an 
appropriate balance between the two.  As emphasised throughout the strategy documents 
mentioned here, the importance of efficiency and cost-savings take centre stage in 
commissioning; what is unclear is how far this importance will constrain the choice of 
treatments available to practitioners at a local level. 
The intention of the recent restructuring of the NHS is to “bring together responsibility for 
clinical decisions and for the financial consequences of these decisions” (Department of Health 
2010a, p.27).  Consortia and practitioners will be held financially accountable on the basis of 
the quality of care provided, guaranteed through inspections, adherence to ‘best practice’ 
guidelines and provisioning of budgets to meet local needs (Department of Health 2010a, 
p.27).  GPs will be responsible for the financial implications, or efficiency, of their practice, 
which is intended to encourage innovation and improved management of chronic illnesses and 
costly conditions.  Care and treatments which are not seen to ‘add value’, or have 
‘demonstrable’ effects for patient health and healthcare, can be eliminated on a practice-to-
practice basis (Department of Health 2010a, p.27). 
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The implication of this position is that separating the two allows for commissioning of 
treatments that are clinically ineffective but cheap or clinically effective but expensive, or out-
of-sync with local care needs.  Bringing practitioners into the ‘commissioning fold’ is seen as a 
way to solve these problems.  However, there is a risk that practitioners may get stuck in 
commissioning only familiar treatments, or those with clear clinical and financial effects 
backed by empirical evidence.  A sort of evidence-based ‘treatment conservatism’ is therefore 
a risk of the new commissioning structure, by which innovations fail to diffuse because of an 
initial lack of evidence demonstrating clinical and financial efficacy, or evidence which is 
applicable to local contexts.104  On the other hand, focusing practitioners on the financial 
consequences of their actions risks infecting clinical decisions with financial motives; GPs are 
to be held accountable for their finances under the new commissioning structure, but 
simultaneously asked not to ‘ration’ care on a patient-by-patient basis, meaning more 
expensive diseases may become less treated.  Furthermore, if the value provided by the GP 
comes to be understood purely from a clinical perspective, meaning value can be ‘measured’ 
in health parameters and outcomes, there is a risk that other beneficial aspects of medical care 
which cannot be demonstrated in clinical terms or RCTs will be eliminated from practice in the 
name of efficiency.  As an example, telecare and telehealth may reduce face-to-face 
encounters with health professionals and family, replaced by machines capable of providing 
the same clinical measurements but lacking the ability to socially and physically engage the 
socially embodied patient. 
Currently, resources are “directed towards priorities” to meet the “almost unlimited demand” 
on a nationalised health system with limited resources (Fitzgerald et al. 2002, p.1443).  As a 
result, innovations in “non-priority areas,” or ones which create additional demands on 
resources may fail to be adopted (Fitzgerald et al. 2002, p.1443), regardless of clinical 
effectiveness.  However, financial incentives can greatly affect the likelihood of adoption 
(Salaman & Storey 2002), particularly “where the innovation requires the alteration of modes 
of service delivery and shifts work across professional or organisational boundaries” (Fitzgerald 
et al. 2002, p.1443).  This aspect of diffusion is certainly relevant to PHM, which increasingly 
shifts care burdens to community and personal settings (such as the home) and away from 
clinical encounters with practitioners to remote monitoring, while being widely tested in the 
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 For example, RCTs are criticised for lacking generalizability to specific contexts of use.  NICE 
guidelines are heavily reliant on RCTs, suggesting that consortia may be unable to find context-specific 




UK (see: Section 5.3.1) and financially supported throughout the EU (Empirica & WRC 2010) in 
the form of telecare and telehealth innovations. 
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Appendix 5:  Problems with Shared Decision-Making under ‘No 
Decision about Me without Me’ 
An overly simplistic view of the patient-provider relationship is presented in the ‘Equity and 
Excellence’ White Paper (Department of Health 2010a, p.13); shared decision-making relies 
upon the patient’s ability to comprehend and compare evidence presented according to the 
provider’s values.  In the NHS’ vision of this relationship, the appropriate balance between 
patient and provider values is unclear; the presentation of ‘evidence’ implicitly incorporates 
the values of the provider (cf. Molewijk et al. 2003), for example in the choice of evidence seen 
as relevant to the patient’s case.  Furthermore, a patient incapable of rationally weighing 
evidence and coming to a care decision may make less clinically effective decisions—in such 
cases, should the provider ‘push’ the patient towards the ‘correct’ decision? 
The principle emphasises transparent access and sharing of care records by patients.  This 
structure is seen to guarantee a central role for the patient in the ‘shared decision-making’ 
model of care (cf. Emanuel & Emanuel 1992), while allowing the patient to ensure the accuracy 
of their care record.  There are numerous problematic assumptions behind the assumed 
efficacy of the principle.  First, it is unclear whether patients will possess the training or 
knowledge necessary to interpret and understand their care record.  Furthermore, patients 
who fail to understand the implications of sharing their record, or are unable to determine 
between (in)appropriate recipients of their records, are placed at risk of having their data 
shared and used inappropriately.  Second, even where records are understood and shared 
appropriately, the principle fails to provide real-time transparency in the decisions and 
judgments made by medical professionals on the basis of the care record.  It is unclear 
whether, for example, a patient being placed into a risk category or disease group, perhaps on 
the basis of the novel health trends and patterns identified from newly linked and aggregated 
data, will always be notified of the categorisation.  If, for example, the categorisation is made 
within an NHS practice or database, it is unclear whether the contents and categories of the 
database will be considered part of the patient’s care record to which they are guaranteed 
access.  Even if categorisations are included in the care record, it would appear that patients 
require significant vigilance in monitoring their records to understand the decisions being 
made about them on the basis of their data, outside of face-to-face clinical encounters; 




Appendix 6:  Truth as Moral Justification 
To say something is true is to say that we, as interpreters, are confident that it is correct.  
Truth is a positive claim to the correctness or a premise; claims can be the product of 
individual or communal agreement to some standard or criteria for truth.  Truth claims in the 
natural sciences, however, are negative by nature under the critical rationalist paradigm of 
falsifiability.  Inductive reasoning, core to the empiricist scientific method, is unable to prove 
the truth of any theory through testing; rather, the aim is to falsify or refute theories (Popper 
1959; Popper 2002).  Truth therefore consists only in theories which have not yet been 
refuted—no theory is ever proven conclusively true.  Repeated testing, duplication of results, 
and refinement through empirical insights can strengthen the relative validity granted to a 
theory, but at best the theory will only ever achieve the status of a well-tested, but not yet 
refuted, ‘truth’ (Bauman 1978, p.238).105 To understand the importance of truth in science, it is 
better to conceive of truth not as absolute, positively proved theories, but as an unreachable 
ideal which guides scientific inquiry.  Truth is a goal for science to strive towards—whether or 
not it is ever reached in practice is inconsequential to the value of the endeavour (Popper 
1959).  Truth must therefore be viewed within the natural sciences as “an objective and not 
mistaken for a description of a specific state of things reached here and now” (Bauman 1978, 
p.238).  Within hermeneutics and its search for ‘true understanding’, truth plays the same role.  
In both cases, truth acts as “the guiding principle of the on-going rational discussion, resulting 
every once in a while in rationally substantiated agreements” (Bauman 1978, p.239).  Truth is a 
‘standard of belief,’ providing grounds for agreeing upon correct ‘interpretations of meaning’ 
between parties in a discourse.  Although the interpretations cannot fully meet the standards 
of truth, rational discourse can ‘prove’ that alternative interpretations adhere closer to the 
shared standards of truth or validity criteria, providing reasons for acting as if the 
interpretations are true. 
For truth to justify actions, cultural consistency or intersubjectivity between participants in 
discourse must be assumed at some level: as Habermas notes, hermeneutic statements “grasp 
interpretations of reality with regard to possible intersubjectivity of action-orienting mutual 
understanding specific to a given hermeneutic starting point” (Habermas 1972, p.195).  
Dialogue therefore assists in the pursuit of agreement on correct interpretations by facilitating 
                                                          
105 In this scientific paradigm, scientific laws are theories shown to be overwhelmingly valid through the 
accumulation of empirical observations.  They are, however, still falsifiable. 
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communication between humans.  Although, as with the natural sciences, hermeneutics 
cannot prove “the truth of intersubjective agreement,” it can play a critical role by identifying 
“conditions of communication which lead to an invalid, untrue consensus” (Bauman 1978, 
p.241).  Hermeneutics moves humans closer to truth in intersubjective agreements by 
identifying instances and conditions of invalid consensus. 
As the ideals of rational discourse cannot be fulfilled in practice, given the impossibility of 
transcending one’s unique perspective or ignoring one’s forestructure of understanding, 
universal (generalisable) truths remain forever out of the grasp of social research.106  However, 
in treating rational discourse as an ideal, participants in dialogue can arrive at provisional 
truths and theoretical claims which can be transferred across contexts and phenomena with 
appropriate supporting rational argumentation or discourse.  It is in this sense that the 
outcomes of rational discourse are ‘generalisable’.  All hermeneutic understanding is 
provisional, as required by the continuous expansion of the hermeneutic circle (Bauman 1978, 
p.235).  This, however, does not need to pose an epistemic problem for hermeneutics and 
rational discourse; recall that, as with scientific knowledge developed through falsification, 
absolute truths are not required for cooperative life (Gadamer 2004).  Rather, all that is 
needed is acceptance of consensus upon which human action can be justified.  The circle thus 
never needs close for hermeneutics research to provide justified norms of conduct attained 
from the pursuit of rational discourse.  
This account of truth is not meant to disparage rational discourse as a method to attain moral 
truth; rather, it shows that according to the ontological and epistemological commitments of 
hermeneutics, acontextual, universal truth is a fundamentally flawed concept.  Truth therefore 
needs to be redefined to recognise the inherent limitations of historically and contextually-
bound human understanding.  The pursuit of truth can be understood as the pursuit of ‘true 
meaning’ or ‘true understanding’, yet these are incoherent concepts because meaning and 
understanding can only be shown to be incorrect (through dialogue) within specific contexts.  
Context-free meaning is impossible: “the fullest understanding one can think of is still context-
dependent and context-confined” (Bauman 1978, p.230).  This does not doom humans to 
moral relativism—generalisations and theories can be comprehended in contexts, while still 
being transferrable or applicable to multiple contexts.  The view that “hermeneutics implies 
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 The same could be said for all social and natural sciences, and human knowledge in general, with the 




that in practical situations one can distinguish between right and wrong, not on the basis of 
objective criteria but through practical experience and on the basis of communication and 
deliberation” has been defended by Gadamer (1960), Ricoeur (1983) and Habermas (1991) as a 
way to move beyond the objectivist-relativist dichotomy (Widdershoven 2005, p.58) through 
pursuit of the ideal of truth in rational discourse. 
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Appendix 7:  A Rejection of Rigour 
Attempts have been made to adapt positivist validity criteria to interpretive research in the 
form of ‘rigour’.  The turn is meant to move interpretive research away from positivism, 
focusing instead on the uniqueness of the methods and goals of social research.  Rigour is a 
judgment of the honesty, transparency and reflexivity demonstrated in the research process 
and outcomes; it is often described in terms of ‘trustworthiness’ or integrity (Finlay 2006, p.7).  
Different accounts of rigour reveal the extent to which criteria are still based on positivistic 
validity rather than reflecting an interpretivist or hermeneutic epistemology. 
Lincoln and Guba (2000) describe credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability as 
criteria of validity in (interpretive) qualitative research.  The latter is the adaptation of 
objectivity to qualitative research, achieved through reproducibility, which refers to the 
reproduction of results with similar participants in a similar context to establish the validity or 
“truth value” of the study.  However, the expectation of reproducibility is inappropriate 
because “qualitative studies by their nature cannot be replicated because the real world 
changes” (Marshall & Rossman 1999, p.195).  They also suggest that the findings should 
represent the views and beliefs of the participants, yet there is an aura of objectivity about this 
criterion in the assumption that the researcher could merely reproduce the beliefs of 
participants without re-interpreting them, as is claimed by hermeneutics.   
Mays and Pope (1995) suggest minimising researcher bias in the presentation of results by 
clearly distinguishing between the data, analytic framework and interpretation.  This approach 
is incoherent in the hermeneutic tradition, as data does not exist independently of the 
interpretation of the researcher.  Transcribed utterances must be interpreted before they have 
meaning, so the data and the interpretation are one in the same.  With this said it is important 
to be as clear as possible about the influences and reasoning behind the interpretation. 
Sources of researcher influence on the outcomes of qualitative research have been recognised 
as problematic, including the Hawthorne effect and the double hermeneutic (Finlay 2006, p.9; 
Kuper et al. 2008, p.687).  According to this criterion, researchers should be forthcoming about 
their possible influence on the participants in an empirical study (Kuper et al. 2008, p.687) to 
highlight potential sources of bias.  In positivistic studies it is typically desirable to avoid such 
influence, but paradigms which do not view researcher influence as problematic, such as 




Triangulation, peer and respondent auditing have been proposed as ways of “validating” 
researcher interpretations (Mays & Pope 1995; Finlay 2006).   The analysis of different sources 
of data which provide different perspectives on the phenomenon under study is said to 
increase validity in qualitative research (Mays & Pope 1995; Marshall & Rossman 1999, p.194; 
Kuper et al. 2008, p.688) by “reducing the risk of chance associations...and allowing a better 
assessment of the generality of the explanations” developed (Maxwell 1998, p.245).  There is, 
however, no reason to expect similar interpretations from different people and methods 
because understanding is unique to the interpreter, reliant as it is on the forestructure of 
understanding and dialogue between texts and persons (Patterson & Williams 2002, pp.32–3).  
Therefore, whether or not similar interpretations emerge in attempts at validation is irrelevant 
to establishing the credibility of hermeneutic research.  Despite the rejection of triangulation, 
multiple sources of information were considered throughout the research project: prior 
research projects (see: Chapter 1) and academic discourse (see: Chapters 2 and 3), DH and NHS 
strategy and pilot studies (see: Chapter 4) as well as the perspectives of potential users (see: 
Chapter 9).   
The crucial difference to recognise between credibility and rigour is that while both are 
evaluations of the quality of research on the basis of its outcomes, rigour also claims that the 
integrity of the methodology contributes to the quality of the research in itself.  Rigour can 
therefore be viewed as an attempt to introduce objectivity into qualitative research by 
deriving truth from methodological purity.  Hermeneutics rejects this view, acknowledging that 
identical methods should not be expected to produce identical results in social scientific 
research due to the interpretive nature of all human experience.  Credibility therefore derives 
truth entirely from evaluation of the research outcomes, as opposed to its method.  With this 
said, methodological considerations can still factor into credibility, as a clear, reflexive 
description of the methodology assists in establishing the persuasiveness and practical utility 
of hermeneutics research.  Rigour criteria can therefore play a secondary role in hermeneutics 
research—they do not contribute to the ‘truth’ of empirical research, but instead provide 
guidance for sufficient explanation of the research which improves the dialogue between 
reader and research text. 
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Appendix 8:  Approaches to Integrating Empirical Data with 
Ethical Theory 
This description of the empirical ethics mind-set breaks with previous work in the field by 
narrowing the scope of studies that can be labelled as empirical ethics.  The refinement in 
scope is the result of a critical analysis of the treatment of empirical data and ethical theory in 
ethical analysis, according to which an iterative relationship between the two is necessary to 
label a study as empirical ethics.  To see how the refinement of the empirical ethics label fits 
into the current field, it is worth outlining existing approaches to the integration of empirical 
data and ethical theory in ethical analysis. Molewijk et al. (2004) have outlined five such 
approaches, which have been assessed by Leget et al. (2009).  The approaches “differ with 
respect to the way in which empirical data and ethical theory interact and the answer they 
provide to the question of whether moral theory, social practice or both possess the final 
moral authority” (Molewijk et al. 2004, p.55): 
1. Prescriptive Applied Ethics – Moral theory is given foundational importance in 
examining social practices.  Empirical data is not used to refine moral theory, but 
rather to determine if practitioners are behaving in a way which upholds or respects 
the theory.  This is an example of a top-down approach. 
2. Ethicists as Theorists – Moral theory has foundational importance, but can be refined 
or improved in light of normative empirical research.  The relationship between theory 
and empirical data is “one-way,” in the sense that data is used instrumentally to refine 
theory.  The emphasis is placed on theory building, rather than solutions for or insight 
into moral practices. 
3. Particularistic Ethics – A bottom-up approach, in which social context is given 
foundational importance, which contrasts with prescriptive applied ethics.  The 
“general acceptance of a practice by a community suffices as ethical justification of 
that practice” (Leget et al. 2009, p.231).  Ethical theory does not play a role in 
considering social practices.  The conclusions reached in this approach are valid only 
within a specific context, and cannot be applied to other practices.  Casuistry is the 
best known approach to applied ethics that meets this description. 
4. Critical Applied Ethics – A two-way relationship between empirical data and ethical 
theory, in which empirical insight into a practice and ethical theory are given equal 
consideration.  The relationship is iterative in the sense that theory can be used to 
refine practice, and vice versa.  Normative concepts such as ‘dignity’ can be used to 
analyse a practice, which may reveal that the concept requires refinement in light of 
its specification within the practice.  In this sense the concept is given meaning 
through social practices, while a theoretical framework provides the initial content 
which is then refined.  Once refined, the concept can then be related back to existing 




ultimately relies on empirically informed ethical theory determining moral judgments 
(Leget et al. 2009, p.234). 
5. Integrated Empirical Ethics – An intensified version of critical applied ethics in which 
the two-way relationship is dependent upon an “ongoing dialogue between 
descriptive social scientists and ethicists in which the distinction between fact and 
value eventually disappears” (Leget et al. 2009, p.231). 
It is worth mentioning problems with a few of these conceptions of empirical ethics.  
Particularistic Ethics amounts to little more than moral relativism if it is truly as insular as 
suggested by Leget et al. (2009), meaning appeals are not made to moral principles or ethical 
theories to justify decision-making.  The distinction drawn between Critical Applied Ethics and 
Integrated Empirical Ethics is equally problematic—the latter is described merely as an 
‘intensified version’ of the former, with little description in what this actually means.  A better 
distinction may be possible on the basis of an emancipatory mind-set (cf. Stahl 2008; Stahl 
2011).  The two-way relationship between practice and theory suggests that both are 
amenable to revision on the basis of the other, which indicates an opportunity for 
emancipation from accepted practice-internal norms or specification of norms within a specific 
theoretical perspective.  How this emancipation would occur in practice is unfortunately 
vague, as is the change in ‘intensity’ seen in integrated empirical ethics, although the collapse 
of the fact-value distinction suggests practice-internal norms and ‘virtues’ may play a greater 
role in the revision of theory. 
To these approaches I would add a sixth approach, which I will call ‘holistic empirical ethics’.  
This category includes approaches to empirical ethics which adapt reflective equilibrium as a 
method for ethical analysis (cf. van Thiel & van Delden 2010; De Vries & van Leeuwen 2010), 
and which view the five models above not as distinct approaches to integration but rather 
different aspects of a holistic approach (Hurst 2010).  Holistic empirical ethics expands upon 
the two-way relationship between empirical data and ethical theory in Critical Applied Ethics 
by requiring consideration of social and historical contextual information and the researcher’s 
perceptions, which are refined through dialogue with moral practitioners.  The researcher 
exists as a third partner in the relationship between empirical data and ethical theory, 
emphasising the influence of the researcher’s frame of reference and interpretation of the 
data on the outcomes of the research.  In holistic empirical ethics the three sources of 
information (empirical data, ethical theory and the researcher’s perceptions) must be refined 
and brought into coherence in reaching normative conclusions.  Each source is given initial a 
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priori legitimacy which can only be confirmed through reflective equilibrium (Rawls 2001, 
pp.29–32), or a similar decision process. 
Of the six general approaches, only the latter three should be given refined label of empirical 
ethics.  The approach taken in this study is most closely aligned to the latter, holistic empirical 
ethics, albeit without a reflective equilibrium component.  In adapting this label, which is 
meant to identify empirical ethics research in which empirical data, contextual information 




Appendix 9:  Initial Credibility of the Normative Claims of Moral 
Practitioners 
Moral wisdom is expressed to others in the form of normative claims.  In other words, moral 
wisdom leads individuals to claim that a certain course of action or norm is the correct one 
when multiple actions or norms are available.  Practice internal norms of good or justified 
actions are seen in ‘moral intuitions’, defined as “pre-reflective judgements about particular 
cases or situations” (van Willigenburg & Heeger 1989), which provide an initial indication of 
the correct ‘direction’ of a moral judgment (van Thiel 2009, p.68).  Moral intuitions can be seen 
as the basis of some normative claims made by moral practitioners, and are an expression of 
prejudices based to some degree on moral experiences with a practice.  Intuitions are initial 
reactions to morally challenging situations, coloured by the moral experiences encountered in 
a particular practice or case.  Intuitions are not merely ‘gut reactions’ or immediate responses 
to a moral experience; they can be the product of a period of reflection, in which the morally 
relevant facts of the situation are considered alongside the “possible effects of different 
decisions.”   At this ‘pre-reflective’ level, intuitions are not influenced by dominant theories or 
principles, such as respect for autonomy (Rawls 1951, p.183; van Delden & van Thiel 1998, 
p.253); intuitions are non-inferential, in the sense that reflection occurs only at the general 
level of a case, prior to detailed reflection on individual morally relevant aspects and 
consideration of relevant moral principles or theories (Audi 1996, pp.112–3).  Intuitions thus 
exist in the ‘pre-reflective’ space between immediate ‘gut-reactions’ to a case and detailed 
analysis of its individual components, which allows for a limited degree of reflection and 
rationality.  The movement from intuition to moral belief through reflection can be seen in the 
movement from ‘present-at-hand’ to ‘ready-to-hand’ phenomena (Heidegger 1967), seen in 
hermeneutic understanding (see: Section 6.1.3.2). 
It is may be inappropriate to judge the reliability of initial judgments before the practitioner 
enters a process of reflection (van Delden & van Thiel 1998; van Thiel & van Delden 2010).  
This proposal is a result of the recognition that beliefs are often created by intuitions rather 
than an ideal process of deliberation and reflection, such as that described by Rawls in naming 
conditions conducive to reflection (1951; 1999).  These beliefs, formed intuitively through 
automatic responses to challenges (Musschenga 2008, 132), are the basis of the prejudices by 
which moral situations are judged and interpreted.  As a result, it is likely the moral wisdom of 
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practitioners in a morally challenging practice is formed on the basis of intuitions to some 
degree.  It is these intuitive beliefs that provide insight into the moral experiences of 
practitioners and morally relevant aspects of a process (G. J. M. W. van Thiel and van Delden 
2010, 189).  Intuitive beliefs are therefore claimed to have a legitimate role in moral 
justification and theory building, such as is undertaken in refining the conceptual framework. 
A9.1 Criticisms of Intuitions as a Source of Morality 
Abstract ethical theories founded upon self-evident first principles often conflict with moral 
intuitions.  The clash can be used as a reason to either ignore intuitions, or to argue against the 
acceptability of a theory.  Criticism of intuitions as a source of morality tend to emphasise their 
weak normative foundation, seeing them as products of “superstition, bias, and mere 
historical accident…[which] should play no role in moral theory construction or justification” 
(Daniels 2011).  Similar lines of criticism have been undertaken by philosophers, particularly 
utilitarians, for many years (Hare 1973; Singer 1974; Brandt 1998). 
Advances in scientific understanding of brain imaging techniques and the evolutionary 
importance of ‘morality’ have provided further fuel to the critical fire.  Studies into the 
structure of moral decision-making suggest that moral judgements begin with intuitive or 
automatic responses, occurring at a subconscious level of thought (Musschenga 2008), which 
is sometimes followed by a longer conscious reasoning process in which the initial judgement 
is rationalised (Haidt et al. 2000; Haidt 2001) or overturned (Greene et al. 2001), perhaps by 
appeal to ethical norms or principles.107  If this structure of moral judgement is accurate, it 
provides an empirical basis for the distinction between moral intuitions and credible normative 
claims, with the latter defined by the process of reflection and appeal to abstract norms and 
principles.  Crucially, this structure shows only that the process of moral deliberation is often 
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 It is worth saying more about the outcomes of these experimental explorations of moral reasoning, 
so as to not overstate the reach of their conclusions.  Greene et al. (2001) showed that, in considering 
the classic “trolley problem,” people defending their intuitive reaction (the majority) showed increased 
activity in the area of the brain associated with emotions, whereas those which overturned their 
intuitive reaction (the minority) took longer to decide, and showed increased activity in the ‘cognitive’ 
area of the brain.  Haidt (2000; 2001) showed that, in a variety of areas of moral reasoning, people tend 
to make judgements quickly through intuitive responses.  When slower, cognitive reasoning is 
undertaken, it typically serves to rationalise the initial response, rather than overturn it by providing a 
new foundation for the moral judgement.  While these studies are relatively limited, their findings are 
still important because they can be interpreted to undermine the ability of humans to engage in critical 
moral reasoning.  However, the results of these studies are preliminary and represent a relatively small 
data set, so taking their conclusions as reliable descriptions of the role of moral intuitions in moral 
reasoning would be irresponsible.  Still, if their conclusions prove justified, it is worth considering their 




quick and intuitive; it does not undermine the existence or practical importance of practice 
internal norms and moral wisdom.  Despite this, it has been used to criticise intuitions as a 
source of morality from an evolutionary perspective. 
Updating criticisms of intuitionism with insights from evolutionary theory and neuroscience, 
Peter Singer argues that moral intuitions are mere cultural, religious and biological remnants 
of human development which express pre-reflective biases lacking normative force (Singer 
2005).  Under this conception, intuitions are not amenable to revision or argumentative force, 
meaning objective criteria for judging more or less morally acceptable intuitions do not exist.  
Singer seems to assume that humans are incapable of altering their moral judgements beyond 
their initial reactions to moral situations.  This perceived weakness, combined with the 
evolutionary origin of norms of common morality, is taken as sufficient reason to strip moral 
intuitions of normative weight because intuitions lack the sort of ‘reason-giving’ or 
argumentative justification of a well-developed normative theory.  Singer denies moral 
intuitions any role in moral deliberation, and condemns reflective equilibrium as a method for 
treating intuitions as “some kind of data from which we can learn what we ought to do” 
(Singer 2005, p.346).  Instead, ethical deliberation should “ignore all our ordinary moral 
judgments,” and deduce practical interventions from an abstract theoretical position.  How 
such a method could be used to construct context-specific interventions acceptable to specific 
practitioners is unclear, but given that moral intuitions would lead to ‘culturally relative’ ethics 
(Singer 2005, p.346), it would appear specific interventions are in principle discoverable 
through the application of a single, abstract theory to real-world moral problems. 
A9.2  Justificatory Power of Intuitions and Credible Normative Claims 
Singer fails to recognise the utility of moral intuitions as initial guides to action, and the ability 
to improve or abandon (e.g. to justify) intuitions through critical revision.  If humans are able 
to refine and justify their intuitions through appeal to abstract principles, theories and 
evidence, then relying upon intuitions for initial guidance in moral situations becomes less 
problematic, especially when intuitions are seen as more than by-products of evolution.  This 
latter statement refers to hermeneutic understanding and prejudices which develop 
throughout life.  If prejudices are built through past instances of moral decision-making, 
meaning they consist of a body of beliefs and evidence which have proven sufficient or 
justified in prior moral deliberation, then intuitions can be granted initial normative credibility 
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in future instances of deliberation through which the interpreter attempts to understand and 
make moral decisions about an unfamiliar phenomenon.  The initial credibility of moral 
intuitions then is simultaneously undermined by its evolutionary origin, and supported by the 
ability of humans to engage in moral deliberation and critical revision of norms.108  Singer 
seems to implicitly deny the possibility of the latter, which explains his call to strip intuitions of 
normative force.  He describes moral intuitions as if they are the mere by-product of evolution, 
denying the possibility of a morality which develops throughout life.  In a sense, he denies the 
possibility of ‘learning’ morality, expressed through intuitive responses. 
The existence of practical-internal norms and practice-specific moral wisdom is not 
undermined by the realisation that moral judgements appear to consist of an intuitive reaction 
followed by cognitive rationalisation of that reaction.  As long as evidence can be found of 
humans overturning their initial judgements through inner and interpersonal moral 
deliberation (Greene et al. 2001), we have reason to believe that moral practitioners can both 
engage in critical reflection and provide unique insight within moral deliberation.  It would be 
odd to think that a person’s experiences throughout life, especially within morally charged 
practices, do not change their norms of morally acceptable behaviour in any way.  If the 
opposite were true, it would seem humans are born with a set of unchanging moral intuitions 
or norms derived from evolution which, although occasionally abandoned within specific 
instances of moral deliberation (Greene et al. 2001), nevertheless provide a fixed set of moral 
norms.  In a sense, humans would be mere slaves to their genetic desires, rather than 
hermeneutic interpreters capable of developing knowledge, for example through dialogue. 
What Singer’s position makes clear is that the foundation of moral intuitions may be 
contentious when ethics is viewed as a means of moving beyond the limitations of nature—if 
we aim to lead better lives, defined by the ability to provide justified reasons for the actions 
we undertake, then it is helpful to know when our intuitions may merely reflect an 
evolutionary bias, of which we may wish to rid ourselves.  Identified as such, appeals to 
                                                          
108
 A source of morality needs to be identified which provides humans with the capacity to engage in 
moral deliberation.  Without this, the outcomes of these deliberations lack normative force.  ‘Moral 
wisdom’ fulfils this role here; for Rawls, it was “moral capacity” (1999, p.46).  Moral intuitions are 
therefore initially credible because they are created by humans with a capacity for moral understanding, 
developed through moral experiences.  The latter is an assumption about human nature fundamental to 
social, cooperative living; morality loses its purpose unless we assume others have experiences and 




‘evolutionary intuitions’ can be seen as the naturalistic fallacy in practice (cf. Hume 1978; De 
Vries & Gordijn 2009). 
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Appendix 10:  Collapsing the Fact-Value Gap in Practice 
Several research goals have been proposed as proof of the need to combine the descriptive 
and normative within empirical ethics, and to demonstrate the value empirical data can have 
in contextualising and developing ethical theory:  (1) to assess implicit normativity in 
technologies or practices (cf. MacIntyre 2007, p.187), referring to their inherent normative 
content, such as the presentation of data to a patient considering a medical intervention109 
(Molewijk et al. 2003; Goldenberg 2005; De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.196);  (2) to improve the 
context-sensitivity and practical feasibility of ethical norms and principles through examination 
of empirical data, for example on the presentation of information to patients as a prerequisite 
of informed consent (De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.195); (3) to identify important empirical 
questions through ethical analysis, which can be studied and iteratively fed back into ethical 
analysis (Musschenga 2005, p.469; McMillan 2008, p.17; Leget et al. 2009; De Vries & Gordijn 
2009, p.194); (4) to ethically assess and develop morally acceptable interventions within the 
field of medicine, such as quality adjusted life years110, advanced directives, informed consent 
and ethics committee reviews (McMillan 2008, pp.17–18; De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.194); (5) 
to critically assess how ethical norms are embedded in social structures and culture, thereby 
revealing morally questionable practices and their methods of concealment (Leget et al. 2009); 
and (6) to assess the moral beliefs of moral practitioners, during which researchers gather and 
analyse normative content and specify ethical concepts and principles through dialogue 
(Musschenga 2005, p.469; McMillan 2008, p.18; De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.195; 
Widdershoven et al. 2009).  In each of these types of research the data collected has 
normative content, whether resulting from implicit normativity or the moral experiences of 
moral practitioners involved in the research, and cannot be reasonably separated into 
normative and descriptive parts (McMillan 2008, p.17; De Vries & Gordijn 2009, p.194).  When 
this epistemological realisation is considered with the contribution of empirical data to 
                                                          
109
 An in-depth discussion of implicit normativity in medicine is available in (Molewijk et al. 2003; 
Goldenberg 2005).  According to Goldenberg (2005), “medical decision-making...draws upon a broad 
spectrum of knowledge, including scientific evidence, personal experience, personal values, economic 
and political considerations, and philosophical principles.  It is not always clear how practitioners 
integrate these factors into a final decision, but what is clear is that medicine can never be entirely free 
of value judgments.”  The concept of ‘health’ is also implicitly normative. 
110
 Empirical evidence may reveal deeper understanding of attitudes towards ethical interventions, such 
as the superficial measurement of respondent opinions towards QALY’s via survey techniques (Edgar 
1995), or the cultural values by which health (and thus QALYs) are measured in specific cultures (Edgar 




improving ethical analysis at all stages of research, the need for empirical ethics becomes 
clear. 
The purpose of mentioning these goals is not to set criteria for labelling studies as “empirical 
ethics,” but rather to hint at the breadth of research in which normative content is present.  In 
practice this means the six research goals mentioned above do not necessarily make a study an 
empirical ethics study; rather, studies must be judged on the basis of the researcher’s 
awareness and explication of the relationship between (and convergence of) the descriptive 
and normative within data gathering and subsequent analysis, as evidenced in the iterative 
relationship between empirical data and normative theory in ethical analysis. 
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Appendix 11:  Validity, Certainty and Credibility 
Validity, certainty and credibility have a potentially confusing relationship which requires 
further attention.  Certainty should be understood along critical rationalist lines in terms of the 
standards by which the validity of normative claims is judged (cf. Popper 1959).  Certainty is a 
summary of the validity of a statement, or the provisional truth of a statement established 
through falsification. 
By the definition of certainty offered above (see: Section 7.3.1.1), uncertain claims are defined 
by a lack of falsifiability, meaning they lack validity.  Recall that despite the name, Habermas’ 
validity claims are better understood as evaluations of credibility because discourse seeks 
moral truth (see: Chapter 6.3.1).  As the term is used here, uncertain claims refer to claims 
about the future.  In this context, uncertainty is linked to phenomena beyond human 
understanding, due to the logical impossibility of knowing the future until it happens.  
Uncertainty can therefore be understood in terms of the failure of the claim to demonstrate its 
“rightness,” or the validity of the future context it describes (Habermas 1984, pp.99–100).  As 
the future is inherently unknowable, the validity of the statement in the context of the future 
cannot be judged.  This lack of validity results from being unable to falsify the statement:  
(empirical) evidence cannot be produced about future phenomena, which are not directly 
observable.  Uncertain claims thus refer to a future context beyond the logical limits of human 
understanding, for which direct observational evidence is unavailable.  Despite this, uncertain 
claims must be taken seriously in discourse due to their influence on human action. 
Certainty need only be seen as an ideal, defined by the distinction between validity and 
credibility (see: Section 6.3.1), or descriptive and prescriptive truth, to operate as an epistemic 
distinction separating claims about the future from claims about the present.  The future 
eludes empirical observation.  Statements about the future can therefore never be certain, or 
valid.  While statements about the future can be based upon observations of the present (e.g. 
foresight), their accuracy in describing the future logically cannot be known.  Despite a lack of 
validity, claims about the future can be judged credible when adhering to accepted standards 
of moral truth, understood along hermeneutic lines.  For example, a claim could be derived 
from a specific possible future phenomenon.  The claim need not be empirically valid for it to 
reach justified conclusions about a future that may occur—in other words, the claim would be 




Appendix 12:  Proportionate Review 
Two types of reviews are available from RECs based on the complexity of the ethical issues 
arising in the study.  ‘Proportionate review’ is an expedited service undertaken by an REC sub-
committee, as opposed to a full committee for ‘full review’.  Proportionate review studies aim 
to provide a decision on NRES applications within 14 days of receipt, as opposed to 60 days for 
full review.  Proportionate review is available for studies with few ethical difficulties, including 
those which do not involve vulnerable adults, children or individuals potentially lacking the 
capacity to consent.  As the original sample included dementia patients, the study had to 
undergo ‘full review’.  Following rejection of the first application, dementia patients were 
dropped from the study, and replaced by dementia carers.  Importantly, the NHS was not 
asked to assist in recruiting dementia carers; for all purposes, dementia was eliminated 
entirely from the two subsequent applications (12/EM/0064 and 12/EM/0160) which was 
believed to improve the chances of the application being approved because the study would 
no longer contain individuals potentially lacking the capacity to consent (e.g. dementia 
patients).  Once dementia patients were eliminated from the application, it was confirmed by 
the Leicester REC that the application would, in theory, be eligible for proportionate review.  
However, because the new applications were connected to the original application which 
involved dementia patients, proportionate review was not an option.  This technicality proved 
serious for the timeline of the study; proportionate review undertaken in January 2012 when 
application 12/EM/0064 was submitted would have potentially reduced the NRES approval 
process by five months, as approval was only granted from full review at the end of May 2012. 
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Appendix 13:  A Rejection of Standardisation 
Among standardised approaches, grounded theory is influential (Bluff 2005).  In its various 
forms grounded theory involves a three-level approach to coding (open, axial and selective) in 
which the researcher moves from identification of basic themes to systematic (“constant”) 
comparison of categories and eventually, to an emergent theory grounded in the data (Strauss 
& Corbin 1994; Bluff 2005).  The desire to create a standardised, clear method of qualitative 
data collection and analysis is unsurprising—in line with positivism, the standardisation of 
methods increases the rigour of a research study, thereby increasing the validity of resulting 
theoretical insights.  Furthermore, standardising an inherently confusing process may be a 
result of the pressure placed upon qualitative researchers to conform to traditional 
quantitative, positivistic standards of validity and method (Denzin & Lincoln 2000).  While bias 
may be undesirable in positivistic research, the expectations of positivists need not carry over 
to other research under other paradigms.  Indeed, the illusion of bias-free methods of 
qualitative research capable of studying social reality may prove harmful for other, less 
standardised yet entirely legitimate research paradigms. 
Grounded theory seeks to eliminate bias or researcher assumptions in the development of 
emergent theory, which is purportedly accomplished through standardised data collection and 
analysis methods (Kelly 2010), yet the influence of the researcher (or the researcher’s 
hermeneutic circle) is central and unavoidable in comprehending social reality under 
interpretivist (e.g. hermeneutic and social constructionist) paradigms (Schwandt 2000; 
Patterson & Williams 2002; Urquhart & Fernández 2006).  Socially constructed knowledge is 
separated by grounded theory into first and second order concepts to demonstrate its 
elimination of researcher influence: first order concepts are the interpretations of 
practitioners, while second order concepts are the researcher’s “interpretations of 
interpretations” (Maanen 1979, p.541).  Grounded theory claims to provide a standardised 
method of “assembling and sorting first order concepts by looking for patterns and saturation” 
(Jones & Alony 2011, p.97).  By limiting itself to knowledge socially constructed through 
interpretation by practitioners rather than researchers, grounded theory claims to reduce the 
influence of researcher bias and interpretation.   
There is reason to doubt claims to this effect.  Proponents have recognised the practical 




temper understanding, observation and interpretation” (Jones & Alony 2011, p.102).  Such 
difficulties are unsurprising from the perspective of hermeneutics, as it is impossible to divorce 
oneself entirely from one’s hermeneutic circle.  In collecting empirical data researchers 
necessarily interpret the beliefs of participants, whether or not they are aware of it.  In this 
sense the act of interpretation is second-nature and dependent upon the researcher’s 
hermeneutic circle (Gadamer 2004). 
The separation into first and second order concepts is untenable.  If “social reality” does not 
exist separately or externally from the people that create it, then the elimination of bias is 
impossible because social reality can only be comprehended through participation (or 
interpretation), which is necessarily biased by the hermeneutic circle of the interpreter.  Each 
interpreter therefore creates a personal interpretation of social reality.  This implies that the 
ordering of social reality is untenable because first order concepts cannot be objectively 
transferred to others.  Rather, all concepts are given content or “constructed” by the 
interpreter during the act of interpretation.  A construction of a concept is therefore personal 
to the interpreter that created it, and cannot be shared between participants in social reality 
without being re-interpreted or re-constructed within a new perspective.   If this is true, all we 
are left with is an ever increasing chain of second order ‘interpretations of interpretations’.   
An iterative relationship between empirical data, ethical theory and the interpretation of the 
researcher is central to this project’s methodology (See: Chapters 6 and 7).  Iteration is ‘messy’ 
by definition, as the influence of each component of analysis in the process of refinement and 
interpretation is not always clear, even to the researcher performing the analysis.  The 
researcher’s hermeneutic circle which shapes interpretation and analysis is imperfectly 
grasped by the researcher himself, meaning absolute clarity and standardisation of analytical 
methods in interpretive (or hermeneutic) qualitative research is impossible.  While a clear 
description of the researcher’s biases and background can contribute to rigour of a qualitative 
research project (Mays & Pope 1995), such an account is always imperfect due to the 
researcher’s imperfect understanding of the influences on his interpretation. 
Standardisation relies not only on standardised methods of coding, categorisation and 
connecting strategies (Maxwell 1998), but on common validity criteria as well (Mays & Pope 
1995; Bluff 2005).  The concept of data saturation is central to the validity of the theory 
developed in grounded theory, as the search for negative evidence is seen to justify 
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generalisations beyond the study’s sample (Bluff 2005; Jones & Alony 2011).  In this project, 
interpretations, categories and themes identified in the analysis, while being iteratively 
introduced into interviews as the study progressed, were not used as a test for data saturation.  
Adding further participants to this sample will increase the scope of the moral beliefs and 
implications considered, but will not prove that the resulting theoretical insights are any more 
legitimate or generalisable without further supporting arguments. 
Any interpretation of social reality is and will necessarily remain incomplete (Patterson & 
Williams 2002); standardisation of methods does not change this reality.  Standardisation 
should therefore be rejected, otherwise in the pursuit of generalisability and validity the 
researcher risks losing sight of the “unusual, the serendipitous—the puzzle” whose solving 
provides unforeseeable insights into the phenomenon (Marshall & Rossman 1999, p.151).  
Therefore, the critical refinement of the researcher and participants’ interpretations in 
hermeneutic dialogue is enough to fulfil the standards of quality outlined in Chapter 6; there is 
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Appendix 15: PHM Charts 










A15.3 – Pedometer Graph 
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